JUDGMENT Rakesh Saksena, J. 1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 14th June, 2005 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Burhanpur in Sessions Trial No. 41/2004, convicting the Appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing her to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default of payment of fine further rigorous imprisonment for three years. 2. According to prosecution, mother-in-law (Appellant) and the father-in-law of Firoza Bi (deceased) used to quarrel with her and ask her to leave their house. On 21.12.2003 at about 12 O' clock in the noon they again quarreled and asked Firoza Bi and her husband Mohd. Alim to leave their house. Salma, the sister of deceased and Sahina, the wife of elder brother of Alim were also present at the house. After quarrel when Mohd. Naeem and Alim went to their shop, Rajiya Bi poured kerosene on Firoza Bi and threw a burning matchstick over her, due to which her clothes caught fire. Her father-in-law Mohd. Amin was also present there and was saying that she should also be turned out of the house. On getting information Naeem came back to his house. Firoza Bi narrated the incident to him. He, Habibur Rehman and other persons carried Firoza Bi to hospital. Her husband Mohd. Alim also reached the hospital at about 4 P.M. On getting information, O.P. Pastariya (P.W. 11), A.S.I. Police reached Nehru Hospital, Burhanpur, where Firoza Bi was taken for the treatment and on the information furnished by her recorded Dehati Nalshi (Ex.P/19). He also requested the doctor to record the dying declaration of Firoza Bi. Dr. M.K. Gupta (P.W. 5) examined the injuries of Firoza Bi and recorded her dying declaration Ex. P/11, wherein she stated that Appellant Raziya Bi and her father-in-law Mohd. Amin set fire to her. 3. On 22.12.2003 at about 12.55 A.M. Firoza Bi succumbed to her injuries. Postmortem of her body was conducted by Dr. B.D. Gattani (P.W. 15). After investigation, charge sheet was filed and case was committed for trial. 4. Accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication. According to them, in connivance with her husband Alim and husband's brother Naeem, Firoza Bi had set fire to herself with a view to pressurize them to dissuade from gifting their property to their daughter. Accused persons also examined five witnesses to substantiate their defence. 5. 4. Accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication. According to them, in connivance with her husband Alim and husband's brother Naeem, Firoza Bi had set fire to herself with a view to pressurize them to dissuade from gifting their property to their daughter. Accused persons also examined five witnesses to substantiate their defence. 5. After trial, upon appreciation of evidence, relying mainly on the evidence of dying declaration, learned trial Judge convicted both the accused persons. Raziya Bi was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Mohd. Amin was convicted under Section 302/ 34 of the Indian Penal Code. During pendency of appeal, Appellant Mohd. Amin died and the appeal in respect of him stood abated. 6. Shri Imtiyaz Hussain, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial Court committed grave error in relying on the dying declaration for holding the Appellant guilty. Appellant was the step mother-in-law of the deceased. Relations between her and the deceased were not cordial. Before recording the dying declaration, deceased was tutored by her relatives. There was no independent corroboration of the dying declaration. He also placed reliance on Mohan Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC 151 , State of U.P. v. Raj Bahadur 1993 Cri. L.J. 86, State of Gujarat v. Khumansingh Karsan Singh and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 1641 , Ram Nath Madhoprasad and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 420 and Laxmi (Smt.) v. Om Prakash and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 118 . 7. On the other hand, Shri J.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the State submitted that immediately after the occurrence, Dehati Nalshi (Ex. P/19) was recorded on the statement made by deceased, therefore, it was rightly treated as a dying declaration. The dying declaration (Ex. P/11) was recorded by doctor on being satisfied that deceased was in a fit condition to make the statement. Both the dying declarations were consistent about the act of Appellant and stood corroborated by the evidence of Mohd. Naeem (P.W. 2), therefore, trial Court committed no error in placing reliance on the aforesaid dying declarations. According to him, no interference was called for in the impugned judgment of conviction of the Appellant. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel of both the parties and perused the impugned judgment and record of the trial Court carefully. 9. Naeem (P.W. 2), therefore, trial Court committed no error in placing reliance on the aforesaid dying declarations. According to him, no interference was called for in the impugned judgment of conviction of the Appellant. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel of both the parties and perused the impugned judgment and record of the trial Court carefully. 9. It is not disputed that deceased died of burn injuries. Mohd. Naeem (P.W. 2), Mohd. Nizam (P.W. 3), Salma Bano (P.W. 4), Mohd. Saeed (P.W. 7) and Habibur Rehman (P.W. 14) categorically stated that they saw Firoza Bi in burnt condition. Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) examined Firoza Bi and found 98% burn injuries on her body. After her death, Tahsildar Mahesh (P.W. 20) conducted the inquest of the dead body and Dr. B.D. Gattani (P.W. 15) conducted the postmortem examination of the dead body. From their evidence, it is evident that Firoza Bi died of burn injuries. 10. Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) stated that on 21.12.2003, Firoza Bi was brought to Government Hospital, Burhanpur by Mohd. Alim in burnt condition. He started his treatment after examining her injuries. The smell of kerosene was emanating from her body. Her hair were singed. Most of the upper part of her body was affected by burn injuries. Though, her pulse and blood pressure was not recordable, but she was conscious. The burn injuries were about 98%. On the request of police officer, he had recorded the dying declaration of Firoza Bi. Before recording the dying declaration, he had certified that she was capable of giving answers. He had recorded the dying declaration Ex. P/11 and signed it. He had also recorded the certificate to the effect that Firoza Bi was fully conscious during the time of making her statement. In Ex. P/11, which was recorded in question and answer form, Firoza Bi stated that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her body and ignited her by throwing burning matchstick. Her clothes caught fire. By the time she reached near the door, her whole body caught fire. When she went out, people covered her with a quilt. At the time of occurrence, her sister Salma and Jithani Sahina were present. Her husband had gone for working on loom. She stated that her father-in-law and mother-in-law used to ask her to leave their house, but where they could have gone, her husband was a labourer. When she went out, people covered her with a quilt. At the time of occurrence, her sister Salma and Jithani Sahina were present. Her husband had gone for working on loom. She stated that her father-in-law and mother-in-law used to ask her to leave their house, but where they could have gone, her husband was a labourer. Her mother-in-law was the step mother-in-law. She had studied up to 5th Class. This statement was signed by the deceased and also by Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5). Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) stated that after getting the treatment started he had gone, but after about 3 1/2 hours on the request of police, he had come back to record the dying declaration. At that time, relative men and women of Firoza Bi were present beside her bed and she was talking to them. When he started recording the dying declaration, he asked all these persons to go out of the room. He admitted that Firoza Bi named only her mother-in-law and she did not tell anything about her father-in-law. He did not know as to who were the persons who had stayed and talked with her. 11. It was not at all challenged that the doctor recorded the said statement incorrectly or that he had animus against the accused persons which could have led him to record the false statement of the deceased. It was also not challenged in the cross examination that Firoza Bi was not in fit condition or was otherwise incapable of making the statement. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the dying declaration (Ex. P/11) was not correctly recorded. In the case of Laxmi (supra), the Apex Court held that one of the important test of the reliability of the dying declaration is the finding arrived at by the Court as to the satisfaction that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and capable of making a statement at the point of time when the dying declaration purports to have been made and/or recorded. The statement may be brief or longish. It is not the length of the statement but the fit state of mind of the victim to narrate the facts of occurrence which has relevance. The statement may be brief or longish. It is not the length of the statement but the fit state of mind of the victim to narrate the facts of occurrence which has relevance. If the Court finds that the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate the facts was impaired or the Court entertains grave doubts whether the deceased was in a fit physical and mental state to make the statement, the Court may in the absence of corroborating evidence lending assurance to the contents of the declaration refuse to act on it. 12. Apart from the dying declaration recorded by the doctor there is yet another statement of deceased which can be taken into account as the evidence of dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is the report Ex. P/19 by way of 'Dehati Nalshi' which was lodged by Firoza Bi. This report was recorded by A.S.I, of police namely O.P. Pastariya (P.W. 11). He recorded this report when Firoza Bi was admitted in Nehru Hospital for treatment. According to Ex. P/19, Firoza Bi was residing with her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. Her husband used to work on loom. Since she was a girl from a poor house, her parents-in-law used to give her pain and sufferings. Appellant was her step mother-in-law. They used to ask them to go out of the house and live somewhere else. On the day of occurrence, at about 12-1 O' clock, her mother-in-law and father-in-law quarreled with her. Her husband had gone out for working on the loom. Her sister-in-law Sahina Bano and sister Salma were at her house. Her mother-in-law Rajiya with intent to kill her, poured kerosene on her and threw a burning matchstick at her, due to which, her clothes caught fire and she got burnt. At that time, her father-in-law was saying that she should be turned out of the house. This incident was seen by Salma and Sahina Bano. Her brother-in-law carried her to hospital for treatment. This report was signed by the deceased and also by Inspector O.P. Pastaria (P.W. 11). O.P. Pastaria (P.W. 11) stated that he recorded the aforesaid report in verbatim as stated by the deceased. He further stated that he also requested the doctor of the hospital to record the dying declaration of the deceased and issued a requisition to him Ex. P/20. O.P. Pastaria (P.W. 11) stated that he recorded the aforesaid report in verbatim as stated by the deceased. He further stated that he also requested the doctor of the hospital to record the dying declaration of the deceased and issued a requisition to him Ex. P/20. He firmly denied the suggestion that this report was not written on the information of Firoza Bi and that it was recorded on the asking of Naeem. In fact, the evidence of this witness was not seriously challenged in the cross examination, it was not even suggested that at the time of recording the said information, Firoza Bi was not in a fit physical or mental condition. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the Case of Laxmi (supra) that a dying declaration made to police officer is admissible in evidence, however, the practice of dying declaration being recorded by an investigating officer has been discouraged and the Supreme Court has urged the investigating officers to avail the services of a Magistrate for recording dying declaration if it was possible to do so and the only exception is when the deceased was in such a precarious condition that there was no other alternative left except the statement being recorded by the investigating officer or the police officer. It was further observed as regards the first dying declaration, in the ordinary course of things, a message should have been transmitted promptly by the police officer to the police control room and should have been recorded as a first information report of the incident disclosing commission of a cognizable offence by specified accused persons. In the instant case, Dehati Nalshi which was registered under Section 307/ 34 of the Indian Penal Code was sent to City Kotwali for registration, and a crime at No. 284/2003 under Sections 307/ 34 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code was registered by Station Officer of City Kotwali R.S. Ghurya (P.W. 23). The first information report Ex. P/26 was recorded on the basis of Dehati Nalshi. R.S. Ghurya (P.W. 23) deposed that the aforesaid first information report was brought by O.P. Pastariya (P.W. 11) from Nehru Hospital. Thus, Dehati Nalshi Ex. P/19 cannot be said to be a suspicious or concocted document. The first information report Ex. P/26 was recorded on the basis of Dehati Nalshi. R.S. Ghurya (P.W. 23) deposed that the aforesaid first information report was brought by O.P. Pastariya (P.W. 11) from Nehru Hospital. Thus, Dehati Nalshi Ex. P/19 cannot be said to be a suspicious or concocted document. Since it contained the statement given by deceased as to the cause and the circumstances of the transactions which resulted in her death, it can be taken into consideration as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. 13. On perusal of the contents of dying declaration Ex. P/11 recorded by doctor and contents of Dehati Nalshi Ex. P/19, we find that there were no inconsistencies in the version of the deceased in respect of the act of Appellant. In both the dying declarations, it was categorically stated by the deceased that she was set on fire by the Appellant. 14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant placing reliance on the case of Ram Nath Madhoprasad (supra) contended that it was not safe to convict the Appellant merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration because such a statement is not made on oath and is not subjected to cross-examination. Oft the facts of the case, the Apex Court observed that: We have reached the conclusion that in view of the sudden firing that took place at that house in the night it was not possible for Sunder to clearly identify the persons who had fired the shots at him, that in all likelihood the names he mentioned at the time were the result of the reaction on his mind on the occasion. He thought he might have been fired upon by his arch enemies...the dying declaration relied upon by the High Court and recorded by the Magistrate does not seem to us to contain a truthful version of what actually happened. In these circumstances, it was held that High Court was in error in basing the conviction of the Appellants much on the uncorroborated the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Magistrate and which was not only vague but which admittedly did not at all even represent the whole truth. 15. In these circumstances, it was held that High Court was in error in basing the conviction of the Appellants much on the uncorroborated the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Magistrate and which was not only vague but which admittedly did not at all even represent the whole truth. 15. In case of Laxmi (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the weak points of a dying declaration serve to put the Court on its guard while testing the reliability and impose on the Court an obligation to closely scrutinize all the relevant attendant circumstances. If in a given case a particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmities, either of its own or as disclosed by other evidence adduced in the case or circumstances coming to its notice, the Court may as a rule of prudence look for corroboration and if the infirmities be such as render the dying declaration so infirm as to prick the conscience of the Court, the same may be refused to be accepted. 16. On sincerely examining the two dying declarations in the present case, we are unable to find any inconsistencies with respect to the act attributed to the Appellant by the deceased. 17. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the relations between the deceased on one hand and her mother-in-law, the Appellant on the other were strained, because the Appellant and her husband used to ask her husband to leave their house, therefore, the possibility of false involvement of the Appellant in the dying declaration could not be ruled out and the conviction could nor be based on such dying declaration. He placed reliance on State of Gujarat v. Khumaisingh (supra). With due respect to the law laid down by the Apex Court, we find this precedent not applicable in the circumstances of the present case. In Khumansingh (supra), Apex Court found inconsistencies between the two dying declarations which betrayed the possibility of the deceased being amenable to tutoring and in those circumstances, held that the possibility of false involvement could not be ruled out and the High Court, therefore, rightly thought that in the absence of corroborative evidence, it was unsafe to rely mainly on the inconsistent dying declarations. 18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant placing reliance on the case of Raj Bahadur (supra) urged that it was admitted by Dr. 18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant placing reliance on the case of Raj Bahadur (supra) urged that it was admitted by Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) that relatives of deceased had talked with the deceased before the dying declaration was recorded, therefore, the possibility of tutoring could not be ruled out. The ratio of Raj Bahadur (supra), in our opinion, is hot attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case as there is nothing on record to indicate that the well wishers of deceased and other persons who were present near her were instrumental in launching the prosecution against the accused persons. 19. On perusal of the evidence of Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5), it does not appear that any suggestion was put to him that the deceased was prompted by any body to name the Appellant as an accused. Otherwise also it is quite natural that when a person is injured in any manner, he will be taken to hospital for treatment by his relatives and well wishers, therefore, unless there appear some circumstances, in the statement made by the deceased from which it can be inferred that out of malice or out of suspicion, the accused was named, it cannot be held that the dying declaration was not trustworthy. The Apex Court in Mohan Lal and Ors. (supra) observed that: The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) SCC 474 (SCC pp.480-481, paras 18-19): (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munna Raja v. State of M.P. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar.) (iii) This Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor.) (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.) (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P.) (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu.) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar.) (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P.) (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan.) (xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra.) 20. In the instant case, though it was admitted by Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) that relatives of deceased were present near the bed of deceased and deceased was talking to them and that he had asked them to leave the room when he recorded dying declaration, but he clarified that he did not know as to who were those persons and what they were talking. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the persons present near the deceased were tutoring her to speak against the Appellant. 21. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the persons present near the deceased were tutoring her to speak against the Appellant. 21. Apart from the evidence of written dying declaration, there was also evidence of Mohd. Naeem (P.W. 2), the elder brother of husband of deceased, who stated that on the day of occurrence his father Mohd. Amin quarreled with his wife and asked him and Alim to go out of the house. When he received information that the wife of Alim i.e. deceased was burnt by the accused persons, he went to his house and carried her on a handcart to the hospital. While he was taking her to hospital, on way she told him that Appellant poured kerosene and accused Amin ignited by her matchstick. 22. Learned Counsel for the Appellant drew our attention to Para 13 of the statement of Mohd. Naeem (P.W. 2) and pointed out that this fact was not mentioned by Naeem in his police statement Ex. D/1. However, on perusal of Ex. D/1, we find it mentioned that deceased told to him that her mother-in-law poured kerosene and set fire to her. It is true that the fact that father-in-law ignited her with matchstick was not mentioned in the Ex. D/1, but it was mentioned that Appellant poured kerosene and set fire to deceased. The oral dying declaration made by deceased to this witness thus corroborated the dying declarations Ex. P/11 and Ex. P/19. 23. Habibur Rehman (P.W. 14) deposed that he saw Firoza Bi in burnt condition. She told him that her mother-in-law and father-in-law set fire to her. Though this witness stated that when he carried Firoza Bi to hospital, Naeem was not present; he had come after some time in the hospital, but in view of the evidence of Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) that Naeem had brought Firoza Bi to hospital for treatment, it cannot be accepted that Naeem had not carried Firoza Bi to hospital. 24. The argument advanced by learned Counsel for the Appellant that Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) had since found 98% burn injuries on the body of deceased, it was not possible for the deceased to have made any dying declaration, cannot be accepted in the absence of any material on record to indicate that deceased was not capable of making the statement. It was categorically stated by Dr. K.M. Gupta (P.W. 5) had since found 98% burn injuries on the body of deceased, it was not possible for the deceased to have made any dying declaration, cannot be accepted in the absence of any material on record to indicate that deceased was not capable of making the statement. It was categorically stated by Dr. Gupta that deceased was fit in mental and physical state when she gave her statement. In P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 443 , Apex Court held that percentage of burns alone would not determine the probability or otherwise of making the dying declaration. Much would depend upon the nature of the burn, part of the body affected by the burn, impact of the burn on the faculties to think and convey the idea or facts coming to mind and other relevant factors. 25. The defence of the Appellant is that due to strained relations and animus between the Appellant on one side and the deceased, her husband and her husband's elder brother on the other side, deceased had sustained self inflicted burn injuries. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the sister of deceased Salmabano (P.W. 4) was present at the time of occurrence. Her presence was admitted by deceased herself in the dying declaration. Salmabano stated that Sahina, the wife of Naeem came with her relatives to the house of Appellant. Her relatives asked accused Mohd. Amin to let Sahina live in the house, but Ameen refused to let her live there. On this dispute there was a quarrel between the accused Amin and his sons Naeem and Alim. Amin asked both of them to leave his house. She peeped through a hole behind the closed doors that Sahina poured kerosene on her sister Firoza Bi and thereafter, Firoza Bi ignited herself by matchstick. Alim suggested to Firoza Bi that after setting fire to herself she should come out side and they will extinguish the fire and will falsely implicate the accused persons. This witness was declared hostile. She was confronted with her police statement Ex. P/8, wherein she stated that when she heard the screams of her sister, she saw her burning. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law were standing near the gate. Her statement before the Court, in our opinion, in view of her earlier statement does not inspire confidence. 26. This witness was declared hostile. She was confronted with her police statement Ex. P/8, wherein she stated that when she heard the screams of her sister, she saw her burning. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law were standing near the gate. Her statement before the Court, in our opinion, in view of her earlier statement does not inspire confidence. 26. As far as the evidence of defence witnesses is concerned Mohd. Salim (D.W. 1) stated that his father gifted his property to his wife and children and that at the time of occurrence his mother was working in the factory and his father was sitting near the main road, suddenly the fire erupted on the back side of the , house. Hearing the noise, his mother rushed to the place of fire, where Firoza Bi was burning. This witness is son of accused Mohd. Amin. He admitted that his father had gifted half of his plot to him and his parents helped him in all the circumstances. He admitted that from the place where he was sitting, the factory where his mother was working and the place where the incident occurred was not visible. Similarly Mohd. Farooq (D.W. 4), nephew of Appellant stated that at the time of occurrence Rajiya Bi was working on the loom; when he came out of the street, he saw a crowd of people. When he went there, he saw Firoza Bi in burnt condition. She had covered herself with a quilt and several people were present there. Kadar Sardar was asking Firoza Bi to implicate her father-in-law and mother-in-law for burning her. Evidence of this witness appears to be unnatural. It does not stand to reason that when Firoza Bi was sitting in burnt condition, Rajiya Bi was still working on the loom. It also appears unnatural that in front of a crowd of many persons, some body would have told to deceased to falsely implicate the accused persons. Shehnaz (D.W. 5), who is also a step daughter of Appellant stated that Firoza Bi ignited herself by matchstick and ran towards the road. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law were present at the place of occurrence. In cross examination, this witness admitted that deceased was a good natured woman. She used to take care of all the family members. She never saw quarrel between her step mother and the deceased. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law were present at the place of occurrence. In cross examination, this witness admitted that deceased was a good natured woman. She used to take care of all the family members. She never saw quarrel between her step mother and the deceased. This witness did not say that any body prompted the deceased to implicate the accused persons by giving false statement against them. She gave no indication as to why the deceased set fire to herself. Her evidence was contradictory to the evidence of Salma (P.W. 4), who stated that deceased ignited herself behind the closed doors in the presence of other members of the family. Mohd. Salim (D.W. 1) and Mohd. Farooq (D.W. 4) did not say that Shahnaz was present in the house when incident occurred. In these circumstances, the evidence of this witness does not inspire confidence. Other witnesses namely Abdul Latif (D.W. 2), Mukhtar Ahmed, Advocate (D.W. 3) deposed about the oral gift of the property to Rajiya Bano, Shehnaz Bano, Mukhtar and Wasim. Their evidence does not appear helpful to Appellant in any manner. 27. After careful scrutiny of the evidence of dying declarations and other evidence on record, we feel satisfied that the dying declarations Ex. P/19 and Ex. P/11 were truthful and trustworthy, and it was absolutely safe to act upon them. Court below committed no error in placing reliance on the evidence of dying declarations for the purpose of convicting the accused/Appellant. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment to warrant interference in this appeal. 28. This appeal is accordingly, dismissed.