JUDGMENT [Per : Hon’ble Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.] 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (from hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1984) against an order dated 20.3.2010 passed by the Judge, Family Court, Dehradun in Misc. Case No. 123 of 2008, on an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (from hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1955), whereby an amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month has been ordered to be given to the wife of the appellant under Section 24 of 1955 Act as maintenance pendent elite proceeding under Section 13 of 1955 Act, instituted by the husband, who is the appellant before this Court. 2. All the same, before this case could be heard on merits, the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the present Appeal under Section 19 of 1984 Act. The short contention of the respondent before this Court is that an appeal can be filed under Section 19 of 1984 Act only against a judgment, or an order which is not of an interlocutory nature, but since the order under challenge dated 20.3.2010 has been passed by the Family Court on an application moved by the respondent under Section 24 of 1955 Act for maintenance in pendent elite of the proceeding, the orders passed therein is essentially of an interlocutory nature and since Section 19(1) of 1984 Act specifically bars an appeal against an interlocutory order, the present appeal is not maintainable. 3. The counsel for the appellant on the other hand submits that the present appeal under Section 19(1) of Act, 1984 before this Court is not against an interlocutory order, but it is against a judgment or at least against an order which has all the trappings of a judgment, therefore, it cannot be called an “interlocutory order” and therefore, asserts that the objections raised by the respondent are entirely misconceived. 4. Before this Court adjudicates upon the merits of the case, since a preliminary objection on a pure question of law has been raised before this Court, it is necessary that this Court first deals with this preliminary objection, before proceeding on merits of the case. 5. Section 19(1) of the 1984 Act reads as follows :- “19. 4. Before this Court adjudicates upon the merits of the case, since a preliminary objection on a pure question of law has been raised before this Court, it is necessary that this Court first deals with this preliminary objection, before proceeding on merits of the case. 5. Section 19(1) of the 1984 Act reads as follows :- “19. Appeal – (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.” 6. The counsel for the respondent in support of his contention has relied upon a catena of judgments passed by various High Courts as well as by the Supreme Court. The first three cases relied upon by the respondent are Sunil Hansraj Gupta vs. Payal Sunil Gupta AIR 1991 Bombay 423, Radheshyam Gupta vs. Smt. Laxmi Bai AIR 1977 Madhya Pradesh 271 as well as Gurbaksh Singh Vs. Smt. Taran Jit AIR 1977 Himachal Pradesh 66. In all the three cases cited above, an order was passed under Section 24 of 1955 Act and the question before the Courts was as to whether in such a contingency an appeal under Section 28 of 1955 Act is maintainable? Therefore, what has been examined in all these cases is the maintainability of such an order under Section 28 of 1955 Act. Sections 24 and 28 of 1955 Act, read as under :- “24. Maintenance pendent elite and expenses of proceedings. Therefore, what has been examined in all these cases is the maintainability of such an order under Section 28 of 1955 Act. Sections 24 and 28 of 1955 Act, read as under :- “24. Maintenance pendent elite and expenses of proceedings. — Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable: [Provided that the application for the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during the proceeding, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the wife or the husband, as the case may be.]” ****** ****** ****** ****** ****** 28. Appeals from decrees and orders. — (1) All decrees made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. (2) Orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act under section 25 and 26 shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable if they are not interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. (3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the subject of costs only. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a [period of ninety days] from the date of the decree or order.]” 7. The above cited cases would not help the case of the respondent inasmuch as under Section 28 of the 1955 Act, the appeal is only maintainable against a “decree”. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a [period of ninety days] from the date of the decree or order.]” 7. The above cited cases would not help the case of the respondent inasmuch as under Section 28 of the 1955 Act, the appeal is only maintainable against a “decree”. This was done by an amendment in the year, 1976. The original unamended Section 28 did provide for an appeal against a decree as well as against an order. The unamended Section 28 reads as follows :- “28. Enforcement of, and appeal from, decrees and orders, — All decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force: Provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only.” 8. Therefore, under the unamended Section 28, an appeal was maintainable under Section 28 against all decrees and orders specifically mentioned in the Act, which included the order under Section 24 of the Act of 1955. However, a bare perusal of the amended Section 28 of the Act of 1955 as it now stands makes only a decree by the Court appealable. There is no mention of orders as it stood earlier under the old unamended Section 28. Therefore, for the purposes of Section 28 of the Act of 1955, appeal is not maintainable against an order passed under Section 24 of the Act of 1955. But we are not concerned with Section 28 of 1955 Act but with Section 19(1) of 1984 Act under which the present appeal has been filed. An appeal to a higher court, tribunal or authority is a creation of a statute. Since we are concerned with the provision Section 19 of the Act of 1984, we will limit our enquiry to the provisions contained therein and any reference to the provision contained under Section 28 of the Act of 1955 or under the Code of Civil Procedure and any other case laws cited at the bar touching these provisions in their respective ways will not be of any relevance. This is so because in addition to what has been said above sub-section (5) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984 states as follows : “[(5)] Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court.” 9. Section 19(1) also has a non-obstante clause, which states “…notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law…”. The non-obstante clause also clarifies that the provision contained in Section 28 of 1955 Act will not be relevant for the present purposes. 10. It is true that other cases cited by the respondent i.e. Mahesh Bhardwaj vs. Smt. Smita Bhardwaj AIR 1995 Rajasthan 47 as well as R. Varadaraj v. Smt. V. Nirmala AIR 2002 Karnataka 241 and Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Swarna Prava Tripathy and another vs. Dibyasingha Tripathy and another AIR 1998 Orissa 173 have held that an order passed under Section 24 of 1955 Act is not open to an appeal under Section 19 of 1984 Act as the order is interlocutory in nature. On the other hand, a division bench of the Allahabad High Court in Avedhesh Narain Srivastava v. Archna Srivastava, 1990 ALJ 183 and subsequently a full bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava vs. Jai Prakash Srivastava [2005 (23) LCD 1] after discussing all the relevant law including the law cited by the respondent came to a conclusion that an order passed by a Family Court under Section 24 of 1955 Act granting maintenance pendent elite proceeding is not an interlocutory order as it gives a finality to the issue raised in an application filed under Section 24 of 1955 Act. Although such an order technically may come under the definition of an interlocutory order, yet it has all the trappings of a “judgment” as it decides the issue finally between the parties and since it is a judgment. It is appealable under Section 19(1) and would not be ousted from the jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of 1984 Act, merely on the basis of its being an interlocutory order, which it is not. 11. Abare perusal of Section 19(1) of 1984 Act shows that an appeal is only maintainable in two cases. It is appealable under Section 19(1) and would not be ousted from the jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of 1984 Act, merely on the basis of its being an interlocutory order, which it is not. 11. Abare perusal of Section 19(1) of 1984 Act shows that an appeal is only maintainable in two cases. Firstly, it is maintainable against a judgment. Secondly, it is also maintainable against an order, if that order is not an interlocutory order. Now even assuming for the sake of argument that the order presently impugned is an order of an interlocutory nature, then what has to be seen is as to whether the order stands in the category of a “judgment”, as stated under Section 19 of the 1984 Act. The word “judgment” has not been defined in the Family Court Act. It is defined under Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows : “2. Definitions.- (9) “judgment” means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order;” This definition, referred above, is of no use to us as it does not define either the wide or narrow parameters within which the word “judgment” has to be construed nor does it state as to what are the characteristics of a ‘judgment’. However, there are a catena of decisions defining the parameters of what would constitute a “judgment”. Leading case on this issue is that of Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another AIR 1981 SC 1786. The Supreme Court in this seminal judgment had laid down the parameters within which the Court must examine as to when an order or even an interlocutory order has the trappings of a judgment. Though the issue was as to what would constitute a “judgment” which would be appealable in a letter patent appeal, all the same, the broad principles laid down in the above case would equally apply to the present case as well. As per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above judgment, an order or an interlocutory order would be called a judgment, if it has the quality of “finality” to it. The Apex Court laid down that there can be three kinds of judgments. As per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above judgment, an order or an interlocutory order would be called a judgment, if it has the quality of “finality” to it. The Apex Court laid down that there can be three kinds of judgments. Relevant portion of the said judgment to that effect is as follows : “(1) A final judgment — A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench. (2) A preliminary judgment — This kind of a judgment may take two forms — (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit. Absence of notice under Sec. 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment: Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse affect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote…” 12. Therefore, in a given case even an order or an interlocutory order will be a ‘judgment’, if it has the quality of “finality” attached to it. 13. It is for this reason that Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava v. Jai Prakash Srivastava [2005 (23) LCD 1] following Khimji concluded as follows :- “20. In other words, the Apex Court ruled that order or interlocutory orders possessing the characteristics and trappings of finality or affecting valuable rights of the party or deciding important aspects of the trial in main or in a ancillary proceeding, will be “judgment”. 21. What noticeable in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984, is that deviating from Section 96 of the Code of 1908 or from sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act of 1955, it provides for appeals against “judgment”. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not provide for appeal against judgments. It provides for appeals against decrees and orders. Likewise Section 28 of the Act of 1955 also does not provide for appeals against judgment. It provides for appeals only against decrees [see : sub-section (1)] and against certain orders [see : sub-section (2)]. The question arises as to why the legislature made a departure by providing appeal against judgments also, under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984. It provides for appeals only against decrees [see : sub-section (1)] and against certain orders [see : sub-section (2)]. The question arises as to why the legislature made a departure by providing appeal against judgments also, under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984. Not that the legislature was not aware of the established practice or did not know the meaning of the word judgment, as given by the Apex Court in Khimji’s case (supra).” 14. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court further relying upon two Supreme Court’s judgments namely Amar Nath v. State of Haryana AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47 also came to the conclusion that an interlocutory order or an interim order in a given situation or case may have the trappings of a judgment. 15. This Court is of a considered view that an order granted by the Court below under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act fixing maintenance pendent elite the divorce proceedings is an order having the quality of finality. It may have nothing to do with the ultimate order, which may be passed by the Court in a matter relating to Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In fact, it is a separate proceeding within a proceeding. Hence, the order passed under Section 24 of the 1955 Act cannot simply be called an order of an interlocutory nature, as it is a judgment. 16. The importance of an order passed under Section 24 of the Act of 1955 has further been observed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava v. Jai Prakash Srivastava [2005 (23) LCR 1], which stated as follows : “So, provision contained under Section 24 of the Act of 1955 is important one from the point of view of the wife. Not only her survival during the pendency of the proceedings under that Act but her right to prosecute or defend the proceedings also depends on the outcome of the proceedings under Section 24. Thus a refusal of such maintenance under Section 24 is serious to the wife, so much so she may even give up the idea of defending herself, for want of sufficient means. 27. Thus a refusal of such maintenance under Section 24 is serious to the wife, so much so she may even give up the idea of defending herself, for want of sufficient means. 27. The argument that appeal against any such order, will delay the disposal of main petition does not appeal to us, so as to give a limited meaning to the word “judgment”. In an appeal against any order under Section 24 of the Act of 1955, granting pendent elite maintenance, main proceedings need not necessarily be stayed or held up. The reason is that grant of such maintenance is not to affect the merits of the main petition.” 17. The present appeal has been filed by the husband challenging the order of maintenance pendent elite under Section 24 of the Act of 1955, yet we are concerned with the larger impact of a judgment in such cases, where primarily the issue of maintenance is crucial to a party to a litigation. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, referred above, after discussing all the relevant law, including the law cited by the learned counsel for the respondent came to the conclusion that an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1984 is maintainable against an order passed under Section 24 of the Act of 1955. We are in complete agreement with the observations of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, and we feel that it is necessary that a broad meaning to the word “judgment” must be assigned and therefore, we hold that the impugned order dated 20.3.2010 was in the nature of a “judgment” and the instant Special Appeal preferred by the appellant is maintainable, under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 18. The question of law raised by the respondent as a preliminary objection is, therefore, decided accordingly, as stated above. Let the appeal be listed for final disposal in ordinary course.