JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Chandra Kumar Rai for the petitioner-appellants. Sri J.K Tiwari, learned standing counsel appears for the respondents. 2. In this intra Court appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, the petitioner-appellants have challenged the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 28.4.2009 by which he declined to interfere with the dismissal order passed against the petitioner-appellants without holding departmental enquiry under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Rank (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short the Rules of 1991). 3. The facts leading to the writ petition are that the petitioner-appellants serving as constables in civil police at Varanasi, were caught red handed, illegally extracting money from Truck No. 61 H - 8292 at about 1.50 a.m. in the night of 13/14.1.2009. A sum of Rs. 55 was recovered C.P. 541 Daya Shankar and a sum of Rs. 60/- was recorded from C.P.2286 Radhey Shyam Rai, at the time they were apprehended. 4. A criminal case under Section 7 (13) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is pending against the petitioner-appellants in which the appellants were granted bail. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi by his order dated 14.1.2009, dismissed them under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules of 1991 on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. He observed that the petitioners have been caught red handed in accepting bribe, causing strong probability of indiscipline amongst other members of the police force. The consequences of such kind of corrupt actions on the police department and the society can be serious. On one hand, the image of the police department will suffer serious damage, and on the other hand, the society will loose their faith in the police department. 5. Learned Single Judge referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and another v. Ram Vinai Sinha, in SLP (Civil) No. 11757 of 2007 cited by the counsel for the petitioner in which it was held that since a stigma was caused to the employee while discharging his services, an opportunity of hearing should have been given. 6. 6. Learned Single Judge also considered the judgment in Pushpendra Singh (C.P. 2187) and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(3) ADJ 689 (DB) : 2008(2) ESC 1477 , in which a Division Bench of this Court has held that dismissal order under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules of 1991 on the ground that the police constable was caught accepting bribe red handed cannot be sustained and that the petition cannot be thrown away on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 7. The learned Single Judge after referring to the law as aforesaid held that in the given circumstances, he was not inclined to interfere with the dismissal order. 8. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants has relied upon judgment in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 and judgment given by one of us (Hon’ble Sunil Ambwani, J) sitting singly in Babban Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(6) ADJ 216 : 2009(4) ESC 2372. In Union of India v. Tulsiram it was held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 130 to 137 as follows : 130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done;feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to practice or perform.: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words used are not, “.not practicable” but “not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a. reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a. reasonable view of the prevailing situation. ‘It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the Government servant, particularly through or together, with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the Government servant by himself or together with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely. in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not finding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such case the Court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not finding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such case the Court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCR 302 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1356 ) is an instance in point. In that case, the appellant, was working as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior Commercial Officer wrote a letter o the appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing and that another chance was, being given to him to offer his explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant submitted his further explanation but on the very next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service. This Court struck down the order holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness for the Department would have been the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in the same person being the main accuser, the chief witness and also the judge of the matter. 131. It was submitted that where a delinquent Government servant so terrorizes the disciplinary authority that neither. that officer nor any other officer stationed at that place is willing to hold the inquiry, some senior officer can be sent from outside to hold the inquiry. This submission itself shows that in such a case the holding of an inquiry is not reasonably practicable. It would be illogical to hold that the administrative work carried out by senior officers should be paralysed because a delinquent Government servant either by himself or alongwith or through others makes the holding. of an inquiry not reasonably practicable. 132. This submission itself shows that in such a case the holding of an inquiry is not reasonably practicable. It would be illogical to hold that the administrative work carried out by senior officers should be paralysed because a delinquent Government servant either by himself or alongwith or through others makes the holding. of an inquiry not reasonably practicable. 132. It is not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the disciplinary inquiry is initiated against a Government servant. Such a situation can also come into existence subsequently during the course of an inquiry, for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the Government servant or after he has filed his written statement thereto or even after evidence has been led in part. In such a case also the disciplinary authority would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the second proviso because the word “inquiry” in that clause includes part of an inquiry. It would also not be reasonably practicable to afford to the Government servant an opportunity of hearing or further hearing, as the case may be, when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending it the Government servant absconds and cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex parte and on the materials before the disciplinary authority. Therefore, even where a part of an inquiry has been held and the rest is dispensed with under clause (b) or a provision in the service rules analogous thereto, the exclusionary words of the second proviso operate in their full vigour and the Government servant cannot complain that he has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in violation of the safeguards provided by Article 311(2). 133. The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty. This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore find a place in the final order. It would be usual, to record the reason separately and then consider the question of the penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the penalty. It would, however, be better to record the reason in the final order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passing. the final order but was subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but the reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause (b) of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement of clause (b) for the disciplinary authority simply to state that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances. 135. It was vehemently contended that if reasons are not recorded in the final order, they must be communicated to the concerned Government servant to enable him to challenge the validity of the reasons in a departmental appeal or before a Court of law and that failure to communicate the reasons would invalidate the order. This contention too cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason to the Government servant. This contention too cannot be accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to communicate the reason to the Government servant. At clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this point final, the question cannot be agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review., The obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause (b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power under clause (b) properly or not with a view to judge the performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of promotion etc. It would however, be better for the disciplinary authority to communicate to the Government servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that the reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would also enable the Government servant to approach the High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court under Article 32. If the reasons are not communicated to the Government servant and the matter comes to the Court, the Court can direct the reasons to be produced, and famished to the Government servant and if still not produced, a presumption should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the written reasons. 136. It was next submitted that though clause (b) of the second proviso excludes an inquiry into the charges made against a Government servant, it does not exclude an inquiry preceding it, namely an inquiry into whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not, and that in such a preliminary inquiry the Government servant should be given an opportunity of a hearing by issuing to him a notice to show cause why the inquiry should not be dispensed with so as to enable him to satisfy the disciplinary authority that it would be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. This argument is illogical and is a contradiction in terms. This argument is illogical and is a contradiction in terms. If an inquiry into the charges against a Government servant is not reasonably practicable, it stands to reason that an inquiry into the question whet her the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is equally not reasonably practicable. 136A. A Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying to his case clause (b) or an-analogous provision of a service rule is not wholly without a remedy. As pointed out earlier while dealing with the various service rules he can claim in a departmental appeal or revision that an inquiry be held with respect to the charges on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank has been imposed upon him unless the same or a similar situation prevails at the time of hearing of the appeal or revision application. If the same situation is continuing or a similar situation arises, it would not then be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry at the time of the hearing of the appeal or revision. Though in such a ease as the Government servant if dismissed or removed from service, is not continuing in service and it reduced in rank, is continuing in service with such reduced rank, no prejudice could be caused to the Government or the Department if the hearing of an appeal or revision application, as the case may be, is postponed for a reasonable time. 137. Where a Government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous provision of the service Rules and he approaches either the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32, the Court will interfere on grounds well established in law for the exercise of power of judicial review in matters where administrative discretion is exercised. It will consider whether clause (b) or an analogous provision in the service rules was property applied or not. The finality given by clause (3) of Article 311 to the disciplinary’ authority’s ‘decision that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry s not binding upon the Court. The Court will also examine the charge of mala fides, if any made in the writ petition. The finality given by clause (3) of Article 311 to the disciplinary’ authority’s ‘decision that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry s not binding upon the Court. The Court will also examine the charge of mala fides, if any made in the writ petition. In examining the relevancy of the reasons, the Court will consider the situation which according to the disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. If the Court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary authority the Court will not, however, sit in judgment over them like a Court of first appeal. In older to decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the Court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a Courtroom, removed in time, from the situation in question. Where two views are possible, the Court will decline to interfere.” 9. In the present case, it is admitted that the petitioners were caught red handed while on duty, and no preliminary enquiry was held nor the petitioners were given opportunity to explain their conduct. The Senior Superintendent of Police has found that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against them only on the ground that the act of police personnel will cause serious damage to the police department, and general public will loose confidence in the police department. 10. In all the aforesaid cases, it was held that unless the reasons given by the disciplinary authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry, relevant for the exercise of power, the Courts will not exercise power of judicial review. 11. 10. In all the aforesaid cases, it was held that unless the reasons given by the disciplinary authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry, relevant for the exercise of power, the Courts will not exercise power of judicial review. 11. In the present case, acceptance of bribe and being caught red handed in the act, may lower the image of the police department, and the confidence of general public, but that by itself cannot be said to relevant grounds to dispense with the preliminary and thereafter departmental enquiry. The exercise of powers under Section 8 (2) (b) will require the act of indiscipline or misconduct to be such, and not its consequences, which may be relevant to record findings that it is not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry. Every allegation of corrupt practice by police officers results into possibility of indiscipline, lowering of image and loss of public faith. These consequences cannot be taken to be sufficient not to cause departmental enquiry to enquire into the truth of allegations after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee. 12. In the present case, we find that the learned Single Judge did not apply his mind to the facts of the case and did not record any conclusion to agree with the findings of the Senior Superintendent of Police that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioners. We do not find that the facts of the case and the reasons are such that it was not proper for the Court to interfere with the dismissal order. 13. The Special Appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 28.4.2009 and the order of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi dated 14.1.2009 are set aside. It will be open to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi to place the petitioners under suspension, and to initiate departmental enquiry against them. The petitioner-appellants shall be reinstated. Since they have not worked for the period from 14.1.2009 till date, they will be entitled only to half of the back wages, for the period during which they were out of employment. —————