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2010 DIGILAW 3345 (ALL)

Munni v. Shiv Shankar

2010-10-27

ANIL KUMAR

body2010
Anil Kumar, J.:- Heard Sri Prabhat Narayan holding brief of Sri S.C. Mishra, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 04.01.1992 contained as Annexure no. 4 to the writ petition passed by the respondent no. 6 (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Special Judge, Unnao) in Claim Petition No. 27 of 1983 (Shiv Shanker Vs. Mushtaq Husain and others). 3. In brief the facts of the present case are to the effect that on 29.12.1982 an accident has taken place at Lucknow-Kanpur Road in which the respondent no. 1(Shiv Shanker) sustained injury, as a result of which he was admitted in the L.L.R. Hospital, Kanpur and in the treatment he expend certain amount. 4. Thereafter, for compensation he filed the Claim Petition registered as Claim Petition No. 27 of 1983 (Shiv Shanker Vs. Mushtaq Husain and others). In the said Claim Petition, the insurer of the vehicle has filed written statement, later on it came to the knowledge of the claimant that the vehicle in question was registered in the name of the present petitioner, he moved an application for impleadment of the petitioner as respondent in the Claim Petition alongwith the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. The said application was opposed by the petitioner by filing the objection, however by means of the impugned order dated 04.11.1992 passed by the respondent no. 6, the said application was allowed. 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 04.01.1992, the present writ petition has been filed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties present today and gone through the material on record. 8. The point involved in the present case is not dispute know in view of the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. C. Padma and another AIR 2003 SC 4394 in the said case after relying on the earlier judgment reported in the case of Dhannalal Vs. 8. The point involved in the present case is not dispute know in view of the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. C. Padma and another AIR 2003 SC 4394 in the said case after relying on the earlier judgment reported in the case of Dhannalal Vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and others (1996) 4 SCC 652 , it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that as under :- "Before the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Act 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident of the breadearner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom, Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of the Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition. "In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the amending Act it does not appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which provides: "158. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which provides: "158. (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer." In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer-in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the insurer concerned. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view of the amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation." The ratio laid down in Dhannalal's case (supra) applies with full force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition was filed sub-section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted. Thus, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place. Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case does not consider Section 6A of the General Clauses Act and therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 6A of the General Clauses Act undoubtedly provides that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal. However, this is subject to "unless a different intention appears". In Dhannalal's case the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out. It is noted that the Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victims of accidents if the claim petition was rejected only on ground of limitation. Thus "the different intention" clearly appears and Section 6A of the General Clauses Act would not apply. Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156 . The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an accident, which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition of the appellant was filed on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156 . The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an accident, which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition of the appellant was filed on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into force on 1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned. In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court held that the case of the appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in Vinod Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case, as noticed above. Learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that since no period of limitation has been prescribed by the Legislature, Article 137 of the Limitation Act may be invoked, otherwise, according to him, state claims would be encouraged leading to multiplicity of litigation for non-prescribing the period of limitation. We are unable to countenance with the contention of the appellant for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Secondly, it is a self contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. The Parliament, in its wisdom, realised the grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being the intendment of the Legislature to give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation, invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the intendment of the Legislature. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which is under challenged in the present case, accordingly, writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed with the observation that the respondent no. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which is under challenged in the present case, accordingly, writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed with the observation that the respondent no. 6 (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Special Judge, Unnao) decide the matter in question expeditiously after hearing the learned counsel for the parties on merit.