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2010 DIGILAW 359 (GUJ)

JIVRAMBHAI VASTABHAI DESAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2010-08-10

K.M.THAKER, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA

body2010
JUDGMENT 1. The captioned appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 27.4.2009 whereby the learned Single Judge has rejected the petition which was filed by the appellant-petitioner against the orders dated 29.11.2003, 9.1.2006 and 21.8.2008 passed by the Mamlatdar & Agriculture Land Tribunal (“Mamlatdar & ALT” for short), the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Mehsana and the Revenue Tribunal, respectively. 2. Mr. A.J. Patel learned advocate with Mr. Sheetal Patel learned advocate has appeared for the appellants and Mr. J.K. Shah, learned Asst. Government Pleader has appeared for the respondent-authorities. We have heard the learned Counsel and perused the record of the petition and present appeal. 3. The relevant facts can be summarized thus:- 3.1. One Mr. Rupaji N. Thakore, the original owner of the parcel of land bearing Survey No. 99/1 admeasuring 0 Hector, 60 Are and 70 Sq. Mtrs. situate in mouje Nagalpur, Mehsana had submitted an application on or around 26.3.1990 to the Collector requesting for permission to convert the aforesaid land from “new tenure land” to “old tenure land” for non-agricultural purpose. The permission for conversion was sought - for with a view to constructing residential houses. 3.2. By his order dated 22.8.1990 the Collector granted the permission as contemplated under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the “Tenancy Act”) and permitted the conversion of the land into old tenure, subject to diverse conditions prescribed in the order including the condition that a sum of Rs. 2,42,340/- shall have to be paid towards premium. It is the case of the appellant-petitioner that the prescribed amount was paid and the land in question was converted into ‘old tenure land”. Consequently, the land in question became freehold land which could be sold, in accordance with law, in the market. 3.3. It is pertinent that over and above the condition for payment of the premium, the aforesaid order dated 22.8.1990 prescribed various other conditions viz. to obtain permission under Land Revenue Code and to apply within six months for permission for N.A. use and to put the land in question to nonagricultural use (“N.A. use” for short) within 3 years. The order also expressly stipulated and clarified that if the conditions were not complied with the permission shall be deemed to have been cancelled. 3.4. to obtain permission under Land Revenue Code and to apply within six months for permission for N.A. use and to put the land in question to nonagricultural use (“N.A. use” for short) within 3 years. The order also expressly stipulated and clarified that if the conditions were not complied with the permission shall be deemed to have been cancelled. 3.4. It emerges from the record that despite the time limit (6 months) specified in the order the application seeking N.A. permission (as prescribed by the aforesaid order) was not made for long time. Instead, the land in question was sold - off on 31.12.1999 (prior to which an agreement to sale appears to have been entered into in 1991 between the original landholder and the petitioners) by the landholder to the petitioners. 3.5. A notice under Section 84(c) of the Tenancy Act was issued by the Mamlatdar and ALT asking the applicant-landholder to show cause as to why the said conveyance should not be declared as in breach of the provisions of Tenancy Act and in breach of the conditions mentioned in the order dated 22.8.1990 and that why the land in question should not be mutated in favour of the State Government. 3.6. In pursuance of the said notice, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed the order dated 29.11.2003. The operative part of said order dated 29.11.2003 reads thus:- “Vide order dated 22.8.1990 of the Collector, Mehsana, with regard to land bearing Survey No. 99/1 of Mouje Nagalpur, admeasuring 0-60-70 Hectare-Are-Sq. Mtr. having revenue of Rs. 3.12, permission for old tenure was granted for non-agricultural use. As per conditions No. 2, and 3 of the said order, application has not been made for non-agricultural use within specified time. Further, non-agricultural usage has not been made within three years from the date of order and land has been sold to other persons. Therefore, for breach of conditions No. 2 and 3 of the order, this land is ordered to be mutated as “Government waste”. The Talati shall make entry in the record as per the order and comply with the same, and shall intimate all the parties.” (emphasis supplied) 3.7. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 120 of 2005 before the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Mehsana which was rejected by the order dated 9.1.2006. 3.8. The Talati shall make entry in the record as per the order and comply with the same, and shall intimate all the parties.” (emphasis supplied) 3.7. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 120 of 2005 before the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Mehsana which was rejected by the order dated 9.1.2006. 3.8. Thereafter the petitioners preferred revision application before Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (“Revenue Tribunal” for short). The Revenue Tribunal by the order dated 21.8.2008 dismissed the revision application and confirmed the orders dated 29.11.2003 and 9.1.2006. 3.9. Aggrieved by the said orders dated 29.11.2003, 9.1.2006 and 21.8.2008 the petitioners preferred the aforesaid petition which has been rejected by the impugned order. Hence present appeal. 4. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that it was due to family disputes between the brothers and the cousins inter se that the application could not be made within prescribed time and the N.A. permission could not be obtained and/or the land in question could not be put to N.A. use (i.e. the construction work could not be commenced and completed within prescribed time) and that therefore the non-compliance of the conditions should not have been treated as a breach of the conditions but should have been viewed only as a technical breach. He also submitted that the conditions under the Rule 25(c) of the Tenancy Act are only directory and not mandatory and that therefore noncompliance thereof should not have been visited with harsh and ultimate consequence of cancellation of the permission and mutation of the entry in the name of Government in respect of the land in question. He submitted that during the interregnum the land continued to be agricultural land inasmuch as it was continued to be cultivated. He also emphasized that the amount towards premium was already paid thus, on account of violation there was neither any loss or prejudice to the government nor to the public at large and the violation ought to have been condoned by imposing fine of appropriate amount. Mr. Patel has also submitted that when there is no dishonesty on the part of the person who is in fault, he should not be penalized only because the law provides for penalty. So as to substantiate his submission Mr. Mr. Patel has also submitted that when there is no dishonesty on the part of the person who is in fault, he should not be penalized only because the law provides for penalty. So as to substantiate his submission Mr. Patel relied upon the judgment by learned Single Judge in the case between Dahyabhai Laldas (Deceased) through his heirs and legal representatives Bhikhubhai Dahyabhai Patel and ors vs. State of Gujarat and another ( 1997 (2) GLH 633 ). 5. The appeal and the submissions of the appellants are vehemently resisted by the learned AGP Mr. Shah. He, at the outset, opposed the submissions of the appellant's counsel that there is no loss and there would not be monetary loss to the State or the public at large. He submitted that if the petitioners were to seek the N.A. use permission as of now then they would be required to pay the premium amount at the contemporary rate which would be much higher than the rate which was applied to the application made by the original landholder in March 1990. This would result into substantial loss to the public exchequer and that therefore the submission of the appellant, he submitted, is not justified. Mr. Shah, the learned AGP also opposed the submission that the provisions under Rule 25 (c) are merely directory and not mandatory. He referred to the text of the provisions under Rule 25(c) and submitted that the said Rules are mandatory. He also supplemented the said submission by contending that even if it is assumed that the said provisions are directory then also in view of the fact that despite the provision under the said Rule the appellants did not seek extension of time it would now not be open to the petitioners to claim that by taking a lenient view about the violation, the petitioners should be let-off with imposition of some fine. He submitted that there are three concurrent orders recording finding of fact wherein all authorities have taken same view against the appellant-petitioners and the said decisions have found favour with the learned Single Judge also inasmuch as the said orders have been confirmed by rejecting the petition and that in view of concurrent decisions at 3 stages and then by the learned Single Judge, the appeal does not deserve to be entertained. 6. 6. There is no dispute between the parties so far as the factum about the violation of the conditions in the order dated 22.8.1990 and/or the breach of the conditions under Rule 25(c) are concerned. The non-compliance and violation of the conditions, is an admitted position. 6.1. In this backdrop and in view of the submissions the first question which arises in present Letters Patent Appeal, is whether the Court should interfere with the concurrent or similar conclusions and decision arrived at and recorded by the 3 authorities, which the learned Single Judge has also confirmed. For the reasons discussed below, we believe we should not. 6.1(a) It is not in dispute that the competent authority had, besides other conditions, prescribed three main conditions viz. (1) Before using the said land for non-agricultural purpose, permission of the competent authority under the Land Revenue code shall have to be obtained. (2) Application shall have to be made before the competent authority under the Land Revenue Code, 1879, for obtaining permission for non-agricultural use of the said land for the respective purpose, within a period of six months from the date of this order. (3) The land shall be put to non-agricultural use within a period of three years from the date of receipt of this order. None of the three conditions were complied with until the authorities commenced the proceedings under Section 84(c) of the Tenancy Act or thereafter. Differently put, all the three conditions have been violated. 6.1(b) It is an admitted position of fact that neither the original landholder Mr. Rupaji Thakore nor the appellants-petitioners (the purchasers of the land in question) have complied with the prescribed conditions. 6.1(c) It is also not in dispute that the original landholder, without complying the conditions, sold the land in question on 31.12.1999 to the appellants-petitioners. Thus the conveyance is also, indisputably, in breach of conditions. 6.1(d) The conduct of the original applicant-land-hoder and present appellant (purchaser) exhibit sheer negligence, and if not defiance atleast disregard to the conditions and provisions of law. Thus the conveyance is also, indisputably, in breach of conditions. 6.1(d) The conduct of the original applicant-land-hoder and present appellant (purchaser) exhibit sheer negligence, and if not defiance atleast disregard to the conditions and provisions of law. 6.1(e) Though the heirs/ legal representatives (L.R.s for short) of the original landholder were party-opponent before the Deputy Collector as well as the learned Tribunal, they have not been impleaded as party to the proceedings of the petition and present appeal and they have chosen to not to come forward contending that the conveyance was not in breach of the conditions or the provision of law. Hence, the said position is also an undisputed fact. 6.1(f) It is not only undisputed fact but also established and admitted position of fact that the conditions attached to the permission were not and have not been complied with and have been observed only in breach and violation. 6.1(g) The authorities have passed the orders after considering factum of breach and non-compliance of the conditions. Having regard to the relevant facts and after taking into accounts all submission and material on record the order-in-original came to be passed by the first authority and has then been confirmed, after due consideration and appreciation, by the appellate and Revisional Authority. The learned Single Judge did not find any infirmity in the orders. We too, do not see any error. 7. In the backdrop of such facts, we are inclined to accept the submission of the learned AGP that the appeal is not maintainable and does not deserve to be entertained since three authorities, including the Tribunal, have arrived at similar and concurrent findings and have passed the orders which the learned Single Judge also has confirmed. The Tribunal's order does not suffer from any infirmity of facts or law. Even the learned Counsel has not been able to point-out any error or infirmities, of fact or law, in any of the orders. Actually, that, precisely, appears to be the reason that the appellant's Counsel has conveniently chosen to urge that the non-compliance may be treated as technical breach and the appellant may be let-off by imposing fine and that the conditions under Rule 25(c) are only directory and not mandatory. Actually, that, precisely, appears to be the reason that the appellant's Counsel has conveniently chosen to urge that the non-compliance may be treated as technical breach and the appellant may be let-off by imposing fine and that the conditions under Rule 25(c) are only directory and not mandatory. Actually, in view of the concurrent orders present appeal deserves to be dismissed on the said singular ground, more so when any question of law is not involved or has not been raised. 8. We have, however, considered the submissions of the appellants-petitioners and for that purpose we have also considered the material obtaining on the record. Having carefully examined the record and the submissions, we are of the considered view, that the impugned orders do not warrant any interference and the submissions and the challenge do not carry any merits. 9. So as to examine the submissions of the appellants it is necessary to recall that the original landholder had made the application in March 1990 for conversion of the land in question from “new tenure” to “old tenure”, on the ground that he intended to use the land for construction of residential houses. 9.1. The competent authority had granted the permission by the order dated 22.8.1990 subject to the conditions prescribed therein which would bring in picture the provisions under Section 43 and Rule 25(c) of the Tenancy Act. 9.2 From the reading of the said order dated 22.8.1990 it becomes clear that the authority had granted “conditional sanction”. Differently put, the order dated 22.8.1990 was a “conditional order”. A “conditional order” becomes alive or it operates if the prescribed condition is complied and if it is not complied then the “conditional order” does not operate or ceases to operate. Consequently the sanction granted by such “conditional-order” would operate if the conditions are complied with, however in the event of non-compliance it would cease to be alive and would not operate after the expiry of the specified time for compliance. Such cessation would give birth to the “deemed consequence” (specified in the order) of the non-compliance viz. the sanction shall stand cancelled / shall be deemed to be cancelled and the transfer shall be deemed to have been made without previous sanction of the Collector. 9.3. Such cessation would give birth to the “deemed consequence” (specified in the order) of the non-compliance viz. the sanction shall stand cancelled / shall be deemed to be cancelled and the transfer shall be deemed to have been made without previous sanction of the Collector. 9.3. By virtue of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, certain restrictions on transfer of land, purchased or sold under the Tenancy Act, have been imposed. The said provision requires previous sanction of the Collector in certain cases/types of transfers. The relevant part of said Section 43 reads thus:- “43. Restriction on transfer of land purchased or sold under this Act. No land or any interest therein purchased by a tenant under Section 17B, 32, 32F, 32-I, [32-O], [32-U, 43-ID or 88E] or sold to any person under Section 32P or 64 shall be transferred or shall be agreed by an instrument in writing to be transferred, by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment, without the previous sanction of the Collector and except in consideration of payment of such amount as the State Government may be general or special order determine; and no such land or any interest, therein shall be partitioned without the previous sanction of the Collector. Provided that..... Provided further that the partition of the land as aforesaid shall not be valid if it is made in contravention to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force; [The sanction under sub-section (1) shall be given by the Collector in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as maybe prescribed by the State Government] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), it shall be lawful for such tenant or a person to mortgage or create a charge on his interests in the land in favour of the State Government.....” 9.4. While the said provision imposes the requirement of previous sanction of the Collector in certain cases, the Rule 25(c) prescribes the circumstances in which and the conditions subject to which the previous sanction of the Collector under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, may be granted. While the said provision imposes the requirement of previous sanction of the Collector in certain cases, the Rule 25(c) prescribes the circumstances in which and the conditions subject to which the previous sanction of the Collector under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, may be granted. The Rule inter alia provides that if the conditions are not complied with then upon expiry of the time limit (or extended time limit - if applied for and granted - as the case may be) the sanction will stand cancelled and if any transaction is entered into - without complying the conditions or in violation of the conditions - then the transaction shall be deemed to be without previous permission of Collector, hence in breach of Section 43. Thus, what the Rule contemplates and provide for is “conditional sanction” which would cease to operate on non-compliance of conditions within time, subject to extension that may be granted by Collector. 9.5. The sub-rule 1 of said Rule 25(c) prescribes the eventuality and the circumstances in view of which the Collector may grant sanction contemplated under Section 43. The sub-rule 2 of Rule 25(c) postulates that in cases of transfer under clauses (a), (b), (c) and (g) the land should be put to use only for the purpose for which the sanction is granted. 9.6. An important feature of said sub-Rule (2) is that the said sub-rule empowers the Collector to grant, for complying the conditions of sanction, extension for a period up to two years in aggregate for genuine reasons to be recorded in writing. The said sub-rule then provides the consequence if the person fails to comply with the conditions. 9.7. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 25(c) pertains to sanction under clause (e) and specifies the period within which the application for N. A. permission has to be made and also provides the period during which the land has to be put to actual N. A. use. The said sub-rule also provides the consequence in the event of failure viz. that if the person fails to comply with the condition within specified period then the sanction granted under Section 43 shall be deemed to have been cancelled and the transfer shall be deemed to have been made without previous sanction of the Collector. The said sub-rule also provides the consequence in the event of failure viz. that if the person fails to comply with the condition within specified period then the sanction granted under Section 43 shall be deemed to have been cancelled and the transfer shall be deemed to have been made without previous sanction of the Collector. The relevant part of the said Rule 25(c) reads thus:- “25 (c) Circumstances in which and conditions subject to which sanction shall be given by the Collector under Section 43 for transfer:- (1)..... (2) The sanction of the Collector under clauses (a), (b), (c) & (g) of sub-rule (1) shall be subject to a further condition that the person or institution in whose favour the transfer is made shall use the land for the same purpose for which the transfer has been sanctioned within a period of three months from the date of transfer of land which may be extended upto two years in aggregate by the Collector with the condition within the period so specified, the sanction given under sub-section (1) of sec. 43 shall be deemed to have been cancelled and transfer shall be deemed to have been made without the previous sanction of the Collector. (3) The sanction of the Collector under clause (e) of sub-rule (1) shall be subject to a further condition that the person in whose favour the transfer is made shall apply for N.A. permission before a competent authority under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 for non-agricultural use of the land within six months from the date of transfer of land and this period may be extended upto two years in aggregate by the Collector for genuine reasons to be recorded in writing and that such person shall use the land for the purpose for which the sanction has been granted within three years from the date of grant of non-agricultural permission under the provisions of the said Code, or within such further period not exceeding five years in the aggregate as the Collector for reasons to be recorded in writing may from time to time fix or within such further period exceeding five years as aforesaid as the Collector may fix with the prior approval of the State Government. If the person fails to comply with the condition within the period so specified, the sanction given under sub-section (1) of Section 43 shall be deemed to have been cancelled and the transfer shall be deemed to have been made without the previous sanction of the Collector. Provided that commencement of bona fide steps to use..... Provided further that if the Collector is satisfied that the person in whose favaour the transfer is made is unable to make use..... Explanation:- Where a question arises whether the steps taken.....” (emphasis supplied) 10. A glance at the aforesaid provisions bring out that the conditions prescribed by the authority in the order dated 22.8.1990 are akin to or analogus to the conditions/obligations mentioned under the Rule 25(c). 10.1. As noted above the order dated 22.8.1990 was passed under Section 43 and Rule 25(c). The said order was “conditional order” and the sanction/permission granted by the said order was “conditional”. Thus, when the conditions under the Rule 25(c) and the order are not complied with, then the sanction has to be “deemed to have been cancelled” and it would not operate and the transfer made shall be considered as “transfer without permission”. 10.2. In light of the aforesaid provisions it is appropriate to recall that in the order dated 22.8.1990 also the authority had expressly specified that:- “in case the conditions specified are not complied with within time, then permission shall be deemed to have been cancelled under sub Section 1 of section 43 of the Tenancy Act”. 10.3. It is pertinent that the said express stipulation in the order dated 22.8.1990 was duly accepted -- without any reservation -- by the applicant landholder. 10.4. Hence, in view of the said stipulation, the permission granted thereunder would, upon noncompliance of the conditions within specified time, automatically stand cancelled or shall be deemed to have been cancelled. 11. In the backdrop of such facts, the submission or the point now required to be considered is that even if the conditions under Rule 25(c) are to be taken as directory and not mandatory -- as urged by the appellant -- then also whether there is any good and satisfactory ground and justification to hold that in present case the sanction should not be “deemed to have been cancelled” and the conveyance should “not be deemed to have been made without previous sanction of the Collector.” 11.1. The three authorities below (the Original, Appellate and Revisional authorities) and the learned Single Judge are of the view that in the facts of presents case there is no good reason or justification. We also agree. 11.2. After careful examination of the record we also are unable to find any reason to not consider the sanction as cancelled (i.e. “deemed to have been cancelled”) upon (and despite) breach of the conditions. 11.3. In the facts of the case, upon expiry of the specified time the “deemed consequence” (expressly specified the order dated 22.8.1990) came into operation on account of the noncompliance of the conditions and there is no good reason or justification to arrest the operation. 11.4. On the contrary, the facts warrant that it should be permitted to operate and play its role and have its effect. 12. In present case it is not in dispute that the appellants as well as the original applicant-landholder have (a) hitherto, not complied the relevant and prescribed conditions, they also (b) did not commence any action to seek N.A. Permission; and (c) before the expiry of specified time they did not even care to seek extension of time and (d) did not satisfy the Collector at the relevant time about genuineness of the reasons due to which they were not in position to take any action. 12.1. The original landholder and the appellants simply did not bother about any condition and provision and all the requirements were thrown to winds. The conduct exhibits sheer disregard and negligence. Only the order dated 29.11.2003 could shake the appellants and wake them from their “we-care-not” attitude. 12.2. Hence, the prescribed consequences i.e. the “deemed consequence” (expressly mentioned in the order granting sanction) would, upon expiry of the specified time, occur and the conditional sanction granted by virtue of the order dated 22.8.1990 shall be, deemed to have been cancelled and the sale/transfer made on 31.12.2009 in favour of the appellants shall be, on account of noncompliance of the conditions, deemed to be without the previous sanction of the Collector. 13. Assuming that the appellant is right in contending that the provision under Rule 25(c) are directory and not mandatory then also it would not follow as corollary that upon noncompliance of the prescribed conditions in specified time limit the “deemed consequence” will not come into operation. 13.1. 13. Assuming that the appellant is right in contending that the provision under Rule 25(c) are directory and not mandatory then also it would not follow as corollary that upon noncompliance of the prescribed conditions in specified time limit the “deemed consequence” will not come into operation. 13.1. The provision under Rule 25 (c) empowers the Collector to merely extend the time limit - subject to the outer/maximum limit of extension specified therein -- for complying the conditions. Thus, the Collector can extend the time limit to enable the compliance, but only to the extent of maximum time limit prescribed under the said Rule. Consequently, if upon being satisfied with the reasons/explanation the Collector extends the originally specified time limit then the requirements/conditions can be complied with within such extended time limit and if the conditions are complied with within such extended time limit then only the “deemed consequence” which may have set -- in upon non-compliance, would get erased. The Rule does not confer any more or wider power on the Collector and since the Collector derives the authority to grant extension in time limit by virtue of the provision, he cannot exercise any authority not conferred on him, or beyond what is conferred. 13.2. In present case until the expiry of even the maximum permissible extension i.e. the outer time limit available for extension (August 1990 being the date of order) any steps were not taken. Thus, even if the appellant's submissions were to be accepted and the conditions were to be treated as directory, as suggested by the appellant, then also it would not assist the case of the appellant and would not take appellants' case any further. 13.3. Actually there is nothing on record, not even proper averment on oath in the petition or the LAP to establish that any application seeking extension was made. Even a copy of any application is not on record. The appellants' Counsel also did not even refer to any application and did not even raise such contention. Thus there is nothing on record to even take such possibility into consideration. Even a copy of any application is not on record. The appellants' Counsel also did not even refer to any application and did not even raise such contention. Thus there is nothing on record to even take such possibility into consideration. However, even if we assume, (though there is no material on record to support such assumption) on the basis of the averments made in the application dated 6.9.2005 wherein it has been averred “.....after purchasing the land in 1999, an application was made for extension of time for making non - agricultural use....” that some application praying for extension of time, was made then also even as per appellants' own submission it was made after the sale i.e. after 1999, hence it was hopelessly delayed inasmuch as it was made almost 9 years after the order i.e. after expiry of the maximum/outer time limit available for extension. Such grossly delayed application could never resurrect the already expired time limit and/or could not erase the deemed consequence which had already come into operation. Even otherwise the Collector also could not have granted any extension beyond his authority i.e. after the expiry of maximum period for which he can grant extension. Besides this, there was no compelling justification also. 13.4. On behalf of the appellants reference to the judgment by the learned Single Judge [ 1997(2) GLH 633 ] has been made. In the facts of present case the said judgment also does not help the case of the appellants. The facts of present case are materially and substantially different. In the cited case the grantee was injucted against making any construction until the final order was passed. Despite such order, the petitioner in the cited case had taken substantial steps in the direction of compliance of conditions and the building plans were got approved. The learned Single Judge, therefore, observed that “.....the petitioner was keen to develop the disputed land after obtaining the N.A. Permission and was justified in not proceeding with the construction work in view of the injunction order.....” Obviously the factum of the injunction order in the cited case was a factor beyond the control of the petitioner in the said case. Furthermore, the petitioner in the cited case had actually obtained N.A. permission and the question was only with regard to the second part of the condition namely putting the land to use for N.A. purpose which could not be completed due to injunction order. It was in background of such facts that the learned Single Judge in the cited case observed “besides, fixation of the time limit for the purpose of completion of construction work pursuant to the order at annexure-A to this petition was a directory and not a mandatory condition......” In that view of the matter, omission on the part of the deceased in making application for extension of time limit for the construction of work can be said to be a mere technical breach ....” Thus what emerges is that the said observations were made in light of the facts of the case. Even otherwise, as noted above, the facts of present case are materially different from the facts in the cited case. Hence the said judgment would not assist the appellants. 13.5. In view of the facts of present case, discussed at length hereinabove, as a result of the breach or non-compliance of the conditions prescribed by the order dated 22.8.1990, the permission shall be deemed to have been (i.e. would stand) cancelled and the sale transaction effected by and between the original landholder and the petitioners-appellants shall be deemed to be without sanction of the Collector. 14. The inaction on the part of the grantee (original landholder) can be, in the facts of the case, more particularly in absence of any convincing and cogent evidence regarding reason for not complying the conditions, construed as, and it may translate into the act of (the grantee) forgoing or relinquishing the permission granted by virtue of the order dated 22.8.1990. 14.1. The appellants-petitioners being conscious of the position which emerged on account of operation of law have calculatively raised only one submission comprising two subordinate submissions viz. that the conditions under Rule 25(c) are directory and not mandatory hence (i) should not be applied with all rigour as if they are mandatory; and (ii) that the violation should be treated as mere technical breach of the conditions which are merely directory and the petitioner should be let-off with a direction to pay fine as may be considered appropriate by the Court. We are afraid, such a submission or request cannot be countenanced in the facts of the case. 14.2. While all the authorities have taken similar/concurrent decision and the said decisions have also found favour and approval of the learned Single Judge we do not think that, in the facts of present case, there are any circumstances which would justify any other view. 15. The learned Counsel for the appellant has cited reason of internal dispute between the brothers and the cousins and the neighbours which allegedly caused the delay. But these are mere bald submissions and no evidence to substantiate such statements is provided and placed on record. Likewise no evidence to establish that any action in the direction of compliance of the conditions were taken, is placed on record. Hence, we are not impressed with the said ground and are not inclined to believe the same and/or accept it as satisfactory reason for not complying with the conditions, for a long time. 16. The fact remains that any of the conditions were not and have not been complied with and without complying with the conditions, the landholder even sold off the land in question to the petitioners-appellants though the permission/sanction granted by the order dated 22.8.1990 stood cancelled by operation of law. 16.1. These defaults, when considered in light of the provision under Rule 25(c) which makes provision for extension of time (and that also was not availed by the landholder or the appellants before the expiry of specified time limit and/or before the expiry of maximum time available to the Collector for extension) do not permit us to take any different view in the matter than the view taken by the authorities and confirmed by the learned Single Judge. 16.2. It is pertinent to note that in view of the facts of present case the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that from the action or rather inaction on the part of the landholder and the purchaser it was apparent that the lands were sought to be converted into old tenure only for the purpose of profiteering and when after nine years when the prices increased, the land in question came to be sold-off. 16.3. It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the appellants-petitioners have failed to make out any case against the impugned order by the learned Single Judge. 16.3. It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the appellants-petitioners have failed to make out any case against the impugned order by the learned Single Judge. Besides the fact that there are concurrent decisions against the appellants, which have been approved and confirmed by the learned Single Judge, it is pertinent that the appellants also could not point-out any error or infirmity in the findings of facts. Even otherwise the appellants-petitioners have not been able to persuade us to take any different view and to disturb the impugned order(s). They have also failed to point out any material from the record which could persuade us to come to the conclusion that the decisions by the authorities below, as confirmed by the leaned Single Judge, are not justified. The fact that the appellants-petitioners urged that the appellant-petitioners should be let-off by imposing fine, (see ground V/page J of the appeal memo), is more than enough to establish that the appellants-petitioners do not have any bonafide explanation regarding the noncompliance of the conditions. For this reason also, we are not inclined to accept the appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed. The appeal, is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. 17. In view of the order passed in main appeal, the civil application stands dispose of.