JUDGMENT By the Court.—The appellant has come up in appeal impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 4th November, 2009 in a writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing several orders including the order dated 12th March, 1992 passed by the Taxing Officer in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 35 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules 1935’). 2. The appellant purchased a Bajaj Priya Scooter bearing Registration No. UTY - 6354 in the year 1980. After purchase of the said vehicle, he got it registered, and on account of some faulty mechanism, he sent it for repairs to the dealer from where he had purchased the Scooter. The Scooter remained with the dealer for a period of almost six months and there appears to be some dispute with regard to the repairs of the vehicle and its payment between the appellant and the dealer. The said dispute travelled to the Civil Court where the appellant instituted Original Suit No. 257 of 1982 against the Scooter dealer claiming relief of a mandatory injunction in respect of the possession of the Scooter and for damages. The suit was decreed and the defendant Scooter dealer was directed to deliver the Scooter to the plaintiff, appellant herein, together with certain damages vide order dated 29th March, 1985. The Scooter, according to the appellant, remained in disuse and the registration documents were surrendered in the year 1992 under the provisions of the then Motor Vehicles Act. According to the appellant, he could not use the Scooter for these eleven years and, therefore, he had also applied to the Regional Transport Officer on 10th August, 1985 through the District Magistrate, Allahabad to waive the road tax since 1.1.1981 onwards. This was followed by another application on 22nd May, 1990 intimating the Regional Transport Officer about the decree of the Civil Court and again making a request for waiver of the tax. The appellant repeated his performance by another application dated 12th March, 1992 again requesting the Regional Transport Officer to waive the tax. This was followed by another application on 22nd May, 1990 intimating the Regional Transport Officer about the decree of the Civil Court and again making a request for waiver of the tax. The appellant repeated his performance by another application dated 12th March, 1992 again requesting the Regional Transport Officer to waive the tax. The Taxing Officer passed an order on 12.3.1992 on the said application to the following effect : “T.K. okgu Lokeh dks great length ij lquk x;kA budh ckr esa cy gks ldrk gS fdUrq dj ekQ djuk lEHko ugha gSA vr% ns; dj :0 15@& 'kkfjr ds lkFk tek djk fy;k tk,A sd/- S.R. Tripathi 12.03.92" 3. It is this order dated 12th March, 1992 which is the centre of dispute in the present proceedings. 4. Having failed to get any relief from the authority/Taxing Officer, it appears that the appellant was ill-advised to file Original Suit No. 1553 of 1993 against the State of U.P. and others, challenging the imposition of tax and fine on the appellant as also the refusal by the Taxing Officer to waive the tax. The defendants State of U.P. and the authorities resisted the suit on the ground that the plaintiff, appellant herein, had a remedy of filing an appeal against the imposition of tax and fine under Section 15 of the United Provinces Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1935’) as was then applicable and since the order had become final, the validity of the order could not be gone into by the Civil Court in view of the provisions of Section 16 of the Act 1935. However, no such issue as to the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court on this ground was framed by the trial Court. One of the issues framed by the trial Court being Issue No. 3 was as to whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit? The trial Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, there was an alternative and efficacious remedy available to the plaintiff-appellant, and on that ground dismissed the suit on 5th December, 2001. 5. The trial Court also discussed the other issues framed and held that the suit would not lie, as a result whereof neither any authority, Tribunal or Court could grant the decree as prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant. 5. The trial Court also discussed the other issues framed and held that the suit would not lie, as a result whereof neither any authority, Tribunal or Court could grant the decree as prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant. The appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2002, which was also dismissed on 15.7.2002. The appellant filed a review application against the said order, which came to be rejected on 19.11.2008, where after the writ petition giving rise to the present appeal, namely Writ Petition No. 1180 of 2009 was filed by the appellant praying for the reliefs for quashing of the orders passed by the Civil Court in relation to the imposition of fine and cost as also for setting aside the order passed on the review application and for a direction to the Appellate Court to decide the same on merits. Simultaneously, the appellant also prayed for quashing of the basic order dated 12th March, 1992 passed by the Taxing Officer refusing to write-off the road tax of the vehicle since 1.1.1981 in exercise of the powers under Rule 35 of the Rules 1935. 6. We may, at the outset, record that the appellant appeared in person assailing the judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby the petition was summarily dismissed holding that the petitioner, appellant herein, could not demonstrate the period for which the tax was sought to be waived and the amount of demand raised and in the absence of any actual injury having been demonstrated, the Court refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. After we had perused the records of the writ petition giving rise to this appeal as also the entire gamut of facts, we found it necessary to provide legal aid to the appellant in view of the intricate and complicated facts of the case as also the applicability of law in the matter and, accordingly, we requested Shri A.D. Saunders, learned Advocate to assist the Court as Amicus Curaie. The matter has been thereafter heard by us today with the able assistance of Shri Saunders, who has taken us through the entire records and has also placed before us the legal issues that have arisen for determination in the present appeal. We, therefore, record our appreciation for the legal assistance given by Shri A.D. Saunders. 8. The matter has been thereafter heard by us today with the able assistance of Shri Saunders, who has taken us through the entire records and has also placed before us the legal issues that have arisen for determination in the present appeal. We, therefore, record our appreciation for the legal assistance given by Shri A.D. Saunders. 8. The first issue that needs to be resolved is the maintainability of this special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’). The Rules do not provide for a special appeal in matters arising out of orders passed by the Courts in the exercise of their civil jurisdiction resulting in the disposal of a writ petition by a learned Single Judge of this Court. In essence, whether a special appeal would lie in a matter arising out of a civil suit under the terms of the aforesaid rules? Apart from this, whether an order passed in appeal by a statutory Tribunal and thereafter culminating in the filing of a writ petition before the learned Single Judge would also raise a bar to the filing of such a special appeal? It is in the aforesaid background, that we have to examine the maintainability of the appeal itself. 9. The appellant approached the Civil Court for a relief in relation to the imposition and realisation of tax and also further to seek a relief of writing-off the tax that was sought to be realised from the appellant. The Civil Court, in our opinion was not empowered to entertain such a claim in view of a specific bar contained in Section 16 of the Act 1935, which is quoted herein below : “16. Bar to jurisdiction of civil and criminal Courts in matter of taxation.—The liability of a person to pay the tax shall not be questioned or determined in any manner nor by any authority other than is provided in this Act or in Rules made thereunder and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against any officer of Government for anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.” 10. The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court both laboured on the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act to answer this issue. The trial Court as well as the Appellate Court both laboured on the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act to answer this issue. In our opinion, there was no occasion for the Civil Court to have avoided the decision in the suit in terms of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, inasmuch as, it was an admitted position that the appellant had not preferred any appeal against order of imposition of tax and had approached the Civil Court for a declaration in respect of his liability to pay the tax. Such a suit, in our opinion, was barred and the Civil Court, therefore, inherently lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit itself. The Civil Court therefore erroneously proceeded to dismiss the suit under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 11. This being the position, the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules would not raise the bar for entertaining the appeal against the decision in a writ petition which had raised a challenge to the order passed in review by the Appellate Court or the order dated 12th March, 1992 itself. The Civil Court having inherently lacked the jurisdiction, the entire proceedings would, therefore, suffer from a nullifying effect. The inherent lack of jurisdiction, therefore, renders the entire proceedings before the Civil Court to be coram non judice. 12. The suit, as held above, was not maintainable. The remedy, therefore, open to the appellant was only to file an appeal against the order dated 19th March, 1992 which he admittedly did not do. The other remedy available to him was the extraordinary remedy of this Court which he has availed of by making a prayer for quashing of the said order. The learned Single Judge has refused to exercise jurisdiction against this order. In such a situation, in our opinion, the Special Appeal would be maintainable as it does not arise out of any appellate order passed by a statutory authority. The Bar of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, therefore, would not operate so as to hold this appeal to be not maintainable. 13. In such a situation, in our opinion, the Special Appeal would be maintainable as it does not arise out of any appellate order passed by a statutory authority. The Bar of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, therefore, would not operate so as to hold this appeal to be not maintainable. 13. The exercise of jurisdiction under Chapter VIII Rule 5 in appeal is the same as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and given the nature of the order of the Taxing Officer, not arising out of an appeal, would be cognizable by a Division Bench of this Court. 14. This Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not proceed on mere legalities or illegalities but is also endowed with the jurisdiction to pass an order to remedy any wrong as extraordinary situations require extraordinary remedies. This view in relation to the extraordinary powers of this Court has been acknowledged in the case of Ravindra Kumar Goel (Dr.) and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2004 (55) ALR 807, which is quoted herein below : “20. In S. Barrow v. State of U.P., AIR 1958 All 154 , a Division Bench of this Court held : “Article 226 of the Constitution does not confine the powers of Courts to issuing prerogative writs in cases where a party makes an application for the purpose, and the words of Article 226 are wide enough to authorise the High Court to quash an order suo motu.” Thus, the High Court has power to issue writs suo motu without any application. 21. In Smt. Abida Begam v. R.C.E.O., AIR 1959 All 675 , a Division Bench of this Court held : “It may not be possible for us to grant a decree in the suit, but, inspite of that fact, we think that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant the relief as against the defendant No. 1, even though this matter had not come in its writ jurisdiction on an application under Article 226.” 22. It may be mentioned that in Abida Begam’s case (supra), the Division Bench was deciding a special appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge who had decided a second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. Thus, the Court was not exercising writ jurisdiction but the jurisdiction of second appeal. However, it was observed that even in such a jurisdiction in certain exceptional cases the Court can issue writs. Thus, the decision in Abida Begam’s case (supra) is an authority for the proposition that in exceptional cases a Judge sitting in a particular jurisdiction can issue a directive relating to another jurisdiction so as to do justice.” 15. To further support the said proposition, we may gainfully reproduce Para 1 of the Apex Court decision in the case of B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy and another, JT 2005 (2) SC 233, which reads as under : “1. Unusual fact situation posing issues for resolution is an opportunity for innovation. Law, as administered by Courts, transforms into justice. “The definition of justice mentioned in Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (adopted from the Roman jurist Ulpian) states ‘Justice is constant and perpetual will to render to everyone that to which he is entitled.’ Similarly, Cicero described justice as ‘the disposition of the human mind to render everyone his due’.” The law does not remain static. It does not operate in a vacuum. As social norms and values change, laws too have to be reinterpreted, and recast. Law is really a dynamic instrument fashioned by society for the purposes of achieving harmonious adjustment, human relations by elimination of social tensions and conflicts. Lord Denning once said : “Law does not stand still; it moves continuously. Once this is recognised, then the task of a judge is put on a higher plain. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time.” 16. Coming to the merits of the claim of the appellant, the order dated 12th March, 1992 which had been reproduced by us herein above, clearly indicates that no reasons have been recorded as to why it was not possible to write off the tax under the provisions of Rule 35 of the Rules 1935. The said Rule is quoted below : “35. The said Rule is quoted below : “35. Write-off of tax.—(1) Where the Taxation Officer is, on an application of the owner of a motor vehicle or otherwise, satisfied after such enquiries as may be prescribed by the Transport Commissioner that a motor vehicle has not been used in Uttar Pradesh for a continuous period of not less than three months since the tax or the instalment of tax was last paid he may exempt the owner of motor vehicles from payment of arrears of tax and write off the amount of such arrears up to a maximum of Rs. 3,000 under intimation to the Transport Commissioner and where the amount of arrears of tax exceeds rupees three thousand, refer the matter to the Transport Commissioner or the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration) for orders. (2) The Transport Commissioner or the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration) to whom any matter has been referred by the Taxation Officer under sub-rule (1) or the Assistant Transport Commissioner (Administration) to whom the Transport Commissioner or the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration) may transfer any such matter for disposal, may, if satisfied that the motor vehicle has not been used for a continuous period of not less than three months since the tax or the instalment of the tax was last paid, exempt the owner of the motor vehicle from payment of arrears of tax and write-off the amount of such arrears or part thereof. Where the Transport Commissioner or the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration) has transferred any matter to the Assistant Transport Commissioner (Administration) for disposal, he may, if he thinks fit, at any stage, withdraw such matter and dispose it of himself. (3) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding sub-rules, where in a case in which exemption from payment of tax and writing-off of arrears was made otherwise than on the application of the owner of the motor vehicle, the owner of the motor vehicle is traceable or the motor vehicle is found in Uttar Pradesh, the arrears of tax which would have been due and recoverable in the absence of writing-off under the said sub-rules may be again recoverable from the said owner of the vehicle.” 17. It is to be noted that the appellant had admittedly surrendered the registration documents in the year 1992 and, therefore, the period for which the prayer was made to write off the tax was between 1981 to 1992. It is to be noted that the appellant had admittedly surrendered the registration documents in the year 1992 and, therefore, the period for which the prayer was made to write off the tax was between 1981 to 1992. Thus, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules 1935, the appellant was not liable to make payment of any tax after 1992 as the vehicle stood surrendered. The refusal of the Taxing Officer, therefore, appears to be absolutely unreasonable, unjustified and without any basis. Apart from this, it is worth noting that the order itself records that there might be force in the claim of the appellant but after recording this, the Taxing Officer simply shed off his responsibility by vaguely observing that it was not possible to write off the tax as claimed by the appellant. The order is bereft of any discretion vested under the Rules 1935. 18. The appellant has contended before us that the vehicle remains in disuse even today and is almost in the shape of scrap. It is submitted by Shri Saunders, on instructions from the appellant who is present in the Court, that the appellant received the custody of the vehicle only in the year 2005 from the dealer with whom he had been fighting a legal battle which had ended up in a decree in his favour after a perilous effort in execution. In such a situation, the plight of the appellant can only be imagined and his courage, perseverance and capacity to endure this entire length of litigation for such a trivial matter has to be appreciated. In our opinion, neither the learned Single Judge nor the Civil Courts ever attempted to assess the aforesaid circumstances. Not only this, the learned Single Judge has summarily dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellant has been unable to point out facts and details with regard to his claim. 19. With utmost respect to the learned Judge, the facts were very much on record and in order to satisfy ourselves we had summoned the records of the writ petition and perused the same. The various representations as also the requests made by the appellant and the pleadings before the Courts below make it ample clear that the appellant had been continuously fighting the battle complaining of illegal realisation of tax and refusal to write off the same. The various representations as also the requests made by the appellant and the pleadings before the Courts below make it ample clear that the appellant had been continuously fighting the battle complaining of illegal realisation of tax and refusal to write off the same. The Scooter itself became an object of litigation for 25 years. 20. The appellant, in our opinion, was entitled to a fair treatment by the Taxing Officer who himself admits that the claim of the appellant has some force. We fail to understand that once the Taxing Officer had arrived at this conclusion, then what prevented him from extending the benefit under Rule 35 of the Rules 1935. 21. In the totality of circumstances, we find that enough injustice has been meted to the appellant and this episode requires a decent burial with full relief to the appellant who, in our opinion, is entitled to be granted the reliefs as prayed for by him. We, therefore, in view of the reasons recorded herein above, quash the order dated 12th March, 1992 passed by the Taxing Officer, and further declare that the appellant is not liable to pay any tax on account of the disuse of the vehicle since 1981 onwards which has been clearly established by him. 22. As noted above, the registration papers of the vehicle have been surrendered to the respondent department. In the event, the appellant chooses to utilise the vehicle if it is in pliable condition, then it shall be open to the appellant to apply before the competent authority at his option. 23. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs. —————