Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 3198 (MAD)

R. Joseph v. K. Balaji

2010-07-30

G.RAJASURIA

body2010
Judgment : Inveighing the judgment and decree dated 3.9.2009 passed by the learned VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai (Rent Control Appellate Authority) in R.C.A.No.70 of 2007 modifying the fair and decreetal order dated 29.11.2006 passed by the learned XV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai (Rent Controller) in RCOP No.1352 of 2004, this civil revision petition is focussed. 2. Heard both sides. 3. The epitome and the long and short of the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision would run thus: 1. The respondents herein filed RCOP seeking eviction on the following grounds: 1. different user 2. act of waste 3. act of nuisance and 4. owner’s occupation by invoking Sections 10(2)(ii)(b), 10(2)(iii), 10(2)(v) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The matter was contested. 2. During enquiry, on the side of the landlords, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits P-1 to P-13 were marked. On the side of the tenant, R.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exhibits R-1 to R-11 were marked. 3. Ultimately, the Rent Controller ordered eviction on all grounds. Being aggrieved by the same, appeal was filed before the appellate authority. After hearing both sides, the Appellate Authority rejected the ground of waste invoked by the landlords and upheld the other three grounds and confirmed the order of the Rent Controller to that much extent and accordingly, allowed the appeal partly. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of both the Courts below, the tenant preferred this revision on various grounds. The learned counsel for the tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision would develop his argument, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: a) Ignoring the factum of the erstwhile landlord having given consent for the tenant to switch over the user from chit fund business to one of conducting prayer in the said non residential building, both the Courts below simply upheld the contention of the landlords as though there was unauthorised change of user of the said demised premises. b) The tenant came to occupy the demised premises as early as in the year 1978. Undoubtedly, he was carrying on chit fund business till 1988 and thereafter with the consent of the then landlord the tenant effected change of user as stated supra. b) The tenant came to occupy the demised premises as early as in the year 1978. Undoubtedly, he was carrying on chit fund business till 1988 and thereafter with the consent of the then landlord the tenant effected change of user as stated supra. c) Only during October 2002, the present landlord purchased the demised premises from the erstwhile landlord and he also continued to receive rent impliedly consenting for the tenant to carry on with his Evangelical service in the demised premises. d) In fact, the original tenant was Joseph, the revision petitioner herein. Subsequently, the said Joseph created a public religious trust comprised of himself and other persons and they were doing Evangelical service so to say, prayer meetings in the demised premises on Sundays. But it was not to the taste of the present landlord and he only as an after-though started raising objections relating to the use of the building for the Evalangelical purpose. As such, both the Courts below failed to take into account the implied consent of the erstwhile landlord in permitting the tenant to use the building for Evangelical purpose. e) Once the erstwhile landlord himself virtually permitted the tenant to the change of user of the building, the present landlord who happened to be the purchaser of the building cannot claim to have locus standi to invoke the ground relating to change of user. f) There is no consistency in the pleading relating to the ground of owner’s occupation. In the RCOP it is found staged that he was doing some business in a particular place in Thoppu Street but while adducing evidence he would state some other place and hence he wanted to vacate the rented premises and occupy the demised premises etc. g) The evidence relating to to nuisance is murky and absolutely there is nothing to show that such conduct of Evangelical service/ prayer meetings in the said building would amount to causing nuisance. There were no complaints from anyone during the pendency of the RCOP and no authority also had initiated action for the alleged nuisance as against the tenant herein. h) Both the Courts below failed to take into account the salient features involved in this case and simply ordered eviction on those grounds. There were no complaints from anyone during the pendency of the RCOP and no authority also had initiated action for the alleged nuisance as against the tenant herein. h) Both the Courts below failed to take into account the salient features involved in this case and simply ordered eviction on those grounds. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the tenant would pray for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for the dismissal of RCOP and consequently to allow this revision. 5. Per contra, by way of challenging and refuting, impugning and gainsaying the contentions/arguments as put forth on the side of the tenant, the learned counsel for the landlord would advance his arguments, the warp and woof of them would run thus: i) The law is settled on the point that unless there is previous written consent from the landlord relating to change of user of the premises by the tenant, the question of pressing into service the implied consent on the part of the landlord by the tenant would not arise at all. Furthermore, in this case, there is no evidence to show that the erstwhile landlord or the present landlord ever gave any implied consent or expressed consent for the change of user of the building. ii) The contention on the side of the tenant that the present landlord who purchased the property is not having locus standi to invoke the ground of change of user for the reason that even his predecessor in title never raised his accusative finger as against the tenant on the ground of change of user, is not tenable. iii) Absolutely, there in no inconsistency in the pleading relating to the ground of owner’s occupation. In the RCOP itself is found spelt out that the landlords are running business in Thoppu Street, Chennai and while adducing evidence also they stuck on to their stand in addition to that they have also stated that they are doing their marketing business in one other place in Pillayar Koil Street and that it does not mean that there is no consistency in the pleading of the landlords relating to the ground of owner’s occupation as they are in genuine need of the demised premises and they are doing business in assembling electronic products. iv) Relating to the ground of nuisance, there is ample evidence to show that such conduct of prayer meetings in a residential area and that too in the premises abetting the narrow road, would certainly cause nuisance. The use of loud speaker is certainly a nuisance to the neighbours. At a time 200 to 500 persons are visiting the demised premises for the purpose of attending the prayer meetings and their vehicles are parked in front of the demised premises place and causing nuisance to the entire neighbourhood. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the landlords would pray for dismissing the revision petition. 6. The points for consideration are as to: 1. Whether the Courts below properly analysed the evidence and upheld the ground raised by the landlord relating to change of user of the building? 2. Whether the Courts below fell into error in not appreciating the evidence relating to the ground of owner’s occupation? 3. Whether the Courts below did not appreciate the concept nuisance in proper perspective and applied the law properly? 4. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the both the Courts below, warranting interference in this Point No.1: 7. At the outset itself, I would like to refer to the precedents relating to the ground of change of user and certain excerpts from those precedents would run thus: 1. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and Others AIR 1988 SC 145 : (1988) 1 SCC 70 “7. We are in agreement with this approach to the interpretation and it is in consonance with the view expressed by this Court earlier as mentioned hereinbefore. In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that it was necessary for the tenant to obtain the consent in writing to subletting the premises. The mere permission or acquiescence will not do. The consent must be to the specific subletting and must be in writing. 2. Dull Chand (dead) by brs. V. Jagmender Das 1989 (2) Scale 133 10. ……………………That apart Section 14(1)(b) requires a “consent in writing” of the landlord in order to avoid an eviction on the ground of sub-letting, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises. 2. Dull Chand (dead) by brs. V. Jagmender Das 1989 (2) Scale 133 10. ……………………That apart Section 14(1)(b) requires a “consent in writing” of the landlord in order to avoid an eviction on the ground of sub-letting, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises. This Court considering the need for obtaining a consent in writing under the provision, in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and Others (supra) quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of the High Court in Delhi Vanaspati Syndicate v. Bhagwan Dass Faquir Cnand: ……………………………………………………………. It deals with restrictions on subletting. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 makes sub-letting lawful though it was without the consent of the landlord provided that the sub-letting has taken place before 9.6.1952 and the sub-tenant is in occupation of the premises at the time when the Act of 1958 came into force. Sub section (2) of Section 16 reiterates the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1952 and lays down that the sub-letting after 9.6.1952 without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord shall not be deemed to be lawful. It does not say that requisite consent should be obtained before sub-letting the premises and the consent obtained after sub-letting will not ensure for the benefit of the tenant. 3. Analia Abreu Piniti v. Miss Olinda de Menezes (since deceased) now represented by her administrator and Others 1997 (4) Bom CR 125 “11. Under Section 22(2)(b)(i) of the Act, it is necessary for the tenant to obtain a “written consent” of the landlord in order to avoid an eviction on the ground of subletting. The words used in the Section are ‘without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord”. If the words were ‘without consent of the landlord” it might mean without consent express or implied and in that sense question of waiver may arise. The question of implied consent will not arise, if the consent is to be in writing………………..” 4. S.P. Sabapathi Pillai v. M. Durga AIR 1995 Mad. 13 “10. If the words were ‘without consent of the landlord” it might mean without consent express or implied and in that sense question of waiver may arise. The question of implied consent will not arise, if the consent is to be in writing………………..” 4. S.P. Sabapathi Pillai v. M. Durga AIR 1995 Mad. 13 “10. In Kannappa Nadar v. Krishnaswamy Pillai, (1981) 1 MLJ 19 (sic), Justice RATNAM (as he then was) held that in the absence of any permission in writing from the landlord, the question whether the landlord will be precluded from seeking an order for eviction on the ground of acquiescence was considered in TVS Abdul Khader v. G.H. Rao (1964) 77 LW 503 and it has been held therein that any kind of acquiescence by the landlord of estoppels by his conduct cannot be a substitute for the plain requirement of the statute about a written consent and in the absence of such written consent,, the landlord is entitled to evict a tenant for having used the building for a purpose other than the one for which it was leased out.” The learned counsel for the landlords would also cite the following decisions on the aforesaid point. 1. T.S.O. Abdul Khader v. G.H. Rao (1964) 2 MLJ 288 2. S. Azeem v. M. Natarajan (1994) 2 MLJ 455 3. B.M. Najira Begum v. A.M.S. Kassim (2001) 1 MLJ 37 : 2000 (4) CTC 74 4. M. Arul Jothi and Another v. Lajja Bal (deceased) and Another AIR 2000 SC 1122 : (2000) 3 SCC 723 5. K. Panchavarnammal (Died) and 6 Others v. E. Saraswathiammal and 3 Others (1996) 2 MLJ 252 : 1996-1-LW-714 6. Bharat Lal Baranwal v. Virendra Kumar Agarwal AIR 2003 SC 1056 : (2003) 2 SCC 343 A mere poring over and perusal of the aforesaid excerpts and the other precedents would amply make the point clear that the law is well settled to the effect that unless there is a previous written consent of the landlord is available with the tenant, change of user of the building can never be justified and he will not be justified in contending also that there has been implied consent or connivance on the part of the landlord relating to the change of user of the building. 8. 8. As such, it is quite obvious and axiomatic that there is no previous written consent of any one of the two landlords, so to say, the erstwhile landlord or the present landlord available with the tenant regarding change of user and in such a case, the concept implied consent or connivance as put forth and set forth on the side of the tenant is not tenable. 9. No doubt, the learned counsel for the tenant would invite the attention of this Court to the fact that even though there was change of user ever since 1998, till the erstwhile landlord sold the property in favour of the present landlord during October 2002, there was no objection to it. However, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and also the decision of this Court as well as the Bombay High Court, the tenant cannot try to wriggle out of his liability to vacate the premises on the ground of change of user by trying to press into service the plea of implied consent. 10. The learned counsel for the tenant also would submit that in fact there is no change of user in stricto sensu for the reason that as per Exhibit P-1 the tenant undertook generally that he would use the demised premises only for non-residential purpose to run his business and he did not undertake to do any specific business only. The actual words used in Exhibit P-1 is extracted here under for ready reference. “I after due and careful consideration agree to take up on tenancy the above said portion belonging to you for only Non-residential purpose of running my business.” (emphasis supplied) According to the learned counsel for the tenant, non-residential purpose would include even conducting of prayer meetings and he never put that premises for any residential purpose. So long as he has been using it only for non residential purpose, the Court could hold that the tenant is using the demised premises for his non-residential purpose as per his own undertaking in Exhibit P-1. 11. So long as he has been using it only for non residential purpose, the Court could hold that the tenant is using the demised premises for his non-residential purpose as per his own undertaking in Exhibit P-1. 11. Whereas the learned counsel for the landlords by way of torpedoing such an argument would invite the attention of this Court to Exhibit P-1 and develop his argument that Exhibit P-1 is found typed in letter head of the tenant as under: “ACA Funds, Madras 103/2, Purasawalkam High Road, Madras-10” and that itself would clearly display and demonstrate that he was doing only financial business for two decades and the conduct of the prayer meetings is not an allied business to financial business and in such a case, it is a clear case of putting the building to a different user. The word ‘business’ would connote and denote differently depending upon different contestants. The tenant was doing commercial business, at the commencement or at the inception of the tenancy and in such a case, the argument as put forth on the side of the tenant is not correct. Evangelical service, even by phantasmagorical thought cannot be described as a commercial business. 12. I would like to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the landlords because the tenant cannot assume and presume that because of the afore extracted words from Exhibit P-1, he was permitted to use the demised premises for Evangelical purpose also other than his financial business which he had undertaken to perform in the demised premises. 13. The contention on the side of the tenant that the right if at all any accrued in favour of the erstwhile landlord to evict the tenant on the ground of change of user, the same cannot be claimed to have been acquired by the present landlord and the said contention, fails to carry conviction with this Court. Change of user is a Statutory right contemplated under the act. Change of user is a Statutory right contemplated under the act. Once during the year 1988 itself, there was change of user and that as per law enunciated supra is something attracting eviction then the subsequent purchaser of the property can also exercise the same statutory right and seek for eviction on the ground of change of user and it is all the more available with the successive landlord, when the change of user continued even after the present landlord purchased the property. 14. The learned counsel for the tenant cited the following decisions: 1. T.M. Ramaswamy Gounder v. Ranganayaki (1990) 1 MLJ 421 : 1990 TNLJ 122 2. A. Gurusami v. Dr. (Ms.) A. Jacob and three Others (1998) 2 MLJ 544 : 1998 (2) CTC In the wake of the aforesaid decisions cited on the side of the landlords, which are clinching the issues, the decisions cited on the side of the tenant are not on the point concerning the issue involved in this case. Hence, I could see no force in the argument as put forth on the side of the tenant that the landlords have no locus standi to invoke the ground of change of user. Both the Courts below in my opinion, correctly addressed themselves to the facts and circumstances and evidence involved in this case and decided the lis au fait with law and au courant with facts, warranting no interference by this Court under Section 25 of the Act. 15. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenant. Pont No. 2: 16. The learned counsel for the tenant would contend that there is no consistency between the pleadings in the R.C.O.P. and the evidence on the side of the landlords before the Court. He would cite the following decisions: 1. Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandai and Others (2009) 4 MLJ 900 (SC) 2. R. Sudhandhira Devi and Others v. K. Navanithakrishna (2005) 4 MLJ 127 17. I also recollect and call up the maxim judicis est judicare secundum allegate et probata – It is the duty of a Judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved. 18. It is a common or garden principle governing the law of pleadings that any amount of evidence without the backing of the pleadings should be eschewed. I also recollect and call up the maxim judicis est judicare secundum allegate et probata – It is the duty of a Judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved. 18. It is a common or garden principle governing the law of pleadings that any amount of evidence without the backing of the pleadings should be eschewed. As such, in civil matters, it is settled proposition of law that any amount of evidence without the backing of the pleadings should be eschewed. However, rigorously, the said rule should not be followed in Rent Control Proceedings where the matters are only summary in nature. 19. As such, simply because in the R.C.O.P., there is no reference to two rented premises which are under the occupation of the landlords for conducting their business and only one building in Thoppu Street, Chennai was mentioned and not about the other building, that would not be fatal to the case of the landlords. 20. At this juncture, I would like to extract here under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and also the decisions emerged there under for ready reference: “Section 10(3)(a): A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order direction the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (i) …. (ii) …. (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own: Provided that a person who becomes landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered: Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause, he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause- (i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own; (ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own. (i) Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Others (1998) 1 MLJ 18, certain excepts from it would run thus at p. 22 of MLJ: “8. …. Therefore, he submitted relying on the decisions in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies, (1996) 5 SCC 344 and Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 , that the view taken by the High Court must be upheld. 9. Section 14(1)(e) of the Act read as follows: “14(1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. (Italics supplied) 10. In making a claim that the suit premises is required bona fide for his own occupation as a residence for himself and other members of his family dependent on him and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation is a requirement of law before the Court can state whether the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and occupation. In doing so, the Court must also find out whether the landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises is required has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is not intermixed with the question of finding out whether he has any other reasonably suitable accommodation. If he has reasonably suitable accommodation, then necessarily it would mean that he does not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona fide. In such circumstances, further inquiry would be whether that premises is more suitable than the suit premises. Therefore, the questions raised before the Court would not necessarily depend upon only the pleadings. It could be a good defence that the landlord has other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and thereby defeat the claim of the landlord.” (ii) Sankaranarayanan v. Palaniswami, (1995) 2 MLJ 649 : 1995 (2) CTC 452 , certain experts from it would run thus at p. 651 of MLJ: “8. …. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) deals with the conditions for obtaining possession of a nonresidential building. The conditions required are: a) The building should be non-residential in character. …. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) deals with the conditions for obtaining possession of a nonresidential building. The conditions required are: a) The building should be non-residential in character. b) The landlord should be carrying on business on the date of his applying for eviction. c) He should not be occupying any other nonresidential building belonging to him for the purpose of his business; and d) The landlord’s claim is bona fide for his business needs and not based on oblique motived like trying to obtain more rent or to harass the tenant.” A mere reading of those decisions would highlight and spotlight the fact that it is sufficient even if there is any preparation to conduct business, on the part of the landlord invoking the ground of personal occupation in a non-residential building. Here, in this case, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the landlords are doing business in two premises. Simply because in the RCOP they stated that only in one place they are doing business and while adducing evidence, they highlighted that in two places they are doing business, that it does not mean that the necessary ingredient relating to carrying on business has not been proved. It has to be seen as to whether there is any false evidence adduced on the side of the landlords. But, absolutely, there is no iota or shred, shard or miniscule, jot or scintilla of evidence to show that the landlords adduced any false evidence relating to the concept “carrying on business” and in such a case, I am of the view that both the Courts below were right in ordering eviction on the ground of personal occupation. 21. I also recollect and call up the maxim that Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta-External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts 22. Here indubitably and indisputably, the landlords are doing business in assembling electronic products and they desire that the tenanted premises in which they are occupying should be vacated by them and they wanted to occupy their own premises, namely, the demised premises herein and in such a case, there is nothing to doubt their genuineness and bona fides in their requirement to occupy the same. There is also nothing to show that their requirement got ceased to persist or exist even now. 23. There is also nothing to show that their requirement got ceased to persist or exist even now. 23. Both the Courts below also adverted to the fact that the landlords are having no other non-residential premises of their own so as to carry on their business within city. In such a case, I could see no perversity or illegality on the part of the Courts below in ordering eviction on the ground of personal occupation. 23. Accordingly, point No. 2 is also decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenant. 24. In respect of the concept nuisance is concerned, the learned counsel for the tenant inviting the attention of this Court to the following decisions would advance his argument. It is therefore, just and necessary to cite those decisions: 1. Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and Others AIR 1999 SC 283 : (1999) 1 SCC 133 : AIR 1998 SCW 3822 2. S. Suresh and Others v. Isabal Thomas and Another AIR 2000 Mad 275 3. R. Saroja v. N. Lokanatha Kanthan 2000 (1) LW 356 A mere perusal of those decisions would highlight and spotlight the fact that a person should not be hyper sensitive relating to nuisance or some disturbances in an area. Here, no doubt, prayer meetings are conducted and that even for argument sake, it is taken that 100 persons or more are visiting on Sundays as put forth by the tenant, certainly, that would cause some inconvenience to the neighbours. The learned counsel for the landlords would submit that the tenant as not proved his contention that he took on lease a parking place so as to enable the visitors to the demised premises to park their vehicles. Nonetheless, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that on certain days, mere parking of vehicles near the demised premises for the purpose of attending prayer meetings cannot be taken as though it causes that much grave nuisance, warranting eviction on that ground. 25. Regarding sound is concerned, no loud speaker is stated to have been used outside the premises. 26. 25. Regarding sound is concerned, no loud speaker is stated to have been used outside the premises. 26. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm but without being tautologous, I would like to point out on certain occasions, even if there is slight bit of sound emanating from the demised premises and reach the ears of the neighbours, it cannot be taken as an actionable nuisance. 27. I recollect and call up the maxim De minimis non curat lax – The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters. 28. The said maxim is found incorporated in Section 95 of the IPC. As fittingly pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court, there are two types of nuisance, viz., private nuisance and public nuisance and if the nuisance is not that much grave in nature, then it has to be ignored. 29. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also pointed out that Exhibit P-10 emerged only pendente lite and not anterior to the filing of the RCOP. The authorities such as Executing Magistrates and Commissioner of Police also had not taken any action on the ground of nuisance. It is common knowledge under Section 133 of Cr. P.C and also under the Police Act, authorities do have the powers to issue mandates and orders preventing noise pollution as well as nuisance, but no such action had been taken by the authorities concerned also. 30. It appears both the Courts below simply without going into the legal principles concerning the concept “nuisance” upheld the contention of the landlord, warranting interference to the limited extent. 31. The learned counsel for the landlord would submit that the very admission of the tenant that he created a trust, which is now conducting prayer meetings would constitute another ground for eviction on the ground of sub-letting. In my considered opinion, the revision petitioner/tenant is also forming part of the trust and in such a case, from the available grounds already pleaded and proved eviction ordered would be sufficient. The revision petitioner and the trust of which he is a member are liable to handover possession of the demised premises. 32. In my considered opinion, the revision petitioner/tenant is also forming part of the trust and in such a case, from the available grounds already pleaded and proved eviction ordered would be sufficient. The revision petitioner and the trust of which he is a member are liable to handover possession of the demised premises. 32. Accordingly, I am of the view that the order of both the Courts below in ordering eviction on the ground of nuisance only has to be set aside and accordingly, point No. 3 is decided in favour of the tenant and as against the landlord. 33. In view of having decided point Nos. 1 and 2 supra, I am of the view that the tenant should be evicted from the demised premises as per orders of both the Courts below. 34. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the tenant would make an extempore submission to the effect that he has been in occupation of the demised premises for a pretty long time and that too ever since 1988 and he requires at least six months’ time to vacate the premises, for which the learned counsel for the landlords would oppose, however, he would submit that if at all the tenant would be regular in paying the future rents, then at the discretion of this Court, time may be granted. 35. I am of the considered view that granting six months’ time would meet the ends of justice, as the tenant to find a suitable alternative place he would require that much time. Accordingly, the following order is passed: i) The tenant shall vacate and hand over vacant premises to the respondents/landlords within six months’ time from this date subject to the condition that the entire arrears should be paid within 15 days from this date and future monthly rents should be promptly paid and if there is any default, it is open for the respondents/landlords to file E.P at once, i.e., even before the time stipulated for vacating the premises. ii) The revision petitioner shall file an affidavit of undertaking incorporating the aforesaid clauses within 15 days from this date. iii) The tenant shall vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession of the demised premises without driving the landlords to the extent of filing EP for eviction. 36. With the above direction, this revision is disposed of. No costs. ii) The revision petitioner shall file an affidavit of undertaking incorporating the aforesaid clauses within 15 days from this date. iii) The tenant shall vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession of the demised premises without driving the landlords to the extent of filing EP for eviction. 36. With the above direction, this revision is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions are closed. Revision disposed of.