Judgment : 1. Inveighing the judgments and decrees dated 10.1.2005 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Thiruvarur (Rent Control Appellate Authority) in R.C.A.Nos.22 and 23 of 2003 confirming the fair and decreetal orders dated 30.9.2003 passed by the learned District Munsif, Thiruthuraipoondi (Rent Controller) in R.C.O.P.Nos.3 and 4 of 2001, these two civil revision petitions are focussed by the tenant. 2. Heard both sides. 3. The epitome and the long and short of the relevant facts niggard and bereft of unnecessary details would run thus: a) The respondents/landlords herein filed the R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001 seeking eviction of the tenant on the following grounds: 1. wilful default 2. sub-letting the premises 3. different user 4. act of waste 5. owner’s occupation by invoking Sections 10(2)(i), 10(2)(ii)(a); 10(2)(ii)(b), 10(2)(iii) and 10(3)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). b) Whereas the revision petitioner/tenant filed the R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001 invoking Section 8(5) of the Act for deposit of rent and both the matters were contested. c) During enquiry in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001, the landlord examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-9. On the side of the tenant, the tenant examined himself as R.W.1 no document was marked. d) In R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001, on the side of tenant, he examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-5. On the side of the landlords, the landlord-Natesan examined himself as R.W.1 and no document was marked. e) Ultimately, the Rent Controller ordered eviction on all the grounds raised by the landlord in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001 and dismissed the R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001 filed by the tenant under Section 8(5) of the Act. f) Being aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred two R.C.A.Nos.22 and 23 of 2003. However, the Appellate Authority partly allowed the R.C.A. concerned rejecting the grounds raised by the landlords relating to act of waste and different user and upheld the order of Rent Controller on the remaining three grounds and also dismissed the R.C.A. filed as against the dismissal of the R.C.O.P. filed by the tenant under Section 8 (5) of the Act. g) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the orders of both the Courts below, these two revisions are focussed by the tenant more or less on the same grounds, 4. g) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the orders of both the Courts below, these two revisions are focussed by the tenant more or less on the same grounds, 4. The learned counsel for the tenant reiterating the grounds of revision would develop his argument, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: - Both the Courts below failed to take into account the fact that absolutely there was no sub-letting on the part of the tenant for the reasons that the demised premises comprised of only 270 sq.ft, which is a shop premises. Whereas admittedly and indisputably the so-called sub-tenant was having his bunk and selling cool drinks, somewhat near the demised premises on the pavement belonging to Panchayat. As such, both the Courts below were wrong in holding that there was sub-letting. Even though the landlord contended that his graduate unemployed son is in need of the demised premises for running general merchant shop, no evidence was produced. However, both the Courts below assumed and presumed as though the said ground relating to owners occupation was established before them. -The Courts below wrongly held as though there was willful default in payment of five months rent so to say, from January to May 2001, even though clinching evidence was adduced before the Rent Controller to demonstrate and display that the tenant was not aware of the change of ownership relating to the demised premises and that the tenant was not put on notice about such change of owner ship. -The tenant in fact, made several efforts to see that the rent is received by the landlord. But owing to the cantankerous attitude of the erstwhile landlord as well as the present landlord, the rent was not received by them. -For no fault of the tenant, he cannot be mulcted with the liability as though he committed willful default in paying rent. Even though the tenant filed the R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001 invoking Section 8(5) of the Act and also enclosed the challan for deposit of the rent; the Rent Controller failed to pass any order thereon. -As such, the landlords cannot try to project and label the tenant as a willful defaulter. Even though the tenant filed the R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001 invoking Section 8(5) of the Act and also enclosed the challan for deposit of the rent; the Rent Controller failed to pass any order thereon. -As such, the landlords cannot try to project and label the tenant as a willful defaulter. No doubt, after getting orders from the High Court totally a sum of Rs.19,250/-representing 55 months rent so to say, from January 2001 to July 2005 had been paid and it would not connote and denote as though he was a defaulter in paying rent for 55 months. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would pray for the dismissal of the R.C.O.P. filed by the landlords and for allowing the R.C.O.P. filed by the tenant, by allowing these revisions. 5. Per contra, by way of torpedoing and pulverising the contentions/arguments as put forth on the side of the tenant the learned counsel for the landlords would develop his argument, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: -Both the Courts below gave a concurrent finding to the effect that the tenant despite having full knowledge about the factum of the present landlord having purchased the demised premises simply committed default in paying the rent and that demonstrates and displays that deliberately the tenant did not want to pay the rent. -The scope of Section 25 of the Act is clear that the revisional Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below. -There is no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by the Courts below. -The attempt on the part of the tenant in putting the blame on the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority as though they did not pass any orders regarding deposit of rent is totally untenable and it was the duty of the counsel appearing for the tenant to see that he got appropriate orders for depositing the rent from the Court concerned. Having failed to do so and that too having deposited a total sum of Rs.19,250/-representing 55 months in one lump sum before this Court, it would not lie in the mouth of the tenant to contend as though he was not at fault but only the Courts below were at fault. -The tenant in fact sub-let the premises and to that extent both the Courts gave their findings warranting no interference. -The tenant in fact sub-let the premises and to that extent both the Courts gave their findings warranting no interference. The landlord’s son has been in need of the demised premises for conducting business. Law does not envisage that he should actually be engaged in doing a business but even a mere preparation would be more than sufficient for attracting Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of the revision. 6. The points for consideration are as to: 1. Whether the findings of both the Courts below from the available evidence before them that the tenant sublet the promises suffer from perversity or illegality? 2. Whether the findings of both the Courts below in ordering eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation suffer from illegality or perversity? 3. Whether the findings of both the Courts below that the tenant committed willful default, in paying rent are just and proper? Point No. 1: 7. The learned counsel for the tenant appropriately and appositely, convincingly and properly would bring to the knowledge of this Court that the so-called sub tenant was admittedly and indubitably doing his business in cool drinks by having a small bunk nearer to the demised premises and not in the demised premises itself. Both the Courts below adverted to the said facts, but they took a wrong view as though it was because of the tenant only the sub tenant was doing business there. No effective counter argument I could hear from the landlords’ side. Admittedly, the factual position is that the said sub tenant was doing his business not in any part of the demised premises but only somewhat nearer to it. In such a case, the decisions of both the Courts below suffer from perversity and illegality, warranting interference in this revision and Accordingly, the said ground is rejected. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is decided in favour of the tenant and as against the landlords. Point No. 2: 8. Regarding the plea of owners’ occupation is concerned, law is well settled that even preparation on the part of the person who is going to occupy the demised premises would be sufficient. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is decided in favour of the tenant and as against the landlords. Point No. 2: 8. Regarding the plea of owners’ occupation is concerned, law is well settled that even preparation on the part of the person who is going to occupy the demised premises would be sufficient. Here, the learned counsel for the tenant in a most effective manner convincingly highlights that not even in the chief examination as well as in the RCOP, there is admission on the part of the landlords about the preparation made by the landlord’s son for conducting such business in the demised premises. 9. Whereas during cross examination, certain questions were put and in response to it, P.W.1, would curiously without any backing of the receipt would submit that certain apparatuses like scales and weights were purchased. As such, I am of the considered opinion that both the Courts below once again fell into error in holding that the landlord established that his son was making preparation to conduct business, Hence, the ground relating to owners’ occupation has also to be rejected and the same is rejected. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is decided in favour of the tenant and as against the landlords. Point No. 3: 10. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa and Others AIR 2000 SC 1880 : (2000) 3 SCC 282 : (2000) 2 MLJ 108 relating to the concept ‘Willful default’ at p. 111 of MLJ: “8. Wilful default means an act consciously or deliberately done with open defiance and intent not to pay the rent. In the present case the amount of rent defaulted firstly is on account of the fact that the agent of the landlord did not come to collect the rent for some reason. Further, notice of default contained the disputed rent. This fact coupled with the fact that eviction suit was filed before maturing a case of wilful default in terms of the explanation to the proviso of Section 10(2), The dispute of rent admittedly was genuine. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter. 9. Further, we find the conduct of the appellant throughout in the past being not of a defaulter or irregular payer of rent. Thus, all these circumstances cumulatively come to only one conclusion that the appellant cannot be held to be a wilful defaulter. 9. In S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.r. Pattabiraman this Court had occasion to consider the word ‘wilful default’ under Section 10(2) of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which is reproduced below: (SCC pp. 605-06, paras 21-26) “21. Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word ‘wilful’ or the words ‘wilful default’. In the book A DICTIONARY OF LAW by L.B. CURZON, at p. 361 the words ‘wilful’ and ‘wilful default’ have been defined thus: ‘Wilful’ – deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows that he is doing and intends to do what he doing. ‘Wilful default’ – Either a consciousness of “negligence or breath of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty. 22. In other words, ‘wilful default’ would mean a deliberate and international default knowing fully well the legal consequences thereof. In WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol 11A (Permanent Edition) at p. 268 the word ‘default has been defined as the nonperformance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Vol. 45 of WORDS AND PHRASES, the word ‘wilful’ has been very clearly defined thus: ‘wilful’ – international; not incidental or involuntary; -done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently; -in common parlance word ‘wilful’ is used in sense of international, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary. p. 296 – ‘Wilful’ refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary. 23. In Vol. III of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at p. 2617, the word ‘wilful’ has been defined thus: 24. The word ‘default has been defined in Vol. 1 of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at p. 590 thus: to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation. 25. 23. In Vol. III of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at p. 2617, the word ‘wilful’ has been defined thus: 24. The word ‘default has been defined in Vol. 1 of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at p. 590 thus: to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation. 25. In BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Fourth edn.) at p. 1773 the word ‘wilful’ has been defined thus: governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed. ‘Wilfulness’ implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice. The word ‘reckless as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of ‘wilful’ or ‘wanton’ 26. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words ‘wilful default appears to indicate that default in order to be willful must be international, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.” A mere poring over and perusal of the aforesaid decision would unambiguously and unequivocally, highlight and spotlight the fact that there should be wilful element involved in such default in payment of rent. The learned counsel for the tenant inviting the attention of this Court to the pre-suit notice, which emerged between the tenant and the erstwhile landlord and the present landlord would develop his argument that absolutely even by phantasmagorical thought, it cannot be stated that the tenant committed any willful default; there was no supine indifference or inertia on the part of the tenant in paying the rent but it is because of the cantankerous attitude on the part of the erstwhile landlord and the present landlord, there appears default in paying rent. Both the Courts below also did not held the tenant in seeing that the tenant should not be made to suffer eviction because of the conduct of the landlord’s concerned. 11. Both the Courts below also did not held the tenant in seeing that the tenant should not be made to suffer eviction because of the conduct of the landlord’s concerned. 11. Whereas the learned counsel for the landlords would correctly and convincingly invite the attention of this Court to the fact that a sum of Rs.19,250/- was paid by way of demand draft only on 3.8.2005 representing rent from January 2001 to July 2005 i.e. for 55 months in one lump sum. 12. Normally, the tenant after meeting with his Waterloo in the Rent Control Court would like to prefer appeal and obtain stay. In that process, the Appellate Court while granting stay would impose a condition that arrears of rent should be paid, But curiously, in this case, there is no such representation on the side of the tenant and the landlord also had not approached the Appellate Authority so as to get directed the tenant to deposit the rents. 13. Be that as it may, even for a moment this Court cannot allow the tenant to plead as though the fault is on the part of the both the Courts below in not enabling the tenant to pay the rent pendente lite and that too for such a long period of 5 years. 14. The learned counsel for the tenant would try to explain away the default on the part of the tenant by trying to put forth and set forth his argument as though the tenant could not prefer revision for a direction unless there is an order against him, 15. It is crystal clear that after filing lodgment schedule, it is the duty of the counsel who is appearing for the tenant to move the concerned Court and get necessary orders. But that was not done. However, the tenant is trying to put unnecessarily and baselessly the blame on the Courts below and no more elaboration in this regard is required. 16. The following decisions would exemplify and evince that even pendente lite the default in payment of rent could be taken into account relating to the conduct of the tenant. 1. B. Anraj Pipada v. V. Umayal (1996) 2 MLJ 44 2. R. Murugan v. M.O.M.Abubuker 2005 (5) CTC 473 Here, the tenant thought that merely by filing an application under Section 8(5) of the Act his liability got ended. 1. B. Anraj Pipada v. V. Umayal (1996) 2 MLJ 44 2. R. Murugan v. M.O.M.Abubuker 2005 (5) CTC 473 Here, the tenant thought that merely by filing an application under Section 8(5) of the Act his liability got ended. But, that is not the legal position. 17. I harp back to the following decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (D) by Lrs. and Others, 2002 (4) CTC 572 (SC) certain excerpts from it would run thus: “4. It would be seen from the above provisions that while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord. However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Act. 5. Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that, the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that, the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The tenant legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i.e. To deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been complied by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal and Another, (1996) 1 SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkataram Naidu, (1996) 6 SCC 228 .” The following other precedents of this Court could also be fruitfully cited in this regard. (i) S. Sundararajan v. S.A. Viswanathan Chetty and Another, Certain Excerpts 1997-2 L.W.567 from it would run thus: “11. …It is thus seen that Section 8(5) of the Act, which had been resorted to by the petitioner in this case in H.R.C.No.569 of 1981. is intended to protect the tenant from the consequences of non-payment of rent amounting even to wilful default owing to the refusal by the landlord to receive the rent when tendered. …It is thus seen that Section 8(5) of the Act, which had been resorted to by the petitioner in this case in H.R.C.No.569 of 1981. is intended to protect the tenant from the consequences of non-payment of rent amounting even to wilful default owing to the refusal by the landlord to receive the rent when tendered. Under Section 9(2) of the Act, the amount deposited under Section 8(5) of the Act may be permitted to be withdrawn by the person held by the Rent Controller to be entitled to the amount on an application made by such person, to the Rent Controller on that behalf. It is thus seen that the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in its absence, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable is intended to be fulfilled by resort to Section 8(5) of the Act and the deposit of the rents, refused to be received by the landlord when remitted by money order as well as that which may subsequently become due under Section 8(5) of the Act, when paid out to the landlord under Section 9(2) of the Act, would ensure the payment of the rent regularly by the tenant as well as the receipt thereof by the landlord on being paid out to him by an order of the Controller under Section 9(2) of the Act. It is therefore, obvious that it is not merely for the sake of a deposit in to Court Section 8(5) of the Act is intended, but it also serves to very vital and important purpose in that by resorting to a deposit of rents under Section 8(5) of the Act after obtaining the orders of the Controller in that regard, the rents refused to be received in the usual course by the landlord are not only paid by the tenant, but also made available to the landlord, so that a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act does not arise, in the event of the deposit of rents being made without default. (iii) Abdul Fatha and Another v. Villayudham and Another, (1998) 3 MLJ 237 : 1998 (2) CTC 627 certain excerpts from it would run thus at p.239 of MLJ: “9. (iii) Abdul Fatha and Another v. Villayudham and Another, (1998) 3 MLJ 237 : 1998 (2) CTC 627 certain excerpts from it would run thus at p.239 of MLJ: “9. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in Padmavathi Ammal v. Gopat, (1994) 2 MLJ 622 arose under Section 8 of the Act. PRATAP SING, J. held that when the tenant chose to exercise the enabling provision, he should take steps one after another as laid down in the procedure and only if the landlord still refused to receive the rent, then he could come to the Court with a petition under Section 8(5) of the Act. In that case, the tenant had skipped Section 8(4) of the Act. The learned Judge held that the tenant was obliged to take the step contemplated under Section 8(4) of the Act and since he had not done it, the petition filed by him under Section 8(5) of the Act had to necessarily fail. I have already held that the petition filed by the revision petitioners under Section 9 of the Act was misconceived. Assuming that a wrong Section had been quoted and that it was only a petition under Section 8, in view of the decision of PRATAP SINGH, J it has to be held that the authorities below rightly rejected the petition inasmuch as the tenants has jumped steps.” (iv) 1) T. Gopalasamy 2) T. Radhakrishnan v. 1) R. Renganathan 2) R. Narayanan 3) R. Vijayaraghavan 4) R. Neelamegham 3) R. Srinivasan 6) Tmt. Rajamuthukone (2000) 1 MLJ 703 : 2000-2-LW-699 certain excerpts from it would run thus at p. 709 of MLJ: “20. Section 8 of the Act deals with consequences where landlord refuses to issue receipt or refuses to receive rent. Section 8(1) says whenever landlord receives any payment towards rent or advance, he shall issue a receipt duly signed by him for the actual amount of rent or advance received by him. Section 8(2) says that where landlord refuses to accept or evades the receipt of rent lawfully payable to him, tenant may by notice in writing, require landlord to specify within ten days from the date of receipt of notice by him, a bank into which the rent maybe deposited to the credit of landlord. Section 8(2) says that where landlord refuses to accept or evades the receipt of rent lawfully payable to him, tenant may by notice in writing, require landlord to specify within ten days from the date of receipt of notice by him, a bank into which the rent maybe deposited to the credit of landlord. If landlord specifies the bank, tenant shall deposit the rent as and when it becomes due in that account till he gets further instruction of landlord. As per Section 8(4), if landlord does not specify bank, tenant is bound to remit the rent to landlord by money order, after deducting the money order commission. In spite of sending rent by money order, if landlord refuses to accept the same, tenant can deposit the amount in Court under Section 8(5) of the Act.” The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be to the effect that the tenant cannot try to wriggle out of his liability to pay the rent by simply saying that the landlord refused to receive the rent. On the landlord’s refusing to receive the rent, the tenant should have swung into action in adhering to the provisions of the Act. 18. Section 8 of the Act clearly and categorically mandates the various steps which the tenant should take. In this case, the deposition of R.W.1 as correctly adverted to by both the Courts below would display and demonstrate that the tenant did not take the steps scrupulously. Hence, in such a case, the dictum in the cited decision would fasten the tenant with the liability to the effect that he is a willful defaulter. 19. Repeatedly, the learned counsel for the tenant would try to stress upon the fact that even though he was a defaulter, there was no willful element involved in it. Once there is non-adherence to the statutory provisions by the tenancy in the event of alleged refusal of rent by the landlord, then the willful element can rightly be inferred as against the tenant and to that effect alone the Apex Court rendered its judgment as set out supra. 20. Both the Courts below after analysing the evidence held that the plea as put forth on the side of the tenant as though he was not aware of the change of ownership is nothing but a ruse to wriggle out his liability to pay rent. 20. Both the Courts below after analysing the evidence held that the plea as put forth on the side of the tenant as though he was not aware of the change of ownership is nothing but a ruse to wriggle out his liability to pay rent. The Rent Controller clearly gave his finding that even in the month of February itself, the tenant had knowledge about the transfer of ownership in favour of the present landlord from the erstwhile landlord from the erstwhile landlord and it is palpably and pellucidly clear that the revisional Court would not incline to interfere with such a finding of fact also. 21. However, I would like to point out that the finding of both the Courts below that from the month of January the present landlord is entitled to arrears of rent, does not hold good as the present landlord purchased the property only on 30.1.2001 from the erstwhile landlord and as such from that day onwards, he would be entitled to receive the rent. Wherefore, he is entitled to get rent for the months of February, March, April and May only as there was default on the part of the tenant in paying the same. 22. With this observation, I would like to confirm the findings of both the Courts below in allowing the plea of willful default and consequently in ordering eviction. For the same reason, no interference with the orders of both the Courts’ below concerning R.C.O.P.No.4 of 2001 is warranted. Accordingly, Point No.3 is decided in favour of the landlords and as against the tenant. 23. In the result, the revisions are partly allowed by rejecting the pleas of the landlords based on sub-letting and owners occupation. However, regarding willful default, the findings of the both the Courts below in ordering eviction is confirmed and accordingly, both these revisions are partly dismissed on that ground. 24. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would make an extempore submission that the tenant has been in possession of the premises for over a period of six decades and all of a sudden, holus bolus he will not be able to vacate the premises and he prays for sufficient time to be granted in favour of the tenant for vacating the premises. Whereupon the learned counsel for the landlord would oppose the prayer of the tenant on the ground that the tenant has got several premise of his own. However, he would submit that if at all the tenant would be regular in paying the future rents, then at the discretion of this Court, time may be granted. 25. I am of the considered view that granting six months’ time would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the following order is passed: (i) The tenant shall vacate and hand over vacate possession of the premises to the respondents/landlords within six months’ time from this date without driving the landlords to file E.P for eviction, subject to the condition that the entire arrears should be paid within 15 days from this date and future monthly rents should be promptly paid and if there is any default, it is open for the respondents/landlords to file E.P at once, i.e., even before the time stipulated for vacating the premises. (ii) The revision petitioner shall file, an affidavit of undertaking to the aforesaid effect before this Court within fifteen days from this date. 26. With the above direction, both these revisions are disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petition is closed.