JUDGMENT Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. The appellant, herein calls in question the legality of order dt. 23-11-2009, passed by Additional District Judge in an execution case No. 8/08, whereby, an application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC filed by the appellant has been dismissed on the ground that the transfer of the suit property in favour of the appellant can not be said to have been during the pendency of the suit, as the execution proceedings has been considered, as if the suit is not pending. 2. Relevant facts unfurled from the pleadings are that, a suit for specific performance was brought by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 vide CS No. 268A/95. The suit was decreed on 31-8-1996 in the following terms: (Vernacular matter omitted....Ed.) 3. The decree-holder alleging the deliberate non-compliance of the stipulations as contained in the judgment and decree, brought an execution proceedings. However, during pendency of the execution proceedings, the judgment debtor respondent No. 2 sold the suit land in favour of the appellants herein vide sale deeds dt. 4-9-2002 and 9r9-2002. 4. Admittedly, the sale was effected without seeking the leave of the Court. 5. The appellant/purchaser thereafter, filed an application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC for their impleadment in the pending execution proceedings. The application was vehemently opposed by the decree-holder on the ground that the sale was a nullity and no right accrue in favour of the appellants to be impleaded in an execution proceedings. 6. The Trial Court by impugned order rejected the application on the ground that the assignment of interest in favour of appellants was not during pendency of a suit and therefore, they have no right to be impleaded. 7. The appellants who are aggrieved of the order have to submit that the executing Court was not justified in rejecting the application. 8. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the Court was not justified in holding that the assignment of interest was not during the pendency of suit. To bring home his submissions, learned Counsel places reliance on the provisions as contained under Section 28 of the Specific relief and the judgments in the Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1826 , V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan and Anr. AIR 1999 SC 918 , Gous Mohd. v. Mohd. Anwar and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1826 , V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan and Anr. AIR 1999 SC 918 , Gous Mohd. v. Mohd. Anwar and Ors. AIR 2005 MP 1 Sitaram Dua v. Saraswati Devi Sainy and Ors. 2001 (1) ILJ 184 : AIR 2000 MP 327 and Sagora Bibi v. Sk. Manik and Ors. AIR 1987 Cal 86 . On the strength of these judgments, it is urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that a transfer of land even during the pendency of the execution proceedings could have the trappings of assignment, creation and devolution of an interest during pendency of suit. 9. It is urged that Section 28 of the Act of 1963 stipulates that where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the Court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessee may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the Court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. 10. Thus, relying upon the provisions as contained under Sub-section (1) of Section 28 and on the strength thereon, it is contended that suit decreed in favour of respondent/decree holder for a specific performance with the conditions laid down therein, the suit is deemed to have continued. It is urged that any transaction by the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the execution proceedings has to be treated as assignment or creation of any interest during the pendency of a suit pending. 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is a basic fallacy in the submissions putforth by learned Counsel for the appellant. Provisions as contained under Section 28 of the Act of 1963, when scanned microscopically contemplates that a Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over decree even after the decree has been passed. But, the parties to the suit have no option to deviate from the terms of decree. Provisions as contained under Section 28 of the Act of 1963, when scanned microscopically contemplates that a Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over decree even after the decree has been passed. But, the parties to the suit have no option to deviate from the terms of decree. It is this limitation which takes away the proceedings of 'execution of decree' out of ambit of the expression "pendency of suit". In Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1826 , their Lordships has been pleased to observe: 20. We also agree with the finding of the Division Bench that since Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides only for an application for rescission of a decree for specific performance for the sale or lease of immovable property, no application to rescind a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell movables, would lie under that section. 21. The question then is whether the application was maintainable under any other provision of the law. The Specific Relief Act, 1963, is not an exhaustive enactment. It does not consolidate the whole law on the subject. As the preamble would indicate, it is an Act "to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief. It does not purport to lay down the law relating to specific relief in all its ramifications. In Ramdas Khatau and Co. v. Atlas Mills Co., Ltd. AIR 1931 Bom 151 it was held that the specific Specific Relief Act 1877, was not exhaustive. In Rahmath Unnissa Begum v. Shimoga Co-operative Bank Ltd. AIR 1951 Mys 59 the Court said that the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is founded on English equity jurisprudence and that it is permissible to refer to English Law on the subject wherever the Act did not deal specifically with any topic (See also Firm Kishore Chand Shiva Charan Lal v. Budaun Electric Supply Co. Ltd. AIR 1944 All 66 at p. 77). Although a matter on which the Act defines the law it might generally be exhaustive, the Act as a whole cannot be considered as exhaustive of the whole branch of the law of specific performance. 24. Ltd. AIR 1944 All 66 at p. 77). Although a matter on which the Act defines the law it might generally be exhaustive, the Act as a whole cannot be considered as exhaustive of the whole branch of the law of specific performance. 24. As the Court retained control over the matter despite the decree, it was open to the Court, when it was alleged that the party moved against has positively refused to complete the contract to entertain the application and order rescision of the decree if the allegation was proved. We, therefore, think that the application of the appellant was competent. 12. The term execution of decree or order is defined in the Law Lexicon : P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1997 Edn. as: Execution of decree or order : "Execution signifies in law the obtaining of actual possession of any thing acquired by judgment of law. (Co. Litt. 154a). (Termes De la Ley.) EXECUTION, signifies the last performance of an act as of a judgment & c. It is the obtaining possession of any thing recovered by judgment of law. (1 Inst. 289. Tomlin's Law Dic.) This execution, or putting the law in force, is performed in the different manners, according to the nature of the action upon which it is founded, and of the judgment which is had or recovered. (Tomlin's Law Dic. See Civil Procedure Code, 0.21). EXECUTION, in the usual legal sense of the word, is a judicial writ grounded on the judgment of the Court from whence it issues; and is supposed to be granted by the Court at the request of the party at whose suit it is issued, to give him satisfaction on the judgment which he hath obtained. (Tomlin's Law Dic.) An "Execution" proceeds from a judgment (Re Hastings, 61 LJQB 654; 67 LT 234), and does not include a distrant for rent or other cause (Ex. p. Birmingham & Staffordshire as Co., Re Fanshow, 40 LJ Bank 52; nor a Garnishee Order, (per COLERIDGE. C.J., Fellows v. Thornton 54 LJ QB 279. Stroude). When there still remains something substantial to be done under a decree before it can become thoroughly effectual, that decree has to be 'executed' within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, 5 CWN 781. C.J., Fellows v. Thornton 54 LJ QB 279. Stroude). When there still remains something substantial to be done under a decree before it can become thoroughly effectual, that decree has to be 'executed' within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, 5 CWN 781. As to execution of decrees and orders of Courts, See Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 21; Anderson's Law of Execution, Annual Practice, yearly Practice of the English Supreme Court; Bacon's Abridgment of the Law, Cababe, on Attachment of Debts and Equitable execution; Chitty's Archbold's Practice; Chitty's Forms, Deniell's Chancery Practice, Deniell's Forms and Precedents, Day's Common Law Procedure Acts, Edwards on the Law of Executions. Gilbert on the Law of EXECUTION, Kerr on Receivers, Mather's Compendium of Sheriff Law, 2nd ed., 1903; Setou's Judgments and others, 6th ed., 1901; Tidd's Practice of the Court of King's Bench, 1828). 13. Order 22 Rule 10 CPC stipulates: 10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit: (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of Sub-rule (1). 14. Thus, unless an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest is during pendency of suit, no right accrues under Order 22 Rule 10. In the case at hand, the suit having been decreed and allowed to attain finality as no appeal is preferred, the judgment debtor passing over the title during execution proceedings, in the considered opinion will not amount to assignment or creation of any interest during the pendency of a suit. 15. In view whereof, judgments relied upon by the appellant turn on their respective facts and the principle of law laid down therein is not attracted in the given facts of present case. 16. There is another aspect of the matter. 15. In view whereof, judgments relied upon by the appellant turn on their respective facts and the principle of law laid down therein is not attracted in the given facts of present case. 16. There is another aspect of the matter. Admittedly, no leave from Court is sought by parties before purchasing the property as contemplated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which requires: Section 52 - Transfer of Property pending suit relating thereto:- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. 17. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 534 : AIR 2001 SC 2552 , it was observed by their Lordships: 7. Under Rule 10, Order 22 of the Code, when there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against persons upon whom such interest has devolved and this entitles, the person who has acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue the suit. But it does not follow that it is obligatory upon them to do so. If a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, and yet, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moti Lal v. Karabud Din ILR (1898) Cal 179, he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary. It is also plain that if the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, obtains leave to carry on the suit, the suit in his hands is not a new suit, for, as Lord Kingsdown of the Judicial Committee said in Prannath v. Rookea Begum (1851-59) 7 Moo Ind App 323, a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of the title. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings. 18. In Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and Anr. and one Ors. case (2004) 1 SCC 191 : AIR 2004 SC 173 in the context of the fact that no leave was sought from the Court as envisaged under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, it was observed by their Lordships: 9. It is not disputed that the present petitioner purchased the property during pendency of the suit and without seeking leave of the Court as required by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the Court cannot, as of right, seek impleadment as a party in the suits which are long pending since 1983. It is true that when the application for joinder based on transfer pendente lite is made, the transferee should ordinarily be joined as party to enable him to protect his interest. But in instant case, the trial Court has assigned cogent reasons for rejecting such joinder stating that the suit is long pending since 1983 and prima facie the action of the alienation does not appear to be bona fide. The trial Court saw an attempt on the part of the petitioner to complicate and delay the pending suits. 10. The decisions cited and relied on behalf of the appellant turned on the facts of each of those cases. They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente-lite without leave of the Court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. The decision relied on behalf of the contesting respondents of this Court in the case of Savinder Singh (supra) fully supports them in their contentions. They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente-lite without leave of the Court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. The decision relied on behalf of the contesting respondents of this Court in the case of Savinder Singh (supra) fully supports them in their contentions. After quoting Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevant observations are thus: Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages that: During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India- of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit. 19. In view of above and the facts of present case wherein admittedly no leave was sought before transfer of land in question, no right accrue in favour of the appellant under Order 22 Rule 10 of CPC. 20. In view of above, no error is perceived in the impugned order. 21. In the result, appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.