JUDGMENT :- [Per GVS, J] 1. These two writ petitions arises out of the common judgment dated 27.02.2006 in CTA Nos.42, 52, 75 and 82 of 2004 on the file of the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’). 2. W.P.No.6212 of 2006 is filed by the appellant in CTA No.42 of 2004 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 27.02.2006 of the first respondent-Tribunal and also the order dated 28.01.2004 of the 2nd respondent-Divisional Cooperative Officer, Kadapa in AR No.2/2002-2003 insofar as it relates to the petitioner concerning his premises No.7/544, admeasuring 3.2 cents situated in NGOs Colony, Jayanagar, Kadapa. 3. W.P.No.6375 of 2006 is filed by the appellant in CTA No.52 of 2004 seeking similar relief in respect of an extent of 0.03 cents in Sy.No.91/1 & 752/2, NGOs Colony, Jayanagar, Kadapa. 4. As two writ petitions involve common questions of fact and law and arise out of the same impugned common order of the first respondent-Tribunal, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 5. The petitioners in both Writ petitions filed CTA Nos.42 and 52 of 2004 assailing the award dated 28.01.2004 passed by the Divisional Cooperative Officer, Kadapa in AR No.2/2002-2003. Two others also filed appeals, CTA Nos.75 and 82 of 2004, questioning the same award. All the four appeals were disposed of by the first respondent-Tribunal and impugned award passed by the Arbitrator was confirmed. Few facts, which are relevant, may be stated thus: 6. The President, Jayanagar Welfare Association and others filed arbitration petition before the District Cooperative Officer, Kadapa on 15.10.2002 alleging in brief as follows: The Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.O.Ms.No.956, Revenue Department, assigned an extent of Ac.78.37 cents of land in Sy.Nos.91/1 and 75/2 of Chinnachowk village for a consideration of Rs.1,01,881/- in favour of Kadapa District NGOs Cooperative Building Society for allotting house sites to the members of the said society. The society got prepared a lay out plan marking the house sites for allocation for some specific public purpose i.e., parks, play ground, school, religious places, shopping, market and some vacant places adjacent to the above plots for roads, parking places for vehicles. The lay out plan was approved by Chinnachowk gram panchayat, and the Director, Town Planning, Hyderabad. The society got prepared a lay out plan marking the house sites for allocation for some specific public purpose i.e., parks, play ground, school, religious places, shopping, market and some vacant places adjacent to the above plots for roads, parking places for vehicles. The lay out plan was approved by Chinnachowk gram panchayat, and the Director, Town Planning, Hyderabad. Specific plots were allotted for small shops bearing Nos.S.27 to 36 and for big shops bearing Nos.B.30 to 40 and also for market and hotel in Section No.4. The small shops bearing Nos.S.27 to 36 are in one block with vacant site admeasuring 47.6” x 23.9” situated on the east and south of the shops to serve as parking places for the entire commercial complex. The said vacant site is facing Jayanagar colony main road on the eastern side and Link road on the southern side. The defendant society sold the said vacant site meant for parking to one M. Venkatramana (writ petitioner in WP No.6212 of 2006) through the registered sale deed bearing document No.1513 dated 07.04.2000 admeasuring 3.2 cents. The said action of the society was alleged to be illegal and contrary to the byelaws of the society and in violation of the approved lay out plan of the society. The defendant society also sold away rasta (road) to various persons under sale deeds for varying consideration. The defendant society also sold an extent of 3 cents to one R.C.S.Raju (writ petitioner in WP No.6375 of 2006), which was earmarked for community centre by registered sale deed dated 20.04.2000. One G.Gangulaiah, Vice President acting on behalf of the President, was not elected by general body of the society and he was illegally empowered to perform statutory functions of the President. One G.Gangulaiah, Vice President acting on behalf of the President, was not elected by general body of the society and he was illegally empowered to perform statutory functions of the President. Alleging that the acts committed by the said Gangualaiah without the approval of the general body or the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, are null and void, the President of the Jayanagar Colony Welfare Association and others, who are respondents 3 to 8 herein, filed arbitration application before the District Cooperative Officer, Kadapa seeking the following reliefs: i) Declare that the sale deeds executed by first defendant in favour of other defendants are null and void and restore the approved plan; ii) Cancel the allotment of the disputed site to Sri M. Venkataramana, defendant No.2, herein and cancel the registered sale deed executed by D.No.1 in favour of D.2 and order to demolish the building in ABCD site, which is meant for parking purpose. iii) Cancel the allotment of the site to K.Lakshmi Narayana and others; iv) Cancel the registered sale deed executed by D.No.1 in favour of D.No.9 dated 20.4.2002 consisting of 0.03 cents in between the defendant society office and Chinnachowk police station and for costs. 7. The defendant before the arbitrator filed written statement with the following averments: The arbitration application filed under Section 61(1)(b) of the Act was not maintainable, as the Jayanagar Welfare Association is not a member of the society and the plaintiffs 4 and 5 were also not members of the society. Nowhere either in the original plan approved by the Chinnachowk gram panchayat or by the Director of Town Planning the said open space is shown as parking place. It was only shown as vacant site, not marked for any public purpose like park, ground or religious place etc. The plaintiffs 4 and 5 sought to purchase the sites, but since they are not members of the society, society sold the site in accordance with the resolutions of the Board of Management. The suit in OS No.37 of 2000 filed by the plaintiffs was also dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, Kadapa and the appeal filed against the same was also dismissed. 8. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Arbitrator framed the following issues: 1. Whether the dispute is cognizable by this Court (Arbitrator)? 2. The suit in OS No.37 of 2000 filed by the plaintiffs was also dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, Kadapa and the appeal filed against the same was also dismissed. 8. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Arbitrator framed the following issues: 1. Whether the dispute is cognizable by this Court (Arbitrator)? 2. Whether 3.2 cents of site sold by the first defendant/society to the second defendant (M.Venkatramana), abutting south of the block of small plots 27 to 36 was meant for parking place of vehicles? 3. Whether the action of the first defendant society in selling the land covered by the area reserved for a public purpose (viz. community purpose or commercial purpose) to defendants 2 to 9 is legal and within its powers? 9. The learned Arbitrator on Issue No.1 held that the Arbitrator-Tribunal had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dispute in view of the dismissal of OS No.37 of 2000 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kadapa, wherein, it was held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the case. It is stated that by the date of passing of the award on 28.01.2004, the appeal suit No.12 of 2003 preferred against the dismissal of OS No.37 of 2000 was pending and subsequently, the said appeal was also dismissed. On issue Nos.2 and 3 the learned Arbitrator held that the sale in favour of M.Venkataramana in respect of 3.2 cents of site covered by the sale deed dated 7.4.2000 is null and void and therefore, cancelled. Further direction was given to the society to cause demolition of the building constructed by Venkataramana in the disputed site of 3.2 cents and to surrender vacant site to facilitate parking of vehicles in the commercial area. The learned Arbitrator further held that the sales in favour of defendants 3 to 9 are null and void and accordingly cancelled the sale deeds. The suit filed by the President of Jayanagar Welfare Association was therefore decreed. 10. The writ petitioners herein and 2 others, who are alienees, filed separate appeals before the first respondent-Tribunal. During the course of hearing of the appeals Exs.A.1 to A.18 were marked on behalf of the respondents therein [i.e., plaintiffs in AR No.2 of 2003] and Exs.B.1 to B.19 were marked on behalf of the appellants therein (defendants in ARC No.2 of 2003). 11. During the course of hearing of the appeals Exs.A.1 to A.18 were marked on behalf of the respondents therein [i.e., plaintiffs in AR No.2 of 2003] and Exs.B.1 to B.19 were marked on behalf of the appellants therein (defendants in ARC No.2 of 2003). 11. The first respondent-Tribunal framed the following points for consideration. (i) Whether there is any dispute for reference under Section 60(1)(b) of the APCS Act 7 of 1964? (ii) Whether 3.2 cents land sold by the President of the society to Sri Venkataramana (appellant in CTA No.42 of 2000) was meant for public purpose such as parking place? (iii) Whether the land of 3.2 cents allotted to Sri Venkataramana by the President of the society is justified and within the powers of the President of the society? (iv) Whether the action of the President of the society in selling the land covered by the area reserved for public purpose (viz. common purpose or commercial purpose) to the defendant Nos.2 to 9 is legal and within his power or authority? (v) Whether the impugned award passed by the Arbitrator suffers from any illegalities or infirmities and liable to be set aside? 12. On point No.1 the first respondent-Tribunal held that the dispute is cognizable by the Arbitrator for adjudication under Section 62(1) (b) of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act 7 of 1964 (for short ’the Act’) in view of the dismissal of OS No.37 of 2000 by the Civil Court wherein it was held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, which finding was confirmed in the appeal also expressing the opinion that the cooperative authority alone has jurisdiction over the dispute. On points 2 and 3, the first respondent-Tribunal held that the Managing committee of the society without taking any legal steps surrendered to the encroachers and executed the sale deeds under the guise that permission was given by the Divisional Cooperative Officer, Kadapa and such an action of the society is not permissible under law. Accordingly, the finding of the Arbitrator declaring the sale deeds as null and void was confirmed by the Appellate-Tribunal. On point No.5, it was held that the Arbitrator has given sufficient opportunity to both parties and the same does not suffer from any infirmities and illegalities. Accordingly, the finding of the Arbitrator declaring the sale deeds as null and void was confirmed by the Appellate-Tribunal. On point No.5, it was held that the Arbitrator has given sufficient opportunity to both parties and the same does not suffer from any infirmities and illegalities. All the appeals were accordingly dismissed by the first respondent confirming the award passed by the Arbitrator, wherein, it was held that the alienation in favour of the writ petitioners herein were invalid and the sale deeds in favour of the writ petitioners herein in respect of 3.2 and 3 cents respectively, are null and void and stood cancelled. Aggrieved by the said dismissal of their appeals CTA Nos.42 and 52 of 2004, the present writ petitions are filed. 13. While admitting the writ petitions, an interim order in WP MP No.7910 of 2006 dated 28.03.2006 was passed directing stay of demolition of the building situated in the disputed site and also further directing that the petitioner shall not make any further constructions on the property covered by the registered sale deed, which is now sought to be cancelled. 14. The respondents, 4, 6 and 7 filed WV MP No.1047 of 2006 for vacating the interim stay and the said petition was dismissed on 14.07.2006 and the interim stay was made absolute observing that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the very nature of the interim order, it was deemed appropriate to continue the interim order granted 28.03.2006 during the pendency of the writ petition. 15. When the matter came up for final hearing before one of us (P.S. Narayana, J), by order dated 03.12.2009, it was held as follows: “The scope and ambit of Section 61 of the Act and the reliefs which had been prayed for in these writ petitions can be granted by the Primary Authority at all or whether such reliefs to be prayed for before a competent civil court only, these aspects had been argued in elaboration and in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra and also the decisions of this Court as well on which strong reliance had been placed, this Court is of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper if these matters are decided by an appropriate Division Bench.” 16. Accordingly, the matter was referred in toto to be heard by the Division Bench and the same came up before this Bench. 17. Arguments of Sri Vedula Venkatramana, learned senior counsel, representing the writ petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Cooperation-respondents 1 and 2 and Sri B. Narayana Reddy and Sri K. Venkatesh Gupta, learned counsel, representing other respondents, are heard. Perused the record. 18. The principal contention of Sri Vedula Venkatramana, learned senior counsel, for the petitioners is that the Arbitrator i.e., Divisional Cooperative Officer, Kadapa, has no authority or jurisdiction to decide the dispute of this nature or grant relief prayed for declaring the sale deeds as null and void and cancelling the allotment and granting other reliefs. 19. Learned Government Pleader for Cooperation and the learned counsel for other respondents, on the other hand, contended that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and the reasons recorded by both Arbitrator and the appellate authority i.e., Cooperative Tribunal, the impugned order is justified in the light of relevant provisions of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act. They further contend that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of this nature under Section 61(1)(b) of the Act and in fact, civil Court also up held the same by dismissing the suit OS No.37 of 2000, which finding was confirmed by dismissal of AS No.12 of 2003. 20. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the question which primarily arises for consideration is whether the Arbitrator-2nd respondent had jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature and grant reliefs of declaring that the sale deeds are null and void and cancelling the same and whether such reliefs can be granted only by a civil Court? 21. This is not much of a dispute regarding the factual matrix relevant for the purpose of considering the above question relating to the jurisdiction. The Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.O.Ms. No.956, Revenue Department, assigned an extent of Ac. 78.37 cents of land in Sy.Nos.91/1 and 75/2 of Chinnachowk village for a consideration of Rs.1,01,881/- for NGOs Coop. Building society for allotting house sites to the members of the said society. The society got prepared a lay out plan in the said area, marking house sites for allocation for some specific public purpose i.e., parks, play ground, school, religious places, shopping, market places etc. Building society for allotting house sites to the members of the said society. The society got prepared a lay out plan in the said area, marking house sites for allocation for some specific public purpose i.e., parks, play ground, school, religious places, shopping, market places etc. and some vacant place earmarked for the purpose of roads, parking places for vehicles etc. The lay out was approved by Chinnachowk gram panchayat and also Director of Town Planning, Hyderabad. Some specific plots were allotted for the purpose of small shops bearing Nos.S.27 to 36 and big shops bearing Nos.B.30 to 40 in Section IV. The vacant site admeasuring 47.6” x 23.9” situated on the east and south direction of the shops meant to serve as parking place for the entire commercial complex in Section IV and the said vacant site marked as ABCD in the plaint plan, is facing towards Jayanagar Colony main road on the east and a link road on the south. The said vacant site is sold by the society in favour of M. Venkatramana, petitioner in WP No.6212 of 2006, under a registered sale deed dated 07.04.2000 in an extent of 3.2 cents. The respondents 3 to 7 raised a dispute regarding the same and the same was referred to the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator for adjudication. The 2nd respondent declared that the alienation is invalid and the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is null and void. On appeal by the petitioner, the first respondent-Tribunal confirmed the award passed by the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator. Similarly, it is alleged that an extent of 3 cents was sold away by the society in favour of RCS Raju, petitioner in WP No.6375 of 2006, which was meant for community centre under a registered sale deed dated 20.4.2000. 22. The question, which arises for consideration, is whether such a dispute is referable to the Arbitrator under the provisions of the Act and whether the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon such a dispute? 23. Section 61 of the Act deals with disputes, which may be referred to the Registrar. 22. The question, which arises for consideration, is whether such a dispute is referable to the Arbitrator under the provisions of the Act and whether the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon such a dispute? 23. Section 61 of the Act deals with disputes, which may be referred to the Registrar. To the extent relevant in the preset context it is extracted below: “Section 61(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, arises – (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members; or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or (c) between the society or its committee, and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent, or past employee or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or (d) between the society and any other society, such dispute shall referred to the Registrar for decision.” 24. A perusal of the above provision would show that any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, can be referred to the Registrar. Such a dispute can be referred when it arises inter-alia among the members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members or when it arises between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society etc. or between the society and any other society. 25. Though sub-section (1) of Section 61 used expression ‘any dispute’, the provision when read in its entirety shows that only certain classes or types of dispute and that too arising between certain classes of persons alone are to be referred to the Registrar. or between the society and any other society. 25. Though sub-section (1) of Section 61 used expression ‘any dispute’, the provision when read in its entirety shows that only certain classes or types of dispute and that too arising between certain classes of persons alone are to be referred to the Registrar. Firstly, the dispute shall be one touching the Constitution, management or the business of the society. Secondly, such a dispute touching upon the constitution, management or business of the society, must have been between the members or past members or persons claiming through them inter-se or between a member, past member or persons claiming through them and the society or between the society and its officers or employees, agents, nominees or between the subject society or some other society. Under Section 62 of the Act, the Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of a dispute under Section 61 either elect to decide the dispute himself; or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf; or refer it for disposal to an Arbitrator. 26. In the present case, the dispute was referred to the 2nd respondent-Divisional Cooperative Officer-Arbitrator. The award of the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator shows that in view of the objections raised by the defendants therein regarding the maintainability of the application a specific issue No.1 was framed as to whether the dispute is cognizable by the said Court and a finding was recorded on the said issue to the effect that ‘as the civil court expressly opined that the Cooperative authority alone has jurisdiction to decide the dispute and so the dispute is taken on file under Section 61(1)(b) for decision under Section 62(1)(a) of the APCS Act 7 of 1964 and the provisions, rules and byelaws of the society, I hold that the dispute is cognizable by this Court’. 27. The finding of the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator was confirmed by the first respondent-Tribunal, mainly proceeding on the ground that OS No.37 of 2000 filed by Jayanagar colony welfare association i.e., 3rd respondent herein, was dismissed by the civil Court holding that they had no jurisdiction to try the case and the same was confirmed in the appeal also. Neither the first respondent-Tribunal nor the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator, examined the issue independently to ascertain whether the dispute raised falls within the ambit of Section 61 of the Act. Neither the first respondent-Tribunal nor the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator, examined the issue independently to ascertain whether the dispute raised falls within the ambit of Section 61 of the Act. 28. Section 121 of the Act stipulating bar of jurisdiction of the Court states as follows: Section 121(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, all orders, refusals, decisions or awards passed or directions issued or actions taken in accordance with this Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be final subject to the provisions for appeal, revision and review and no such order, refusal, decision, award, direction or action taken shall be liable to be called in question in any court or forum. 29. It can be seen from the above provision that among other things, actions taken in accordance with the Act or rules made thereunder shall be final subject to the provisions of the appeal, revision and review and no such action taken shall be liable to be called in question in any Court or forum. In order to attract immunity from being questioned in a civil Court, action taken must be one, which is in accordance with the Act or Rules made thereunder. Before a dispute can be referred to Arbitration under Section 61(1), it must be shown that the said dispute is one touching the constitution, management or business of the society. Admittedly, the present dispute regarding the alienation of an extent of 3.2 cents in favour of M. Venkatramana and 3 cents in favour of RCS Raju, are not disputes touching the constitution or management of the society. According to the respondents 3 to 7, the dispute is one touching the business of the society, which proposition is vehemently opposed by the petitioner. It is, therefore, to be considered whether the dispute, which arose due to the alienation of the above extents by the 8th respondent-society in favour of the petitioners, is a dispute touching the ‘business’ of the society? 30. It is not disputed that 8th respondent society is registered under the provisions of APCS Act 1964 and the objective of the society among other things is to carry on for the benefit of its members, trade of building and buying, selling, hiring, acquiring, allotting and developing the land in accordance with the cooperative principles and to give loans to the members for construction of dwelling houses. In order to full-fill the said objectives, the society purchased the government land of an extent of Ac. 78.37 cents in Sy.Nos.91/1 and 75/2 of Chinnachowk village for allotting house sites to its members. 31. Byelaw 41 of the Byelaws of the society states that subject to such resolutions as the general body may from time to time pass, the Board of Directors/Managing Committee shall have full power to do all things which they deem necessary or expedient for the accomplishment of all the objects specified in byelaw No.2 including power to purchase, hold, sell, exchange, mortgage, sub-mortgage, rent, lease, sublease, surrender, and accept surrenders of land or houses and to construct houses. Clause (2) of byelaw 41 enables the society to render the land so purchased fit for habitation. As per Clause (3) the society can prepare a layout to get the sanction of the authorities concerned and submit a copy of the approved lay out to Registrar. Clause (4) deals with allotment of plots to the members according to seniority under intimation to the Registrar. Clause 5 deals with providing and maintaining common facilities like roads, drainage, water supply, lighting and similar works of common utility. Byelaw No.42 regulates the procedure governing allotment of plots to the members. Byelaw No.43 deals with construction of houses. Byelaw No.51 deals with sanction of loans to the members for construction of houses. 32. A perusal of the byelaws of the society would disclose that the society was formed with an avowed objective of securing dwelling houses for its members by acquiring land and getting a lay out approved by the competent authority and allotting the plots to its members and assisting them in the matter of construction of houses by arranging loans. Detailed procedural regulations have been contemplated under the byelaws of the society for achieving the above avowed objective. In the present case, it is not the complaint of the respondents 3 to 7 that there is a dispute either regarding the allotment of plots or in the matter of construction of houses by the society or arranging the loans for its members for construction of the houses. In the present case, it is not the complaint of the respondents 3 to 7 that there is a dispute either regarding the allotment of plots or in the matter of construction of houses by the society or arranging the loans for its members for construction of the houses. The grievance of the respondents 3 to 7 is that the alienations of 3.2 cents in favour of M. Venkatramana and 3 cents in favour of RCS Raju, which extents were earmarked for a common purpose, is illegal and the sale deeds executed by the society in favour of the above persons are null and void. Even according to the respondents 3 to 7, the said alienations do not form part of the business of the society nor do they any way promote the objectives of the society and the said alienations made by the society are without jurisdiction and beyond their competence and are in violation of the byelaws. 33. When such is the case, the dispute raised by the respondents cannot be termed as one touching the business of the society, within the meaning of Section 61(1) of the Act. The respondents, not only questioned the alienations made by the society in favour of the petitioners, but also sought a relief of cancellation of the sale deeds. The 2nd respondent-Arbitrator while declaring that the transactions are illegal, further held that the sale deeds are null and void and cancelled the same. The Arbitrator further directed the society to cause demolition of the building constructed by the petitioner in an extent of 3.2 cents. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that such reliefs can be granted only by a civil Court and not by the Arbitrator, especially, when the dispute raised is not touching the business of the society and, therefore, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. He would further contend that the bar of jurisdiction contemplated under Section 121 of the Act is not attracted to the present case, as the dispute is not one touching the business of the society and impugned action of the society is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Rules, even according to the respondents. He would, therefore, contend that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a dispute and grant reliefs of the nature prayed for is not ousted. He would, therefore, contend that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a dispute and grant reliefs of the nature prayed for is not ousted. In that connection, he relied upon a decision in ‘Dhulabahai vs. State of M.P., ( AIR 1969 SC 78 (1)), wherein, the apex Court laid down the principles regarding the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court as follows: “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders if the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.” …… ………… …… 35. Though Section 121 of the Act bars the action before the civil Court, the same is confined only to such orders, refusals, decisions or awards passed or directions issued or actions taken in accordance with the Act or Rules made there under in respect of which penalty is attached. Though Section 121 of the Act bars the action before the civil Court, the same is confined only to such orders, refusals, decisions or awards passed or directions issued or actions taken in accordance with the Act or Rules made there under in respect of which penalty is attached. When once it is shown that the action taken by the society, which is subject matter of the dispute raised before the Registrar is one not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Rules and in respect of which, no adequate or effective remedy is provided for resolving such a dispute within the frame- work of the Act, the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court does not come into operation. The Act, admittedly, does not provide for any machinery for determining the rights and liabilities arising out a transaction like the present one, where under, the vacant extents belonging to the society and earmarked for a common purpose, are said to have been illegally alienated in favour of the petitioners, who are strangers. The Act does not contemplate grant of relief of the nature prayed for by the respondents 3 to 7 pertaining to the alleged illegal alienation by the society in favour of the petitioners, like cancellation of the sale deeds, a relief which, the civil Court is certainly empowered to grant. 36. In ‘Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain ( AIR 1969 SC 1320 ), a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court dealing with the aspect as to what constitutes a dispute touching the business of the society, held as follows: “The question arises whether the dispute touching the assets of a society would be a dispute touching the business of a society. This would depend on the nature of the society and the rules and byelaws governing it. Ordinarily, if a society owns buildings and lets out parts of buildings, which it does not require, for its own purpose it cannot be said that letting out of those parts is a part of the business of the society. But it may be that it is the business of a society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members. In that case letting out property may be part of its business. But it may be that it is the business of a society to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members. In that case letting out property may be part of its business. In this case, the society is a co-operative bank and ordinarily a co-operative bank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned by it Therefore, it seems to us that the present dispute between a tenant and a member of the bank in a building which has subsequently been acquired by the Bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank, and the appeal should fail on this short ground.” 37. In the above case, the Apex Court while dealing with Section 91 of Maharastra Cooperative Societies Act 1961, which enables reference to the Registrar, among other things any dispute touching the business of the society. The dispute referred to was one between the society, namely, bank and a tenant in a building, which was subsequently acquired by the bank regarding eviction of the tenant, it was held as follows: “One other limitation on the "dispute" may also be placed and that is that the word "dispute covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. It seems to us very doubtful that the word "dispute" would include a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the landlord society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. In the presence of various rent Acts which give special privileges to tenants it would be difficult to say that such disputes were intended to be referred to the Registrar. Of course, this result may also follow from the interpretation of the Rent Act and the Co-operative Societies Act by applying other principles of construction.” 38. In ‘Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Panchsheela Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd., (ILR (1979) I Delhi 300) the Division Bench of Delhi High Court referring to ‘Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd.,’s case (second supra), held as follows: “The question which arose for decision was whether the dispute between the parties could be referred to arbitration under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. One description of dispute encompassed by the section was that ‘touching the………business of a society’. One description of dispute encompassed by the section was that ‘touching the………business of a society’. As to the word ‘touching’, the Supreme Court said, it ‘is very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of a Society, but we are doubtful whether the word “affects” should also be used in defining the scope of the word “touching”. On the other hand, the word ‘business’, it was said, ‘has been used in a narrower sense and it means the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the act and the Rules and its bye-laws’. It was also observed that although ‘the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it is difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does nor is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects can be said to be part of its business’. It was further held as follows: “Remembering that the word ‘touching’ is wide, and the word ‘business’ is narrow, and approaching the matter in a common sense way, where does the present case fall? The loan was taken by the society for building a factory. This is stated in the ‘agreement for over draft’ and the deed of guarantee, and is not disputed. The intended business of the society was the bleaching, dyeing and printing of textiles and yarn. This was the main object of the society. But, when the loan was taken, even the factory was still only a dream. At that time, the society had no ‘trading or commercial activity’. In these circumstances, howsoever widely the word ‘touching’ may be interpreted, to say that the taking of the loan from the bank was an ‘act touching the business of the society’ is to speak in a language which is so unreal as to be practically devoid of meaning. Common sense boggles at the idea. The loan was taken to build a factory, which, if all went well, and it went into production, would have enabled the society to go into business. No doubt, in metaphysical terms one can find a connection between the loan and the business, but I think it is far too remote for the law. Common sense boggles at the idea. The loan was taken to build a factory, which, if all went well, and it went into production, would have enabled the society to go into business. No doubt, in metaphysical terms one can find a connection between the loan and the business, but I think it is far too remote for the law. As the Supreme Court warned, not everything that a society does is a part of its business”. 39. In ‘A.Ramachandra Naidu Vs. The Chittoor District Central Co-op. Stores Ltd., ( 1993 (2) ALT 276 ) this Court by following the above decision of the Apex Court, in ‘Deccan Merchants Cooperative bank’s case (2nd supra), in the context of bar of jurisdiction under Section 121 of the Act, held as follows: “As observed by the Supreme Court, the activity of the respondent-society is a cooperative store dealing in sale of goods. The relief sought for by the petitioner is, not to dispossess him from the vacant site, which is leased out to him. Therefore, leasing out of the premises to the petitioner cannot form part of the main business activity of the society and, therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court, the permission of the Registrar is not necessary in the present context.” 40. In the above case, the revision petitioner filed suit for permanent injunction regarding the vacant site, which was leased out to him by the respondents-society. The suit was dismissed for default and an application was filed for its restoration. When the said petition was pending, the society went into liquidation. The revision petitioner/ plaintiff filed IA No.467 of 1990 for impleading the liquidator as a respondent/defendant. The lower Court dismissed the said IA on the ground that sanction of the Registrar under Section 121(2) of the Act was not obtained. This Court while setting aside the order of the trial Court observed that ‘the trial Court has not properly construed the provisions of Section 121 of the Act’. This Court further held that ‘the dispute pertaining to lease of vacant site belonging to the society in favour of the petitioner therein was not a dispute touching the business of the society or affairs of the society’. 41. This Court further held that ‘the dispute pertaining to lease of vacant site belonging to the society in favour of the petitioner therein was not a dispute touching the business of the society or affairs of the society’. 41. Similarly, in the present case also, the dispute raised pertains to the alleged alienation of the vacant site of the society to the petitioners, who are non-members and such alienation does not form part of the business of the society nor is one in the nature of promoting the objectives of the society. 42. In ‘M/s Hyderabad Sheet Metal & Allied, Industries vs. M/s Industrial Packages ( AIR 1993 AP 213 ) this Court held as follows: “Apart from the above legal infirmity, the impugned award is also vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of record. The reasoning given by the learned Arbitrator that the sub-lease was illegal and that the Society should not have entered into the Tripartite Agreement dated 19.03.1983 does not fit into the direction given by the Arbitrator to allot the land to the sub-lessee (R1). In a way, the ultimate direction given contradicts the reasoning or finding in the Award. Another obvious error in the Award is that the Arbitrator is that the Arbitrator failed to see that until and unless the plot was resumed by the Society from the petitioner after following the due procedure, the question of allotment of the plot of 6,000 sq. ft. to R.1 does not arise. Indisputably, the allotment still stands in the name of the petitioner. If the petitioner had committed breach of the conditions of the lease or agreement, the Society could only take steps to resume the land after giving a show cause notice and affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Society could not have straightaway allotted that plot to R.1. What the Society itself could not do in the normal course, it cannot profess to do by virtue of the directions given by the Arbitrator. Thus, viewed from any angle, the impugned Award is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, I quash the impugned Award.” 43. In the above case, the dispute related to sub-lease of a plot by a member in favour of another member. Thus, viewed from any angle, the impugned Award is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, I quash the impugned Award.” 43. In the above case, the dispute related to sub-lease of a plot by a member in favour of another member. The Arbitrator directed the society to take over the plot, which was in possession and enjoyment of the sub-lessee and allowed the same to the same person M/s Industrial Packages. The petitioner therein challenged the said award contending inter-alia that there was no dispute between the sub-lessee and the society with regard to allotment of the plot, which could be taken cognizance under Section 61 of the Act and the direction to the society to take over the plot and allot the same to the first respondent was without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of authority of the arbitrator. Seeing force in the said contention, this Court while quashing the award, held that ‘prima-facie action of the petitioner therein constitutes breach of terms of the agreement. It is open to the society to initiate action to resume the land after giving opportunity to the petitioner and the society and after resuming the land, can consider the request of the first respondent therein for allotment of plot on its own merits’. It was further held that ‘the society could not have straightaway allotted the plot to the first respondent and if there was any breach of conditions of the lease or agreement by the petitioner, the society could only take steps to resume the land after giving show cause notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner’. It was further held that ‘what the society itself could not do in the normal course, it cannot profess to do by virtue of direction given by the Arbitrator’. 44. In the present case, the complaint is of course against the society itself with regard to the alienation of the sites in favour of the petitioners. However, such alienation which, even according to the respondents 3 to 7, being illegal and beyond the authority of the society and in violation of the provisions of the Act and Rules, the same cannot be construed as a dispute touching the business of the society. However, such alienation which, even according to the respondents 3 to 7, being illegal and beyond the authority of the society and in violation of the provisions of the Act and Rules, the same cannot be construed as a dispute touching the business of the society. By granting relief of setting aside the alienations and cancelling the sale deeds in respect of a dispute, which is not one touching the business of the society, the Arbitrator-2nd respondent certainly exceeded the jurisdiction and acted beyond the scope of his authority. In order to attract the section, it is sufficient, if there is a dispute touching the business of the society. It is not necessary that the dispute should arise directly, out of the business of the society. It would be touching of the business of the society if the dispute has any relevancy or is in any way connected with the business of the society. 45. In ‘Punjab National Bank Ltd’s case (3rd supra), it was also held that ‘taking of a loan for building factory by the society which was having no trade or commercial activity, taking of loan cannot be said to be an act touching the business of the society’. 46. In the present case, alienation of the vacant site that too earmarked for common purpose in favour of strangers or doing any real estate business with the land acquired for the avowed objective of providing dwelling houses to the members of the society cannot be considered to be an act arising directly out of ‘the business of the society’ or even ‘touching the business of the society’. As such the alleged unauthorized and illegal alienation of the vacant sites in favour of strangers has no relation to nor is in any way connected with the business of the society, namely, providing dwelling houses to the members of the society or any ancillary activity relatable to the conduct of the said business of the society. As such the alleged unauthorized and illegal alienation of the vacant sites in favour of strangers has no relation to nor is in any way connected with the business of the society, namely, providing dwelling houses to the members of the society or any ancillary activity relatable to the conduct of the said business of the society. As observed by this Court in ‘M/s Hyderabad Sheet Metal & Allied, Industry’s case (4 supra), the finding that the alienations made by the society in favour of the petitioners do not give raise to a dispute touching the business of the society, does not amount to approval of the impugned action of the society inducting third parties in possession of the vacant sites earmarked for common purpose as alleged and it is certainly open to the competent Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the dispute, if raised before the civil Court, independently on its own merits. 47. The word ‘business’ cannot be construed so as to include any illegal transaction of the society or its members purporting to act as members of the society violating any statutory provisions and entering into a transaction, when such transaction cannot be treated as part of business of the society. 48. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the vacant site purchased by the petitioners is not car parking place nor earmarked for any common utility or public purpose and the 8th respondent society also contended before the Tribunal that the land sold to the petitioners was vacant commercial space and not parking place. The question as to whether or not the disputed site is vacant space, which is alienable and not a common space earmarked for public utility cannot be gone into in this proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the same is a disputed question of fact, that can be decided based on the evidence. 49. The decision in ‘C.C.H.O. Welfare Association vs. Commisioner, Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation ( AIR 2002 AP 175 ) relied on by the respondents is not relevant to the facts of the present case, as the question that arose in the above case where portion of the park alienated in favour of third party by the first respondent-corporation and it was held that ‘the purported alienation made by the first respondent-Commissioner in favour of the respondents 2 and 3 was wholly illegal. The first respondent shall continue to utilize the space as park’. It was further held that ‘the contention that keeping in view the area of the park, if a portion thereof is alienated nobody would be prejudiced cannot be accepted inasmuch as having regard to the doctrine of public trust, no portion of the land is alienable’. It was further held that ‘any construction made in any portion of the park or any other area earmarked for a public purpose, may be directed to be demolished’. 50. The other decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in ‘NGOs Colony Development Committee vs. District Collector, Krishna at Machilipatnam ( 2001 (1) ALD 55 ) wherein it was held that ‘all areas intended for parks vest in Municipal council nor the Collector can assign the said areas for construction of the buildings’ is also not relevant in the context of the present case. 51. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the genuineness or otherwise of the sale deeds, the identity and nature of the land in dispute, whether the alienations are liable to be set aside and the sale deeds are liable for cancellation, and whether the constructions made by the petitioners on the disputed land are liable to be demolished or not, are all matters, which are out side the scope of Section 61 of the Act, as they do not relate to ‘business of the society’, which can be referred to and adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. When once, the sale deeds are executed and registered, title in the property covered by the sale deeds gets legally transferred in favour of the vendees and even the vendor cannot unilaterally cancel the same. In case the transaction is found to be illegal and beyond the authority of the society, necessary recourse has to be taken to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, which provides for cancellation of documents and decrees. 52. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, by passing the impugned award, the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator appears to have decided the dispute usurping the jurisdiction of the civil Court. 52. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, by passing the impugned award, the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator appears to have decided the dispute usurping the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The impugned award passed by the 2nd respondent, as confirmed by the first respondent-Tribunal, therefore, suffers from lack of inherent jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon the dispute, which is found to be not a dispute, touching the business of the society. 53. In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, the impugned award of the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator, as confirmed by the first respondent-Tribunal, is held vitiated for want of jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon the dispute referred and hence, the same is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. 54. It is however, open to the society or aggrieved members thereof to pursue other legal remedies, if any available under law independent of the observations made herein above. 55. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed quashing the award of the 2nd respondent-Arbitrator, as confirmed by the first respondent-Tribunal, insofar as it relates to the petitioners. No order as to costs.