JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shri Kant Tripathi, J.—Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Srivastava, for the revisionist, Mr. Manmohan Singh and the learned AGA for the opposite party. 2. This is a revision against the order dated 28.8.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Ballia in S.T. No. 459 of 2004, State v. Kamlakant Chaubey and others, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the revisionist’s application for summoning witnesses under Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ;the Code’). 3. In the application moved under Section 233 of the Code the revisionist made first prayer for summoning record of the departmental inquiry held against the S.H.O. Ram Prakash Bajpai, Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar and constables Lalta Prasad, Pradeep Kumar Rai and Amar Nath. It was contended in this regard that these persons had stated during the inquiry that they were not present at the police station at the time of the incident but during the trial they have stated otherwise. The other prayer of the revisionist was for summoning the record relating to the grant of fire arm licenses in favour of Kamal Singh, Akhilesh Singh, Arvind Singh and Daya Shankar Singh. The aforesaid application was moved by the revisionist in pursuance of the directions of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 2557/2010. This Court, while dismissing the said revision, observed that even at the later stage, if the defence moves an application to adduce any kind of evidence which is relevant the same may be considered and suitable orders may be passed in the ends of justice. 4. It appears that the revisionist moved the aforesaid application for summoning the record of the departmental inquiry to use the previous statements of the aforesaid police officials made during the inquiry, for proving contradictions in their statements recorded during the trial. Section 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act provides for impeaching credit of a witness on the basis of proof of his former statement inconsistent with any part of his evidence, which is liable to be contradicted. In other words, if any witness makes any statement during the trial, which is inconsistent with his previous statement, his evidence in the Court can be contradicted with the previous statement by proving the former statement. In other words, if any witness makes any statement during the trial, which is inconsistent with his previous statement, his evidence in the Court can be contradicted with the previous statement by proving the former statement. In doing so the provisions of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act must also be kept in mind, which consists of two parts. The first part provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to the matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved, whereas the second part provides that if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it, which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. In other words, if the maker of the contradicting statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention must be drawn to his previous statement as required by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act so as to provide him an opportunity to explain the discrepancy or inconsistency and to clear up the ambiguity. 5. In the case of Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283 , the Apex Court considered the ambit and scope of Sections 145 and 155 (3) of the Evidence Act and held as follows: “12. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his evidence in Court. This principle is delineated in Section 155 (3) of the Evidence Act and it must be borne in mind when reading Section 145 which consists of two limbs. It is provided in the first limb of Section 145 that a witness maybe cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him without such writing being shown to him. But the second limb provides that “if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose for contradicting him”. There is thus a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may be. But the second limb provides that “if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose for contradicting him”. There is thus a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the previous statements made by him. He may at that stage succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such cross-examination even without resorting to the procedure laid down in the second limb. But if the witness disowns having made any statement which is inconsistent with his present stand, his testimony in Court on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-examiner proceeds to comply with the procedure prescribed in the second limb of Section 145.” 6. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Karan Singh and others v. State of M.P., (2003) 12 SCC 587 , as follows: “When a previous statement is to be proved as an admission, the statement as such should be put to the witness and if the witness denies having given such a statement it does not amount to any admission and if it is proved that he had given such a statement the attention of the witness must be drawn to that statement. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is clear on this aspect. The object is to give the witness a chance of explaining the discrepancy or inconsistency and to clear up the particular point of ambiguity or dispute.....” 7. Therefore, if some one else tries to use the previous statement of a witness as contradictory statement during the trial and moves any application for summoning the previous statement, the prayer cannot be said to be irrelevant because the same would assist the Court in making appreciation of the statement of witness recorded during the trial and to dispense justice in the case. Therefore, what was required from the trial Court was to see whether the witnesses who had allegedly deposed during the trial against their earlier statements recorded during the departmental inquiry, were confronted with the said previous statements during the cross-examination, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If they had been so confronted, then and then alone, the question of summoning record of the departmental inquiry for proving the previous statements would arise otherwise not. If the witnesses have neither been examined nor confronted with their previous statements during the trial, the question of summoning the record of the departmental inquiry for proving the previous statements does not arise and the prayer for summoning that record would be nothing except to cause delay in the disposal of the case. Therefore, the matter needs to be re-examined accordingly by the Court concerned. 8. So far as the summoning of the records relating to grant of arm licenses are concerned, the revision has no merit. The learned trial Court has recorded a cogent reason for not summoning the records relating to the grant of arm licenses. I do not find any error in the conclusion of the learned lower Court. 9. For the reasons discussed above, the revision is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 28.8.2010 refusing to summon the record of the departmental inquiry is quashed. The learned trial Court is directed to reconsider the prayer for summoning the record of the departmental inquiry in the light of the observations made herein before and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. However, the remaining portion of the impugned order is approved. —————