Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition is filed against the order dated 7.4.2010 passed by the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No.II, Salem, in R.E.P.No.59 of 2005 in O.S.No.83 of 2004. 2. The facts in nutshell would run thus: (i) The first respondent herein obtained a money decree and it filed the REP No.59 of 2009, so as to get arrested the revision petitioner/judgment debtor for the purpose of recovering the decretal amount. The matter was contested. (ii) On the side of the first respondent/decree holder one Vasudevan was examined as P.W.1 and no document was marked. On the side of the revision petitioner/judgment debtor, the revision petitioner herein examined himself as R.W.1 and Exs.B1 and B2 were marked. (iii) Ultimately, the Executing Court rejected the plea of the revision petitioner/judgment debtor that he was a man of no means as on that date. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, this revision has been filed on various grounds. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/J.D. placing reliance on the grounds of revision would develop his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: The revision petitioner/judgment debtor is having 1/7th share in a joint family house and one self-acquired property and both the properties are under the mortgage in favour of the Industries Department. Over and above that, he also borrowed money from Syndicate Bank and in connection with that the said Bank obtained attachment also in respect of those two immovable properties. So far as the decree pertaining to the present REP is concerned, it is only a personal decree. However, in view of the encumbrances created already in respect of both the properties of the revision petitioner herein, he is not in a position to raise money so as to discharge the decretal debt. (ii) The lower Court without considering all these aspects, after narrating the case on both sides, simply and cryptically held as though the revision petitioner/judgment debtor is a man of means and he should be arrested. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for setting aside the order of the lower Court. 5. While arguing, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/judgment debtor has also submitted that the revision petitioner is for settling once and for all the matter and on his representation, the bank also has come forward for negotiations and sent communication to the revision petitioner. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for setting aside the order of the lower Court. 5. While arguing, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/judgment debtor has also submitted that the revision petitioner is for settling once and for all the matter and on his representation, the bank also has come forward for negotiations and sent communication to the revision petitioner. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for R1 herein would put forth and set forth his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: (i) No doubt, the revision petitioner/judgment debtor is heavily indebted. There are a many as 11 decrees as against the judgment debtor and in such a case, it is for him to raise money in the way known to law with the help of his two properties and he cannot simply try to wriggle out of his liability by pointing out that there are mortgages and attachments and that he could not raise money. (ii) The lower Court was right in rejecting such plea of no means and accordingly, ordered arrest, warranting no interference in the revision by this Court. 7. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Executing Court. 8. A mere perusal of the order of the lower Court would leave much to be decided. In my considered opinion it is far from satisfactory also. In the counter filed by the revision petitioner/judgment debtor as well as in his chief examination affidavit he has detailed and delineated as to how he is heavily indebted. But, the Executing Court has not taken into account all those facts, but cryptically held that the revision petitioner/judgment debtor is a man of means. 9. At this juncture, I recollect and call up the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court: (1980) 2 SUPREME COURT CASES 360 – JOLLY GEORGE VARGHESE AND ANOTHER V. THE BANK OF COCHIN, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "10. Equally meaningful is the import of Article 21 of the Constitution in the context of imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The high value of human dignity and the worth of the human person enshrined in Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 19, obligates the State not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its procedural essence. The high value of human dignity and the worth of the human person enshrined in Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 19, obligates the State not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its procedural essence. Maneka Gandhi case as developed further in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, Sita Ram v. State of U.P. and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration lays down the proposition. It is too obvious to need elaboration that to cast a person in prison because of his poverty and consequent inability to meet his contractual liability is appalling. To be poor, in this land of daridra narayana, is no crime and to recover debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is too flagrantly violative of Article 21 unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of his wilful failure to pay in spite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness. Unreasonableness and unfairness in such a procedure is inferrable from Article 11 of the Covenant. But this is precisely the interpretation we have put on the proviso to Section 51 CPC and the lethal blow of Article 21 cannot strike down the provision, as now interpreted. 11. The words which hurt are “or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree”. This implies, superficially read, that if at any time after the passing of an old decree the judgment-debtor had come by some resources and had not discharged the decree, he could be detained in prison even though at that later point of time he was found to be penniless. This is not a sound position apart from being inhuman going by the standards of Article 11 (of the Covenant) and Article 21 (of the Constitution). The simple default to discharge is not enough. There must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasises the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree. The provision emphasises the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree. Here considerations of the debtor’s other pressing needs and straitened circumstances will play prominently. We would have, by this construction, sauced law with justice, harmonised Section 51 with the Covenant and the Constitution." 10. A mere perusal of the above excerpts including the whole judgment would amply make the point clear that after passing of the decree if there is anything to show that the judgment debtor had means to discharge the debt and despite that he did not discharge the debt, then the question of arresting him would arise. But in this case, lot of facts were placed before the Executing Court on the side of the Judgment debtor detailing and delineating the facts so as to demonstrate and display his inability to discharge the debt because of the mortgages and the attachments effected in respect of his two properties. But the lower Court, did not take into account all those facts and simply held as though the judgment debtor is a man of means. Without adverting to the dictum as enunciated in the aforesaid judgment of the Honourable Apex Court and the ingredients of clause (ii) to clause (a) appended to proviso to Section 51 of C.P.C., which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference. "Sec.51: Powers of Court to enforce execution - Provided that, where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied- (a) that the judgment debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree- (i) . . . . . . . . (ii) has, after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or" 11. . . . . . . . (ii) has, after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or" 11. There should be clear finding on the part of the Executing Court that after passing of the decree the judgment debtor had scope as well as means to discharge the decree debt and even then he did not do so, but there is no such finding in the impugned order. Wherefore the approach of the Executing Court warrants interference in revision. 12. The fact also remans that earlier this Court passed the conditional order to pay a sum of Rs. Fifty thousand, but even that conditional order, the first respondent did not comply with, for which, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would expound and explain that the revision petitioner/judgment debtor could not raise that much amount because of his impecunious and cash strapped situation even though he has been facing the threat of arrest. 13. In view of the above, the order dated 7.4.2010 passed by the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No.II, Salem, in R.E.P.No.59 of 2005 in O.S.No.83 of 2004 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the lower Court for disposing it within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order as per law, after giving due opportunity to both sides to adduce additional evidence, if any. Both the parties shall appear before the Executing Court on 31.8.2010. 14. The civil revision petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.