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2010 DIGILAW 356 (GAU)

Lalhlimpuia v. State of Mizoram

2010-05-20

H.BARUAH

body2010
ORDER H. Baruah, J. 1. In this petition the validity and legality of the notifications under Memo No. TRF-A/RO-53/2008/807 dated 11th September, 2009 and No. TRF-A/RO-5 3/2008/878 dated 13th October, 2009 issued under the hand and seal of the respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Aizawl District, Aizawl and Notification under Memo No. D.26017/1/2006-TRP dated 14th December, 2009 issued by Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Transport Department, Mizoram, Aizawl has been challenged by which plying of taxies in group (A, B and C) in alternate day excluding Saturday and Govt. holidays within the city of Aizawl has been provided in other words mandated. 2. The petitioners herein are all owners-cum-drivers. Each of them obtained contract carriage permits of taxi from respondent No. 5, the Secretary, State Transport Authority under the provisions of Section 74(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with Rule 89(1)(b) of the Mizoram Motor Vehicles Rules 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) for plying taxi within the Aizawl city wherein road area etc. have been specified with terms and conditions, Joint Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Transport Department by a notification under memo No. B. 12012/19/04-TRF dated 22nd August, 2008 in partial modification of the earlier notification dated 25-9-2007 by virtue of authority given by the Governor of Mizoram authorized the Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Aizawl to exercise powers under Sections 112,115, 116, 117 and 201 of the Act with immediate effect and until further order. Superintendent of Police (Traffic) Aizawl District, Aizawl pursuant to the said notification as indicated issued a notification under Memo No. TRF-A/RO-5 3/2008/807 dated 11th September, 2009 in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Act grouping the taxies plying within the Aizawl city into 3 (three) groups and allowed each group of taxi to ply in alternate day minus the Government holidays in view of congestion of vehicle within the Aizawl city, safety of the people at large and convenience of the traffic. In the notification it is indicated that strong public support and opinion of many other organizations, prompted issue of such notification in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Act. The notification was to take effect on and from 14-9-2009 until further order. Respondent No. 4 by another notification under Memo No. TRF-A/RO-53/2008/878 dated 13th October, 2009 extended the operation of the notification dated 11th September, 2009. The notification was to take effect on and from 14-9-2009 until further order. Respondent No. 4 by another notification under Memo No. TRF-A/RO-53/2008/878 dated 13th October, 2009 extended the operation of the notification dated 11th September, 2009. Subsequently, Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Transport Department, respondent No. 2 herein issued another notification under Memo No. D.26017/1/2006-TRP dated 14th December, 2009 dividing the taxies into 3 (three) groups 'A', 'B' and 'C' plying within the Aizawl city giving effect to it on and from 14-12-2009 until further order. The notification indicates the days in which each group of taxi is required to ply. The notification also provides that the restriction indicated therein, in plying the group of taxi shall not be applicable in all Government holidays and Saturday. The notification dated 14-12-2009 issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Transport Department has been published in the Mizoram extraordinary on 10th February, 2010. 3. It is contended by the petitioners that though Section 115 of the Act empowers the State Government or any authority authorized in this behalf by the State Government to order prohibition or restriction in the interest of public safety or convenience, nature of road or bridge in driving of motor vehicles or any specified class or description of motor vehicles or use of the trailers either generally in a specified area of or a specified road by putting traffic signs as required under Section 116 of the Act by publishing in official gazette, such prohibition or restriction must be on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government or the authority concerned else not. By issuing notification by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4, grouping the taxies plying within the Aizawl city into 3 (three) groups that too on alternative day except Govt. holidays violated the fundamental right of the petitioners enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since the notification has debarred the petitioners to do their business in taxi and earn their livelihood and therefore, the notifications are bad in law and violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is also contended by the petitioners that respondent Nos. 2 and 4 before issuing those notifications by virtue of Section 115 of the Act did not afford any opportunity of being heard whereby the principle of natural justice has been violated. It is also contended by the petitioners that respondent Nos. 2 and 4 before issuing those notifications by virtue of Section 115 of the Act did not afford any opportunity of being heard whereby the principle of natural justice has been violated. The respondent authorities also disregarded the maxim audi alteram partem. The petitioners in their writ petition further contended that the State Government or its authority in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Act is within the competence of ordering restriction/prohibition in plying of motor vehicles in the interest of public safety and convenience, nature of road or bridge in consonance of the provision of Section 116 of the Act. But it has never been intended by the legislature to put a restriction on plying of vehicle for days together affecting the business, income, livelihood of the person(s) concerned. By grouping the taxies into three groups and allowing plying on alternate day minus Government holidays and Saturday, the State respondents put a restriction on business, income and livelihood of the petitioners herein. On these facts and circumstances, the petitioners have prayed for setting aside of the notifications issued under the hand and seal of the Superintendent of Police (Traffic), Aizawl District, Aizawl and Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Transport Department. 4. State respondents resisted this petition by filing counter-affidavit. However, respondent Nos. 6 to 8 have not filed any counter-affidavit as against the writ petition. The specific contention raised in the counter-affidavit filed by the State respondents is that respondent Nos. 4 and 2 having had the authority in law as provided under Chapter VIII of the Act, 1988, more particularly Section 115of the Act, having received various complaints from different quarters in the interest of public safety and convenience and also to cut the congestion of traffic on the roads within the city of Aizawl issued notifications prohibiting/restricting plying of taxies in the manner described in the notification. By issuing such notification impugned herein no fundamental right of the petitioners under Article19(1)(g) enshrined in the Constitution has been violated rather infringed by such notifications since fundamental right enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution can be curtailed by reasonable restrictions as dictated in Article 19(6) of the Constitution. By issuing such notification impugned herein no fundamental right of the petitioners under Article19(1)(g) enshrined in the Constitution has been violated rather infringed by such notifications since fundamental right enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution can be curtailed by reasonable restrictions as dictated in Article 19(6) of the Constitution. The main thrust of objection of the State respondents is that the issue raised in this instant writ petition has been set at rest by a decision of this Court rendered in W.P(C) No. 6031 of 2006 delivered on 18-12-2006. The parties to he petition as aforesaid was Zoram Taxi Drivers Association v. State of Mizoram. It is contended, therefore, that the issue being raised in this writ petition being similar in nature to the issue raised in W.P.(C) No. 6031 of 2006, the notification issued in exercise of power under Section 115 of the Act 1988 cannot be tainted as illegal and violative of the fundamental right. The respondent Nos. 2 and 4 having had complaints from various quarters like, President, Village Council Court, Khatla, Secretary, Dawrpui Village Council, VCP, Tuikul South, Secretary, Young Mizo Association regarding congestion of traffic and resultant insecurity to the public were constrained to issue such notifications prohibiting plying of taxies within the Aizawl city groupwise. However, such restriction is not made applicable during Saturday, Sunday and Government holidays. In the counter-affidavit it has further been contended that there are 50(fifty) Nos. of identified taxi stand within the city which have the capacity to accommodate 390 taxies at a time. Presently, there are 2950 taxies operating actively in Aizawl city, therefore, the number of taxies becomes disproportionate to the number of identified taxi stands which causes congestion on the roads and creates inconvenience to the general public. In order to diminish the flow of taxies, taking the public safety and convenience in mind respondent No. 2 having been authorized vide notification No. B. 12021/10/04-TRP dated 22-8-2008 (Annexure-2) issued the notification Nos. TRF-A/RO-5 3/2008/807 dated 11-9-2009 and TRF-A/RO-53/2008/878 dated 13-10-2009 (Annexure-5) allowing the taxies in group in a particular day to ply within the Aizawl city to minimize the traffic congestion and maintain public safety and convenience. The notification (Annexure-8) issued by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Transport Department also in the same direction as indicated in Annexures-4 and 5. The notification (Annexure-8) issued by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Transport Department also in the same direction as indicated in Annexures-4 and 5. It is further contended by the State respondents that the notification dated 14-12-2009 (Annexure-8) has been published in the official gazette in accordance to the proviso of Section 115 of the Act, 1988. It is also contended that before issuance of such notifications Zoram Taxi Drivers Association was consulted which extended their co-operation in this regard. Since Section 115 of the Act empowers the Government and its authority(s) to take appropriate action in prohibiting and restricting the use of motor vehicles for public safety and convenience, the notifications issued cannot be held to be violative of the fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution. 5. Mr. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners as well as Mr. Aldrin Lallwmzuala, learned Additional Advocate General for the State respondents were heard at length. None appeared for and on behalf of the respondent Nos. 7 and 8. 6. There is no dispute at the bar that the petitioners are not owner-cum-taxi drivers and are not plying their taxies within the Aizawl city by virtue of contract carriage permit issued to them by the appropriate authority. Therefore, the petitioners by virtue of their permit have the right to ply their taxies within the Aizawl city. However, such plying of taxi is limited as per terms and conditions of the permit. Admittedly, the owner-cum-taxi driver cannot ply his taxi on a particular road in a particular place if he violates the conditions of the permit or the road. Cancellation of a particular permit is within the jurisdiction of the authority concerned who issued the permit. Therefore, a owner-cum-taxi driver can ply his taxi by remaining within the terms and conditions contained in the permit. 7. Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act provides provision for control of traffic. Section 115 of this chapter empowers the State Government or any authority authorized by the State Government to restrict the use of motor vehicle on certain exigencies. Section 115 of the Act, 1988 can be reproduced below: 115. 7. Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act provides provision for control of traffic. Section 115 of this chapter empowers the State Government or any authority authorized by the State Government to restrict the use of motor vehicle on certain exigencies. Section 115 of the Act, 1988 can be reproduced below: 115. Power to restrict the use of vehicles.- The State Government or any authority authorized in this behalf by the State 'Government, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public safety or convenience, or because of the nature of any road or bridge, may by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit or restrict, subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notification, the driving of motor vehicles or of any specified class or description of motor vehicles or the use of trailers either generally in a specified area or on a specified road and when any such prohibition or restriction is imposed, shall cause appropriate traffic signs to be placed or erected under Sect. 116 at suitable places: Provided that where any prohibition or restriction under this section is to remain in force for not more than one month, notification thereof in the Official Gazette shall not be necessary, but such local publicity as the circumstances may permit, shall be given of such prohibition or restriction. Corresponding law.- Section 115 corresponds to Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Objects and Reasons.- Clause 115 empowers the State Government and prescribed authorities to restrict the driving of any specified class of motor vehicle and also to restrict the driving of any class of motor vehicle below a minimum speed fixed for that class of vehicle on any public road. Therefore, from the reading of this section it appears that in the interest of public safety and convenience or because of the nature of the any road or bridge, the State Government or any authority under it having been authorized by the Government may restrict use of vehicles for a certain period by publishing a notification in the official gazette. However, such restriction is always subject to subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. If the prohibition or restriction under the section is to remain in force for not more than 1 (one) month notification in the official gazette thereof is not necessary, but there should be local publicity of such restriction or prohibition. However, such restriction is always subject to subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. If the prohibition or restriction under the section is to remain in force for not more than 1 (one) month notification in the official gazette thereof is not necessary, but there should be local publicity of such restriction or prohibition. Mr. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, had not disputed the power under Section 115 of the Act. It was argued by him that such power can be exercised by the State Government or its officers duly authorized on its or their subjective satisfaction on the question of restriction or prohibition of the motor vehicles. But the respondents by issuing notifications of the nature cannot infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their business of taxi for a certain period. Such a step on the part of the State respondents would be violative of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution. It was argued by Mr. M.M. Ali that prohibition is always intended for public safety and convenience or because of the nature of the road or the bridge. Such restriction cannot be extended put a halt in the business of the petitioners for some days in a week. Therefore, allowing the taxies to ply on a certain day(s) in a week in group affected the petitioners to run their business in taxi. 8. It was argued by him further that before issuance of such notification impugned, no notice was issued to the petitioners offering opportunity to project their case. The respondent authorities, therefore violated the principle of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem. The claim of the respondents that a discussion was made with the Zoram Taxi Drivers Association would be not binding upon the petitioners since they are not the members of the association. "Apart from that the respondents failed to apprise the petitioners about the nature of complaints made to the appropriate authority regarding public safety and inconvenience when the respondent authorities were asked to supply such information to the writ petitioners. Therefore, the claim of subjective satisfaction for issuance of such notification by the respondents cannot sustain, which is a basic ingredient/necessity to take resort to Section 115 of the Act, 1988. It was further argued by Mr. Ali that by operation of the notifications, the business of the writ petitioner cannot be taken away. Therefore, the claim of subjective satisfaction for issuance of such notification by the respondents cannot sustain, which is a basic ingredient/necessity to take resort to Section 115 of the Act, 1988. It was further argued by Mr. Ali that by operation of the notifications, the business of the writ petitioner cannot be taken away. 9. Controverting the submissions advanced by Mr. M.M. Ali, Mr. Aldrin Lallawmzuala, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there is over crowded of taxies in the Aizawl city which not only created inconvenience to the public in general but also causes threat to the public safety. There are altogether 50(fifty) approved taxi stands which can accommodate 390 taxis only. At present 2950 taxies are plying within, the Aizawl city. The road condition of the Aizawl city is also not good, therefore, plying of 2950 taxies at a time in a particular day would certainly create traffic congestion, accident, etc. Such traffic congestion, therefore, undoubtedly actuate public inconvenience. It was argued further by him that the appropriate authority received various complaints about traffic congestion, inconvenience on account of plying of taxies within the Aizawl city, therefore, respondents taking into such complaints and public inconvenience and safety on account of traffic congestion in mind rightly issued the notifications by virtue of Section 115 of the Act, 1988. It was further argued by him that by such prohibition or restriction there is no violation of fundamental right enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Learned Additional Advocate General, therefore, argued that notifications were validly issued and the same are not violative of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). 10. No dispute is put forward by either party that Section 115 of the Act has not empowered the State Government or its authorized authorities to issue prohibition/restriction in the use of motor vehicle for public safety and convenience or road condition or bridge. But the issue before us whether grouping of the taxies and allowing each group to ply on a certain day to minimize the traffic congestion, maintenance of public safety and convenience by the impugned notifications would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is no doubt true that under Article19(1)(d) of the Constitution the citizen have right to move freely through out the territory of India as well as to practice any profession or carry any occupation, trade or business in view of Article19(1)(g). It is no doubt true that under Article19(1)(d) of the Constitution the citizen have right to move freely through out the territory of India as well as to practice any profession or carry any occupation, trade or business in view of Article19(1)(g). However, it cannot be claimed that right to exercise freedom gives a guarantee by the Constitution in the above referred articles should be unfettered by any restriction. Such right under Article 19(1)(g) cannot be said as absolute one and cannot be subjected to reasonable restriction contemplated under Clause 6 of Article 19. The reasonableness of restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and from the stand point of the interest of the general public and not from the point of view of the persons upon whom the restriction are imposed. While considering the aspect of validity of restriction and judging reasonableness it is always necessary to adhere to the surrounding circumstances prevailing. Social interest is also to be looked into. In this instant case it has been brought on the record by the State respondents that on account of plying of taxies more in number than the capacity of the taxi stands within Aizawl city, traffic congestion is always there, which results insecurity to the public as well as inconvenience. In order to arrest the situation, various corners, authorities submitted complaints. Traffic congestion, insecurity of public and inconvenience together with the filing of complaints by various authorities, persons, State respondents thought it appropriate to take resort to Section 115 of the Act and accordingly issued notifications prohibiting plying of taxies as indicated therein. It was argued by Mr. Aldrin Lallawmzual, learned Additional Advocate General that allowing the taxies to ply on a certain day group-wise reduced considerably the traffic congestion minimizing the insecurity of the public at general and inconvenience. It was also argued by Mr. Aldrin Lallwmzuala, learned Additional Advocate General that the respondent authorities by putting restriction of plying taxies in the manner indicated in the notification impugned have not violated the fundamental right of the writ petitioners enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution inasmuch as such fundamental right can be subjected to reasonable restriction acting under Sub-clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 when provides or gives an authority to the State Government or its authorized authorities to put restriction/prohibition in the movement of the motor vehicles it would be wrong to say that by issuing notification impugned, State respondents violated the fundamental right of the writ petitioners. 11. Controverting the submission advanced by Mr. Aldrin Lallawmzuala, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents, Mr. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners strenuously submitted that a restriction under Section 115 of the Act is possible on the part of the Government or its authorized authorities on the flow of motor vehicle in respect of a particular road or area that too in consonance with the provisions of Section 116 of the Act. Section 115 is not intended by the legislature, it was argued by Mr. M.M. Ali, that by operation of the Section 115 trade or business of person(s) can be denied to a certain period. Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution gives a fundamental right to the citizen of India to practice any provision or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Therefore, the writ petitioners being the owners-cum-drivers of taxi have the right to carry on taxi business to earn their livelihood. Such right, therefore, cannot be taken away by the respondents by prohibiting/restricting them to ply their taxies in Aizawl city. This submission of Mr. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel for the petitioners would be not sustainable in view of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution wherein it has specifically stated as under: 19(6). Nothing in Sub-clauses (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to. (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, or any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. 12. (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, or any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. 12. From the facts contended by the respective parties it has become apparent that plying of taxies within the Aizawl city created insecurity to the general public and caused inconvenience to a great extent in view of the situation of the city and the road condition. It is contended in the counter-affidavit that the number of taxies which ply in the Aizawl city in a day is much in number in comparison to the taxi stands which can cater a less number of taxies thereat. That apart the respondent authorities also received some complaints from various corners, authorities, persons with regard to the insecurity caused by plying of taxies in Aizawl city to the general public. Therefore, the State respondents to arrest the situation issued notification prohibiting/restricting plying of taxies within the Aizawl city and allowed the taxies to ply in the Aizawl city group-wise on a particular day. By virtue of Clause (6) of Article 19 reasonable restrictions in the exercise of right conferred under Article 19(1)(g) is permissible in view of incorporation of Section 115 in the Act, 1988. By notifications impugned plying of taxies has been restricted to a group which does not find place in a particular day mentioned in the impugned notification. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the fundamental right of the writ petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) has been infringed/violated wholly. It is true that the petitioners are allowed to ply taxies within the Aizawl city on the strength of the contract carriage permit issued in their favour by the competent authority. Such permit is liable to be cancelled by the authority concerned if the terms and conditions incorporated therein are violated. Argument of Mr. M.M. Ali that the restrictions put by notification offend to their right in plying their taxies by virtue of their permit and, therefore, the impugned notifications cannot stand in their way. It was also argued that the respondent Nos. Argument of Mr. M.M. Ali that the restrictions put by notification offend to their right in plying their taxies by virtue of their permit and, therefore, the impugned notifications cannot stand in their way. It was also argued that the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 before issuing the notification impugned did not issue any notice to the writ petitioners to place their case, issuance of notification, therefore, was in violation of principle of natural justice. Writ petitioners were never heard by the respondent authorities on this point. Mr. M.M. Ali, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners therefore, submitted that the impugned notification more particularly notification No. D.26017/1/2006-TRP dated 14-12-2009 (Annexure-9) issued by respondent No. 2 cannot sustain legally. 13. In regard to subjective satisfaction of the respondent authorities to issue such notifications restricting/prohibiting plying of taxies within the Aizawl city on a particular day providing group therefor, it was argued by Mr. M.M. Ali that the respondent authorities are unable to provide instances in regard to the insecurity of the public or inconvenience on account of plying taxies within the Aizawl city. It was contended by him that when the respondent authorities were requested to supply such information by the writ petitioners, they (respondent authorities) sat over the matter tight which according to Mr. M.M. Ali infers that no such situation did arise which prompted the respondent authorities, respondent Nos. 2 and 4 in particular to issue the notification (impugned). Therefore, subjective satisfaction which is ah essential requirement to take action under Section 115 of the Act 1988, is very much wanting and, therefore, notifications issued with so-called subjective satisfaction of the respondents concerned would not be sustainable in law. 14. Controverting the submission, Mr. Aldrin, learned Additional Advocate General taking aid of the annexures to the counter-affidavit contended that argument advanced by Mr. M.M. Ali cannot sustain since the authorities received several complaints from; various corners, persons, authorities at different point of time in regard to the plying of taxies in Aizawl city. 15. In the case between Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union v. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai reported in (2004) 1 SCC 625 : AIR 2004 SC 416 , the Apex Court held that pavement hawkers/squatters have a fundamental right to hawking under Article19, subject to restriction. In paragraphs 8 and 10 the Apex Court held as under: 8. 15. In the case between Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union v. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai reported in (2004) 1 SCC 625 : AIR 2004 SC 416 , the Apex Court held that pavement hawkers/squatters have a fundamental right to hawking under Article19, subject to restriction. In paragraphs 8 and 10 the Apex Court held as under: 8. It must be mentioned that this judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Chandrachud (as he then was). Immediately thereafter, a Constitution Bench of this Court, headed by Chief Justice Chandrachud (as he them was) delivered a judgment in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 . This case dealt with the rights of pavement dwellers in Bombay. On behalf of the hawkers strong reliance was placed on various observations made in this judgment. It was submitted that this case showed that the right to hawk was also a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, such an argument has been negatived by this Court in the case of Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee AIR 1989 SC 1988 . This case dealt with hawkers in the city of Delhi. It was held that the hawking on roadsides fell within the expression "occupation, trade or business" in Article 19(1)(g) but that it was subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. It was held that this right was specifically for poor hawkers and not for sellers of luxury items or goods. It was further held that hawkers had no right to occupy any particular place on the pavement nor could they assert right to occupy permanently specific places demarcated on the pavement. It was held that the Municipality had a right to regulate such business and the Municipality was directed to frame rules and schemes regarding street-tradings. It was also recognized that hawking could be totally prohibited in certain areas. The Court negatived an argument, based on Olga Tellis case that the hawkers had a fundamental right under Article 21. It was held that the right to carry on trade or business was not covered by Article 21 and the hawkers could claim no right under Article 21. It was inter alia held as follows : (SCC pp. 167-68, para 17)(at pp. 1994-95, para 16 of AIR): 17. It was held that the right to carry on trade or business was not covered by Article 21 and the hawkers could claim no right under Article 21. It was inter alia held as follows : (SCC pp. 167-68, para 17)(at pp. 1994-95, para 16 of AIR): 17. So far as right of a hawker to transact business while going from place to place is concerned, it has been admittedly recognized for a long period. Of course, that also is subject to proper regulation in the interest of general convenience of the public including health and security considerations. What about the right to squat on the roadside for engaging in trading business? As was stated by this Court in Bombay Hawkers' Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1985 SC 1206 the public streets by their nomenclature and definition are meant for the use of the general public; they are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the busy thoroughfares, thereby paralysing all civic life. This is one side of the picture. On the other hand, if properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the sidewalks can considerably add to the comfort and convenience of general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. 10. The above authorities make it clear that the hawkers have a right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. This right, however, is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). Thus hawking may not be permitted where, e.g. due to narrowness of road, free flow of traffic or movement of pedestrians is hindered or where for security reasons an area is required to be kept free or near hospitals, places of worship etc. There is no fundamental right under Article 21 to carry on any hawking business. There is also no right to do hawking at any particular place. The authorities also recognise the fact that if properly regulated, the small traders can considerably add to the convenience and comfort, of the general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. The scheme must keep in mind the above principles. There is also no right to do hawking at any particular place. The authorities also recognise the fact that if properly regulated, the small traders can considerably add to the convenience and comfort, of the general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. The scheme must keep in mind the above principles. So far as Mumbai is concerned, the scheme must comply with the conditions laid down in Bombay Hawkers' Union case. Those conditions have become final and there is no changed circumstance which necessitates any alteration. In our instant case, though the petitioners being the owner-cum-taxi drivers have the right to ply their taxi within the Aizawl city by virtue of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, such right is always subject to reasonable restriction as provided under Clause (6) of Article 19. The view adopted by the Apex Court in the case (supra) who also adopted by the Apex Court in the case between Hinsa Virodhak Sanga v. Marzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat reported in (2008) 5 SCC 33 : AIR 2008 SC 1892 . The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case between Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhy a Pradesh reported in 1969 (1) SCC 853 : AIR 1970 SC 93 in paragraphs 8 arid 9 held as follows: 8. The power to issue bye-laws indisputably includes the power to cancel or withdraw the bye-laws, but the validity of the exercise of the power to issue and to cancel or withdraw the bye-laws must be adjudged in the light of its impact upon the fundamental rights of persons affected thereby. When the validity of a law placing restriction upon the exercise of fundamental rights in Article 19(1) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State. A law requiring that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community, shall be done under a permit or licence' of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence or permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or a permit confers discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules or principles expressed or implied, and exercisable in consonance with rules of natural justice, it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion, the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1). Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition, but when the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the burden of providing that a total ban on the exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the general public interest lies heavily upon the State. 9. This Court in Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India AIR 1960 SC 430 held that the word "restriction" in Article 19(5) and 19(6) of the Constitution includes cases of "prohibition" also, that where a restriction reaches the stage of total restraint of rights special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied by considering the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public, and whether the restraint caused by the law was more than what was necessary in the interests of the general public. The Supreme Court in the case (supra) held that notification placing ban on slaughter of bulls and bullocks would not violate the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) if reasonableness placing such ban has been proved by remaining within the four corners of the law placing such restriction. 16. Again a division bench of the Bombay High Court while dealing with the case in between Zakir Hussain v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2001 Bom 21 held that the fundamental right to carry on any occupation trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to reasonable restriction under Clause 6 of Article 19. 17. 16. Again a division bench of the Bombay High Court while dealing with the case in between Zakir Hussain v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2001 Bom 21 held that the fundamental right to carry on any occupation trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to reasonable restriction under Clause 6 of Article 19. 17. Thus, having taken care of the facts and circumstances of the case, law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Court, this Court finds no reasonable and plausible ground to set aside the notification No. D.26017/1/2006-TRP dated 14-12-2009 (Annexure-9) in particular issued by the respondent No. 2. At this stage it would be appropriate for this Court to mention that in view of the publication of the notification in the official gazette as indicated above issued by the respondent No. 2, the other 2 (two) notifications turn infructuous. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. No cost.