Dr. Saikia, CJ. 1. Heard Mr. A.M. Magrey, Senior Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the applicants as well as Mr. H.I. Hussain, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 65 days in preferring the related letters patent appeal. 3. In order to explain the above mentioned delay, the following explanations have been put forward in this condonation petition: "1/ That the above titled LPA is being instituted before this Hon’ble court against judgment and order dated 27.08.2009. The matter involves important questions, which requires adjudication before this Hon’ble Court. The writ petitioner has been ordered to be promoted to the post of Associate Professor against which he was not eligible at the relevant point of time. The appellants have a strong case on merits in the LP And are sure to succeed in it. 2/ That there is some delay in filing of LPA against above mentioned judgment after deducting sixty days limitation period and the period taken by the registry in issuance of the judgment, but the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but has occasioned due to the reason beyond control. As soon as the judgment was received in the Institute, same was examined and the matter had to pass through many tables as per procedure and administrative niceties, due to which a considerable time got consumed. 3/ that in case delay is not condoned, a meritorious case will be thrown out of the court. In that eventuality, serious prejudice will be caused to the interests of the appellants. 4/ In the premises, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to accept this application for condonation of delay and the LPA may be entertained and appropriate orders passed; same shall meet the ends of justice." 4. It is stated at the Bar by Mr. Magrey, learned Sr. AAG, supporting the above contentions, to be the satisfactory explanation that since it is a Government lis, some leniency needs to be shown because from the date of judgment till the date of taking final decision for preferring the appeal, a lengthy official process is required to be followed in which the matter has to move from table to table. In this case as well, when the matter has been processed for filing the appeal, the delay in question has occurred. In this case as well, when the matter has been processed for filing the appeal, the delay in question has occurred. Accordingly, it is submitted that the delay in question may be condoned. 5. It is established that law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by the Statute. Although Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act Smvt. 1995 (for short `the Act’) provides for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases, the applicant or appellant seeking such extension under the said provision of law is required to satisfy the Court that he has "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period as is prescribed by law. 6. Under the concept of welfare State, in order to promote social justice, it is the bounden duty of the State to protect and preserve public interest and public fund. Since public exchequer is incurring heavy expenses on different departments of the State and its instrumentalities, it is incumbent upon them to be fast and prompt in discharging their duties and in carrying their responsibilities with due diligence. If there is a good case on merit and the application for condonation of delay, unintentional or otherwise, filed by the State is not allowed, it is certain that damage will be caused to the public interest and public fund. Unfortunately, the officers of the State and its instrumentalities carry an impression that with each and every case, the delay caused in filing an appeal is bound to be condoned, taking it for granted on the basis of a few decisions where the delay has been condoned considering the facts of those cases where sufficient causes were shown and proved. 7. In the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Apex Court, at paragraph 6 ruled as under: "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs." 8. In another case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deliberating upon the question of condonation of an inordinate delay of 264 days on an application preferred by the Government, has observed as under: "2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner’s own words: "(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 alongwith the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993." 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common Interests. The affidavit is gain one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest." 9. The present application for condonation of delay of 65 days has been filed in a very cryptic and casual manner without explaining the delay as required by the law of limitation and the same is explicitly evident from the contentions and submissions made in this application by way of explanations, as quoted hereinabove. Amazingly, there is not even a whisper in the explanations so furnished as to how many delay is sought to be condoned. 10. An attempt has been made on behalf of the applicants to impress upon the Court that in condoning the delay on an application filed by the State, the expression `sufficient cause’ occurring in the relevant provision of the law should receive a liberal construction in favour of the State so as to advance the cause of substantial justice. 11. However, we find that the term "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Act. But, from a bare perusal of the relevant provisions thereof, it is manifest that the Act itself is an exhaustive Code governing the law of limitation in respect of matters specially dealt with by it. This is why the law of limitation is a panacea to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity of justice or what may have been lost by the parties or inaction / negligence of laches. 12. This is why the law of limitation is a panacea to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity of justice or what may have been lost by the parties or inaction / negligence of laches. 12. The Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions of the Act or to supplement them. The Courts cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable considerations or on the ground of hardship. 13. Having meticulously perused the application and considered the submissions and contentions in the form of explanation, as quoted above as well as in view of the judicial authorities above referred, we do not find that any such attempt has been made by the applicants to explain the delay caused in preferring the appeal, satisfactorily. 14. In view of what has been stated, discussed and observed hereinabove, we find no cogent or plausible ground to accept the explanations to be sufficient cause. 15. Accordingly, this condonation petition stands dismissed.