JUDGMENT Vilas V. Afzulpurkar, J. 1. A.S. No. 357 of 2001 is filed by the third Defendant - Executive Officer, Sri Bramarambha Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, Beeramguda, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District, against the decree in O.S. No. 55 of 1997 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy. A.S. No. 1468 of 2001 is filed by Defendants 1 and 2 i.e. Joint Collector, Medak District and Mandal Revenue Officer, Patancheru, against the very same decree. 2. Since the parties are common, both the appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Suit O.S. No. 55 of 1997 was instituted by Respondents 1 to 5 in both the appeals for relief of declaration of title and ownership of Sy. Nos. 627/A and 674 admeasuring Ac. 11.00 cents and Sy. Nos. 627 and 674 also admeasuring Ac. 11.00 cents at Beeramguda Village, Hamlet of Ameenpur Village, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District and for consequential perpetual injunction. The said suit was instituted by the aforesaid Respondents on the basis of registered sale deeds executed in their favour by their vendors under Document Nos. 6701 and 6702 of 1996 both dated 12.12.1996. 4. The aforesaid Respondents/Plaintiffs also claimed that they have been granted Record of Rights (ROR) for the year 1989-1990 under Ex.B31 and questioning the said record of rights, the Ex-Sarpanch of the village had filed a revision before the Joint Collector, Medak District, in case No. F3/5/Inam/96/F3/5060/95 and the said revision petition was allowed by modifying the said record of right by deleting the name of the Respondents and recording the name of Sri Bramarambha Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, by order of the Joint Collector dated 07.05.2001. Questioning the said order of the learned Joint Collector, the Respondents have filed WP. No. 12590 of 2001, which is also clubbed for hearing along with the aforesaid two appeals and is being disposed of by this judgment. 5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. The relevant facts are as follows. 6. The suit schedule land of Ac. 22.00 cents is claimed by the first Plaintiff, which is a registered partnership firm and Plaintiffs 2 to 5 are its partners. Under the registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1996, marked as Exs. The relevant facts are as follows. 6. The suit schedule land of Ac. 22.00 cents is claimed by the first Plaintiff, which is a registered partnership firm and Plaintiffs 2 to 5 are its partners. Under the registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1996, marked as Exs. A1 and A2, the Plaintiffs claim that they have purchased the suit land from one T. Visweshwararao and Charka Raj @ Chakra Rao, sons of one T.V. Bhargava. It is claimed that the plaint schedule land fell to the share of their vendors as per compromise decree in O.S. No. 95 of 1984 dated 01.02.1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sangareddy. The Plaintiffs claimed that they have verified the title deeds and revenue records prior to purchase, had the schedule lands surveyed under a Panchanama by Survey Department dated 31.01.1994, marked as Ex. A6 and it is claimed that their vendors were enjoying the suit schedule land as absolute owners and pattadars right from 1345 Fasli (1934 AD) and from 1950-51 up to 1995-96 without any interruption and as such, even by prescription acquired title. The Plaintiffs filed and marked their partnership deed as Ex. A3 and certified copies of title deeds were marked as Exs. A4 and A5 apart from Pahanis for the year 1965-66 - Ex. A8; 1971-72 EX. A9; 1974-75 to 1980-81 - Exs. A10 to A14; 1985-86 - Ex. A15; 1991-92 - Ex. A16 and 1995-96 - Ex. A17. The Plaintiffs also filed land revenue receipts - Exs. A18 to A33; Encumbrance certificates - Exs. A34 and A35; acknowledgement of registration of firm - EX. A36; certified copy of Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli (1935 AD) - Ex.A37 and Ex.A38 - Setwar of 1330 Fasli (1919). In addition to that they relied upon Ex.A39 memo issued by the MRO, Patancheru Mandal dated 21.04.1994 and Ex. A40 memo issued by the Joint Collector, Medak District dated 26.08.1977, to claim that the said authorities had certified that the aforesaid suit lands are not Inam lands but patta lands. It is further alleged that when they dug bore-well and were fencing the land they were threatened by MRO not to cultivate the land on 08.07.1997. The MRO is said to have visited the suit land and directed the Plaintiffs to stop cultivation of the said land and based on the said cause of action the present suit is filed. 7. The MRO is said to have visited the suit land and directed the Plaintiffs to stop cultivation of the said land and based on the said cause of action the present suit is filed. 7. The first Defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the second Defendant. Later, the third Defendant was also impleaded vide orders in I.A. No. 822 of 1997 dated 24.03.1998 and he filed a separate written statement and additional written statement. The Defendants claimed in the written statement that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 151 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as Act 30 of 1987). It is also claimed that the suit lands are temple lands and are entered in the book of endowments and even if patta stands in the individual name it is deemed to be a patta granted to the institution. Reliance is also placed on Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli, Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 and subsequent records to claim that the suit land is recorded in the name of Mallikarjuna Swamy and under Deval Nigrani under the supervision of Poojari. It is also claimed that the suit is not maintainable for non-compliance of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and even under Section 87 of the Act 30 of 1987 the civil Court would have no jurisdiction, as the authorities under the Act 30 of 1987 alone have to decide the nature of the land as to whether it belongs to endowment or private land. It was claimed that wrong entries were entered in some of the pahanis without sanction and after noticing the wrong entries, the District Registrar was informed by the Joint Collector not to register any sales but in spite of the same, the District Registrar has registered Exs. A1 and A2. It is also claimed that one A. Narasimha Reddy former Sarpanch of Ameenpur village, gave a complaint, which was enquired into by the Joint Collector, Medak and notices to all interested persons were issued. At this stage, the vendors of the Plaintiffs sold away the land to the Plaintiffs and the present suit is filed. 8. A1 and A2. It is also claimed that one A. Narasimha Reddy former Sarpanch of Ameenpur village, gave a complaint, which was enquired into by the Joint Collector, Medak and notices to all interested persons were issued. At this stage, the vendors of the Plaintiffs sold away the land to the Plaintiffs and the present suit is filed. 8. The third Defendant claimed that the lands belong to the temple and stand in the name of Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple and were originally granted by HEH Nizam. Since the lands are Inam lands in the name of Diety, the Setwar and the Khasra Pahani record the name of Diety as pattadar and such subsequent wrong entries in the revenue record are of no consequence. It is alleged that the land was kept fallow as per the revenue record and the said claim of the Plaintiffs that they were in possession is denied. 9. Based on the above, the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues: 1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title of suit lands as prayed for? 2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for seeking perpetual injunction against the Defendants as prayed for? 3. Whether the suit lands belong to Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple lands (Endowment Book maintained by the Erstwhile Nizam Government) as prayed for? 4. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 151 of Endowment Act? 5. Whether the VAO of Ameenpur village issued incorrect revenue receipts and there were wrong entries in the Revenue records as prayed by the Defendants? 6. To what relief? ADDL. ISSUE: 1. Whether the Plaintiff and their vendors perfected adverse possession and adverse title over the suit schedule land as pleaded by them? RECONSRUCTED ADDL. ISSUE: 1. Whether the vendors of the Plaintiffs perfected their title to the suit schedule lands by way of adverse possession? 10. The Plaintiffs examined their Managing Partner as P.W.1, one of their vendors as P.W.2 and two other witnesses as P.Ws.3 and 4. P.W.3 claimed that he is the Supervisor over the plaint schedule land on behalf of the Plaintiffs and as such, he is only an employee of the Plaintiffs. He claimed that he had approached the Revenue Divisional Officer to find out whether the suit lands are covered under endowment and he states that the RDO gave a certificate under Ex. P.W.3 claimed that he is the Supervisor over the plaint schedule land on behalf of the Plaintiffs and as such, he is only an employee of the Plaintiffs. He claimed that he had approached the Revenue Divisional Officer to find out whether the suit lands are covered under endowment and he states that the RDO gave a certificate under Ex. A40 that the suit lands are not Inam lands. P.W.4 is a neighbour cultivator of the suit lands, who states that the temple is situated in Sy. No. 993 whereas the suit lands bearing Sy. Nos. 627 and 674 are patta lands. On behalf of the Defendants, the MRO examined himself as D.W.1, the third Defendant examined himself as D.W.2, the cultivator of the suit lands was examined as D.W.3 and the Ex-Sarapanch, A. Narasimha Reddy, who had given complaint against the Plaintiffs and at whose instance the ROR was corrected by the Joint Collector, was examined as D.W.4. The Defendants filed Exs. B1l to B38, which primarily comprises of the revenue record beginning with Khasra Pahani - Ex. B2; pahanis from 1345 Fasli (1934) - Ex. B3; pahani extracts from 1950-51 to 1993-94 - Exs. B4 to B28; Setwar for the year 1330 Fasli - Ex. B29; Pahani for the year 1979-80 - Ex.B.30; ROR for the year 1989-90 - Ex. B31; Setwar for the year 1330 Fasli - Ex. B32 of 1330 Fasli (1919); Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli (1933) - Ex. B33 and Ex. B37 is page 230 of Endowment Register. In addition to the above exhibited documents, the Plaintiffs have called for and marked Exs. C1 and C2, which are files of the endowments department relating to the minutes of the Renovation Committee of the temple. 11. B32 of 1330 Fasli (1919); Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli (1933) - Ex. B33 and Ex. B37 is page 230 of Endowment Register. In addition to the above exhibited documents, the Plaintiffs have called for and marked Exs. C1 and C2, which are files of the endowments department relating to the minutes of the Renovation Committee of the temple. 11. After considering the aforesaid evidence, the trial Court found that (i) the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it is in the nature of declaration of title and for that purpose relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Pindi Jaggayya v. Deity of Seetharamaswamy Varu 1987 (1) ALT 18 and came to the conclusion that the suit is maintainable; (ii) Issue No. 5 was found to have been unnecessarily framed as it related to suspension of Village Administrative Officer for collecting land revenue, though it was abolished; (iii) On issue No. 3 the trial Court found that the Defendants are claiming the suit land as Inam land belonging to the temple and therefore, was of the view that the burden of proof is on the Defendants; (iv) It was of the view that Ex. B37, which is the entry at page 230 of the Endowment Register, being in Urdu, in its translation filed by the Defendant No. 3 under Ex. 37(a) found certain discrepancies and has refused to take into consideration the translation Ex. B37(a) as it was a translation done by a private agency, which has no authenticity, on the ground that the survey numbers mentioned in Ex. B37 are new survey numbers whereas the suit land had corresponding old Sy. Nos. 475 and 528, which were not found in the old document Ex. B37; (v) the trial Court was also of the view that Exs. B2 to B28 and Exs. B30 and B31 shows that the lands are Sakari, which according to the trial Court means patta lands. The trial Court also relied upon the minutes of the renovation committee and accepted its minutes dated 20.01.1981, which are as follows: The committee noted that the Hillock on which the temple is situated is covered by Sy. No. 993/91 and admeasures altogether 354.34 acres except the land attached to the main temple, and the other subsidiary structures, no land at present is in the name of temple itself. No. 993/91 and admeasures altogether 354.34 acres except the land attached to the main temple, and the other subsidiary structures, no land at present is in the name of temple itself. The committee was of the view that the entire area should be got assigned by the Government in favour of the temple. The above minutes are relied upon by the Plaintiffs also to contend that there is no other land, which belongs to the temple. The trial Court, while discounting the aforesaid documents marked on behalf of the Defendants, has accepted the pahanis marked by the Plaintiffs viz. Exs. A8 to A17 and also entries in Exs. B2 to B33 to find that the vendors of the Plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the suit lands and also relied upon the evidence of D.W.1 that pattadar passbooks and title deeds under the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act, 1971 were issued to the vendors of the Plaintiffs and his admission that the lands are not Inam lands. The trial Court also relied upon his statement that there is no document to show that the Nizam granted the suit land to the temple. Based on the above analysis, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the entries in Record of Rights are statutorily required to be presumed as true under Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act, 1971 and answered the issues in favour of the Plaintiffs. The trial Court also found that the title deeds and pattadar passbooks show the possession of the Plaintiffs and their predecessors over the statutory property and as such, they have perfected title by adverse possession also. Consequently, the suit was decreed as prayed for. 12. Mrs. A.B. Lalitha Gayathri, learned Assistant Government0 Pleader appearing in support of A.S. No. 1468 of 2001 has contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of non-compliance of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is also contended that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish the title of their predecessors, though the Plaintiffs claim that their vendors acquired title to the suit property through the decree passed in O.S. No. 95 of 1984. The maintainability of the suit is also questioned in view of Section 87(1) as well as Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987. The maintainability of the suit is also questioned in view of Section 87(1) as well as Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987. The finding of adverse possession is also questioned by contending that Article 65 of the Limitation Act is not kept in mind by the Court below while answering the said issues and lastly it is contended that the report of the committee under Exs. C1 and C2 has neither statutory nor has any probative value and is not conclusive. Learned Assistant Government Pleader places reliance on the following decisions: State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 ; Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1068 ; Government Press Employees Union v. Returning Officer and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, 2004 (2) ALD 549 ; Juturu Satyanarayna v. Juturu Lakshmi Devamma 2002 An WR 1 630; Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Janikamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150 ; Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati, (2004) 10 SCC 65 ; Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (1981) 2 SCC 103 ; State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (2000) 5 SCC 652 and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah 2010 (1) Scale 206. 13. Mr. L. Prabhakar Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the third Defendant in support of A.S. No. 357 of 2001, has supported the Defendants 1 and 2 by contending that the Plaintiffs suit documents Exs. A1 and A2 are mere certified copies and non-production of original documents warrants an adverse inference to be drawn against the Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs failed to establish the ingredients of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. It is not a case of loss of originals and as such, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to lead secondary evidence under Exs. A1 and A2. He also contended that the Plaintiffs have not established that the suit properties are ancestral properties of their vendors and in view of Khasra Pahani - Ex. B2 and Endowment Register - Ex. B37; the title claimed by the Plaintiffs is clearly unsustainable. A1 and A2. He also contended that the Plaintiffs have not established that the suit properties are ancestral properties of their vendors and in view of Khasra Pahani - Ex. B2 and Endowment Register - Ex. B37; the title claimed by the Plaintiffs is clearly unsustainable. He also contended that mere mutation of entries is not decisive and relied upon the following decisions: A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2007) 7 SCC 482 ; Eerappa v. Golla Nagaiah 2008 (2) ALD 349 ; Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223 ; T.K. Mohammed Abubacker v. P.S.M. Ahamed Abdul Khader, AIR 2009 SC 2966 ; Jaggayya v. Deity of Seetharamaswamy Varu 1987 (1) ALT 18 ; Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy v. Konduru Seshu Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 436 ; H.P. Vedavyasachar v. Shivashankara, (2009) 8 SCC 231; Chakicherla Audilakshmamma v. Atmakuru Ramarao, AIR 1973 AP 149 and Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh AIR 1954 C 758. 14. Mr. N. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs/Respondents in both the appeals, support the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that Exs. A1 and A2 are certified copies of the sale deeds and they were received in evidence without any objection by any of the Defendants and as such, at this distance of time, an objection under Section 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be raised. He also contended that the property originally belonged to one A. Venkanna, who was grandfather of the Plaintiffs' vendors. He was succeeded by his son Bharagava and later by Visweshwar Rao and Chakra Rao. He submitted that their possession from 1950 onwards is established and there is a decree by civil Court in O.S. No. 95 of 1984 wherein the Plaintiffs' vendors succeeded to the property. He also relied upon the certificates issued by MRO and RDO - Exs. A39 and A40 that the suit lands are not Inam lands and also places reliance on Ex. B6 - Sesala Pahani of 1955-58, showing the vendors of the Plaintiff as pattadars and possessors. He also argued that while the Plaintiffs have discharged their burden based on Exs. A1 and A2 and revenue records, the Defendants, however, have failed to discharge their burden. B6 - Sesala Pahani of 1955-58, showing the vendors of the Plaintiff as pattadars and possessors. He also argued that while the Plaintiffs have discharged their burden based on Exs. A1 and A2 and revenue records, the Defendants, however, have failed to discharge their burden. Learned Counsel also raised a contention that pattadar passbooks and title deeds give rise to a presumption under Section 6-A(5) of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act and that there is no document on record to show that the suit lands are given to the temple. Learned Counsel also questions the authenticity of Ex. B37 entry in the endowment register by contending that it has neither any date nor any seal nor the authority, which has issued the same. He also questions as to how the new survey numbers could be mentioned in the said old documents and that no notification was published regarding the aforesaid land. He relied heavily on Exs. C1 and C2 to contend that the very responsible and high power committee has noted that there are no lands belonging to the temple except the hillock on which the temple exists and the suit lands are far away from the temple. He also contended that in the absence of registration of the temple under Section 43 of the Act 30 of 1987 it cannot be said to be a temple covered under Endowments Act and there is no question of the suit lands being the property of the temple. He also submitted that regarding non-compliance of Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure there was neither any issue in the trial Court nor any contention raised and as such, the said question cannot be permitted at appellate stage. He has relied upon the following decisions in support of his contentions. Jaggayya v. Deity of Seetharamaswamy Varu 1987(1) ALT 18 ; Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 ; State of Gujarat v. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai, (2006) 9 SCC 772 ; Chanumolu Nirmala v. Chanumolu Indira Devi, 1994(1) ALT 673 (DB) and D. Subramanyam v. K. Bhavanarayana AIR 1954 Andhra 17. 15. On the basis of the above, the following questions arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Plaintiffs' suit is required to be held as not maintainable in view of non-compliance with Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. 15. On the basis of the above, the following questions arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Plaintiffs' suit is required to be held as not maintainable in view of non-compliance with Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the Plaintiffs can claim declaration of title based on secondary evidence under Exs. A1 and A2? 3. Whether the suit of the Respondents is maintainable in view of Sections 87 and 151 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1857? 4. Whether the Plaintiffs have discharged their burden under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the Plaintiffs have proved possession for over 30 years and whether they can claim adverse possession? 6. Whether the presumption of title has to be drawn in favour of the Respondents/Plaintiffs in view of memos of Mandal Revenue Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer under Exs. A39 and A40 and the pattadar passbooks and title deeds issued to the Respondent/Plaintiff under the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971? 7. What is the evidentiary value of Exs. C1 and C2? Notice Under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure: 16. It is not in dispute that the Respondents filed the present suit without issuing any notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure, though the suit was originally instituted against the Joint Collector, Medak District as Defendant No. 1 and Mandal Revenue Officer, Patancheru Mandal, as Defendant No. 2. Later, the Executive Officer of Bramarambha Mailikarjuna Swamy Temple was impleaded, as Defendant No. 3, vide orders in I.A. No. 822 of 1997 dated 24.03.1998. Though the' Defendants are not impleaded as required under Section 79 Code of Civil Procedure, in substance, the suit being one against the Government and the authority under the Endowments Act, compliance with Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was necessary. As required by Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure, prima facie, the Plaintiffs could not have maintained the suit without issuing notice in compliance with Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure and the plaint must also contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. 17. In the written statement filed by Defendant Nos. As required by Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure, prima facie, the Plaintiffs could not have maintained the suit without issuing notice in compliance with Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure and the plaint must also contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. 17. In the written statement filed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, it is contended in the very first sentence in Para 2 of the written statement that the suit is not maintainable for non-compliance with Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure. However, it appears that all the parties lost their attention with regard to the said objection and consequently there was no issue on this aspect before the trial Court. In the grounds of appeal in A.S. Nos. 1468 and 357 of 2001 filed by the Defendants 1 and 2 as well as separately by Defendant No. 3 respectively, no such ground is raised objecting to the maintainability of the suit. 18. Learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the Appellants in A.S. No. 1468 of 2001 has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand's case (2 supra); C.P. Agencies's case (1 supra) and Government Press Employees Union's case (3 supra) to contend that the suit is not maintainable. 19. Learned Counsel for the Respondents/Plaintiffs submits that such contention cannot be allowed, as there was neither any issue nor any contention before the trial Court nor such ground was raised in any of the grounds of appeal. In substance, therefore, the learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that such objection is deemed to have been waived by the Appellants. 20. The Supreme Court in Bishandayal v. State of Orissa (2001) 1 SCC 555 considered the issue as to waiver of notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure and has held in Para 16 as follows: 16. There can be no dispute to the proposition that a notice under Section 80 can be waived. But the question is whether merely because in the amended written statement such a plea is not taken it amounts to waiver. This contention was argued before the Appellate Court. Even otherwise we find that in the suit itself Issue No. 4 had been raised as to whether or not there was a valid and appropriate notice under Section 80. But the question is whether merely because in the amended written statement such a plea is not taken it amounts to waiver. This contention was argued before the Appellate Court. Even otherwise we find that in the suit itself Issue No. 4 had been raised as to whether or not there was a valid and appropriate notice under Section 80. Such a point having been taken in the original written statement and an issue having been raised, it was not necessary that in the amended written statement such a plea be again taken. On behalf of the Respondents, reliance has been placed on the case of Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa, AIR 1971 SC 442 wherein it has been held that where the Plaintiff's cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 was served, it would be duty of the Court to reject the plaint. In this case the original notice was only in respect of a claim under the plaint as it originally stood. That claim was on the basis that there was a concluded contract and that the Appellants had already acquired rights in the mill and the lands. As has been fairly conceded those reliefs were not maintainable and were given up before the Appellate Court. The amended plaint was on an entirely new cause of action. It was based on facts and events which took place after the filing of the original plant. It was a fresh case. Now the claim was for specific performance of the agreement alleged to have been entered into on 29.12.1978. Admittedly no notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was given for this case. As there was an issue pertaining to Notice under Section 80, the trial court should have dealt with this aspect. The trial court failed to do so. It was then pressed before the Appellate Court. In our view the finding in the impugned Judgment that the suit based on this claim was not maintainable is correct and requires no interference. If a new cause of action is being introduced a fresh notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure would be required to be given. The same not having been given, the suit on this cause of action was not maintainable. 21. If a new cause of action is being introduced a fresh notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure would be required to be given. The same not having been given, the suit on this cause of action was not maintainable. 21. In a Division Bench judgment of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pioneer Builders, 1999 (3) ALT 1 (DB), on a survey of various decisions, this Court came to hold at Para 44 as follows: 44. Though the argument is advanced by the learned Advocate General appearing for the Defendants that the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, the same is not agreeable since the parties, particularly the Defendants knowing fully well about non-issuing of notice have not raised such a plea in the written statement or additional written statement filed in the suit. Even when the Issues were framed, the Defendants did not complain that proper Issues were not framed particularly as to maintainability of the suit. Having participated in the original proceedings, now it is not open for the Defendants to raise the contention as to the maintainability of the suit, in view of waiving the defect if any at earliest point of time. 22. Similarly, learned single Judge of Orissa High Court in State v. Bamadeb AIR 1971 Ori 227 also considered the similar question when such objection was raised at the stage of second appeal and on a reference to various decisions came to hold that though the notice under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory, the same could be waived which amounts to abandonment of a right and it may be express or implied through conduct. On the high authority of Privy Council in Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of The Provinces AIR 1947 PC 197 which was approved by the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 it was held as follows: It is relevant to note that neither was this point taken by the Respondent in the written statement, which it filed in answer to the Appellants claim nor was any issue framed in that behalf by the trial Court and this may justify the inference that the objection under Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure have been waived. In the light of the above legal position, therefore, and in view of the fact that no issue was framed, no contention based on Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was raised before the trial Court and no such ground was raised in the memorandum of either of the appeals, it has to be held that the contention as to non-compliance with Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure was waived by the Appellants. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly. ORIGINAL SALE PEEPS NOT PRODUCED: 23. Point No. 2 is as to whether the Appellants herein can raise the objection that the original sale deeds are not filed and only certified copies thereof are filed and marked as Exs. A1 and A2. Learned Counsel for the Appellants states that under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, the secondary evidence may be given when the original is not in possession of the person or if it is destroyed or lost as enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act and unless the Plaintiffs satisfy any of the said ingredients, in the absence of original documents, they cannot maintain the suit for declaration of title based upon the certified copies of Exs. A1 and A2. The Appellants also contend that no explanation is forthcoming from the Plaintiffs as to why they have withheld the originals of Exs. A1 and A2 from the Court and this being not the case of loss of originals, non-production of originals warrants drawing of an inference against the Plaintiffs and they are required to be non-suited on that ground. 24. Learned Counsel for the Respondents/Plaintiffs, on the contrary, submits that when Exs. A1 and A2 were tendered into evidence, no objections whatsoever were raised by the Defendants. Further, apart from the fact that both the said documents are certified copies of registered sale deeds, the said documents were proved by examination of the vendor of the Plaintiffs, as P.W.2. Further, no such plea even remotely was raised before the trial Court and no such ground is raised in the memorandum of grounds in either of the appeals. Learned Counsel, therefore, submits that such ground cannot be urged for the first time before the appellate Court. 25. While it is true that no objection to admissibility of said documents - Exs. Learned Counsel, therefore, submits that such ground cannot be urged for the first time before the appellate Court. 25. While it is true that no objection to admissibility of said documents - Exs. A1 and A2 was raised by the Appellants before the trial Court nor any such contention, as is now raised, was even argued before the trial Court. Further in either of the appeals, no such ground is raised. It is, no doubt, true that under Section 65 of the Evidence Act unless the loss of originals is accounted for and the case for reception of secondary evidence is made out under any of the ingredients of Section 65 of the Evidence Act, the secondary evidence could not have been permitted to be adduced. The fact remains that the Appellants have by their own conduct allowed the reception of such additional evidence without raising any objection at any time, as such, the said contention cannot be permitted before the appellate Court. I am fortified in the above view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. Sri K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082 held at paras 14 and 15 as under: 14. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Gopal Das and Anr. v. Sri Thakurji and Ors. reported in , AIR 1943 PC 83 in which it has been held that when the objection to the mode of proof is not taken, the party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. That when the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the court of appeal. Similarly, in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084, it has been stated that where copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection to their admissibility can be taken afterwards in the court of appeal. When a party gives in evidence a certified copy, without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at the time of admission and such objection will not be allowed at a later stage. 15. In the present case, when the Plaintiff submitted a certified copy of the sale deed (Ex. P1) in evidence and when the sale deed was taken on record and marked as an exhibit, the Appellant did not raise any objection. Even execution of Ex.P2 was not challenged. In the circumstances, it was not open to the Appellant to object to the mode of proof before the lower appellate Court. If the objection had been taken at the trial stage, the Plaintiff could have met it by calling for the original sale deed which was, on record in collateral proceedings. But as there was no objection from the Appellant, the sale deed dated 14.11.1944 was marked as Ex. P1 and it was admitted to the record without objection. The said contention is, therefore, liable to be rejected and is' accordingly rejected. OBJECTION AS TO MAINTAINABILITY OF SUIT: 26. Further, the point with regard to maintainability of the suit under Sections 87 and 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 is concerned; it would be useful to extract Section 87 as under: 87. The said contention is, therefore, liable to be rejected and is' accordingly rejected. OBJECTION AS TO MAINTAINABILITY OF SUIT: 26. Further, the point with regard to maintainability of the suit under Sections 87 and 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 is concerned; it would be useful to extract Section 87 as under: 87. Power of Endowments Tribunal to decide certain disputes and matters: (1) The Endowments Tribunal having jurisdiction shall have the power, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the person concerned, to enquire into and decide any dispute as to the question- (a) whether an institution or endowment is a charitable institution or endowment; (b) whether an institution or endowment is a religious institution or endowment; (c) whether any property is an endowment, if so, whether it is a charitable endowment or a religious endowment; (d) whether any property is a specific endowment; (e) whether any person is entitled by custom or otherwise to any honour, emoluments or perquisites in any charitable or religious institution or endowment and what the established usage of such institution or endowment is in regard to any other matter; (f) whether any institution or endowment is wholly or partly of a secular or religious character and whether any property is given wholly or partly for secular or religious uses; or (g) where any property or money has been given for the support of an institution or endowment which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or the performance of any service or charity connected with such institution or endowment or the performance of a charity which is partly of a secular character and partly of a religious character or where any property or money given is appropriated partly to secular uses and partly to religious uses, as to what portion of such property or money shall be allocated to secular or religious uses. (h) whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment. (2) The Endowments Tribunal may, pending its decision under Sub-section (1), pass such order as it deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment. (h) whether a person is a founder or a member from the family of the founder of an Institution or Endowment. (2) The Endowments Tribunal may, pending its decision under Sub-section (1), pass such order as it deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment. (3) The Endowments Tribunal may while recording his decision under Sub-section (1) and pending implementation of such decision, pass such interim order as it may deem fit for safeguarding the interests of the institution or endowment and for preventing damage to or loss or misappropriation or criminal breach of trust in respect of the properties or moneys belonging to or in the possession of the institution or endowment. (4) The presumption in respect of matters covered by Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) in Sub-section (1) is that the institution or the endowment is a public one and that the burden of proof in all such cases shall lie on the person claiming the institution or the endowment to be private or the property or money to be other than that of a religious endowment or specific endowment, as the case may be. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the above sub-sections the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction shall continue to enquire into and decide the disputes referred to in Sub-section (1) until the constitution of Endowments Tribunal. 27. Similar issue was considered by this Court in a Division Bench judgment in Jaggayya's case (14 and 19 supra) which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court, which considered similar contention with respect to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowment Act, 1966 wherein similar question with reference to Section 77 of the 1966 Act was considered and the suit was held to be maintainable. The present Section 87 being similar to Section 77 of the 1966 Act, it has to be held that since it is a suit for declaration, the same would not fall within the purview of the authorities under the Act 30 of 1987 under Section 87. The present Section 87 being similar to Section 77 of the 1966 Act, it has to be held that since it is a suit for declaration, the same would not fall within the purview of the authorities under the Act 30 of 1987 under Section 87. Similarly, Section 151 contains a bar of jurisdiction that no suit or legal proceeding in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding, for which the provision is made in this Act 30 of 1987 shall instituted in any Court. As a suit for declaration of title is not falling within the parameters of Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 the said contention of the Appellants is liable to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected. PLAINTIFFS' BURDEN Under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act: 28. Since it is a suit for declaration of the title the Plaintiffs have to establish not only their title but also the title of their vendors. The pleadings and the evidence on record show that Plaintiffs have purchased the suit schedule land under Exs. A1 and A2 from their vendors and one of the vendors is examined as P.W.2. The vendors in turn claimed the property by stating that it is ancestral property and the same was partitioned in pursuance of a compromise decree for partition in O.S. No. 95 of 1984. Neither the plaint nor the decree in the suit O.S. No. 95 of 1984 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sangareddy is filed nor there is any other evidence on the part of the Plaintiffs' vendors to establish that it is their ancestral property. The decree in O.S. No. 95 of 1984 is a decree of compromise and not a decree on merits. From the evidence on record, an inference can also be drawn that the Appellants are not parties to the said suit and as such, ex facie, the said decree would not bind the Appellants. Further except stating that the property, devolved on the vendors of the Plaintiffs, is ancestral property there is no other evidence on record. As the Appellants rely upon various revenue records, the Plaintiffs also rely upon pahanis and other revenue records to show that their vendors have been recorded as pattadars and possessors. Further except stating that the property, devolved on the vendors of the Plaintiffs, is ancestral property there is no other evidence on record. As the Appellants rely upon various revenue records, the Plaintiffs also rely upon pahanis and other revenue records to show that their vendors have been recorded as pattadars and possessors. The Plaintiffs claim that their possession is recorded right from 1950 onwards and based on that not only title is claimed but a claim for adverse possession is also made. 29. On issue No. 1, the trial Court found the same in favour of the Plaintiffs based upon it's finding on issue No. 3 that the suit lands do not belong to Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple and that predecessors of the Plaintiffs are the original owners. The aforesaid finding of the trial Court is primarily based on two erroneous assumptions. Firstly, the trial Court was of the opinion that the burden is on the Defendants to prove that the suit lands are lands belonging to temple and secondly, the crucial revenue records in the nature of Khasra - Ex. B2, Setwar - Exs. B29 to B32 of the year 1330 Fasli (1919-20 AD), Wasool Baqui - Ex. B33 of the year 1344 Fasli (1933-34 AD) and Ex. B37, which is relevant page of endowment register, were all ignored. The trial Court also got swayed by thinking that D.W.4 on whose complaint the first Defendant initiated enquiry and stopped registration of suit lands by instructing the Registrar concerned, was held to be not a reliable witness. The trial Court also got swayed by the minutes of the renovation committee - Exs. C1 and C2, relevant portion thereof is already extracted above. Thus the trial Court has not taken into consideration the relevant evidence by excluding the same and on the contrary, has placed burden on the Defendants and finding that the Defendants have no Government record to show that the suit lands belong to Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs' vendors had good title. 30. The trial Court had rejected Ex. B37, the relevant extract of the endowments register on the ground that the translation thereof, which was filed and marked as Ex. B37(a) was obtained from a private translator. 30. The trial Court had rejected Ex. B37, the relevant extract of the endowments register on the ground that the translation thereof, which was filed and marked as Ex. B37(a) was obtained from a private translator. Further, the trial Court found that since new survey numbers are mentioned in the said document, it has recorded a finding that in all probabilities Ex. B37 is a fabricated document. CMP. No. 116 of 2006: 31. The Defendant No. 3, who is Appellant in A.S. No. 357 of 2001, has filed an application under CMP. No. 116 of 2006 under Order 41 Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure seeking to file 12 documents as additional evidence. This application was filed on 23.01.2005 and all the documents proposed to be filed are certified copies of the revenue records including certified copies of duly translated Ex. B37. Further, at least six of the documents therein were already marked in the suit viz. Ex. B37 which is same as additional document No. 1; Wasool Baqui - Ex. B33, which is same as additional document No. 2; Setwar of 1344 Fasli equivalent to 1938-39 filed as additional document No. 3 was already filed under Exs. B29 and B30 for earlier years. Similarly, additional documents 9 to 12 were already filed and marked as Exs. B2, B4, B5 and B6, thus, except for five documents i.e. additional documents 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 rest of the additional documents are already on record. Further, all the said additional documents are certified copies of revenue records and as such, are public documents receivable as certified copies. The said documents were filed as additional evidence, particularly, in view of the finding of the trial Court excluding Ex. B37 on the ground that it is translated copy (Ex. B37(a) is procured from private translator) and therefore, additional document No. 1 is filed through official translator, who has certified the said document in his capacity of Deputy Director of Translations, Government of Andhra Pradesh. B37 on the ground that it is translated copy (Ex. B37(a) is procured from private translator) and therefore, additional document No. 1 is filed through official translator, who has certified the said document in his capacity of Deputy Director of Translations, Government of Andhra Pradesh. The said application was opposed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs by filing a counter affidavit by contending that the additional documents are being filed five years after filing of the appeal only to full up the lacunae and that the very same documents were available earlier but they were not filed before the trial Court and as such, no sufficient cause exists for admitting the documents as additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure. 32. During the hearing of the appeal, I have considered the said application also in the light of the aforesaid rival contentions on either side. In view of the fact that Ex. B37 is in Urdu, while hearing the appeal, I had secured the assistance of the Urdu knowing staff from the Registry of the High Court, which are dealing with translation and printing of lower records. Similarly, other revenue records and documents sought to be filed, as additional evidence also are written in Urdu or Telugu language, which were not clearly legible even to a Telugu knowing person of the present generation. Since the said documents are certified copies of public documents and duly translated and certified by the official translator, I am of the view that reception of said evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure is not only just and proper with a view to adjudicate the issues involved but also necessary for this Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the controversy involved in the case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the said additional evidence deserves to be admitted as they are merely certified copies of public documents and their genuineness is not in doubt as well as in view of the fact that most of the said documents are already on record. CMP. No. 116 of 2006 is/therefore, allowed and the said documents are accordingly received and marked as Exs. B39 to B50 as prayed for. 33. The additional document Ex. B39, which is English translation of Ex. B37(a) would show that it is a relevant page of endowment register called as 'PROFORMA OF MUNTAKHAB OF REGISTER OF ENDOWMENTS'. CMP. No. 116 of 2006 is/therefore, allowed and the said documents are accordingly received and marked as Exs. B39 to B50 as prayed for. 33. The additional document Ex. B39, which is English translation of Ex. B37(a) would show that it is a relevant page of endowment register called as 'PROFORMA OF MUNTAKHAB OF REGISTER OF ENDOWMENTS'. Sl. No. 1 relates to office register; Sl. No. 2 relates to Taluqa register; under Sl. No. 3 different temples are mentioned; Sl. Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are with regard to municipal number; Sl. No. 7 is in respect of the land with place or village on which the temple is situate; Sl. No. 8 is with regard to survey numbers; Sl. No. 10 is with regard to the name of the Endower; Sl. No. 11 is with regard to purpose of endowment; Sl. No. 12 is with regard to the name of Mutawalli; Sl. Nos. 13 and 14 are with regard to the monthly/yearly income and Sl. No. 15 is with regard to the remarks column, which mentions the file number concerned. Sl. Nos. 1 and 2 in the said register relates to Sri Mahadev Temple; Thakesar Temple and third item bearing office register No. 5497 relates to Sri Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, Beeramguda, Sangareddy. As per Appellants the land is said to situate at Ameenpur village, Sangareddy, column No. 8 gives survey number, extent and that the Inam land was given by HEH Nizam. The name of the endower and the name of the Mutawalli is shown as Government and purpose of the endowment is 'Pooja'. The remarks column mentions File No. 6/22/2348/6/22 of 1954 and the remarks are signed by the Assistant Secretary. Item 3 above described relates to the suit land and file number of 1954 shows that it is recorded in the endowment register as an Inam given by HEH Nizam for pooja at the temple but the authenticity of the said document was doubted by the trial Court on the ground that new survey numbers are mentioned there. Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli, which contains the corresponding statement of old survey numbers and new survey numbers was marked as Ex. Wasool Baqui of 1344 Fasli, which contains the corresponding statement of old survey numbers and new survey numbers was marked as Ex. B33 but since the translation thereof was not filed, a certified copy of the said Wasooi Baqui together with translation is filed in the additional evidence, which is now received and marked as Ex.B40, shows that old Sy. No. 478 corresponds to new Sy. No. 627 and old Sy. No. 528 corresponds to new Sy. No. 674. The said Wasooi Baqui of 1344 Fasli (1933-34), therefore, shows the old survey numbers revised as new survey numbers and as such, showing of new survey numbers in the Muntakhab - Ex.B39 referred to above, being a reference to file of 1954, correctly shows new survey numbers. The trial Court has completely missed to notice the aforesaid and has reached an erroneous conclusion and has completely excluded the said document from consideration. 34. The next most important document being the Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 already marked as Ex.B2 is filed in the additional evidence as document No. 11, which is received and marked as Ex. B49, shows under column 8 the name of the pattadar for both the said survey numbers as 'Mallikarjuna Swamy' and in column 14 relating to possession, the possession is that of the pattadar, which is recorded as 'Deval Nigrani' (for service of temple) and pattadar - 'Mallikarjuna Swamy'. It is well settled that Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 was prepared as per the Record of Rights, regulations and the entries therein have the force of a title by itself. A Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited 2002 (5) ALT 370 had examined in detail the statutory provisions under Land Revenue Act under which Settlement Records and Record of Rights are prepared ad after a detailed survey and discussion of the provisions as well as several decisions came to hold that Setwar is a settlement register prepared by Survey Authorities at the time of survey and settlement wherein the names of pattadars are recorded after due enquiry. Evidentiary value with respect to Khasra Pahanis, which are prepared under the Record of Rights in Land Regulations 1358 Fasli was also considered with reference to several decisions of this Court and that of the Supreme Court. Paras 73, 89, 95 and 96 are relevant and are extracted hereunder. 73. Evidentiary value with respect to Khasra Pahanis, which are prepared under the Record of Rights in Land Regulations 1358 Fasli was also considered with reference to several decisions of this Court and that of the Supreme Court. Paras 73, 89, 95 and 96 are relevant and are extracted hereunder. 73. In Keshav Ram (9 supra), the Supreme Court noticed that the courts below decreed the Plaintiff's suit for declaration of title relying upon the only piece of evidence being an order of Assistant Settlement Officer directing the correction of the record of the right. The Supreme Court posed the question "as to whether the entry in the settlement papers recording somebody's name could create or extinguish title in favour of the person concerned?" and held: It is to be seen that the disputed land originally stood recorded in the name of Raja Sahib of Keonthal and thereafter the State was recorded to be the owner of the land in the record of right prepared in the year 1949-50. In the absence of the very order of the Assistant Settlement Officer directing necessary correction to be made in favour of the Plaintiffs, it is not possible to visualize on what basis the aforesaid direction had been made. But at any rate such an entry in the Revenue papers by no stretch of imagination can form the basis for declaration of title in favour of the Plaintiffs. To our query as to whether there is any other document on the basis of which the Plaintiffs can claim title over the disputed land, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents could not point out any other document apart from the alleged correction made in the register pursuant to the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer. In our considered opinion, the Courts below committed serious error of law in declaring Plaintiffs' title on the basis of the aforesaid order of correction and the consequential entry in the Revenue papers. 89. In Mylaram Lachaiah v. Nafeezunnisa Begum, a Division Bench of this Court while holding that khasra pahani is the Record of Rights notified under Section 4(2) of the Regulation held that the Record of Rights do not in any manner alter the pre-existing rights of the parties. Only a presumption is raised under Section 13 of the Regulation until the contrary is provided or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. 95. Only a presumption is raised under Section 13 of the Regulation until the contrary is provided or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. 95. In Kasturchand v. Harbilash, the Supreme Court found fault with the courts below as well as the High Court for their not having placed any reliance on the entries in the khasra prepared and maintained under the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of 1950 and held: The entries in the annual village papers create a presumption albeit rebuttable in favour of a person whose name is recorded. We find that a procedure is prescribed to challenge the entries made in the annual village papers. The procedure is contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of 1950 (for short "the Land Revenue Act"). Section 45 of that Land Revenue Act specifies that khasra, jamabandi or khatauni and such other village papers as the Government may from time to time prescribe shall be annual village papers. Section 46 enjoins preparation of annual village papers each year for each village of a district in accordance with rules made under the Act. Section 52 embodies the presumption that all entries made under that chapter in the annual village papers shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved and Section 50 prescribes the method or procedure for correction of wrong entries in the annual village papers by superior officers. Thus it is clear that in the event of wrong entries in the annual village papers the same is liable to be corrected under Section 50 and unless they are so corrected the presumption under Section 52 will govern the position. 96. A careful analysis of the decisions referred to hereinabove of this Court as well as of the Apex Court would make it clear that the entries made in the Record of Rights carry with them a very great evidentiary value, provided the Record of Rights is prepared and maintained under the provisions of the relevant statutes or the Regulations, as the case may be, and further provided that the entries therein are made after holding public enquiries. Sometimes, they constitute the only evidence available in order to establish one's title to the lands. Sometimes, they constitute the only evidence available in order to establish one's title to the lands. The entries made in Columns 1 to 19 of the pahani patrikas shall be deemed to be the record of Rights prepared and maintained by a public servant in discharge of his official duties. 35. Ex. B50 is Sesala Pahani, which covers the period of three years 1955-56 to 1957-58 contains Khatedar's name as Chakrapani and the name of the father of the cultivator as Veeraiah. These entries are said to be rounded off subsequently and 'Mallikarjuna Swamy' is written in the place of Chakrapani in the entry relating to Pattadar/Khatedar. The very same Sesala Pahani was already filed and marked as Ex. B6 and the learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed strong reliance upon the same to contend that the name of their vendors appears in the Sesala Pahani right from 1955-56 onwards and in subsequent Pahanis and it is contended that based on the consistent revenue entries, the Plaintiffs have bonafide purchased the suit lands from them. Even accepting that under Ex. B6 the name of the Plaintiffs' vendors appears, it is clearly evident that the same is contrary to the entries in Khasra Pahani, Wasool Baqui as well as Setwar, which are referred to and discussed, as above. In my opinion, therefore, the aforesaid revenue record clinchingly establishes that the suit lands are endowed lands in favour of the Deity - Sri Mallikarjuna Swamy. 36. The criticism of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs on the said revenue records and particularly, Ex. B37 is liable to be rejected, as the genuineness of the said documents in the light of duly translated certified copies produced by the Appellant in A.S. No. 357 of 2001 by way of additional evidence and marked as Exs. B39 to B50, fully and satisfactorily establish the title of the Deity. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Plaintiffs' vendors had title to the said property and consequently, the title claimed by the Plaintiff is liable to be rejected. ADVERSE POSSESSION: 37. This leaves the last main contention of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs that their title is established by adverse possession on the ground that their vendors were in possession of the suit lands for over 30 years. ADVERSE POSSESSION: 37. This leaves the last main contention of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs that their title is established by adverse possession on the ground that their vendors were in possession of the suit lands for over 30 years. The legal position with regard to claiming adverse possession is well settled as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Amrendra Pratap Singh's case (6 supra) and the relevant paras 22 and 23 are extracted hereunder: What is adverse possession? 22. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title can be instituted within a period of 12 years calculated from the date when the possession of the Defendant becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. By virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, at the determination of the period limited by the Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property stands extinguished. The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. A person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner, commences prescribing title into himself and such prescription having continued for a period of 12 years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of 12 years results into extinguishing of the latter's title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrongdoer. The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the Wrong doer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of 12 years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. Inaction for a period of 12 years is treated by the Doctrine of Adverse Possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. 23. The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognized by doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one's own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of 'dealing' with one's property which results in extinguishing one's title in property and vesting the same in the wrong doer in possession of property and thus amounts to 'transfer of immovable property' in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section. 38. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that the possession claimed by the Respondents is not continuous and is sporadic. The hostile, open and continuous possession has to be established by the person claiming adverse possession. In the present case, even assuming that the Plaintiffs or their predecessors were in possession, the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they had any animus to possess the land adversely. The adverse possession, in order to fructify into a title must also be against true owner. The animus to possess would include the acts of the Plaintiffs' vendors when they knew that the Deity is the owner of the land and in defiance of the said title they had occupied the land and exercised the rights of ownership openly, continuously and to the knowledge of the true owner for over statutory period. The animus to possess would include the acts of the Plaintiffs' vendors when they knew that the Deity is the owner of the land and in defiance of the said title they had occupied the land and exercised the rights of ownership openly, continuously and to the knowledge of the true owner for over statutory period. The ingredients and factual foundation for claiming title by adverse possession must be pleaded in the plaint apart from establishing the same by evidence. Except an insertion of a sentence in para 2 of the plaint by way of an amendment vide orders in I.A.No.995 of 1999 dated 07.01.2000, there is hardly any pleading to support the plea of adverse possession. Mere insertion of a statement in the plaint that their vendors are in adverse possession is hardly sufficient to sustain such plea. 39. The revenue records including pahanis do not support the continuous possession for over 30 years and as such, the finding of the trial Court that the Plaintiffs have perfected title by adverse possession is clearly unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 40. I may also consider two other subsidiary points raised by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs that there is presumption in their favour in view of registered documents - Exs. A1 and A2 and for that reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain's case (20 supra). The said contention is clearly unsustainable and liable to be rejected as mere holding of registered documents would not entitle the Plaintiff to relief of declaration of title under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The mere holding of registered documents would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the Appellants are the registered owners of the land, however, that by itself is not sufficient to decree a suit for declaration of title. 41. Learned Counsel Respondents/Plaintiffs also raised a contention based upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Chanumolu Nirmala's case (22 supra) to contend that there is a presumption of title under Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act 1971, in view of the fact that Plaintiffs have been issued pattedar passbooks and title deeds. The said pass books and title deeds are issued by the revenue authorities based upon the documents produced by the Plaintiffs. The said pass books and title deeds are issued by the revenue authorities based upon the documents produced by the Plaintiffs. Even if a presumption arises in favour of the Plaintiffs based on the documents, the said presumption is always rebuttable and in a suit for declaration of title, the title of the Plaintiffs as well as that of their vendors vis-a-vis the rival title claim by the Defendants has to be examined by the civil Court. The said contention also, therefore, is without any substance. 42. The last of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs is based upon Exs. C1 and C2 the minutes of the renovation committee. Firstly, the said renovation committee neither has statutory basis nor its reports or minutes amount to any statutory adjudication. Similarly, it's recording of the minutes that the temple has no other land other than the land on which the temple exists, cannot extinguish the title of the Deity over the suit land which preexists. Therefore, merely because the renovation committee has recorded in the minutes that there are no other lands attached to the temple does not mean that suit lands do not belong to the temple when there is evidence to the contrary, as discussed and found in the paragraphs above. 43. In view of the answer to the points for consideration in favour of the Appellants, as above, the appeals succeed and are, therefore, allowed and the suit O.S. No. 55 of 1997 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, shall stand dismissed. WP. No. 12590 of 2001: 44. Since the writ petition is primarily interlinked with and based on the findings in the appeals, as above, the impugned order of the Joint Collector directing the correction of entries by showing the name of Mallikarjuna Swamy as pattadar of the suit lands has to be sustained in view of the decision in the appeals, referred to above. The writ petition, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the result, the appeals and the civil miscellaneous petition are allowed and the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed