Shashi Kant Gupta, J.:- This writ petition is directed against the order dated 13.1.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court no. 5, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Revision No. 44/2008 and the orders dated 4.4. 2008 and 15.5. 2008 passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer(in short 'R.C.E.O.'), Kanpur Nagar under sections 12/16(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The brief facts of the case, as set out in the writ petition, are as follows:- 3. The petitioner is a tenant in a portion of House No. 106/375, Gandhi Nagar, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the 'disputed premises') since 1967. The opposite party no. 3 had purchased the premises in dispute in the year 2005. An allotment application was filed in respect of the said premises. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, on the basis of the said application, directed the Rent Control Inspector to submit its report, who, after receiving objections from the concerned parties, submitted its report. R.C.E.O. by its order dated 04.04.2008 declared the vacancy under section 12 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') of the disputed premises and allowed the release application of the landlord opposite party no. 3. 4. Feeling aggrieved with the orders dated 4.4. 2008 and 15.5. 2008 passed by the R.C. E.O. under sections 12/16(1)(b) of the said Act, a revision was filed under section 18 of the Act and the same was dismissed by the revisional court vide order dated 13.1.2009. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the premises in dispute was never vacated by him and the said premises is still occupied by him along with his son namely Virendra Singh. However, it has not been denied by the petitioner that his other son Rajendra Singh has got constructed his own house and has shifted to the newly constructed premises. It has been further submitted that the report of the Rent Control Inspector was procured by the landlord. He further submits that the R. C. E. O. merely on the basis of voter list, ration card and identity card has wrongly concluded that the petitioner permanently has shifted to his native village leaving the disputed premises in the exclusive possession of his son Virendra Singh. He further submits that the R. C. E. O. merely on the basis of voter list, ration card and identity card has wrongly concluded that the petitioner permanently has shifted to his native village leaving the disputed premises in the exclusive possession of his son Virendra Singh. He further submits that the provisions of Rule 8 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules) have not also been complied with. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the last has submitted that the proceedings with regard to the vacancy of the disputed premises were initiated after more than 15 years and as such the said proceedings are time barred and in support of this contention he has relied upon the decision in Smt. Brij Bala Jain Vs. Smt. Amarjeet Kaur and others, 1996 All. CJ 1233. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent (landlord) submitted that there was no violation of Rule 8(2) of the Act while submitting the report by the Rent Control Inspector as notice was duly served upon the petitioner. However, he further submitted that the provisions of Rule 8(2) are of no importance in the present case because the petitioner himself had participated in the proceedings of vacancy. He further submits that the petitioner has surrendered his tenancy in favour of his son Virendra Singh without the consent of the then landlord and had shifted to his native village. He further submits that, admittedly, the opposite party no. 2, Virendra Singh was paying rent of the disputed premises to the landlord in his own right, as such, there was no longer any relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent no. 3 and the petitioner. He further submitted that, admittedly, Rajendra Singh, the other son of the petitioner has shifted to his newly constructed house, as such the provisions of sections 12(1) and 12(3) of the Act are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. It is further submitted that there is no whisper that Rajendra Singh, who was a member of the family of the petitioner was not normally residing with him or was not dependent upon him (petitioner) during the continuance of his tenancy, as such the provisions of Sections 12(1) and 12(3) of the said Act apply with full force. It is further submitted that there is no whisper that Rajendra Singh, who was a member of the family of the petitioner was not normally residing with him or was not dependent upon him (petitioner) during the continuance of his tenancy, as such the provisions of Sections 12(1) and 12(3) of the said Act apply with full force. It has been further submitted that, admittedly, the rent receipts are being issued in the name of Virendra Singh therefore, the tenant/landlord relationship existed only between Virendra Singh and the landlord and the petitioner has no concern with the disputed premises. Since Virendra Singh is occupying the premises without any allotment order he is an unauthorised occupant of the disputed premises in view of the provisions of section 13 of the Act. 7-AThe learned counsel for the landlord opposite party, in support of his contention, has also referred to the voter list, ration card, identity card to demonstrate that the petitioner is not living in the disputed premises and has shifted to his native village. He has also referred to the document issued by the Nagar Nigam to indicate that Rajendra Singh has got constructed his own house No. 109 Barra-3, Kanpur Nagar. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent (landlord) has further submitted that no period of limitation has been prescribed under the Statute to declare vacancy and in support of his contention he referred to the judgement of this Court rendered in Civil Misc. Writ Petition NO. 26826 of 2009, Chandra Mohan Sama Vs. Banwari Lal Ghai and another as well as the decisions of the Apex Court in Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and others : AIR 1997 SC 2695 = 1997 All. CJ 1292) and The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva and others AIR 1964 SC-752. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The petitioner was initially the tenant of the disputed premises which was purchased by the respondent no. 3 in the year 2005. It is not disputed that from 2000 onward rent receipts were issued in favour of Virendra Singh son of the petitioner. It is also not disputed that Rajendra Singh, the other son of the petitioner has constructed his own house at 109 Barra-3, Kanpur Nagar. 3 in the year 2005. It is not disputed that from 2000 onward rent receipts were issued in favour of Virendra Singh son of the petitioner. It is also not disputed that Rajendra Singh, the other son of the petitioner has constructed his own house at 109 Barra-3, Kanpur Nagar. The voter list, ration card and identity card filed by the respondent landlord clearly goes to show that the petitioner is not living in the disputed premises and no documentary evidence whatsoever has been filed by the petitioner before the court below to demonstrate that the petitioner is still occupying the said premises. Even the report of the Rent Control Inspector also indicates that at the time of inspection, the petitioner was not present and his son Virendra Singh was found occupying the premises in dispute. It is also notable that Rajendra Singh, the son of the petitioner has constructed his own house and it has not been pleaded any where by the petitioner that his son Rajendra Singh was not normally residing with him or was not dependent upon the petitioner during the continuance of his tenancy, as such, in view of the circumstances as stated above, the provisions of section 12(3)of the Act will also be applicable in the present matter. 10. The courts below have also recorded a concurrent findings of fact that Virendra Singh, who is a son of the petitioner, has occupied the premises in dispute without any allotment order and the petitioner has shifted to his native village leaving the premises in exclusive possession of his son Virendra Singh. Finding of facts recorded by the court below is based upon the evidence available on record. Therefore, the court below has not committed any error in declaring the vacancy and releasing the premises in dispute. 11. It is also noteworthy that the revisional court's order goes to show that petitioner before the revisional court merely argued that since the municipal number of the premises in dispute has been mentioned incorrectly in the allotment application, therefore, the vacancy has been declared illegally. It has not been pleaded any where in the writ petition by the petitioner that other pleas were also raised by him before the revisional court and the same was not considered by it. 12. It has not been pleaded any where in the writ petition by the petitioner that other pleas were also raised by him before the revisional court and the same was not considered by it. 12. The main contention of the petitioner weaves round the argument that the declaration of vacancy is time barred because it was declared after more than 15 years. Relying upon the principles laid down in the case of Smt. Brij Bala Jain (supra), he submitted that even though the said Statute does not provide for any limitation to declare vacancy but it should be exercised within a reasonable time. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord submitted that the law of limitation will not come in the way in filing the release application as the petitioner's son Virendra Singh is an unauthorised occupant of the premises in dispute and there is a recurring cause of action. The Apex court in the Case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale (supra) has held as under: (All. CJ 1292 Para 4) "Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that in the absence of fixation of rule of limitation, the power can be exercised within a reasonable time and in the absence of such prescription of limitation, the power to enforce the order is vitiated by error of law. He places reliance on the decisions in State of Gujarat vs. Patel Raghav Natha &Ors. [ (1970) 1 SCR 335 ]; Ram Chand & Ors. vs Union of India& Ors.[ (1994)1 SCC 44 ]; and Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim [CA No. 5023/85 decided on August 22, 1996 : (Reported in 1997 All. CJ. 1291)]. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the order of ejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamalatdar's Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, Therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time,especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. The Division Bench, Therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time,especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts." 13. In The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva and Others ( AIR 1964 SC 752 ), the Apex Court has held that Court has no power to fix any limitation where it is not provided in the statute as this would amount to legislate the statute. In this regard the relevant portion of paragraph no.13 of this decision is extracted as under: "In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that though the legislature knew how the problem of recovery of wages had been tackled by the Payment of Wages Act and how limitation had been prescribed in that behalf, it has omitted to make any provision for limitation in enacting s. 33C (2). The failure of the legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot, in our opinion, be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the circumstances, it would be legitimate to infer that legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under s. 33C (2). It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of s. 330 (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claims which they may have to make under the said provision. Besides, even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution within 12 years, provided, of course, it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of execution from time to time as required by art. 182 of the Limitation Act, so that the test of one year or six months' limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. 182 of the Limitation Act, so that the test of one year or six months' limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. It seems to us that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The words of s. 33C (2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without any considerations of limitation. Mr. Kolah no doubt emphasized the fact that such belated claims made on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience to the employer, but that is a consideration which the legislature may take into account, and if the legislature feels that fair play and justice require that some limitations be prescribed, it may proceed to do so. In the absence of any provision,however, the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under s. 33C (2)." 15. The principles laid in the aforesaid decision has been followed by this court in Civil Misc. WP 26826 of 2009, Chandra Mohan Sama Vs.Banwari Lal Ghai and another dated 13.8.2010(Reorted in 2010 All. CJ. 1645) wherein this court has held that if the limitation of 12 years as reasonable period is read in the provision of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, though there is a definite lack of legislative intent in the Act in this regard, it would amount to permitting illegal occupants to grant legal sanction to their acts. Occupation of building without allotment would frustrate the regulatory provisions of the Act and not germane to the object for which the Act was legislated. 16. Thus, in view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that limitation should not be read where it is not specifically provided for. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.