JUDGMENT : Hon'ble S.S. Chauhan, J. - Heard learned counsel for the revisionist and learned counsel for the opposite party. Feeling aggrieved with the order dated 4.7.2001 passed in S.C.C. No.20 of 1991, the present revision has been preferred, inter alia, on the ground that the court below has misdirected itself in rejecting the deposit made under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No.13 of 1972) (for short "the Act"). 2. The proceedings in the court below were initiated under Section 20 of the Act. After initiation of the proceedings, tenant was required to deposit the amount as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act on the date of first hearing. The tenant proceeded to deposit the amount on the date of first hearing along with the written statement to the tune of Rs.30,700/-. Thereafter the parties were allowed to lead evidence and the case was heard and decided. The Judge, Small Causes Court proceeded to allow the application under Section 20 of the Act by holding therein that the deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act was not a valid deposit and was not in the competent court and hence, it cannot be taken note of. 3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the court below has misdirected itself in not appreciating the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act. Submission is that while considering the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act, intention of the tenant has to be seen and if there was any objection in regard to the jurisdiction, then the court itself ought to have refused to deposit the rent or in the alternative, after receipt of the notice, the opposite party could have raised objection before the court concerned where the deposit was made. It is submitted that merely because the deposit was made in the court of Munsif South, that could not be a ground for excluding the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act. Learned counsel has also submitted that there was a refusal on the part of the landlord and the tenancy was terminated and after termination of the tenancy there was no option with the tenant but to deposit the amount under Section 30 of the Act. Learned counsel has also submitted that there was a refusal on the part of the landlord and the tenancy was terminated and after termination of the tenancy there was no option with the tenant but to deposit the amount under Section 30 of the Act. So far the question of deposit in respect of water tax is concerned, the same has been deposited, which is evident from the schedule appended along with the written statement. Learned counsel for the revisionist has also relied upon a judgment of the apex Court rendered in the case of Kailash Chandra and another v. Mukundi Lal and others, [2002 (20) LCD 538] to give force to the argument that the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act has to be taken into consideration. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, has submitted that since the deposit was made in the wrong court, therefore, the same could not have been taken into consideration for the purpose of deposit as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act. It is also submitted that the water tax was not deposited, which was later on deposited by the revisionist and there was no refusal from the side of the landlord and hence, the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act was not a valid deposit as contemplated under law. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 6. The sole question which falls for consideration is as to whether the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of deposit under Section 20 of the Act. 7. It is apparent from the order dated 25.1.1985 passed in Misc. Case No.304 of 1984, Co-operative Bank, Branch Naka Hindola Vs. Rameshwar Hawelia, that tenancy of the revisionist was terminated and thereafter refusal was also there in regard to the receipt of rent and hence, the deposit was accepted and was allowed to be made continuously. For convenience, the order dated 25.1.1985 is quoted below:- "Called out. None responds. O.P. is served. Perused the record. It appears that the O.P. had sent a notice to the applicant for termination of tenancy the rent receipt and the refusal are on record. For convenience, the order dated 25.1.1985 is quoted below:- "Called out. None responds. O.P. is served. Perused the record. It appears that the O.P. had sent a notice to the applicant for termination of tenancy the rent receipt and the refusal are on record. According to S. 30 (i) of the Act No.13 of 1972, a person claiming to be a tenant may deposit the amount tendered by him and refused to be accepted by the landlord. Here Kha-3 is allowed. The applicant may continue to deposit the rent at his own risk." 9. Narration of the facts in the aforesaid order goes to indicate that the deposit was made by the revisionist only when the termination of tenancy followed and there was refusal on the part of the landlord to accept the rent. There was no option with the revisionist except to deposit the rent under Section 30 of the Act. The contention of learned counsel for the opposite party is that the rent was deposited in a wrong court and therefore, the court below has committed no illegality while deciding the case and allowing the application under Section 20 of the Act. This reasoning does not appear to be correct only for the reason that the deposit was made in the wrong court. Intention of the tenant has to be seen while the deposit is made. There was termination of tenancy and so, the deposit having been made in a court cannot be ignored only on this technical ground that the same was made in a wrong court and even if the deposit was made in a wrong court, then the case could have been transferred to the court of competent jurisdiction and only on this score the deposit made will not become invalid. 10. The question of deposit of water tax does not go to the root of the matter and the schedule appended along with the written statement goes to indicate that the water tax was deposited and therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any default of rent and moreover, deposit made under Section 30 of the Act has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the application under Section 20 of the Act. The law in this regard as propounded by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra (supra) is as follows:- "A tenant is required to make deposit, under sub-section (1) of Section 30 on refusal of the landlord to accept the rent. The deposit under sub- section(2) of Section 30 is required to be made where any doubt or dispute arises as to the person who may be entitled to receive rent in which event, the tenant may deposit the amount in the Court till such doubt has been removed or dispute has been settled. The effect of the deposits made under sub-sections (1) and (2) is to be found under sub-section (6) of Section 30 according to which it shall be deemed that the person depositing the amount has paid it on the date of deposit, to the person in whose favour deposit is made under sub-section (1) and to the landlord in case deposit is made under sub-section (2). It is thus clear that the effect of deposit under two different circumstances as provided under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30, is the same. The deposit is deemed to be payment made by the person depositing to the landlord. That being the position, it is not open to say that a deposit made under sub-section (2) of Section 30 would not be deemed to be payment of rent to the landlord and the same is not liable to be accounted for while considering the amount due. Omission of sub-section (2) of Section 30 in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, cannot lead to an inference, which would negate or nullify the express and statutory effect provided under sub-section (6) of Section 30 regarding deposits made under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 11. Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party on the judgments rendered in the case of Ram Babu Verma v. VII Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, Ram Sewak v. Munna Lal, Jagat Prasad v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, Kameshwar Singh Srivastava v. IV Addl. Distt. Judge, Lucknow and others, and Chunni Lal and another v. Ramesh Chand and others, to give force to his argument that the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act has to be a valid deposit only then the same can be taken into consideration. 12. Distt. Judge, Lucknow and others, and Chunni Lal and another v. Ramesh Chand and others, to give force to his argument that the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act has to be a valid deposit only then the same can be taken into consideration. 12. In view of my foregoing reasoning, the deposit made by the revisionist under Section 30 of the Act has to be taken to be a valid deposit in view of the law propounded by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra (supra) and hence, the court below has committed manifest illegality in allowing the application under Section 20 of the Act. 13. In the aforesaid circumstances, the revision is allowed and the order dated 4.7.2001 passed in S.C.C. No.20 of 1991 is set aside.