Parmatma Yadav @ Parmatma Nand Yadav v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
2010-01-07
GYAN SUDHA MISRA, R.R.PRASAD
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Order This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 15.5.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 156 of 2008, by which the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant herein was dismissed. Consequently the plea of the petitioner-appellant challenging the order of his superannuation from the Services of the respondent-company w.e.f. 29.2.2008 was upheld, which the petitioner appellant had challenged on the ground that his date of birth had illegally and wrongly not been• rectified by the respondent-Company in response to his application, which he had filed for correction of his date of birth. 2. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is meticulous in nature wherein it has been recorded that the petitioner-appellant had entered into the services of the respondent-Company as Face Worker on 6.3.1973. At the time of his appointment, the petitioner had duly affixed his signature on the form indicating that his age was 25 years and thereafter he was sent for medical examination for assessment of his age, after which his age was assessed as 25 years and the same was confirmed. The petitioner thereafter continued in the services of the respondent-Company but in the year 1998 the concerned department of the respondent-Company informed the appellant that as per entry in his service record, his date of birth was recorded as 27.2.1948 and in case he had any objection and he wanted the entry to be corrected, then he should produce the relevant document for correction, if any. This gave a cause to the petitioner-appellant to file a protest letter in the year 1998 stating that his actual date of birth indicated as per the mark-sheet, which was issued to him when he was declared unsuccessful in a matriculation examination, is 4.7.1952 and not 27.2.1948. The respondents however refused to rectify the date of birth of the petitioner-appellant and consequently an order of superannuation was passed on 31.8.2007, indicating that the petitioner was to superannuate from service w.e.f. 29.2.2008. 3. The petitioner-appellant filed a writ petition before the Single Bench bearing W.P.(S) No. 156 of 2008, assailing the order of his superannuation but the learned Single Judge, for the detailed reasons recorded in the impugned judgment and order, was pleased to dismiss the writ petition against which this appeal has been preferred. 4.
3. The petitioner-appellant filed a writ petition before the Single Bench bearing W.P.(S) No. 156 of 2008, assailing the order of his superannuation but the learned Single Judge, for the detailed reasons recorded in the impugned judgment and order, was pleased to dismiss the writ petition against which this appeal has been preferred. 4. The counsel for the appellant has practically reiterated the arguments, which were advanced before the learned Single Judge, and much emphasis has been laid on the fact that the date of birth entered in the matriculation certificate is the conclusive documentary proof, which should have formed the basis for rectifying the date of birth. However when he was confronted with the fact that the petitioner appellant has admittedly not cleared the matriculation examination and, therefore, he had no matriculation certificate to his credit, he relied upon a copy of the marksheet which was issued to him by the school authorities indicating his date of birth as 4.7.1952. Much reliance has been placed by the appellant and his counsel on this document and emphasis has also been laid on the contention that as the appellant had appeared in the matriculation examination and although he was declared unsuccessful, his date of birth ought to have been reckoned on the basis of the date of birth recorded in the mark sheet issued to him by the school authorities in his matriculation examination. 5. The learned Single Judge took note of the fact that although the petitioner-appellant had appeared in the matriculation examination prior to his entering into the service of the respondent-Company, the fact remains that he had not disclosed in his application form that he had appeared in the matriculation examination and the reason was obvious as the petitioner had not been declared successful.
However, the fact regarding his failure in the matriculation examination, although might not have any impact in respect of his date of birth, the more important and relevant fact is that he had himself affixed his signature on the application form, indicating his age as 25 years which was not contested by him for an unduly long number of years i.e. from 1973 to 1998, which means that the appellant after putting 25 years of service took advantage of the communication by which he had been informed that if he has any reason to correct his actual date of birth, he may produce the relevant document, which was not meant to be acted upon without a valid reason. 6. In all fairness, it was expected of the petitioner-appellant to inform the authority that no change is required in his date of birth but he grabbed it as an opportunity to start a dispute that his age was wrongly recorded as 25 years when he entered into the services of the Company in the year 1973, which was ascertained and recorded after he underwent the medical check up after which his age was confirmed to be 25 years at the time of entry into the services. 7. However, counsel for the appellant relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in support of his submission and submitted that that although he had affixed his signature in token of his age, the same should not be treated as a bar for correction of his date of birth but the counsel is missing that the Supreme Court has time and again held that the correction of the date of birth has to be done at the earliest and at the fag end of service, the correction would not be permissible as it would clearly be treated as a ruse to get over the order of ensuing superannuation and the same was bound to be treated as an afterthought. 8. Counsel for the appellant, however still pursued and submitted that this was not at the fag end of his service as he had raised his objection way back in the year 1998.
8. Counsel for the appellant, however still pursued and submitted that this was not at the fag end of his service as he had raised his objection way back in the year 1998. But the counsel in the process is missing that even in the year 1998 he had already completed 25 years of service and what made the petitioner-appellant to wait for 25 years for correction• of his date of birth is not explained at all by the petitioner-appellant, either before the learned Single Judge or before, this Court. Thus, even if we were to accept this submission that he had raised the dispute regarding his date of birth way back in the year 1998, the fact remains that he had already put in 25 years of service by that time. Besides this, it cannot be overlooked that the petitioner-appellant has not cleared his matriculation examination when he had entered into the services of the Company and it is nobody's case that the matriculation certificate should not be relied upon as a conclusive document for the date of birth and the dispute which we are confronted with, is whether the appellant was justified in seeking rectification of his date of birth after he had already put in 25 years of service contrary to the entry made in his service book. 9. Thus while concurring with the finding of the learned Single Judge, the additional reasons assigned hereinbefore for not interfering with the order of the superannuation, •is crystal clear. 10. The appeal thus has no substance and hence it is dismissed at the admission stage itself.