Judgment :- P.R. SHIVAKUMAR, J. Sundaravel, son of Elumalai, the husband of the petitioner, has been detained as a goonda under Act 14/1982 by virtue of the order passed by the second respondent herein in his Memo no.146/BDFGISSV/2009 dated 08.07.2009. 2. To arrive at a satisfaction that the detenu was a goonda and his presence at large would be detrimental to the maintenance of public order and peace, the detaining authority has referred to: i) Cr.No.312/2009 on the file of D.4, Zam Bazaar Police Station registered for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 341, 324, 307 and 506(ii) IPC relating to an occurrence that allegedly took place on 14.06.2009, ii) Cr.No.191/2009 on the file of D.6 Anna Square Police station registered for offences punishable under Sections 341, 392 and 506(ii) IPC relating to an occurrence that allegedly took place on 24.06.2009 and iii) Cr.No.685/2009 on the file of D.2 Anna Salai police station registered for offences punishable under sections 341, 384 and 506(ii) IPC relating to an occurrence that allegedly took place on 30.06.2009 as the adverse cases and Cr.No.347/2009 registered on the file of D.4, Zam Bazaar police station for alleged offences punishable under sections 341, 307, 397, 336, 427 and 506(ii) IPC as the ground case. 3. The petitioner, who is none other than the wife of the detenu Sundaravel, has come forward with the present habeas corpus petition challenging the said order of detention on several grounds set out in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. Among other grounds, the petitioner has challenged the order of detention on the grounds of 1) non-application of mind by the detaining authority regarding the discrepancy found in the records as to whether the intimation by telegram to the relative of the detenu soonafter arrest was given first in point of time to be followed by the remand order or vice versa and 2) the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the possibility of the detenu coming out on bail in the ground case and the third adverse case was not based on cogent materials. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly relies on the above said grounds of attack and also one another ground with the permission of the court, as the same has not been incorporated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly relies on the above said grounds of attack and also one another ground with the permission of the court, as the same has not been incorporated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. The new ground taken during argument is that the arrest intimation allegedly sent by telegram to the petitioner was defective in so far as the address of the petitioner as found in arrest memo differs from the address to which the telegraphic intimation was allegedly sent to her by the arresting officer. 5. We have heard the submissions made by Mr.A.Saravanan, learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) representing the State on the above said submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The records produced in the form of paper book have also been perused. 6. The remand report in the ground case is found at pages 195 to 197 of the paper book. It has been recited therein that the detenu was brought to the police station at 13.00 Hrs and that after informing the relative (petitioner herein) by telegraphic message, the detenu was sent for remand to the Magistrate. However, in the copy of the telegraphic message found at page 199 of the paper book, the petitioner was informed that the detenu was lodged at Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai in the ground case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly pointed out that this particular information could not have been incorporated in the telegram, if the telegram was sent prior to the preparation of the remand report. This particular aspect was not adverted to, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, by the detaining authority. We are able to find substance in the above contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. The next ground that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the possibility of the detenu coming out on bail in the third adverse case and the ground case was not based on cogent material, also deserves consideration. It is obvious from the grounds of detention itself that no bail application was filed by the detenu or on behalf of the detenu in both the cases. The ground case is for graver offences, namely, offences punishable under Sections 307 and 397 IPC also. It is obvious from the grounds of detention itself that no bail application was filed by the detenu or on behalf of the detenu in both the cases. The ground case is for graver offences, namely, offences punishable under Sections 307 and 397 IPC also. The satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority to the effect that he was aware that the detenu would come out on bail, if he files application for bail, as the courts are passing orders in favour of the accused in such cases after some time, is not supported by any material, which are available in the paper book. Therefore, the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is nothing but an ipse dixit not supported by cogent material, has got to be accepted. 8. The third ground alleged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is variation in the address found in the remand report and the telegraphic intimation sent to the petitioner by the arresting officer. In the remand report, the door number has been given as No.5, Pakkiri Sahib 3rd Street, whereas in the telegraphic intimation, it is noted as No.18/22, Pakkiri Sahbib 3rd street. The address found in the petition tallies with the address found in the telegraphic intimation. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that this particular discrepancy found in the arrest memo and the telegraphic intimation was not adverted to by the detaining authority and that the same will amount to non-application of mind. This court also finds substance in the above said contention. 9. For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that, on all the three grounds discussed above, the order of detention impugned in this petition, is vitiated. 10. In the result, the habeas corpus petition is allowed and the impugned order of the second respondent in no.146/BDFGISSV/2009 dated 08.07.2009 is set aside. The detenu (Sundaravel, son of Elumalai) is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless his custody is required in connection with any other case.