Sibghat Ullah Khan, J.:- In spite of sufficient service, no one has appeared on behalf of contesting respondents. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner-insurance company. 2. This is a strange case. The respondents' claim for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act was decided on 13.12.1994 by I Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in MAC No.217 of 1988, Sharifan Vs. Iqbal. Insurance Company was directed to pay the entire awarded amount of Rs.151,400/- with 11% per annum interest since the date of petition till the date of actual payment. It was further directed that in case payment was not made within three months, the rate of interest would be 15%. Copy of the said judgment is Annexure-I to the writ petition. How the amount was to be apportioned among different claimants was not provided for in the operative portion of the judgment. It appears that either some application was given or the court by itself realised the mistake and passed the order of apportionment on 27.01.1995. The copy of the said order is Annexure-II to the writ petition. However, at the top of the said judgment, it is mentioned as follows: "Judgment retyped as per order of the court dated 27.01.1995." 3. Thereafter, almost entire judgment, which was delivered on 13.12.1994 was reproduced giving details of the claim, facts, issues and findings. The court completely fails to understand that what was the need of passing another judgment. Only an order directing apportionment of the award of compensation could be passed. 4. The insurance company paid the entire awarded amount alongwith 11% interest on 21.04.1995, i.e. within three months from second judgment dated 27.01.1995 but beyond three months from the date of first judgment dated 13.12.1994. The claimants asserted that as the amount was deposited beyond three months from the date of first judgment, hence 15% per annum interest must be charged. The petitioner insurance company contended that the deposit was within three months from the date of second judgment, hence only 11% per annum interest was chargeable. The same learned A.D.J., Sri H.L. Kureel passed the impugned order on 25.05.1995 in Execution Case No.8 of 1995. Para-2 of the said judgment is as follows: "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the insurance. I am of the view that the date of original judgment is material and the date of review judgment is not material." 5. Para-2 of the said judgment is as follows: "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the insurance. I am of the view that the date of original judgment is material and the date of review judgment is not material." 5. This writ petition is directed against the said order. 6. Even in the said order, copy of which is Annexure-IV to the writ petition, absolutely no reason has been given as to why a complete judgment was once again passed which was termed as review judgment. The only error in the first order was in the operative portion, hence subsequently only operative portion ought to have been corrected. Passing an altogether new judgment is not understandable. In any case if a fresh judgment was passed on review then petitioner was entitled to deposit within three months therefrom. Moreover, in Annexure-II also it is mentioned that in case payment was not made within three months, the rate of interest would be 15% per annum. Obviously three months started from the date of said second judgment/review judgment. It is also not clear as to whether some party had filed review application or court itself corrected its mistake. However, the review judgment like the one passed on 27.01.1995 beginning with the words "Judgment retyped as per order of the court dated 27.01.1995" is an exercise which is not permissible under any provision of C.P.C. or any other Act. 7. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside. It is held that petitioner was liable to pay only 11% per annum interest and not 15%.