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2010 DIGILAW 325 (KAR)

Vinodamma v. Union of India

2010-03-15

V.JAGANNATHAN

body2010
JUDGMENT :- (Miscellaneous First Appeal filed under Section 23(1) of the RCT Act against the judgment and order dated 30.1.2008 passed in O.A.No.21/2005 on the file of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, dismissing the application filed under Section 16 of the RCT Act for payment of compensation.) 1. The appellants (applicants before the Railway Claims Tribunal), being the mother and brothers of deceased Thippeswamy, call in question the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal dismissing their application filed under Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 seeking compensation following the death of Thippeswamy in an untoward accident. The said accident occurred when he was getting down the train at Chikkajajur Railway Station and the train suddenly moved on account of which Thippeswamy fell down, sustained injuries and died. 2. It was the case of the appellants before the Railway Claims Tribunal that Thippeswamy had a valid ticket purchased by him at Chikkajajur Railway Station and when he boarded the train at Chikkajajur and when he was trying to get down the train, all of a sudden, the train move leading to Thippeswamy falling down and later died on account of the injuries sustained in the said accident. It was also the case of the appellants that the deceased was holding a second class train ticket in respect of train No.581. The facts are also not in dispute that the ticket bearing No.05725 was issued at Chikkajajur Railway Station on 2.1.2005 for the train that leaves at 11.45 hours. It is on these facts that the appellants approached the claims tribunal for compensation. 3. The respondent railway administration took up the contention before the claims tribunal that though the deceased was holding a valid ticket to travel as a passenger, the said ticket pertained to train No.582 and not for train No.581 and, therefore, it cannot be said that the deceased was a bonafide passenger in respect of train No.581. The Railway Claims Tribunal accepted the said contention of the respondent railways and held that the deceased was not a bonafide passenger because, he had been issued a ticket in respect of train No.582 and not in respect of train No.581. The Railway Claims Tribunal accepted the said contention of the respondent railways and held that the deceased was not a bonafide passenger because, he had been issued a ticket in respect of train No.582 and not in respect of train No.581. It was, therefore, held by the Tribunal that the deceased was not holding a valid ticket for his travel by train at the relevant time of the accident and he cannot, therefore, be considered as a bonafide passenger in respect of the train in question and, as such, the application was rejected. The Tribunal also held that for being a passenger within the meaning of the Railways Act, he must be a person travelling with a ticket relating to the concerned train. 4. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the claim application, the appellants-applicants are before this court in this appeal and I have heard the learned counsel Shri R.Krishna Reddy for the appellants and the learned counsel Shri N.S.Sanjay Gowda for the respondent-Union of India. I have also perused the impugned order as well as the record of this case. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view taken by the Railway Claims Tribunal was totally erroneous and contrary to the very provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 and it was contended that so long as it is not disputed that deceased Thippeswamy was holding a valid ticket to travel by a train as a passenger, it is immaterial as to from which train he fell down so long as the case falls within the ambit of Section 124-A and outside the exceptions mennoned in the said section. Referring to the definition of “passenger” both in the explanation to Section 124-A and to the definition at Section 2(29) of the Railways Act, 1989, the submission made is that deceased Thippeswamy satisfies the requirement of being a passenger and, therefore, the claims tribunal could not have dismissed the claim application. 6. It is further argued in this connection that when a platform ticket holder is also eligible for compensation under Section 124-A though the said platform ticket holder does not hold the said ticket in respect of any train, the same analogy could be extended even in respect of a person holding a valid ticket to travel by a train carrying passengers. To further substantiate the above submission, the learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on the decisions reported in 2004 ACJ 1420 and 2008 ACJ 1895 and argued that the provisions of the Railways Act will have to be liberally interpreted so as to advance the benefit conferred by the Act and the interpretation should not be so narrow as to deprive the benefit of the Act being reaped by the persons in respect of whose welfare the beneficial provisions have been incorporated in the Act. 7. Yet another submission made is that the ticket itself was produced before the claims tribunal at Ex.A-6 and there is no indication in the in the said ticket as to by which train the deceased was supposed to travel. Therefore, the impugned order be set aside and compensation be awarded as per the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-Union of India argued that the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal is just and proper and requires no interference and the finding recorded by the Tribunal that for being a passenger within the meaning of the Railways Act, he must be a person travelling with a ticket relating to the concerned train is the correct view in the light of the material placed before the Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, the ticket held by deceased Thippeswamy was in respect of train No.582 and nor for train No.581 from which train he fell down and sustained injuries. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the claims tribunal cannot be said to be contrary to the provisions of the Railways Act and the deceased cannot be deemed to be bonafide passenger. As such, no interference is called for. Yet another submission made is that except the first appellant who is the mother of the deceased, the other appellants, being major brothers of the deceased, are not entitled for compensation. 9. In the light of the aforesaid submissions made and the decisions cited, the only point that requires consideration is as to whether the deceased can be called a “passenger” so as to entitle the claimants for compensation by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 124-A of the Railways Act. 10. 9. In the light of the aforesaid submissions made and the decisions cited, the only point that requires consideration is as to whether the deceased can be called a “passenger” so as to entitle the claimants for compensation by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 124-A of the Railways Act. 10. Section 2(29) of the Railways Act defines a passenger as follows: “(29) “passenger” means a person travelling with a valid pass or ticket;” The word “passenger” also occurs in Section 124-A and the said section with the explanation, therefore, will have to be referred to at thus juncture and it reads as under: “124A. Compensation on account of untoward incident When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent a may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident; PROVIDED that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to- (a) suicide or attempted suicide by him; (b) self-inflicted injury; (c) his own criminal act; (d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity; (e) any natural cause of disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, “passenger” includes- (i) a railway servant on duty; and (ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling by a train carrying passengers, on any date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward incident.” 11. That fact that deceased Thippeswamy was holding a valid ticket is not in controversy as the Railway Claims Tribunal has also accepted the said fact by referring to the ticket number and the date on which it was issues ad the said ticket is also produced at Ex.A-6. That fact that deceased Thippeswamy was holding a valid ticket is not in controversy as the Railway Claims Tribunal has also accepted the said fact by referring to the ticket number and the date on which it was issues ad the said ticket is also produced at Ex.A-6. By virtue of Section 2(29), the deceased is, therefore, is deemed to be a passenger. With this conclusion in the background, if we look at Section 124-A, the word “passenger” that occurs in the said section including the explanation will, therefore, covers the case of deceased Thippeswamy as well. The explanation to Section 124-A further makes it clear that ‘passenger’ also includes a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling and the said explanation is followed by the punctuation mark ‘coma’ and it goes on to say that, by a train carrying passengers. Therefore, a plain reading of the said explanation does not give room to take the view that in order to be considered as coming within the definition of ‘passenger’ both in Section 124-A and Section 2(29) of the Railways Act, the said person must hold a valid ticket to travel as a passenger in a particular train. The use of the expression in the explanation “by a train carrying passengers” would imply that the person holding a valid ticket can travel in any train which takes him to his destination and the use of the indefinite article “a” and not the definite article “the”, therefore, would imply that the framers of the Act or the legislation had in view the possibility of a person holding a valid ticket to travel by any train that takes him to his destination. 12. To further illustrate this, if a person, who wants to reach a destination in between Bangalore and Mysore, purchases a ticket at Bangalore station, he could go by a train that takes him to his destination in between Bangalore and Mysore, unless the ticket itself prohibits from travelling in any train that takes him to his destination. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid explanation given to Section 124-A and the definition in Section 2(29) of the Act, it cannot be said that deceased Thippeswamy was not holding a valid ticket to travel in a train from Chikkajajur. 13. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid explanation given to Section 124-A and the definition in Section 2(29) of the Act, it cannot be said that deceased Thippeswamy was not holding a valid ticket to travel in a train from Chikkajajur. 13. As far as the view taken by the Claims Tribunal that train No.581 was bound from Bangalore to Dharawad and train No.582 was the train coming from Hubll to Bangalore and the deceased was holding a ticket and boarded train No.581 is concerned, so long as the deceased satisfies the definition of a “passenger” occurring in Section 2(29) and in Section 124-A and the explanation therein, the railway administration cannot escape its liability if the case falls outside the purview of exceptions (a) to (e) to Section 124-A. It is nobody’s case that the case of Thippeswamy is covered by any one of the five exceptions mentioned in Section 124-A. 14. Apart from the above, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is not uncommon to come across situations where persons holding valid tickets get into a train other than one in which they were supposed to travel due to various factors like confusion when the platform from which the train moves is suddenly declared to be a different platform and also due to illiteracy and other factors. Therefore, the provisions of the Railways Act will have to be interpreted in a manner which would advance the object of the Act and since it is a beneficial legislation, liberal interpretation should be given and, in this connection, it is also relevant to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, reported in 2008 ACJ 1895 . The relevant paragraphs of the said decision which require to be reproduced are a under: “12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, the beneficial on welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. In other words, the beneficial on welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 647 (para 7); Jeewanlal Ltd v. Appellate Authority, AIR 1984 SC 1842 (para 11); Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 852 (para 13); S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom Distt. Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27 (para 12); etc. 13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, AIR 1996 SC 285 , this court observed: “(40) in this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this court in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. American Express International Banking Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71 , wherein Chinnappa Reddy. J in para 4 of the report has made the following observations: “The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statues of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights’ legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislation the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the ‘color’, the ‘content’ and the ‘context’ of such statues [we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce’s opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds, (1971) 3 ALL ER 237]. In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquiry, beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations in one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surender Kumar Verma v Central Govt, Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court AIR 1981 SC 422 , we had occasion to say: ‘Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statues. Welfare statues must, of necessity, receive a board interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions’”. 14. Welfare statues must, of necessity, receive a board interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions’”. 14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’ in section 123 (c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well-known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by the railway trains sine everybody cannot afford travelling by air or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’ includes accidents when a bona fide passenger, i.e., a passenger travelling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the prioress. In other words, a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should be given to the expression. 15. Having regard to the aforesaid view expressed by the Apex Court, in the case on hand, the Claims Tribunal, instead of giving a liberal interpretation more so in the light of the definition of “passenger” as contained in Section 2(29) and Section 124-A as well as explanation to the said section, narrowed down the interpretation of “passenger” and thereby the applicants were deprived of being entitled to compensation. Therefore, the finding of the Claims Tribunal that for being a passenger within the meaning of the Railways Act, he must be a person travelling with a ticket relating to the concerned train cannot be sustained in law not only in view of the definition of “passenger” referred to by me above but also in view of the interpretation to be given to the words in respect of a beneficial or welfare statute is concerned. Consequently, the order of the Claims Tribunal is liable to be set aside. 16. Coming to the entitlement of compensation, death of Thippeswamy on account of untoward incident is not in dispute. Consequently, the order of the Claims Tribunal is liable to be set aside. 16. Coming to the entitlement of compensation, death of Thippeswamy on account of untoward incident is not in dispute. The deceased was also a passenger satisfying the definition of “passenger” in Section 2(29) and the definition of “passenger” occurring in Section 124-A as well as the explanation to the said section and, therefore, compensation will have to be awarded. But, as rightly brought to the notice of this court by the learned counsel for the respondent, appellants-2 and 3 being the major sons of the first appellant, only the first appellant, who is the mother of deceased Thippeswamy, will be eligible for compensation and this is in view of the definition of “dependents” as contained in Section 123(b) of the Railways Act. The quantum of compensation is also to be found in the schedule to the Railway Accidents and Untoward incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 and in respect of death, the amount of compensation payable is Rs.4,00,000/- and it is only the first appellant, who is the mother of deceased Thippeswamy, who is entitled for the said amount. The interest payable will be at 6% from the date of claim application. 17. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following order: The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Railway Claims Tribunal is set aside. The claim application is allowed in part to the extent of compensation being payable only to the first appellant i.e., mother of deceased Thippeswamy. The compensation is quantified at Rs.4,00,000/- as per schedule to the aforesaid compensation rules. The said amount will also carry interest at 6% from the date of application till the date of the order and if the payment is not made within three months from the date of receipt of this order, the interest will be payable at 9% till actual payment is made. Out of the compensation amount awarded to the first appellant, Rs.3,25,00/- shall be kept in fixed deposit in her name for a period of three years in a nationalised bank of her choice. The interest on the fixed deposit shall be payable to the first appellant every quarter. The balance after deposit shall be paid to the first appellant with accrued interest.