Judgment : 1. This Application is filed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity,” the C.P.C.”) to set aside the order passed by this Court on 26.2.2010 in O.P. No. 757 of 2008. 2.1. The First Respondent in the Original Petition has filed the present Application. It is seen that the Application was awarded a contract for construction of quay-wall and side walls of slip way with quarried rubble back-fill and reclamation of fishing harbor at Chinnamuttom In Kanyakumari District and an agreement was entered on 23.7.1986 for a total value of Rs. 2,17,36,265/-. 2.2. In respect of certain disputes arisen, it appears that the Applicant has moved the Sub-Court, Nagercoil by filing O.S. No.75 of 1990 and he has also filed an Application for interim injunction restraining the Respondent from terminating the contract and not to engage any other contractor for execution of the balance work and that Application came to be dismissed by the Trial Court on 20.3.1991, against which C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991 filed by the Applicant came to be allowed by judgment dated 29.4.1991. While allowing the said Appeal, this Court has directed the Respondent to measure and value through the Executive Engineer the work done by the Applicant/contractor till the date of cancellation of contract, viz., 25.9.1990, before proceeding with the execution of the balance work and to hand over a copy of such measurement to the Applicant. 2.3. As against the order passed in C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991, it appears that the Respondent has filed an Appeal in LP.A. No.155 of 1991 and the Division Bench, in the judgment dated 3.11.1993, has set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge in C.M.A. No.310 of 1991 with a direction that before the Respondent proceeds to execute the balance work, the work done by the Applicant/Contractor till the date of cancellation of the contract, viz., 25.9.1990, be measured and handed over to the Applicant. 2.4. 2.4. It appears that the Applicant has thereafter filed C.S.No. 208 of 1996 before this Court for appointment of an Arbitrator to decide the dispute and the same was dismissed on 27.11.1996 and the Appeal filed against the said judgment in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997 also came to be dismissed holding that the claim of the Applicant under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is time barred, however, with liberty to the Applicant to proceed with the Suit in O.S. No. 175 of 1990 pending on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil. It was against the said judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, the Applicant/contractor has preferred further Appeal to the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 8.2.1999. 2.5. It is also seen that the Applicant has filed another Suit in O.S. No.116 of 2004 before the District Court, Kanyakumari for a declaration that the cancellation of the contract was illegal, claiming Rs. 88,08,493/-as compensation for illegal termination of the contract with interest. It is seen that the District Court passed an order in the above Suit on 16.2.2005 appointing Mr. K. Ramalingam, Retired Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Public Works Department as Arbitrator, the other members of the Arbitral Tribunal being M/s. R. Sambandam and A. Chandrasekaran. 2.6. The Arbitral Tribunal has passed an award on 20.10.2007 granting an amount of Rs.60,78,204/- in favour of the Applicant to be paid by the Respondent on or before 31.12.2007 and if not, to pay interest at the rate of 10% on the principal amount of Rs.52,58,353/- until the actual payment is made. 2.6. The Arbitral Tribunal has passed an award on 20.10.2007 granting an amount of Rs.60,78,204/- in favour of the Applicant to be paid by the Respondent on or before 31.12.2007 and if not, to pay interest at the rate of 10% on the principal amount of Rs.52,58,353/- until the actual payment is made. The following is the abstract of award of the Arbitral Tribunal on various heads: Claim No. Brief Description As claimed Award amounts 1 Payment of final bill 3,49,000 2,09,826 2 Escalation Charges 29,89,000 25,65,419 3 Extra lead for riversand 1,17,000 1,05,690 4 Extra lead for rubble & metal 1,52,700 1,52,669 5 Fixing steel rods in precast blocs 1,32,700 Nil 6 Losses due to stoppages of work 25,29,000 8,24,900 7 Loss of profit 13,34,000 2,52,808 8 Expenses on casting yard 21,300 Nil 9 Refund of security deposit 10,66,293 10,29,541 10 Refund of fines 1,17,500 1,17,500 11 Refund of losses due to excise duty 7,80,000 Nil 12 Total of awards 95,88,493 52,58,353 Interest at 10% on the awarded amount from 8.3.2006 until 30.9.2007 on Rs.52,58,353 (year-6 months & 22 days 8,19,851 Total 60,78,204 The said award came to be challenged by the Respondent in the above said Original Petition. 2.7. The Applicant/Contractor, who is the First Respondent, has not chosen to appear before this Court. However, the Original Petition came to be allowed by this Court in the order dated 26.2.2010, setting aside the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. While allowing the Appeal, this Court has decided the same on merits, especially by referring to various judgments of this Court, including the Division Bench, and the Apex Court and held that the appointment of Arbitral Tribunal by the District Court in O.S.No. 116 of 2004 is against the judgments rendered by this Court. In fact, this Court has considered the conduct of the Applicant in not even informing the District Court about the pendency of the Suit in the Civil Court, apart from the judgments passed by this Court in C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991, L.P.A. No. 155 of 1991 as well as O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997. 2.8. In fact, this Court has considered the conduct of the Applicant in not even informing the District Court about the pendency of the Suit in the Civil Court, apart from the judgments passed by this Court in C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991, L.P.A. No. 155 of 1991 as well as O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997. 2.8. This Court has referred to the judgment dated 27.11.1996 passed in C.S.No.208 of 1996 rejecting the request of the Applicant for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which was confirmed by the Division Bench by judgment dated 18.11.1997 in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, which was also affirmed by the Apex Court by order dated 8.2.1999, thereby rendering a finding which is binding upon the Applicant as well as the Respondent that the plea of the Applicant for reference to arbitration under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is time barred, especially when the earlier Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S. No.175 of 1990 was pending. 2.9. This Court, while setting aside the award, has categorically held that the reference to the Arbitral Tribunal by the District Court, Kanyakumari in a subsequent Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S. No. 116 of 2004 is not only a deliberate suppression, but such decree of the District Court by appointing Arbitral Tribunal runs contrary to the judgment rendered by this Court in C.S.No.208 of 1996, dated 27.11.1996; the Division Bench judgment in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, dated 18.11.1997, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in the order dated 8.2.1999 in S.L.P.No. 17264 of 1998, and that the Applicant is not entitled to claim appointment of Arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act,1940, since such claim is hopelessly barred by limitation and if at all there is any remedy to the Applicant, it was only to pursue his remedy in the earlier Suit in O.S. No.175 of 1990 on the file of Sub-Court, Nagercoil. 2.10. While setting aside the award as totally opposed to the judgment of the Supreme Court and the binding precedents on the parties, this Court has also held that mere appearance in the Suit filed by the Applicant before the District Court, Kanyakumari in O.S.No.116 of 2004, which has culminated into the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal, by Counsel on behalf of the Respondent, would not validate the illegal order of appointment of Arbitral Tribunal. This Court has categorically held that even though notice was sent to the Applicant herein, who was the First Respondent in the Original Petition, the Applicant has not chosen to appear in spite of the fact hat the Applicant has chosen to file Execution Petition before the District Court, and therefore, set aside the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on merits and on the established principles of the binding effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court between the Applicant and the Respondent. 3. It is the order passed by this Court dated 26.2.2010 in the Original Petition setting aside the Arbitral Tribunal’s award, which is sought to be set aside by the Applicant on the basis that it is an ex parte order and the Application has been filed under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. 4.1. The said Application is opposed by the Respondent stating that the non appearance of the Applicant in the Original Petition is deliberate and in fact, publication has been effected in two Tamil dailies, viz., Malai Malar and Dinakaran on 1.12.2009, as per the direction of this Court dated 24.11.2009 and even thereafter, there was no appearance and even though notice was ordered in the Original Petition in the year 2008, it was after a prolonged period, the order came to be passed only on 26.2.2010 on merits. 4.2. It is the case of the Respondent that inasmuch as the order was passed by this Court in O.P. No.757 of 2008 by setting aside the award on merits, the application to set aside the said order under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. is not maintainable and if at all there is any remedy, it is only by way of an Appeal. 5.1. Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Counsel for the Applicant would submit the inasmuch as the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal was set aside in the Original Petition, in which the Applicant could not appear, the application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. is maintainable. 5.2. It is his submission that by giving one more opportunity to the Applicant to put forth his case, especially when the Arbitral Tribunal has passed an award in his favour, no harm would be caused to the Respondent. 5.3. 5.2. It is his submission that by giving one more opportunity to the Applicant to put forth his case, especially when the Arbitral Tribunal has passed an award in his favour, no harm would be caused to the Respondent. 5.3. It is his submission that the Supreme Court has only directed the Applicant to proceed with the Suit filed by him earlier and has not dealt with the right of the Applicant in filing the Suit under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 5.4. He would also rely upon Order 41, Rule 21,C.P.C. wherein even in the Appeal stage, when as ex parte judgment was passed, an Application can be filed for rehearing the Appeal if it is proved that the notice in Appeal was not served or the Respondent in the Appeal was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the Appeal was called on for hearing. 5.5. He would also submit that in the interest of justice, since the Applicant has succeeded before the Arbitral Tribunal, which has passed an award in favour of the applicant, even cost can be awarded to give one more opportunity to the Applicant to put forth his case in the Original Petition as First Respondent. 6.1. On the other hand, Mrs. He would also submit that in the interest of justice, since the Applicant has succeeded before the Arbitral Tribunal, which has passed an award in favour of the applicant, even cost can be awarded to give one more opportunity to the Applicant to put forth his case in the Original Petition as First Respondent. 6.1. On the other hand, Mrs. Bhavani Subbarayan, learned Special Government Pleader would vehemently contend that, on the factual matrix, when the High Court in a Suit filed by the Applicant himself for appointing an Arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 has categorically held that the Applicant’s right for appointment of Arbitrator is hopelessly barred by limitation and when that judgment has been confirmed by the Division Bench in Original Side Appeal and by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed by the Applicant against the judgment of the Division Bench, certainly the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal runs contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court and it is by a deliberate conduct of the Applicant in suppressing such judgment and filing a fresh Suit in the District Court, an order of appointment of Arbitral Tribunal came to be obtained and even if that order of the District Court remains unchallenged, it is her contention on the established principles of precedents and binding effect of the judgments of the higher Courts that the order of the District Court, Kanyakumari in O.S.No. 116 of 2004 should be treated as a nullity in the eye of law unenforceable and therefore, consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the issue at all. 6.2. It is her contention that it is not as if the Applicant was not served notice in the Original Petition and therefore, the question of applicability of Order 41, Rule 21, C.P.C. cannot be invoked on the facts of the present case. 7.1. On a reference to the records, It is seen that when the Respondent has filed the Original Petition, the notice sent to the Applicant to his address came to be returned with postal acknowledgement “left” and thereafter, newspaper publication was effected in two Tamil dailies viz., Malai Malar and Dinakaran on 1.12.2009, as per the direction of this Court dated 24.11.2009 and in spite of the service having been effected, the Applicant has not chosen to appear before this Court. 7.2. 7.2. It is relevant to point out that even in the present Application filed by the Applicant, he has admitted that he has received the notice in the Original Petition and in fact, engaged a Counsel and the Applicant in the Affidavit has chosen to state as if the clerk of his Counsel at Chennai has misplaced the Vakalat in some other bundle, since there was renovation in the Advocate’s office. The Applicant has chosen to state that he having entrusted the papers to the Counsel at Chennai after receiving the notice in the Original Petition has filed the Execution Petition in District Court, Kanyakumari for executing the award dated 20.10.2007. 7.3. On the face of it, it is clear that the Applicant having had the knowledge of the Original Petition filed by the Respondent against the award, even assuming that there has been some misplacement of Vakalat at the office of the Advocate at Chennai, it is not known as to what steps he has taken to find out the status of the Original Petition filed by the Respondent in the High Court in respect of which, admittedly, the Applicant has received a notice. That apart, certainly the Applicant is not entitled to swear an Affidavit to say that his Advocate’s Clerk at Chennai has misplaced the Vakalat. Therefore, there is no difficulty to conclude that this is not a case where the Applicant has proved either that the notice was not duly served on him or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the Original Petition was called for hearing. Therefore, even assuming that the Applicant is entitled to claim re-hearing as per Order 41, Rule 21, C.P.C., which is as follows: “Order 41, Rule 21.Re-hearing on Application of Respondent against whom ex parte decree made. Therefore, even assuming that the Applicant is entitled to claim re-hearing as per Order 41, Rule 21, C.P.C., which is as follows: “Order 41, Rule 21.Re-hearing on Application of Respondent against whom ex parte decree made. – Where an Appeal is heard ex parte and judgment is pronounced against the Respondent, he may apply to the Appellant Court to re-hear the Appeal; and if he satisfies the Court that the notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the Appeal was called on for hearing, the Court shall re-hear the Appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit to impose upon him.” There is absolutely no reason for this Court to come to a conclusion that there is any valid ground insistence for the Applicant even for applying for re-hearing, for the reasons stated above. 8.1. But, that is not the crucial issue as far as the factual aspect of this case is concerned. It is not in dispute that the Applicant has originally filed Suit in O.S. No.175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil with the following prayer: “A. Declaring that the cancellation of the contract purporting to be done as per letters dated 25.9.1990 and 27.9.1990 by the Second Defendant is illegal, void and of no effect. B. Declaration of the Plaintiffs right to have the Application for extension of time beyond 30.9.1990 is liable to be considered and disposed of granting reasonable time for finishing the balance work to be done. C. Restraining Defendants 1 and 2 from acting on the footing of the cancellation of contract and doing anything based on the alleged default of the contract and particularly receiving any amount from the Third Defendant on the footing of the guarantee for mobilization charges and restraining payment of Third Defendant based on the guarantee.” 8.2. Pending the Suit, he has filed I.A. No.621 of 1990 for an interim injunction and the said Application came to be dismissed by the Sub-court, Nagercoil by a detailed order dated 20.3.1991. Pending the Suit, he has filed I.A. No.621 of 1990 for an interim injunction and the said Application came to be dismissed by the Sub-court, Nagercoil by a detailed order dated 20.3.1991. It was against the said order dismissing the Interlocutory Application for injunction filed by the Applicant, the Applicant has approached this Court by filing C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991 and this Court, in the judgment dated 29.4.1991, has no doubt allowed the Appeal by setting aside the order of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil in rejecting the Interlocutory Application for injunction. 8.3. On a further Appeal filed by the Respondent in L.P.A. No. 155 of 1991, the First Bench of this Court, in the judgment dated 3.11.1993, while setting aside the judgment passed in C.M.A. No. 310 of 1991, has restored the Original order passed in I.A. No.621 of 1990 rejecting the Application for injunction. However, the Division Bench, while permitting the Respondent to proceed with the balance work, has directed the measurement of the work done by the Applicant till the date of cancellation of the contract, viz., 25.9.1990 and to intimate the same to the Applicant. The Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. No.155 of 1991 has become final. 8.4. However, very curiously, the Applicant without pursuing the Suit filed by him in O.S. No.175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil, wherein he has prayed for declaration that the termination of the contract by the Respondent as null and void, has chosen to file a Suit in C.S. No.208 of 1996 before this Court under the Arbitration Act, 1940 for a direction against the Respondent to file the original agreement dated 7.11.1986 before this Court and to appoint an Arbitrator to hear the dispute between the parties. That Suit came to be dismissed by this Court in an elaborate judgment dated 27.11.1996. That Suit came to be dismissed by this Court in an elaborate judgment dated 27.11.1996. This Court, while dismissing the said Suit filed under Arbitration Act, 1940, has dealt with the plea of the Applicant that he was semi-literate and did not have proper legal advice to file such Suit within the prescribed time under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and therefore, he should be given extension of time under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 by ignoring the delay, and categorically held that the Applicant was not illiterate; the contract was signed in 1986 and work should have been completed in 18 months and he has chosen to complete the work only after four years which has resulted in termination; he has chosen to file a Suit before the Sub-Court, Nagercoil and filed an Appeal against the interim order before this Court, which went up to the Division Bench in L.P.A. and therefore, there is no reason for extending the time as per Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and that the Applicant has to suffer because of his own negligence and dismissed the Suit. 8.5. The Applicant did not stop with that. He has chosen to file O.S. A. No. 63 of 1997 against the above said judgment. The Division Bench, while dismissing the Appeal, in the judgment dated 18.11.1997 has taken note of the pendency of the Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S. No. 175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub- Court, Nagercoil for declaration that the cancellation of the contract is illegal and confirmed that under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the right of the Applicant has extinguished, since it is barred by limitation. The operative portion of the judgment is as follows: “11…. … Admittedly, in this case, the claim under Section 20 of the Act was beyond 90 days from the date of final bill dated 15.3.1994. Therefore, a barred claim cannot be adjudicated by the Arbitrator. The learned Judge also has clearly found that the claim under Section 20 of the Act by the Appellant was out of their turn. But however, the right of the Appellant before the courts can always be pursued provided if the said claim is also within the period of limitation. Therefore, a barred claim cannot be adjudicated by the Arbitrator. The learned Judge also has clearly found that the claim under Section 20 of the Act by the Appellant was out of their turn. But however, the right of the Appellant before the courts can always be pursued provided if the said claim is also within the period of limitation. The Appellant has admittedly filed Suit on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil in O.S. No. 175 of 1990 for declaration of the cancellation of the contract as illegal and for consequential relief. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further represents that the Appellant has already filed another Application is pending for final adjudication. Though the claim under Section 20 of the Act to invoke the arbitration is barred, the Appellant is always at liberty and also file a Suit to pursue his remedy before the Civil Court in O.S.No. 175 of 1990. Therefore, the Subordinate Judge Nagercoil is directed to dispose of the said claim of the Appellant on merits and in accordance with law after affording opportunities to both the parties. The O.S. Appeal is ordered accordingly.” 8.6. In the Special Leave Petition filed by the Applicant against the judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997, the Honorable Apex Court, in the order dated 8.2.1999, while dismissing the Petition has clearly held that by virtue of the Suit filed by the Applicant, the question of arbitration does not survive. The order of the Supreme Court is as follows: “As seen from the Counter Affidavit at page 30, the Petitioner has already filed a Civil Suit and therefore, the question of arbitration does not survive. Hence the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.” Therefore, the Apex Court has finally held that there is no right of arbitration on the part of the Applicant by confirming that such right has been barred by limitation as per the Arbitration Act, 1940. However, liberty has been given to the Applicant to proceed with the Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S. No.175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil. 8.7. However, liberty has been given to the Applicant to proceed with the Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S. No.175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil. 8.7. Having obtained such final order from the Honorable Apex Court, which is certainly binding on the Applicant, very curiously, the Applicant has chosen to file another Suit in O.S. No.116 of 2004 of the file of the District Court, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil for a declaration that the cancellation of the contract is illegal and also for a direction to pay compensation Rs. 88,08,493/- with interest, which is no doubt similar to that of the prayer in the prior Suit filed by the Applicant in O.S.No. 175 of 1990 on the file of the Sub-Court, Nagercoil. 8.8. Unfortunately, while the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.1997 made in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, the operative portion of which is elicited above, is clear that the Applicant is not entitled to adjudication of claim under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and there is a bar to invoke Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil was directed to dispose of the claim raised in O.S. No. 175 of 1990, it appears that while drafting the decree in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, a mistake has crept in, wherein the decree has been drafted wrongly as follows: “1. That the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil be and hereby is directed to dispose of the claim of the Appellant herein under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act on merits and in accordance with law in the light of the observations and directions contained in the Judgment herein and; 2. that there be no costs in this Appeal.” 8.9. That the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil be and hereby is directed to dispose of the claim of the Appellant herein under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act on merits and in accordance with law in the light of the observations and directions contained in the Judgment herein and; 2. that there be no costs in this Appeal.” 8.9. The crucial aspect of it is that the District Judge, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil, while passing judgment in O.S. No.116 of 2004, having referred to the decree of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997, has been swayed by the decree drafted by mistake, without choosing to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No.63 of 1997 and astonishingly the Applicant , who happens to be the Plaintiff in O.S. No.116 of 2004, which can certainly be stated to be a fraudulent device, has added insult to the injury by producing the wrongly drafted decree before the District Court, deliberately suppressing the detailed judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997, and the District Court has passed a judgment on 16.2.2005 appointing the Arbitral Tribunal purely based on the decree which has been wrongly drafted in O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997. 8.10. At the risk of repetition, it has to be reiterated that while the judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No. 63 of 1997 is only in terms of direction to the Sub-Court, Nagercoil to decide the Suit in O.S.A. No. 175 of 1990 on merits and not to dispose of any Application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the order of the District Court in appointing the Arbitral Tribunal is totally opposed to the judgment of the Division Bench, as confirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court and there is absolutely no difficulty to conclude that the Applicant, who is party to all the above said proceedings and who is bound by the ultimate judgment of the Supreme Court, has fraudulently obtained an illegal order from the District Court by deliberate suppression. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by virtue of the said judgment dated 16.2.2005 made in O.S. No. 116 of 2004 has no legs to stand in law. 9. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by virtue of the said judgment dated 16.2.2005 made in O.S. No. 116 of 2004 has no legs to stand in law. 9. Without going into the merits of the contentions of the parties in respect of the contract and conduct, inasmuch as the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal is opposed to the judgment of the higher Court, it has to be necessarily held that the award passed by such Arbitral Tribunal cannot be treated as a legally enforceable award and that was the decision which was rendered by this Court in O.P. No. 757 of 2008 and in such circumstances, even by allowing the Applicant to argue the case in the Original Petition on merits, certainly no useful purpose will be served. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Applicant, Mr.V.Raghavachari, in Savithri Amma Seethamma V.Aratha Karthy, 1983 (1) SCC 401 , wherein he has relied upon the following observation: “2. Now it is obvious that the Appellant could not appear at the hearing of the Revision Application preferred by the 1st Respondent because the Advocate engaged by him as occupied in another Court and this fact was stated by the learned Advocate in the Affidavit made by him in support of the Application for rehearing. We are, therefore, of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Appellant had sufficient cause for not being present at the hearing of the Revision Application and the learned Single Judge of the High Court ought, in the circumstances, to have allowed the Application and reheard the Civil Revision Petition applying the principle underlying Order 41, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We accordingly allow the Appeal, set aside the orders dated March 30, 1982 and June 22 1982 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and remit the C.R.P. No. 766 of 1981 to the High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law….” Is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. Again, the judgment of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the Applicant, in Salammal and another V. Mannagatti and others, 1978 (2) MLJ 277 , has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. Again, the judgment of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the Applicant, in Salammal and another V. Mannagatti and others, 1978 (2) MLJ 277 , has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. This is not a case where the jurisdiction has to be exercised under order 41, Rule 21, C.P.C. or under Order 41, Rule 17, C.P.C. inasmuch as this Court has given a detailed judgment on merits and on the binding effect of orders of the higher Courts on the parties, under the celebrated Principle of Precedents. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the Application has to be rejected, as any decision otherwise would be detrimental not only to the Rule of Discipline and the Doctrine of Binding Precedents but it will also lead to inconsistency in decisions on the point of law. Accordingly, the Application fails and the same is dismissed.