JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying inter alia quashing of the impugned certificate dated 01st November, 2010 issued by the Returning Officer, respondent No. 4 herein to the respondent No. 5 along with other incidental prayers. 2. Mr. Radha Kant Ojha, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has relied upon a chart, annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, which says that the petitioner obtained 2759 votes when the respondent No. 5 obtained 2093 votes. The petitioner was declared elected by the Returning Officer under Rule 54 of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Election of Members) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘’Rules, 1994'). But such declaration of result was cancelled by the authority and the respondent No. 5 was declared elected. Mr. P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5, has brought to our notice that the entire chart relating to obtaining of votes by each candidate in the election has not been annexed by the petitioner which is suppression of the material facts. By saying so, he placed a copy of the entire chart. From a perusal of such chart we find that apparently there is no mistake in calculating the votes of respondent No. 5 in all the columns of the chart itself excepting last column. When the complaint was made by the respondent No. 5 to the District Magistrate, immediately calculation was done and it was found that wrongly 53 votes have been recorded in the last column of the sheet in the place and instead of 833 votes. No dispute has been raised by the petitioner with regard to such chart. Therefore, prima facie it appears to us that it is an arithmetical mistake on the part of the Returning Officer which on the basis of the complaint was corrected, before forwarding the same to the State Election Commission in compliance with the Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994. 3. In S. Baldev Singh v. Teja Singh Swatantra (Dead) and others, AIR 1975 SC 693 , a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court even in dealing with the election petition regarding recounting etc. has held that if formal defects had been misconstrued as substantial infirmities, or vice versa, resulting in wrongful reception or rejection, the sooner it was set right the better. has held that if formal defects had been misconstrued as substantial infirmities, or vice versa, resulting in wrongful reception or rejection, the sooner it was set right the better. This is illustrative, not exhaustive, but underlines the need, in appropriate cases, to be reasonably liberal in recheck and recount by Returning Officers. After all, fairness at the polls must not only be manifest but misgivings about the process must be erased at the earliest. Election petitions come to Court after a month and a half and ripen for trial months later and then the appeal, statutorily vested, inevitably follows. In this operation litigation, which is necessarily protracted, liberal recount or lax re-inspection of votes may create belated uncertainties, false hopes and a hovering sense of supense, long after elections are over, Governments formed and legislatures begin to function. Moreover, while a recount, within the counting station, with the entire machinery familiar with the process still available at hand and operational, is one thing, a re-inspection and recount, which is an elaborate undertaking with mechanics and machinery of a specialised nature and which can not be judicially brought into existence without an amount of time, toil and expense, is a different thing. 4. The moot point of argument of Mr. Ojha is that once an election is complete and the result is declared by issuance of certificate by the Nirwachan Adhikari (Returning Officer, as said), he will become functus officio, therefore, he can not further interfere and cancel such certificate. If such certificate is cancelled in spite of having been prohibited under the relevant Rules, the same can not be said to be an election dispute but administrative lapse amenable under the writ jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. Ojha drew our attention to Rule 54 of the Rules, 1994, which is as follows: “54. Declaration of result.—The Nirvachan Adhikari shall declare candidate securing the highest number of votes in their respective constituency to be duly elected.” 5. However, we find from Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 that certain stages are there in connection with declaration of result, therefore, it requires consideration and as such, the same is quoted below: “56. Declaration of result.—The Nirvachan Adhikari shall declare candidate securing the highest number of votes in their respective constituency to be duly elected.” 5. However, we find from Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 that certain stages are there in connection with declaration of result, therefore, it requires consideration and as such, the same is quoted below: “56. Report of result.—As soon as may be after the result of an election has been declared, the Nirvachan Adhikari shall report the result, to the District Magistrate and shall also inform the Block Development Officer of the Kshettra Panchayat or Chief Executive Officer of Zila Panchayat as the case may be. The District Magistrate shall report the result to the State Election Commission.” 6. Mr. Ojha has relied upon various judgments of this Court to establish that there is no embargo upon the writ Court in interfering with such type of disputes. According to us, normal practice is that from the date of commencement of election by way of issuance of notification and till the date of de-notification the election cases will not be interfered with by the Court, meaning thereby if any dispute arises out of the election, the same can be decided by way of election petition when the election is over. So far as the writ Court is concerned, though there is no embargo in interfering with any matter but the writ Court in its wisdom maintains the restraint, so that the necessity of franchise should not be disturbed during such period. There is a gulf difference between not having power and having power to maintain its restraint. All the cited Division Bench judgments of this Court have principally held that there is no absolute bar to the writ Court. We have no quarrel with the proposition but, according to us, each case is dependent upon factual matrix of such case. Therefore, if a case of such nature is required to be heard by way of election petition, the entire dispute will be resolved in such manner. Alternatively, if the writ Court finds that the dispute is not an election dispute but due to administrative lapse amenable under writ jurisdiction then the entire matter will be adjudicated by the writ Court. Therefore, if a case of such nature is required to be heard by way of election petition, the entire dispute will be resolved in such manner. Alternatively, if the writ Court finds that the dispute is not an election dispute but due to administrative lapse amenable under writ jurisdiction then the entire matter will be adjudicated by the writ Court. No half hearted action would be permissible to construe one action as an administrative lapse and the other as an election dispute, particularly when the provisions of Article 243-O of the Constitution is crystal clear that no election to any Panchayats shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. When a person, by invoking the writ jurisdiction, taken a plea that dispute is such that the same would be amenable under writ jurisdiction due to administrative lapse, he can not turn around thereafter to convert the dispute as election petition. We can not stretch the jurisdiction of the writ Court and convert it to forum for hearing dispute. Hence, we have to see whether there was any administrative lapse on the part of the authority under the State Election Commission or not. Petitioner’s own case is that the action on the part of the authority is administrative lapse. 7. The respective judgments, cited by the petitioner, are 1995 (2) UPLBEC 771 (Smt. Ram Kanti v. District Magistrate, Hamirpur and others), 2000 (3) UPLBEC 2097 [Shyam Sakhi (Smt.) and others v. The State Election Commission, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and others], 2005 ADJ 595 (All) (DB) (Smt. Sunita Patel v. State of U.P. and others) and an unreported judgment of the Division Bench dated 30th March, 2006 delivered in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 266 of 2006 (Smt. Kamlesh v. Mukya Nirwachan Ayuct, Rajya Nirwachan Ayog, U.P. and others). We have carefully gone through the judgments as referred above. 8. Writ Petition No. 266 of 2006 (Smt. Kamlesh v. Mukya Nirwachan Ayuct, Rajya Nirwachan Ayog, U.P. and others). We have carefully gone through the judgments as referred above. 8. The first judgment in re: Smt. Ram Kanti (supra), which has been subsequently relied upon, decided on the following points: “(i) Whether the State Election Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the Election Officer has power to cancel the poll held for electing a Pradhan and direct for fresh poll after a candidate has been declared elected as Pradhan under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act and the Rules framed thereunder? (ii) Whether the State Election Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the Election Officer has power to cancel the declaration, declaring a candidate as duly elected Pradhan and direct for recounting; and (iii) Whether the writ petition challenging such cancellations and directions for repoll/recounting is barred by Article 243-O of the Constitution of India? 9. So far as the last point is concerned, apart from the embargo under Article 243-O of the Constitution, we have already clarified the factual and legal positions herein which do not require to be repeated. Moreover, factually the aforesaid case is factually distinguishable from the present case. 10. As far as Shyam Sakhi (supra) is concerned, the dispute therein was that several persons filed the nomination papers and the Assistant Returning Officer rejected the nomination papers of others leaving aside the petitioners, who were declared elected as unopposed. It was stated on behalf of the respondents therein that a fresh election should take place as fraud was practised in getting the nomination papers of others rejected. However, in dealing with factual aspect the Court held that there is no averment in the counter affidavit that the petitioners had committed any fraud. Therefore, again we say that second case is also factually distinguishable. In Smt. Kamlesh (supra) dispute was there with regard to post of Member of Block Development Committee. The fact was that the Returning Officer firstly declared the petitioner as successful and certificate had been issued. The Returning Officer subsequent thereto declared the respondent No. 3 as a successful candidate and also issued the certificate to that effect on the same day on the ground that the votes relating to polling booth No. 132 had not been counted and could not be taken into consideration while making the declaration in favour of the petitioner. The Returning Officer subsequent thereto declared the respondent No. 3 as a successful candidate and also issued the certificate to that effect on the same day on the ground that the votes relating to polling booth No. 132 had not been counted and could not be taken into consideration while making the declaration in favour of the petitioner. As after counting all the votes, the respondent No. 3 secured more votes than the petitioner and was declared successful. Even question of inadvertent mistake was not considered by the Bench in contra ratio of three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Baldev Singh (supra), where even in dealing with the election petition, it was held that in appropriate cases Returning Officer would be reasonably liberal in recheck. We do not find any reference of such judgment in Smt. Kamlesh (supra). There is other facet of this issue. All the judgments are following rigidity to send the second successful candidate to the election petition when in S. Baldev Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has taken a reverse stand in dealing with election petition. 11. Out of all the aforesaid cases, nowhere reference has been made with regard to applicability of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat (Election of Members) Rules, 1994 excepting in Shyam Sakhi (supra) that too with regard to Rule 21 of the Rules, 1994 about declaration of result of uncontested elections and Rule 6 relating to appointments of Nirwachan Adhikari (Returning Officer) and Sahayak Nirwachan Adhikari (Assistant Returning Officer). 12. Dispute herein is only with regard to the import of Rule 54 and Rule 56 of the relevant Rules, 1994. This part has only been dealt with in one of the judgments as referred above i.e. Smt. Sunita Patel (supra). Even factually therein recounting and re-tallying of the votes was already done and based upon that the Returning Officer subsequently issued another certificate on the same day in favour of the contesting respondent therein. According to the Division Bench of this Court, after declaring the result and issuing the certificate evidencing such declaration, the Returning Officer became functus officio and had no power to review his decision regarding the returned candidate. 13. According to the Division Bench of this Court, after declaring the result and issuing the certificate evidencing such declaration, the Returning Officer became functus officio and had no power to review his decision regarding the returned candidate. 13. The argument as advanced by the respondent in Smt. Sunita Patel (supra) is that reporting of the result under Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 should be held to be an integral part of the declaration of result under Rule 54 of the Rules, 1994 on the ground that the superintendence and control of the election is within the State Election Commission and till the dispatch of the papers under Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 is completed, the Returning Officer would be well within the power to get the ballots recounted, re-tallied and recomputed. The Division Bench has held that the argument of the respondent can not be accepted firstly for the reason that the scheme of the Rules, 1994 suggests that with the declaration of the result by the Returning Officer under Rule 54 of the said Rules, the election stands concluded and communication of the result is only consequential formality and by no stretch can it be held that the communication of the result by the Returning Officer to the District Magistrate and thereafter to the State Election Commission under Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 is an integral part of the declaration of result under Rule 54 of the Rules, 1994. The other reason for not accepting the submission is that the State Election Commission does not have the power to exercise the said power of superintendence in violation of the statutory rules. 14. Mr. Baghel, on the other hand, has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 : 1980 (Supp.1) SCC 420 (Grindlays Bank Limited v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal) to establish that a review on the part of the Returning Officer is squarely within his domain. There are two types of review, one is procedural review and another is review on merits. In respect of the review to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by an authority must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in it. There are two types of review, one is procedural review and another is review on merits. In respect of the review to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by an authority must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in it. Therefore, when by virtue of such power the arithmetical calculation is corrected, it can not be said to be an interference of the Returning Officer dehors the Rules. 15. According to us, Rule 54 and Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994 will be carefully read together. Rule 54 has contemplated only with regard to declaration of securing highest number of votes in the respective constituency to be elected. The words “to be elected” give two imports. Either he has to be elected at once or subject to reporting of result as contemplated under Rule 56 thereof. Admittedly, there is no provision for issuance of certificate under the Rules. Therefore, issuance of certificate, being additional act on the part of the authority, can not by itself give an independent cause of action to proceed. Hence, if we hold and say that issuance of certificate in contemplation of Rule 54 is final, Rule 56 will be nugatory. On the other hand, as per Rule 56, as soon as result of the election is declared, it will be reported to the District Magistrate then to the Block Development Officer of the Kshettra Panchayat or Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Panchayat and also it will be reported to the State Election Commission. There is no dispute that the State Election Commission is the authority to conduct the Panchayat elections. On 28th October, 2010 this Division Bench has already held in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 56318 of 2010 (Srimati Sarita Devi v. State of U.P. and others) that the Commission, being creature of the Constitution, has plenary and residuary powers to overcome the respective situations. Such nature of work is to supplement the law but not to supplant. Superintendence, direction, control and conduct of elections have been held by the Courts on numerous occasions in the broadest terms. Therefore, it is crystal clear that formal declaration of result under Rule 54 will be abide by Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994. Such nature of work is to supplement the law but not to supplant. Superintendence, direction, control and conduct of elections have been held by the Courts on numerous occasions in the broadest terms. Therefore, it is crystal clear that formal declaration of result under Rule 54 will be abide by Rule 56 of the Rules, 1994. In other words, when declaration of result under Rule 54 is formal one, declaration of result subject to Rule 56 is final one. It is an admitted position that election starts with notification and finishes with de-notification. Scope of election petition arises thereafter. But during this period, Election Commission is the final authority of the entire process. Therefore, after formal declaration of result by the Returning Officer, if he is called upon by the other authorities under Rule 56 to remove the defects which are either minor or formal or inadvertent and he removes, neither he can be said to be functus officio nor it can be said to be outside the scope and jurisdiction of the Election Commission or any authority thereof. In this context meaning of functus officio is to be made known. It says that having fulfilled the function, discharged the office or accomplished the purpose and, therefore, of no further force or authority; applied to an officer whose term has expired and who has consequently no official authority. Time and again we have held that from the date of notification till the date of de-notification the State Election Commission is the final authority to adjudicate any dispute, if it is called upon. After de-notification it is open for an aggrieved to file appropriate election petition. The petitioner herein thought it fit that the dispute is in the nature of administrative lapse not an election dispute. Therefore, it is required to be understood what type of administrative lapse it is. The administrative lapse, if any, is calculational mistake. Even then, if the petitioner feels that it is a major departure on the part of the Returning Officer or any other authority connected with the State Election Commission, it is open for her either to approach the State Election Commission till the time election is not de-notified and/or thereafter by way of election petition. Even then, if the petitioner feels that it is a major departure on the part of the Returning Officer or any other authority connected with the State Election Commission, it is open for her either to approach the State Election Commission till the time election is not de-notified and/or thereafter by way of election petition. Why the respondent No. 5 will be compelled to file an election petition for this type of minor or formal or inadvertent mistake particularly when there is an apparent suppression of the material fact in the affidavit on the part of the petitioner on account of production of the appropriate sheet showing calculational mistake, is unknown to us. Had the petitioner a strong prima facie case, she would have come with clean hands. 16. So far as the question of statutory interpretation is concerned, we have to hold and say that when the language of a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is reasonable and the other unreasonable according to the Court, the Court should hold that former must prevail. It is further known that where the language of a statute is general, doubtful or obscure, the language may be modified or varied by interpretation in order to avoid any manifest absurdity, repugnance, mischief or injustice. When the language of a statute is capable of two interpretations, one of which works injustice and the other does not work any injustice, the latter must prevail. The rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent, or, obviously repugnant provisions of an Act, the Courts should make an effort to so interpret the provisions as to harmonise them so that purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose. 17. There is a parallel Rule i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994. For the purpose of better understanding, Rule 29 of such Rules is quoted hereunder: “29. 17. There is a parallel Rule i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994. For the purpose of better understanding, Rule 29 of such Rules is quoted hereunder: “29. Declaration of result.—When the counting of the votes has been completed and the result of the voting has been determined, the Returning Officer shall in the absence of any direction by the State Election Commission to the contrary, forthwith— (a) declare the result to those present; (b) report the result to the District Magistrate, the State Election Commission and the State Government; (c) prepare and certify a return of the election in Form VIII; and (d) seal up in separate packets the valid ballot papers and the rejected ballot papers and record of each such packet a description of its contents.” 18. According to us, under the said Rule though the Returning Officer is directed to declare result forthwith but declaration of result includes both the parts as under Rules 54 and 56 of the Rules, 1994 herein. In interpreting Rule 29 a Division Bench of this High Court in Ram Kishun, Gorakhpur v. State Election Commissioner and others, 2003 (3) AWC 2271 , held that declaration of result by the Returning Officer is not final but subject to disposal of objection or application, if any, filed by any candidate. 19. These Rules are pari materia with the Rules 54 and 56 of the Rules, 1994 herein. Having so, we suggest that the relevant Rules can be suitably amended to avoid future litigations. But as of now, we have no other alternative but to hold that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Sunita Patel (supra) as regards Rule 56 is not integral part of Rule 54 of the relevant Rules, 1994 but incidental thereto, is per incuriam in nature. 20. Hence, in totality the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. —————