JUDGMENT 1. This petition has been preferred seeking following substantive relief : The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order at Annexure 'I' hereto; and consequently declaring that the petitioner does not hold any surplus land at all; 2. The petitioner filled up Form No.1 under section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the ULC Act) vide order dated 30.3.1988. The Competent Authority declared 20043 Sq.Mts. of land as surplus out of the total holding of the petitioner while permitting retention of 1000 Sq.Mts. of land. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Urban Land Tribunal (the Tribunal) against the aforesaid order. The appeal was dismissed on 26.10.1990. The petitioner came before this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 3814 of 1992.3. Vide judgment rendered on 7.2.2003 the aforesaid petition was disposed of by the High Court after recording the following findings : 2. The main contentions that are raised by the petitioner are that the lands in question also consisted parcels of land which cannot fall within the definition of vacant land. It is also contended that one of the holders of the land had filled up the form under section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (now repealed), which has not been processed up-till now by the authority concerned. The next contention is that application under section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 ( ULC Act for short) has also not been decided. Some of the lands have been in possession of tenants. It is contended that the possession of the lands in question has not been legally taken although the other side's case is that the possession is taken in presence of panch witnesses. It is, therefore, contended that in view of the provisions contained under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 ( Repeal Act for short), the land now must vest back into the petitioner. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Patel has reiterated the above grounds. He has drawn attention of this Court to the amendments made in the petition following the enactment of the Repeal Act. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. Patel has reiterated the above grounds. He has drawn attention of this Court to the amendments made in the petition following the enactment of the Repeal Act. He has also produced material before this Court to indicate that there were constructions on some of the lands, including a cinema hall, a chemical factory, etc. He submitted that the possession has been taken by the Maintenance Surveyor, who cannot be considered as a person authorised to take the possession by the Government, as contemplated under the Act and, therefore, the petition may be allowed . xxx xxx xxx xxx6. Having regard to the contentions raised before this Court, undisputedly, the possession appears to have been taken by the Maintenance Surveyor, Urban Land Ceiling, Ahmedabad, on April 30,1992, as per the Panchnama drawn in this regard in presence of panch witnesses. The Panchnama indicates that there were constructions on the lands in question. The constructions include a cinema hall, some construction of chemical factory, some godown, etc. It also transpires that Rasik Cinema Enterprise has filled in Form No.1 under section 6 of the ULC Act (now repealed) and as per the say of the petitioner, this form has not been processed, which is reflected in the order of the Competent Officer dated 5.8.1992 (Annexure-I).7. It is true that the petitioner did not produce any material to show that construction was made prior to the appointed date before both the authorities below. However, Form No.6, filled in by the petitioner specifically indicates existence of Sangam Theatre, etc. The petitioner has produced certain documetns to indicate that the construction was regularised somewhere in 1964 by the T.D.O., Ahmedabad. It, therefore, prima facie, appears that there were some constructions on some part of the lands in question on the appointed date. The constructions are still there and even the cinema hall still operates, as per the statement made at the Bar by learned Advocate for respondent No.3.8. In the opinion of this Court, interst of justice, therefore, requires that the case of the petitioner is considered by the authority concerned in a proper perspective in light of the fact situation as it existed at the relevant time. Failure on part of the petitioner in producing relevant documents before appropriate authority at the relevant time need not result in miscarriage of justice if what is indicated by the petitioner is true. Failure on part of the petitioner in producing relevant documents before appropriate authority at the relevant time need not result in miscarriage of justice if what is indicated by the petitioner is true. This Court is , therefore, of the opinion that, it would be in the fitness of things that the case of the petitioner, as emerging from Form No.1 filled by him under section 6 of the ULC Act (now repealed), is considered afresh after taking into consideration the relevant material . xxx xxx xxx Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, is, therefore, directed to decide the matter afresh, in accordance with law, after considering all the points raised by the petitioner in Form 1 filed under section 6 of the ULC Act (now repealed), keeping in light the material that may be produced by the petitioner before the authority concerned. It is clarified that the petitioner would be permitted to produce relevant documents on record and on production of the documents, the decision would be taken as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within three months thereafter . 4. Thereupon the petitioner filed written submissions before the Tribunal. Vide impugned order dated 17.1.2004 the Tribunal held that out of the total 20043 Sq.Mts. land declared to be surplus in relation to land situated at Makarba out of 14570 Sq.Mts. of land only 5023 Sq.Mts. of land shall be treated as surplus, whereas in relation to other parcels of land situated at Chhadavad, Rakhial Ward and Vasna, total surplus land admeasuring 5473 Sq.Mts. of land was not required to be interfered with. It is this order which is under challenge in the present proceedings. 5. On behalf of the petitioner it was pointed out that during pendency of the earlier petition, being Special Civil Application No. 3814 of 1992, the ULC Act had been repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (the Repeal Act) and this was pointed out to the Court by making an appropriate amendment in the petition. That the High Court had therefore recorded and noted the appointment of Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department as the Urban Land Tribunal under section 4 of the Repeal Act, but the said Notification was by name and therefore the impugned order which has been made by another gentleman is without jurisdiction in absence of any specific Notification in this regard.5.1. That the High Court had therefore recorded and noted the appointment of Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department as the Urban Land Tribunal under section 4 of the Repeal Act, but the said Notification was by name and therefore the impugned order which has been made by another gentleman is without jurisdiction in absence of any specific Notification in this regard.5.1. The next contention was that by virtue of operation of section 4 of the Repeal Act all the proceedings would stand abated and as the Proviso under section 4 of the Repeal Act did not refer to proceedings under section 10 of the ULC Act, provisions of section 3 of the Repeal Act would have no relevance. That in absence of any fresh Notifications as required by provisions of section 10(1) to section 10(5) of the ULC Act the impugned order would be infructuous and the same be declared as such.5.2. Lastly it was contended on the basis of judgment of Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. L.J. Johnson & Anr., reported in AIR 1983 SC 1303 to submit that while granting relief in relation to constructed portion of land, land appurtenant to such constructed property had to be considered for the purpose of exclusion while computing surplus. 5.3. An incidental submission in this regard was that once the earlier order made by the authority was quashed and set aside and the appeal restored to file before the Tribunal, earlier order and the consequential Notifications would fail, being non existent in law and therefore unless and until the procedure prescribed under section 10 of the ULC Act is followed once again no land could be held to be surplus. 5.4. In support of the submissions following judgments of this High Court have been relied upon :[i] Bharatkumar Lalbhai Vasa & Ors. V/s. State of Gujarat & Ors. 2007(4) GLR 3740.[ii] Dahyabhai Manorbhai Patel V/s. Competent Authority & Addl. Collector, Unit No.2, Vadodara & Anr. 1987(2) GLR 1396 .[iii] D.S.Patel & Construction Co. V/s. Competent Authority & Dy. Collector(U.L.C.) Rajkot & Anr. 1997(3) GLR 2375 . 6. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the extracted portion from judgment dated 7.2.2003 between the same parties in Special Civil Application No. 3814 of 1992 makes it clear that Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department was directed to decide the matter afresh. V/s. Competent Authority & Dy. Collector(U.L.C.) Rajkot & Anr. 1997(3) GLR 2375 . 6. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the extracted portion from judgment dated 7.2.2003 between the same parties in Special Civil Application No. 3814 of 1992 makes it clear that Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department was directed to decide the matter afresh. The Court had not directed any particular officer by name to hear and decide the appeal. The petitioner having filed written submissions before the Tribunal, having participated in hearing now cannot turn round and state that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction. This is so because at no stage had the issue regarding lack of jurisdiction been raised by the petitioner before the Appellate Tribunal. It is settled position that when a jurisdictional issue arises the same has to be raised at the earliest point in time and cannot be agitated belatedly. Therefore this contention does not merit acceptance. 7. In so far as the applicability of provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act are concerned, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of this High Court in the case of Vijaygauri wd/o. Vishnuprasad Nathalal Bhatt & Ors. V/s. State of Gujarat & Anr. 2009(2) GLR 952 wherein the High Court has after extracting provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act held as under : 9. On a plain reading it becomes clear that despite the repeal of the principal Act Section 3 saves (i) the vesting of any vacant land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government; AND (ii) a case where any land deemed to have vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government and any amount has been paid by the State Government in respect of such land, but such land shall be restored if the amount paid by the State Government is refunded to the State Government. In other words, all acts where vesting and possession by the State Government are complete the said acts will be saved; moreover, when vesting has taken place and payment has been made by the State Government but possession has not been taken over, even such vesting will be saved subject to the land holder refunding the amount to the State Government, in which eventuality the land shall be restored to the land holder by the State Government. Therefore, in the facts of the present case if one reads Section 3 of the Repeal Act as a standalone provision, the petitioners cannot claim any restoration as the act of vesting, taking possession has been saved by provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. 10. However, Section 4 of the Repeal Act provides for abatement of legal proceedings and states that all proceedings relating to or made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of the Repeal Act, before any Court, Tribunal or any authority shall abate. The Proviso has carved out a limited exception in relation to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act subject to fulfillment of the conditions stipulated therein. 11. The validity of both these provisions was challenged before this Court in case of Rameshchandra Shamjibhai Raniga Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra). A Division Bench of this Court held that (i) Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act is a constitutionally valid piece of legislation; (ii) the provisions of Section 4 of the Repeal Act are also valid, but construed reasonably the said provisions mean that the question whether, on the facts and law, in a given case, the pending proceedings before a Court, etc. would abate or not, is a question open to judicial scrutiny. Hence, the interplay of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act will have to be considered in light of the following observations made by this Court in the aforesaid case of Rameshchandra Shamjibhai Raniga Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra) : 43. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the points urged and carefully examined the ratio of the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Maganlal Patel (supra). State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra) : 43. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the points urged and carefully examined the ratio of the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Maganlal Patel (supra). On a bare reading of the provision and particularly the language used in opening part of Section 4 "all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made ...... shall abate" only means that such proceedings pending before any court, tribunal or authority shall not be continued and would come to an end. The language used aforesaid can never mean that the power of the court, tribunal or authority to examine whether the order passed or purported to have been passed under the principal Act, while it was in operation, was valid or not, has been taken away. Any other interpretation on the language of Section 4 would be unconstitutional, because the Legislature by no provision can completely take away the power of judicial review. The learned Single Judge, in the portion of his judgment quoted above, has taken a view that as an effect of Section 4 of the Act of 1999, even writ proceedings before the High Court would abate. We find no ground to take a contrary view and overrule his judgment on the interpretation of Section 4 but we consider it necessary to add a rider or explanation so as to construe the provision in a manner to make it constitutionally valid. In the impugned provision of Section 4, the word "abate" if construed harmoniously in the light of the constitutional provisions, would mean that the proceedings under the Repealed Act would not be continued on the repeal because as a result of repeal of the principal Act, the proceedings thereunder are rendered infructuous. In our considered opinion, provisions of Section 4 cannot be read and construed to infer that the effect of abatement would be that even validity of actions taken under the Repealed Act and examination of its provisions for the purpose of ascertaining whether any rights and liabilities thereunder are saved, would be outside the scrutiny of courts, tribunals or authorities. The inference of such effect of Section 4, as to take away completely power of judicial scrutiny, would be a clear negation of the legal and constitutional powers of the courts, tribunals and authorities under the two enactments. The inference of such effect of Section 4, as to take away completely power of judicial scrutiny, would be a clear negation of the legal and constitutional powers of the courts, tribunals and authorities under the two enactments. Such interpretation would militate against the theory of basic structure of the Constitution as propounded by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of his His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others V. State of Kerala AIR 1973 Supreme Court 1461 which is followed and reiterated by recognising the power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution over Administrative Tribunals in case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others AIR 19987 SC 1125. In the case of Chandra Kumar, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the High Court and Article 32 of the Supreme Court is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. The independence of judiciary is also a basic part of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 4 having an effect of abatement of pending proceedings in relation to an `order made or purported to be made' under the Repealed Act, cannot be construed to completely take away the power of the courts, tribunals and authorities as judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to examine the validity of the order or action taken under the Repealed Act and to find out the impact of repealing Act on the rights and liabilities of the land owners and the State. An example will make the legal position clear. Under Repealed Act, suppose an agricultural land which is not covered by the definition of `urban land' under Section 2(o) of the Repealed Act of 1976 is clubbed with other urban land of an owner and declared excess to be deemed to have been acquired and vested in the State. Thereafter it is taken possession of. It would be saved and retained by the State as an effect of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repealing Act of 1999. Thereafter it is taken possession of. It would be saved and retained by the State as an effect of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repealing Act of 1999. Construction as sought to be put on Section 4 would result in abatement of case of such owner pending before any authority, court or tribunal and would deprive the land owner from contending that he did not hold any excess urban land, such land was not governed by the Repealed Act of 1976, and was wrongly treated to have been acquired and vested in the State and its possession was wrongly taken from him by force and coercive methods. Such unjust result cannot be intended to have been provided in Section 4 of the Act of 1999.44. The provisions of Section 4 providing for abatement of all proceedings under the Repealed Act, can only mean that on repeal of the principal Act, all proceedings under it, to the extent they are not saved and left unaffected by the Repealing Act, would not be proceeded with as having been rendered infructuous. All such pending proceedings in which previous operation of the Repealed Act is challenged can never be deemed to have been abated, as the pending cases would require some adjudication and decision on the question of legal effectof the abatement provided in Section 4 of the Act. "Purport" is a well known word in legal usage and has many shades of meaning to be ascertained in the context of the provisions under construction. In the present context, it cannot be construed to mean that proceedings found to be de hors the Repealed Act, or beyond jurisdiction of the concerned authorities, who had undertaken it, although prima facie invalid, would be beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. The use of word "purport" in Section 4 is to be read down in the manner not to render it unconstitutional. The Legislature can never be presumed to have intended that even an order passed de hors the Act or beyond jurisdiction of the authorities under the Repealed Act would be outside judicial scrutiny. Every law is presumed to be prospective in operation unless a contrary intention is expressed in that law. By repeal of principal Act, its previous operation cannot be held to be beyond judicial scrutiny where such previous orders and proceedings are found to have adversely and prejudicially affected the parties. Every law is presumed to be prospective in operation unless a contrary intention is expressed in that law. By repeal of principal Act, its previous operation cannot be held to be beyond judicial scrutiny where such previous orders and proceedings are found to have adversely and prejudicially affected the parties. The right of land owners to challenge the validity of such proceedings cannot be intended to have been taken away by providing abatement of such proceedings. As observed by us above, "the basic structure" theory of the Constitution in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) and reiterated in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) does not countenance such an unconstitutional and unjust situation. An interpretation of the provisions, therefore, that such law does not deprive the power of independent judiciary has to be preferred.45. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Maganlal Patel (supra) does not appear to us to have laid down anything contrary to the constitutional scheme. As held by the learned Single Judge, the word `proceedings' as used in Section 4 of 1999 Act may include writ proceedings in the High Court and the law can be made to render them infructuous but the power of the constitutional court of judicial scrutiny cannot be held to have been taken away by such Legislation. The constitutional power of High Court or Supreme Court to decide whether, on the facts and legal position in a given case, the proceedings before it would abate or not, can never be taken away by ordinary law. We also do not find any such intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 4 in the Act of 1999. Judicial scrutiny of actions taken and order passed under Repealed or Repealing Act would always be permissible and the court, tribunals and authorities can decide whether on the facts and law in a given case, the proceedings before it had abated or been rendered infructuous or not. To the above extent, the provision under Section 4 have to be read down. The judgment of the learned Single Judge (supra) has to be understood and the provisions construed in a reasonable manner accordingly. To the above extent, the provision under Section 4 have to be read down. The judgment of the learned Single Judge (supra) has to be understood and the provisions construed in a reasonable manner accordingly. (emphasis supplied)The effect therefore is that the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act are held to be constitutionally valid piece of Legislation but, though the writ proceedings before the High Court would abate, the powers of the High Court to examine, whether in the facts of a given case such abatement will take place or not, are left intact and provisions of Section 4 have been read down to the said extent . 8. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that section 4 of the Repeal Act is absolute in terms and section 3 of the Repeal Act cannot be applied. In the facts of the present case, admittedly when the order was originally made on 30.3.1998 following different parcels of lands were held to be surplus respectively as per details reproduced in paragraph No.4 of the petition. The relevant extract is as under :Sr.No. Village Survey/F.P/Sub-Plot No. Area in sq.mt. 1. Makarba 43,44 14570 2. Chhadavad F.P. 42 of T.P.No.21 641 3. Rakhial Ward Land with building. 1840 4. Vasna Survey Nos. 379, 380, 381Sub Plots No.1213 14 45 862841910379------20043 Sq.Mts. 9. Pursuant to order dated 30.3.1998 Notification under section 10(1) read with Rule 6 under the ULC Act was issued. This was followed by Notification under section 10(3) of the ULC Act on 30.11.1990 and ultimately culminated in notice under section 10(5) of the ULC Act dated 25.3.1991. The panchnama had thereafter been executed on 30.4.1992. Therefore, before the High Court admitted the petition on 9.6.1992 the entire gamut of procedure stipulated by section 10 of the ULC Act was over. 10. Thus it becomes clear that despite repeal of the ULC Act, section 3 of the Repeal Act saves vesting of any vacant land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government. The interplay of provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act has already been considered by this High Court in the aforesaid judgment rendered in case of Vijaygauri (supra). 11. The interplay of provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act has already been considered by this High Court in the aforesaid judgment rendered in case of Vijaygauri (supra). 11. However, what is more material is the fact that what had been set aside by the High Court in the earlier round of proceedings was not the order made by the Competent Authority but the order made by the Urban Land Tribunal in Appeal No. 259 of 1988 and hence the direction to the Appellate Authority to decide the matter afresh. Therefore, even on facts the original order dated 30.3.1988 survives and thus the consequential actions under sections 10(1) to 10(5) of the ULC Act remain intact. 12. In the circumstances, the contention that in absence of any fresh Notification as required by provisions of section 10 of the ULC Act no land could be treated as surplus land cannot be countenanced. At the cost of repetition it is required to be stated that surplus land as declared under order dated 30.3.1988 had vested in the State Government and therefore by virtue of operation of section 3 of the Repeal Act such vesting would be saved and would not be disturbed. The only relief in such circumstances that the petitioner would get is reduction of the area declared as surplus in relation to land situated at Makarba. Instead of 14570 Sq.Mts. of such land being surplus now only 5023 Sq.Mts. of land from Makarba shall be treated as surplus. 13. In the aforesaid set of facts and circumstances of the case, reliance by the petitioner on the aforesaid judgments of this High Court would not assist the case of the petitioner because at no stage has order dated 30.3.1988 been disturbed by the High Court and thus the consequential proceedings also stand, the only variation is the modification of the appellate order in the second round granting partial relief to the petitioner. 14. Even otherwise, on facts if one examines the aforesaid three judgments it becomes apparent that none of the judgments can apply in the present scenario. In the first case of Bharatkumar Lalbhai Vasa (supra) the High Court has observed as under : 21. 14. Even otherwise, on facts if one examines the aforesaid three judgments it becomes apparent that none of the judgments can apply in the present scenario. In the first case of Bharatkumar Lalbhai Vasa (supra) the High Court has observed as under : 21. The Repeal Act provides for saving of the action under sub-sec.(3) of the Act of 1976, if the land has vested to the State Government under Sec. 10(3) of the Act and the possession of which has been taken over by the State Government, but neither of the said contingencies was in existence on the date when the Repeal Act came into force. Therefore, if there is no vesting under Sec. 10(3) of the Act and the possession is taken over without there being authority under the law as concluded in the earlier paragraph, the case would fall under Sec. 4 of the Repeal Act for abatement of the proceedings under the Act of 1976. xxx xxx xxx The fact remains that on the date when the Repeal Act came into force, neither the land had vested to the State Government, nor was the possession taken over under the authority of law. Therefore, merely because the order of status quo operated pending the petition, is no sufficient ground for not to apply the provisions of the Repeal Act either for saving of the action under the Act of 1976 or for the abatement of the proceedings under the Act of 1976 as per the Repeal Act and, hence, the contention of Mr. Gori that this Court may examine the matter for testing the legality and validity of the order passed by the competent authority and the confirmation thereof by the Urban Land Tribunal on the face of the Repeal Act cannot be entertained and deserves to be rejected . 15. In so far as the second case of Dahyabhai Manorbhai Patel (supra) is concerned, the entire controversy before the Court was as to whether an appeal was maintainable before the Tribunal after Notifications under section 10(3) and 10(5) of the ULC Act have been issued. This Court held that provisions of section 33 of the ULC Act which statutorily permit filing of appeal cannot be rendered nugatory by such issuance of Notifications. The Court observed as under: 10. This Court held that provisions of section 33 of the ULC Act which statutorily permit filing of appeal cannot be rendered nugatory by such issuance of Notifications. The Court observed as under: 10. If one reads the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 in the aforesaid manner it is very clear that the legislature did provide for an appeal against an order passed by the Competent Authority under sec. 9 of the Act. The right of appeal is not made conditional on the publication or non-publication of the Notification under sec. 10 of the Act. In a given case the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal may grant stay of further proceedings or may even grant conditional stay of further proceedings or may even refuse to grant stay. In cases where stay is not granted at all, the Competent Authority shall proceed further and notification as provided under sec. 10 will be issued and published in the Government Gazette. In such cases it would be absurd to hold that even though the appeal is filed within time, but on account of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal Notification under secs. 10(3) and 10(5) have been issued and therefore the appeal has become infructuous. Such can never be the intention of the legislature. Therefore, the last part of the phrase occurring in sec. 10(3) of the Act such land shall deem to have vested absolutely in the State Government cannot be read so as to defeat the provisions of the Act, i.e. the provisions of sec. 33 of the Act. If this construction is not adopted the right of appeal can be frustrated by not granting stay of further proceedings or by not registering the appeal immediately. 11. Such an interpretation would be both absurd and unreasonable. Therefore it has to be avoided. The only reasonable interpretation that can be given to the provisions of secs. 10(3) and 10(5) of the Act is that the vesting of the land in the Government would be subject to the result of the appeal under sec. 33 of the Act. In cases where aggrieved party may succeed in appeal and the final order passed by the Competent Authority under sec. 9 is set aside (or varied or modified), the further consequential steps under sec. 33 of the Act. In cases where aggrieved party may succeed in appeal and the final order passed by the Competent Authority under sec. 9 is set aside (or varied or modified), the further consequential steps under sec. 10 also will have to be taken by the Government so as to bring the same in confirmity with the final order under sec. 9 of the Act. Just as the order under sec. 9 is set aside (or varied modified) by the Urban Land Appellate Tribunal similarly the subsequent steps under sec. 10 of the Act will have to be taken by the Government and it will have either to set aside (or vary or modify) its earlier actions.12. Reading both the provisions in the aforesaid manner, the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal that because Notification under sec. 10(3) of the Act was issued and therefore the appeal was not maintainable cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel for the respondents has not been able to show any provision of law on the basis of which it can be held that once the declaration under sec. 10(3) of the Act is published in the Official Gazette, right to challenge the final order under sec. 9 of the Act passed by the Competent Authority conferred upon an aggrieved party under sec. 33 of the Act gets extinguished. As stated hereinabove, right conferred by statute cannot be extinguished by adopting an unreasonable and unusual manner of interpretation of statute . 16. Similarly in so far as the third case of D.S.Patel & Construction Co. (supra) is concerned, again it was a case of where during pendency of appeal, if notifications are issued, the appeal would be rendered infructuous or not. 17. In this connection, it is necessary to note that in none of the three judgments was the factum of operation of section 3 of the Repeal Act directly in issue. In the present case, at the cost of repetition, it is required to be reiterated that original order dated 30.3.1998 made by the Competent Authority was never disturbed and the proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal were the only proceedings revived by the High Court. 18. In the present case, at the cost of repetition, it is required to be reiterated that original order dated 30.3.1998 made by the Competent Authority was never disturbed and the proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal were the only proceedings revived by the High Court. 18. Lastly, in so far as the alternative contention based on the Apex Court judgment in the case State of U.P. & Ors.(supra) is concerned suffice it to state that in the facts of the present case it was never the case of the petitioner that the arithmetical working of the area is at any stage disputed by the petitioner or that the petitioner had made any claim in relation to the land appurtenant to the constructed property. The only case put up by the petitioner all throughout was that the land on which the construction has been put up has wrongly been included while computing the surplus area of land. Even before the Appellate Tribunal no such plea was raised and therefore, the Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not go into a question of fact where evidence is required to be led and such evidence is never led before the Tribunal, nor any foundational facts have come on record. 19. In the circumstances, for the aforestated reasons none of the contentions raised at the time of hearing merit acceptance. The petition is not required to be granted and accordingly the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.