Judgment :- The first defendant/Judgement debtor in O.S.No.50 of 2007, on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Nagercoil, is the revision Petitioner. 2. The above suit was filed for partition by Late. K.M.A.Umar Lebbai, who was the first respondent in the revision and the final decree was passed on 15.12.1978 and in the final decree it was held that the revision petitioner has to pay an Owelty amount of Rs.15,607.04/-to the said Umar Lebbai/plaintiff and as the amount was not paid, the said plaintiff/decree holder filed E.P.No.64 of 1985, for realising the Owelty and in that Execution Petition, the revision petitioner appeared through counsel and filed counter and the lower Court passed an order of sale of the property for the realisation of Owelty amount by an order, dated 07.10.1985. The revision petitioner filed E.P.Nos.404 and 405 of 1985 for reviewing the order passed in E.P.No.64 of 1985 and those applications were dismissed on 14.11.1985 and against that C.R.P.No.379 of 1986 was filed before this Court and that was also dismissed. In the said Judgment, this Court has held that in a suit for partition in execution of the decree, the owelty amount can be realised and this Court has granted three months time to the revision Petitioner to pay the said amount. But the revision petitioner did not pay the owelty amount, as directed by this Court. Therefore, the properties of the revision petitioner were brought to sale and after getting permission from the Court, the decree holder purchased the property and it is now contended that the sale proceedings taken by the decree holder is not in accordance with law and without following the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C., the Court has allowed the sale to take place and therefore, the sale is not a valid one and it is liable to be set aside. 3. It is further submitted that the revision petitioner has also deposited a sum of Rs.15,607.04/-on 23.04.1995, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Nagercoil, before the confirmation of sale and therefore, the sale is liable to be set aside. The Courts below after considering the various steps taken by the decree holder, held that the sale was held as per the provisions of Order 21 Rule 64 and other relevant provisions and paper publication was made and therefore, sale cannot be set aside. The Courts below after considering the various steps taken by the decree holder, held that the sale was held as per the provisions of Order 21 Rule 64 and other relevant provisions and paper publication was made and therefore, sale cannot be set aside. Aggrieved by the same, this revision is filed by the revision petitioners. 4. Mrs.N.Krishna Veni, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that admittedly, a charge has been created under the decree and when a charge has been created as per Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the procedure has to be followed and therefore, the charge must be treated as a mortgage and without following the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C., the proceedings initiated by the decree holder by filing execution application to execute the decree passed in O.S.No.50 of 1970, is illegal and therefore, that is liable to be set aside. 5. In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the judgments in Kharaiti Lal vs. Raminder Kaur and others reported in (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 664; Dattatreya Shanker Mote and others vs.Anand Chintaman Datar and others reported in (1974) 2 Supreme Court Cases 799; Janapareddy Latchan Naidu vs. Janapareddy Sanyasamma reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1556; Rai Bahadur Choudhary Raghuraj Singh v. Murari Lal and others reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1631 and Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar and others reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 834. She therefore contended that the entire execution proceedings taken by the decree holder without following the procedure contemplated under Order 34 C.P.C. is void and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr.S.Subbiah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that a charge created by the Court in a partition suit on the owelty amount cannot be equated to the charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and when in a suit a charge has been created, the same can be executed by executing the decree and it cannot be treated as a mortgage and there is no need to follow the provisions of Order 34 C.P.C. 7. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgements in V.S.V.Thangavelu Mudaliar v. G.Thirumalswami Mudaliar and another reported in 1955(II) MLJ 618 and Seethalakshmi Ammal v. Srinivasa Naicker and others reported in AIR 1958 Madras 23. 8. The point for consideration in this revision is when a charge is created in a partition suit, can the decree holder realise the owelty amount by executing the decree by resorting to the provisions under Order 21 C.P.C. or should he follow the procedure as per Order 34 C.P.C., on the premise that the charge created under a decree is a charge, as per Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, it must be treated as a mortgage. 9. In the Judgement V.S.V.Thangavelu Mudaliar v. G.Thirumalswami Mudaliar and another reported in 1955(II) MLJ 618 , the Honble Division Bench of this Court has held categorically that the charge defined under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act does not include within its ambit, the charge created by the Court in a decree and it will not come under the phrase by operation of law and held that a charge created by a decree of Court cannot be a charge created by act of parties or by operation of law and it is altogether a different category not contemplated by section 100 of Transfer of Property Act. It is further held that the scope of section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act is limited only to the charges created by act of parties or by operation of law. 10. In the Judgement (Seethalakshmi Ammal v. Srinivasa Naicker and others) reported in AIR 1958 Madras 23, the learned single Judge considered the entire case laws on this aspect and held that, if the charge falls under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property can be realised by filing a suit for sale under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, as if it were a simple mortgage. But if the charge is created by a decree, it may be realised in a execution of a decree. The learned judge also made a distinction and held that if the decree creating the charge is merely declaratory, the decree-holder is not entitled to sell the property in execution, but must file a suit to enforce the charge. But if the charge is created by a decree, it may be realised in a execution of a decree. The learned judge also made a distinction and held that if the decree creating the charge is merely declaratory, the decree-holder is not entitled to sell the property in execution, but must file a suit to enforce the charge. But, if the decree is executable a charge created by it can be enforced in execution and no particular form of words is necessary to create an enforcible charge and all those required is that there must be a clear indication of the property being made security for the payment of money. 11. Therefore, from the above two judgments of this Court, it is made clear that there is no need to enforce the charge by filing the suit by resorting to the provision under Order 34 of C.P.C. and the charge can be executed in execution of decree. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that as per Order 34 Rule 15, it is made clear that all the provisions contained in this Order, which apply to a simple mortgage shall, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or charge, within the meaning of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. She therefore, contended that without filing a suit by treating the charge as a simple mortgage, the execution proceedings taken by the decree holder in the execution of the decree for the realisation of the owelty amount is not in accordance with law. She further submitted that the amount was also paid by the decree-holder in the Court and hence, there is no question of executing the decree. 13. I am not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. It is made clear under Order 34 Rule 15(2), that where a decree Ordered payment of money and charges it on immovable property in case of default of payment, the amount may be realised by the sale of property in the execution of the decree. This provision was inserted by Act 104/76 and it clears the doubts. Order 34 Rule 15(2) now makes it clear that when a charge is created on immovable property for the payment of money, as ordered in the decree, the same can be realised by sale of the property in execution of the decree. This provision was inserted by Act 104/76 and it clears the doubts. Order 34 Rule 15(2) now makes it clear that when a charge is created on immovable property for the payment of money, as ordered in the decree, the same can be realised by sale of the property in execution of the decree. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted that the charge created in a decree must be construed as a charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. Further, the judgement relied upon the learned counsel for the revision petitioner referred to above are all relating to charges created under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act by act of parties and as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgement V.S.V.Thangavelu Mudaliar v. G.Thirumalswami Mudaliar and another reported in 1955(II) MLJ 618 , that a charge created in a money suit or in a suit for partition will not come under the phrase by operation of law and it cannot be treated as a charge created by the act of parties and therefore, those judgement will not apply to the facts of the case. In this case, it is not in dispute that the procedures contemplated under Order 21 Rule 64 were followed and the Courts below elaborately considered these aspects and held that there was a proper publication and the sale was effected as per the provisions of Order 21. Hence, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the lower court and hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.