Judgment S.D.Anand, J. 1. The challenge herein is to the finding recorded both by learned Rent Controller and also the learned Appellate Authority upholding the plea of the respondents-landlords for personal bonafide need which they had filed to obtain ejectment of the petitioner- tenant herein. The landlord did not, however, succeed in both the Courts to get a finding in his favour about the premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The disfavourable finding on that point not with standing, the landlord succeeded in obtaining the order for ejectment of the petitioner herein from the premises in dispute on the plea of personal bonafide necessity. 2. The pure and simple plea raised by the respondents landlord, in the context of bonefide requirement, was that he had retired from service about a year before filing of the petition. Thereafter, he started residing with one of his son at Hisar. It is thereafter only that he made up his mind to start business in the disputed premises which (premises) are located in an area described as the hub of the commercial activity in the town of Jind. 3. Since the very points urged before Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority were reiterated in revision, I shall proceed to deal with the same hereunder. 4. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that putting forward a plea for bonqfide necessity was a mere ruse to obtain ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the premises in dispute and the respondent-landlord had, infact, settled with his son at Hisar. In that context, the learned counsel drew sustenance from the fact that the respondent-landlord did hold a residential plot in the urban estate at Jind which he sold off on 30.6.1999. His wife also held a 48 sq. yard plot at Bhiwani Road, Jind, which she sold off in the year 1990. The plea raised thereby is that if the respondent- landlord had a bonqfide need to run business in the premises in dispute, he and his wife would not have been expected to sell off the residential plots which they held at Jind.
yard plot at Bhiwani Road, Jind, which she sold off in the year 1990. The plea raised thereby is that if the respondent- landlord had a bonqfide need to run business in the premises in dispute, he and his wife would not have been expected to sell off the residential plots which they held at Jind. It was also argued that the want of bonsafides on the part of the respondent-landlord in raising the plea aforementioned is further apparent from the fact that they have not been able to adduce any evidence to the effect that they have any experience in the cloth business which he claims to be desirous of running in the disputed premises. It was further vehemently urged that the respondent- landlord had himself built a palatial bouse at Hisar where he is putting up with his sons and there is, thus, no understandable need for him to start a business at Jind. 5. Insofar as the last indicated item of criticism is concerned, the learned Appellate Authority noticed that there was complete want of evidence to prove it. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has not been able to invite my attention to falsify that evidence- based observation recorded by the learned Appellate Authority. 6. Insofar as the other items of grievance are concerned, there also the petitioner-tenant is not on a firmer footing. Needless to state, there is plethora of law on the point that it is for the landlord to decide what exactly would he like to do with the commercial premises owned by him. This is, of course, subject to proof of bonqfides on his part in raising that plea. It would require pertinent notice, in that context, that this petition was filed by the respondent- landlord within about a year of his retirement. After having concluded the professional innings lasting a fairly long duration one would expect a former public servant to relax a while and, then, make up his mind about the avocation to be followed. The fact that the landlord allowed about a year to elapse would not, ipso facto, be suggestive of the advocated inference that the need put forward by him is not bonqfide. I find myself in complete agreement with the learned Appellate Authority on the finding that the shifting of respondent-landlord to Hisar was a temporary arrangement and not a permanent settlement. 7.
I find myself in complete agreement with the learned Appellate Authority on the finding that the shifting of respondent-landlord to Hisar was a temporary arrangement and not a permanent settlement. 7. Insofar as the want of experience in the proposed business is concerned, there also I do not find myself in agreement with the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner. No particular expertise in the business of cloth would be required as a condition precedent for some one to think of starting a business. If the landlord gets the tenanted premises vacated and does not start utilising the same for the purpose of pleaded necessity, the law would take care of him in terms of the rent Legislation. 8. I find that the finding on point of personal bonqfide necessity recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also the learned Appellate Authority are completely relatable to the material obtaining on the file and the learned counsel has not been able to persuade me to invalidate the same on any count whatsoever. 9. Finding the petition to be completely denuded of merit, I have no reservations in dismissing it and it is so ordered accordingly. However, the petitioner-tenant is given one month time from today to vacate the premises under reference.