JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner/ori. defendant has filed this Civil Revision Application under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 challenging the order and judgment passed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Junagadh in Regular Civil Appeal No.92 of 1980 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Second Joint Civil Judge (J.D.) Junagadh on 14.3.1980 in Regular Civil Suit No.404 of 1976. 2. The Civil Revision Application was admitted and rule was issued on 26.10.1983 and on applicant depositing all the arrears of rent / mesne profit within four weeks from the date of receipt of the writ and further depositing future rent / mesne profit as it accrues and due from time to time, the execution of decree for possession only passed by the Extra Assistant Judge, Junagadh in Regular Civil Appeal No.92 of 1980 arising from Civil Suit No.404 of 1976 was stayed till further order or final disposal of the Civil Revision Application. 3. During the pendency of this Civil Revision Application the applicant - ori. defendant i.e. Durlabhji Lalji expired and hence his legal heirs are brought on record of this Civil Revision Application. 4. The brief facts giving rise to this Civil Revision Application are that the respondent - ori. plaintiff is a landlady and late Durlabhji Lalji the defendant in the suit was her tenant on monthly rent of Rs.3/- in the suit premises comprising of one room, kitchen, a portion of ousri and a backyard situated on Nagar road at Junagadh. The plaintiff filed the suit for eviction on the ground; (1) subletting, transfer or assignment of suit premises. (2) permanent construction in suit premises without her permission. (3) Non-payment of rent for more than 6 months. (4) acquisition of alternative suitable residential accommodation. 5. The case of the plaintiff in the suit was that the defendant was a tenant in arrears of rent for more than six months from April, 1972 to March, 1976 at the time of notice given to him under Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. It was also the case of the plaintiff that the defendant tenant had acquired alternative suitable residential accommodation in housing society in Junagadh, before about 5 to 6 years from the date of institution of the suit. It was also the case of the plaintiff that the defendant tenant had acquired alternative suitable residential accommodation in housing society in Junagadh, before about 5 to 6 years from the date of institution of the suit. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant-tenant had sublet, transferred or assigned the suit premises to his sister. The ground of subletting was added by way of amendment of plaint. 6. On service of summons, the defendant contested the suit by filing Written Statement Ex.8. He also filed Written Statement of amended plaint vide Ex.28. The defendant denied the correctness of all the allegations made by the plaintiff for eviction of the suit premises. The defendant had also denied that he was tenant in arrears of rent. According to the defendant he was always ready and willing to pay the rent but it was the plaintiff who refused to accept the rent. The defendant also denied the allegation that he has acquired any other suitable alternative residential accommodation in any housing society in Junagadh. The defendant also denied the allegation of subletting in his Written Statement Ex.28. 7. After framing of the issues at Ex.11 and after allowing the amendment and further framing the issues at Ex.29, the learned trial Judge recorded the evidence led by both the parties. After appreciation of the evidence led by both the parties oral as well as documentary, the learned trial Judge recorded the finding that the rent had fallen due but the defendant was not at fault. He has further recorded the finding that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the rent and hence the plaintiff was not entitled to decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. The learned trial Judge has also negatived the issue of acquisition of alternative accommodation. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit by his judgment and decree dated 14.3.1980. 8. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff carried the matter before the District Judge by way of filing Regular Civil Appeal No.92 of 1980. Though in the Appeal memo the findings of the lower Court on all issues have been challenged, at the time of arguments, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant - ori. plaintiff restricted his argument only on issue of alternative accommodation by the defendant. Though in the Appeal memo the findings of the lower Court on all issues have been challenged, at the time of arguments, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant - ori. plaintiff restricted his argument only on issue of alternative accommodation by the defendant. The learned District Judge after considering the arguments and submissions and after perusing the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, had come to the conclusion that the defendant's eldest son was married and was not earning anything when the building in Mahalaxmi Society came to be acquired in the year 1968-69. He has further observed that simply because a tenant acquires or purchases alternative accommodation in the name of his son or any other member of his family to escape from the clutches of Rent Act it cannot be said that he has not acquired alternative suitable accommodation. The learned District Judge, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit and directed the defendant to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff on or before 31.10.1983. 9. It is this order which is under challenge in the present Civil Revision Application. 10. Mr. S.M. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the lower Appellate Court has made out a new case of Benami acquisition of a house in Mahalaxmi Society by the defendant tenant in the name of his son Chandrakant, though no such case was pleaded or set up by the plaintiff in the plaint or in her evidence. He has further submitted that acquisition of the house by the son of the petitioner cannot be considered to be acquisition of residence by the petitioner. There is no case of plaintiff in the plaint that the society's residence alleged to have been acquired by the defendant is a suitable residence and there is no evidence about the extent of accommodation in the Mahalaxmi Society house, as such, it cannot be said that the alleged residence acquired is a suitable residence. Mr. Shah further submitted that the defendant deposed in terms that he has no interest or right or title in the Mahalaxmi Society house of his son, Chandrakant. Mr. Shah further submitted that the defendant deposed in terms that he has no interest or right or title in the Mahalaxmi Society house of his son, Chandrakant. The acquisition of residence by the son of the defendant cannot be considered as acquisition of suitable residence by the defendant within the meaning of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. The evidence led by the plaintiff is that the residence alleged to have been acquired by the defendant is house in Girnar and not in Mahalaxmi Society and still the lower Appellate Court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant has acquired suitable residence. Mr. Shah has further submitted that no presumption under Section-114 of the Evidence Act can be raised on the basis of voters' list and consumer card for gas and this cannot be treated as substantive evidence and proof of acquisition of suitable residence. On the basis of voters' list Ex.46 it cannot be held that the defendant was staying in 1975 at Mahalaxmi Society and from consumer card for gas Ex.49 it cannot be inferred and presumed that the request for change in the address was made by the defendant on acquisition of alternative accommodation. 11. Mr. Shah in support of his submission relied on Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jayantilal Kanjibhai (since decd.) by his heirs and Lrs. Kamlaben Jayantilal & Ors Vs. Rameshchandra Uttamram, reported in GLR 2000 XLI (3) 2110, wherein it is held that under Clause (1) of Sec. 13(1) landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises from the tenant provided Court is satisfied that after coming into operation of the Act, the tenant has built or has acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. From the scheme of the provision, it is clear that it is only when the tenant gets a right to reside in a house other than the demised premises on the happening of any one of the three alternatives mentioned in Section 13(1)(l) that the landlord can seek recovery of possession of the demised premises. The Court further held that there is no law, according to which, husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. The Court further held that there is no law, according to which, husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. If the tenant has no legal right in the property acquired by the other spouse, then his need for old tenanted residence does not go, nor does he lose his right in tenanted premises. 12. Based on the above Full Bench decision Mr. Shah has submitted that the acquisition of house for Mahalaxmi Society by the defendant's son cannot be said to be an acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation by the defendant-tenant and hence the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. Mr. S. D. Suthar, learned advocate appearing for Mr. N.K. Majmudar, for the respondent - ori. plaintiff has submitted that the lower Appellate Court has considered the aspect of acquisition of house in Mahalaxmi Society by the son of the defendant especially when son has no source of income in 1968-69 and immediately after acquisition of that house, the defendant has started living with his son in newly acquired house. This was done by the defendant only with a view to escape from the clutches of Rent Act. He has further submitted that other corroborative evidence are on record in the form of voters' list as well as consumer card for gas connection in the name of defendant which establishes beyond doubt that the defendant has started living with his son in the newly acquired house. 14. In support of his submission Mr. Suthar has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Vrajlal Dwarkadas Vs. Girdharlal Kalidas Dhruv, reported in GLR 2004 XLV (2) 1754, wherein it is held that, as per the evidence on record, it is clear that the wife of the petitioner is not having any other income in any manner and from the evidence on record, it is clear that the petitioner has purchased the house, in the name of his wife, from his own income as the wife of the petitioner was not having any income worth the name. The Court further held that even in a given case, wife or even a family member of the tenant has acquired any premises and if it is proved, on evidence, that the tenant himself has shifted his residence, alongwith his family members, it is enough to attract the provisions of Section 13(1)(l). Ultimately, the object of the Section is that, if a tenant vacates the suit premises and is residing elsewhere, he cannot legitimately put his claim over the rented premises. 15. Mr. Suthar further relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Navinchandra Nathalal Doshi Vs. Jagdishbhai Shankerlal Modi & Ors., reported in GLR 2004 XLV (2) 714, wherein it is held that the defendant has not stated anything as to in which manner his wife was able to purchase the flat in question. As against that, the defendant, as per his evidence, is doing civil construction work, and accordingly, he is in the building construction activity. This aspect of the evidence is appreciated by both the Courts below and they have ultimately reached the conclusion that the plaintiff has proved his case for getting possession on the ground of acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation on the part of the tenant. 16. Mr. Suthar further relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Lilavatiben Wd/o Eknath Rana Vs. Urmilaben Satyenkumar Zaveri through heirs, reported in 2004 XLV (1) 19, wherein it is held that the tenant had right in the suit premises but after she had purchased another residence in the name of the son, she has lost her legal right to live in the tenanted premises as she has shifted in that another newly purchased bungalow to reside with her son. As such, there is no legal right of the defendant to retain the rented premises in the present case. Secondly, that property has been acquired by the lady tenant herself in the name of her son, hence, she has domain over the newly purchased flat. 17. Based on the above judgments of this Court which were rendered subsequent to the Full Bench judgment and judgment of Full Bench was duly considered, Mr. Secondly, that property has been acquired by the lady tenant herself in the name of her son, hence, she has domain over the newly purchased flat. 17. Based on the above judgments of this Court which were rendered subsequent to the Full Bench judgment and judgment of Full Bench was duly considered, Mr. Suthar has strongly urged that the judgment and order passed by the lower Appellate Court is in accordance with law laid down by this Court and it requires no interference by this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. He has, therefore, submitted that the Revision Application deserves to be rejected. 18. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and having considered their rival submissions in light of the orders and judgments passed by the Courts below and also in view of the statutory provisions contained in Section-13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act as well as judicial pronouncements on the subject, the Court is of the view that the learned Appellate Court is justified in allowing the Appeal and setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge and also directing the present petitioner / ori. defendant to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the present respondent - ori. plaintiff. The only point for consideration before the lower Appellate Court as well as before this Court is as to whether the learned trial Judge was in error in holding that the original defendant has not acquired an alternative suitable residential accommodation. Before deciding this question of alternative residential accommodation by the appellant - ori. defendant, it is necessary to decide the question as to whether the acquisition of alternative suitable residential accommodation in Mahalaxmi Society, Junagadh by the son of the petitioner can be said to be an acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant himself looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned trial Judge was of the view that the acquisition of alternative accommodation should be by the tenant himself in his own name. However, narrow meaning to the word 'acquire' is not contemplated by the legislature. The learned trial Judge was of the view that the acquisition of alternative accommodation should be by the tenant himself in his own name. However, narrow meaning to the word 'acquire' is not contemplated by the legislature. To appreciate the controversy between the parties in its true perspective it is necessary to have a close look at the provisions contained in Section 13(1)(l), which reads as under :- “13(1)(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. That the tenant after the coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence.” Thus, the section itself envisages three eventualities. What is needed to be established is whether the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a suitable alternative accommodation. The tenant must have either built or he must have acquired or he must have been allotted a suitable residence. It is true that Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jayantilal Kanjibhai (since decd.) by his heirs and Lrs. Kamlaben Jayantilal & Ors (Supra) while interpreting Clause 13(1)(l) took the view that it is only when the tenant gets a right to reside in a house other than the demised premises on the happening of any one of the three alternatives mentioned in Section 13(1)(l) that the landlord can seek recovery of possession of the demised premises. This interpretation therefore prima facie supports the case of the appellant - ori. defendant to the effect that the acquisition of alternative suitable premises by the tenant himself in his own legal right. 19. However, the question paused before the Court in the present case was not the subject matter of the controversy before the Full Bench. The question which is to be decided by this Court as to whether simply because the tenant acquires or purchases alternative accommodation in the name of his son or any other member of his family to escape from the clutches of the Rent Act, can it be said that he has not acquired alternative suitable accommodation ? This question was succinctly addressed by this Court in the case of Lilavatiben Wd/o Eknath Rana (Supra). This question was succinctly addressed by this Court in the case of Lilavatiben Wd/o Eknath Rana (Supra). In para-17 of the judgment this Court has observed that, so far as applicability of the above decision of the Full Bench of this Court is concerned, it is pointed out in the said decision that the learned Single Judge referred to the Civil Revision Application to the larger Bench on the ground that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Shivlal Nathuram Vaishanv to the effect that the cause of action must exist at the time of notice and also at the time of filing of the suit, requires consideration in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dewan Chand Bhalla Vs. Dr. Ashok Kumar Bhoil ( 1994 (5) SCC 445 ) and Ramanlal Becharbhai Tailor Vs. Champaklal Nanalal Modi (1998 (2) GLH (UJ-9) 20. Hence, the learned Single Judge had referred Civil Revision Application for consideration of the Larger Bench. As such, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent, the matter referred to the Larger Bench was in respect of the cause of action regarding the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. The matter was not actually referred to the Larger Bench on the question whether any of the members of the tenant if acquires suitable residential accommodation would amount to compliance of the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act or not and it was found that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Chand Vs. Sher Singh, reported in 1981 DRJ 287 (SC) was not overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of B.R. Mehta Vs. Atma Devi & Ors., ( AIR 1987 SC 2220 ) This Court further observed in that case that in the case of Prem Chand Vs. Sher Singh, reported in 1981 DRJ 287 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under :- “Having considered the averments of the parties on the point at issue, it was held in that case that the respondent had through his wife acquired vacant possession of the residence in Delhi and in that view of the matter, it was held “not entitled to retain old tenanted premises.” The Supreme Court in the case of B. R. Mehta Vs. Atma Devi & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 2220 has held as under :- “In our opinion, from the fact that the wife of the tenant was allotted a temporary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that there was admission by virtue of which the tenant could lose his tenancy that the wife has acquired a house which is available to the husband over which the husband has domain which could be a substitute to the tenanted premises. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that there was no admission.” This Court, therefore, after considering both these judgments of the Apex Court has observed that the ratio of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is that the tenant-husband cannot lose his tenancy because of wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation. If a wife or a husband acquires a property and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition to stay there, then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of Clause (1) of Section 13(1), otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated. In other words, if for all practical and real sense the tenant, acquires, builds or is allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises. The Court ultimately held in that case that no material has been produced or shown before this Court to establish that the property allegedly was actually not purchased by her, but it was purchased by her son and she is not residing in the newly purchased property and residing in the suit premises. The material which could have been produced even before this Court in Appeal From Order filed in this Court by the petitioner or even in this Revision Application in order to reach to a proper and just decision, could have been seen and considered but no material or evidence either before the trial Court or before lower Appellate Court or even before this Court has been produced. In absence of any evidence produced by the petitioner, this Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, cannot go beyond the material produced by the respondent-plaintiff that the property was purchased by the petitioner-tenant in the name of her son and she herself has shifted to the newly acquired suitable residential accommodation and she is residing there with her son. 20. The above ratio and the observations made by this Court clearly apply to the facts of the present case. 21. Coming to the facts of the present case it appears from the evidence of the plaintiff's son, namely, Mahesh P. Vaishnav at Ex.36 that the defendant was staying with his son in the society for 5 to 6 years before the date of filing of the suit. It further appears from the plaintiff's witness, namely, Shri Vithalbhai Jivabhai at Ex.48 that the said witness was serving as Supervisor in Indane Gas and the defendant was having the gas connection at Serial No.1228. Initially defendant's address was that of the suit premises. However, subsequently on an application given by the defendant the address was changed to 6, Mahalaxmi Society and gas cylinder was used to be supplied at the said address even when the evidence was recorded on 8.12.1979. It further appears from the evidence of the defendant that his son was residing in Mahalaxmi Society and the house is in the name of his son. The defendant has admitted in his deposition that his son was staying separate for the last 14 years. He has further admitted that his son has acquired house in Mahalaxmi Society in the year 1968-69 and his son was in the employment for the last 11 to 12 years from the date of recording of his evidence i.e. 6.2.1980. All these evidence clearly establish that at the time when the house was acquired in Mahalaxmi Society, the son of the defendant had no source of income. The only presumption that can be drawn is that the said house in the Mahalaxmi Society was acquired out of funds provided by the defendant. All these evidence clearly establish that at the time when the house was acquired in Mahalaxmi Society, the son of the defendant had no source of income. The only presumption that can be drawn is that the said house in the Mahalaxmi Society was acquired out of funds provided by the defendant. For the purpose of rebuttal of this presumption no evidence whatsoever was produced by the defendant that his son was having other source of income or that he has obtained loan from the Bank or Financial Institution or that the amount was given by him by way of gift. In absence of any evidence to the contrary, the presumption drawn by the lower Appellate Court is quite justified and there is no infirmity in the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court that the defendant has acquired the alternative residential accommodation in the name of his son only with a view to escape from the clutches of the Bombay Rent Act. Though the defendant has no legal right to claim the ownership of the house in Mahalaxmi Society, at the same time, since the funds are presumed to have been provided by him and since he was staying with his son for 5 to 6 years prior to the date of filing of the suit, the son cannot dare to say his father not to stay in the house. The son has not entered into the witness box and his statement was not recorded. 22. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and further considering the relevant statutory provisions as well as law laid down by this Court even after the Full Bench decision, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the defendant has acquired an alternative suitable residential premises and hence the finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court does not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. 23. In the above view of the matter, the order and judgment passed by the Appellate Court is hereby confirmed and since the appellant - ori. defendant has expired all his heirs and legal representatives are required to vacate the suit premises and to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the respondent - ori. plaintiff within two months from today. 24. defendant has expired all his heirs and legal representatives are required to vacate the suit premises and to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the respondent - ori. plaintiff within two months from today. 24. This Civil Revision Application is accordingly disposed off. Parties will have to bear their own cost.