JUDGMENT PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. These two petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment as was suggested by the learned Counsel for the parties. The background facts may be noticed in brief. The dispute relates to a double storied building No. B2/211 Bhadaini, Varanasi. The petitioner claims that he is the owner in possession 'of the said building as his name is recorded in the municipal record as owner. The electric connection is also in his name since 1964 and he is paying the house tax to the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi There are four shops on the ground floor of the said building facing the main road Its back portion consists of a temple. The rooms are around the said temple. 2. Raghavanand Acharya, the respondent No.3 in writ petition No. 7131 of 1989 who is respondent No.2 in the connected writ petition wants to grab the said property. With this design in the background of his mind, a suit being suit No. 208 of 1982 was filed against the petitioner for declaration etc. The said suit was not pursued any further and was dismissed in default vide order dated 24th of August, 1984. 3. Another suit being SCC suit No. 109 of 1982 was filed by Raghavanand Acharya against Sarvendra Kumar Verma for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and ejectment of the defendant on the ground that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the tenant has defaulted in paying the arrears of rent. The said suit was decreed ex part on 31st of May, 1983 by JSCC, Varanasi. 4. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for setting aside the ex part decree which was registered as Misc. Case No. 222 of 1985 but the said application was rejected by the Trial Court and the order of the Trial Court has been confirmed in Civil Revision No. 162 of 1986 by the judgment dated 3rd of May, 1989, on the ground that the petitioner being a third party has no locus to maintain such an application for setting aside the expert decree. Challenging these two orders, the writ petition No. 14452 of 1989 has been filed. 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Challenging these two orders, the writ petition No. 14452 of 1989 has been filed. 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner admits that the petitioner was not arrayed as one of the defendants in the suit. Submission is that the decree obtained in the Small Cause Suit by Raghavanand Acharya affects his right to the property in dispute he is an aggrieved person and thus, can maintain an application to set aside the ex part decree. 7. On a careful consideration, I do not find any merit in the said submission. It was a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the tenant. The suit was of small cause nature. In such a suit the intricate questions of title cannot be gone into in view of the restricted jurisdiction of the Judge Small Causes Court. The remedy of the petitioner is to get his right established and prove in a duly constituted suit as he may be advised. Thus, I find no merit in the petition. The writ petition No. 14452 of 1989 is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 7131 of 1989 8. The above petition arises out of execution proceedings in Execution Case No. 73 of 1984 of decree obtained by Raghavanand Acharya against his tenant in sec Suit No. 109 of 1982. Execution of the decree was resisted by the petitioner and an objection under Order XXI, Rule 97 C.P.C was filed, claiming his title and ownership qua the property in dispute. The said objections were rejected by the Executive Court by the order dated 12th of August, 1986 and the said order has been confirmed by the Revisional Court in Civil Revision No. 298 of 1986 by the judgment dated December 9, 1988. Challenging these two orders, the present writ petition has been filed. 9. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is not claiming the property in dispute through a judgment debtor. He is claiming his independent right in respect of the property in dispute. The Court below was obliged to decide the objections of the petitioner on merits. Reliance has been placed on the following two judgments: 1. Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others1 and 2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another2 10. He is claiming his independent right in respect of the property in dispute. The Court below was obliged to decide the objections of the petitioner on merits. Reliance has been placed on the following two judgments: 1. Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others1 and 2. Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another2 10. In reply the learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned orders. 11. Considered the respective submissions of the Counsel for the parties and perused the record. A bare perusal of the impugned orders would show that the Revisional Court has given three reasons for not interfering in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Firstly, that the impugned order if it was really passed under Order XXI, Rule 99 C.P.C. by the Trial Court, was appeasable and not revisable. This can hardly be a ground to reject the claim of a litigant. It is a question of giving label to a case whether it is appeal or revision. Even otherwise also, the scope of interference in appeal is wider than the scope of interference in a revision. The Court below should not have been guided by the nomenclature given by the petitioner as in both the cases whether it is appeal or revision it had the jurisdiction to consider the legality and validity of the order of the Executing Court. This being so, the first ground taken by the revisional Court is not sustainable. Secondly the Revisional Court was obsessed with the view that since there is no jurisdictional error in the order of the Executing Court and at the most it could be a cage of error of law no interference in the revision is possible. This approach of the Revisional Court runs contrary to the view taken by it that the order was appeasable. It should have exercised the appellate jurisdiction. 12. The third ground taken is that the petitioner here n who has filed the revision has claimed his right on the compromise decree dated 7th of July, 1986 in suit No. 194 of 1985, while the decree sought to be executed and the suit giving rise to it was of the year 1983. The Court below has really missed the real point and has not cared to consider the case of the petitioner in depth. The Court below has really missed the real point and has not cared to consider the case of the petitioner in depth. The petitioner is claiming title to the property in dispute not through the compromise referred to above but on the basis that his name is recorded in the municipal record as owner over the property in dispute. Under the said compromise, the possession was delivered to it by the outgoing tenant. The petitioner is not claiming any right through the outgoing tenant but he is claiming his independent right. Therefore, this part of the reasoning is also not sustainable in the eyes of law. 13. On a careful consideration of the entire material on record it cannot be said that the petitioner is claiming the property in dispute through the outgoing tenant. On the contrary, as stated herein above he is claiming an independent right. Much emphasis was laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the fact that the contesting respondent who claimed himself as landlord had filed a suit against the present petitioner and subsequently got it dismissed in default. 14. In Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others (supra) it has been laid down that a party in possession of property claiming independent right as a tenant not party to a decree for possession of immovable property under execution could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objections under Order XXI, Rule 97 C.P.C. The expression "any person" used in sub-clause (1) of Rule 97, C.P.C. is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the Executing Court could adjudicate the claim made in such application under Order XXI, Rule 97 C.P.C. 15. In Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another (supra) elaborating the law further on the subject it has been laid down that in execution of a decree for possession, it is not necessary that the third party can get his claim adjudicated only after losing the possession Even an stranger can get his claim adjudicated prior to losing possession to decree holder. As against above, the learned Counsel for the respondent could not place any material to persuade this Court to take a different view of the matter on the facts of the present case. 16. As against above, the learned Counsel for the respondent could not place any material to persuade this Court to take a different view of the matter on the facts of the present case. 16. Irresistible conclusion therefore is that the impugned orders refuting the claim of the petitioner without its adjudication on merits cannot be allowed to stand. The claim made by the petitioner is liable to be adjudicated upon before claiming possession against him. 17. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 9.12.1988 (Annexure 15-A) and 12.8.1986 (Annexure-10) are hereby set aside. The matter is restored back to the Executing Court to decide the objections filed by the petitioner preferred under Order XXI, Rule 97C.P.C expeditiously in accordance with law. 18. No order as to costs. 19. In view of the above discussions, the writ petition No. 14452 of 1989 is dismissed and the writ petition No. 7131 of 1989 is allowed. W.P. No. 14452 of 1989 Dismissed W.P. No. 7131 of 1989 Allowed.