ORDER Subhash B. Adi, J: 1. Writ Petition No.9023/2008 is directed against the order dated 27/05/2008 passed by the learned I Additional Civil Judge(Senior Division) Dharwad in O.S.No. 175/2007 as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and has also questioned 'the constitutional validity of Section 34 of Article See) of the Schedule to Karnataka Stamps Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act). 2. In Writ Petition 64748/2009 petitioner has called in question the order dated 14th July, 2009 passed on LA,No. 12 in O.S.No.398/2007 on the file of the learned Principal Civil Judge(Senior Division), Hubli and also constitutional validity of Section 34 clause (a) and Article 5(e) of the Act. 3. In Writ Petition 67011/2009 petitioner has called in question the validity of Article 5(e) and Section 34 Clause(a) proviso of the Act as unconstitutional and also order dated 18/11/2009 passed on LA.No.5 in O.S.NO.214/2004 on the file of the learned Principal Civil Judge(Senior Division), Hubli. 4. In Writ Petition 60874/20 10 petitioner has called in question the order dated 02/02/2010 passed on LANo.6 in O.S.NO. 19/2007 on the file of the learned First Additional Civil Judge(senior Division), Hubli and validity of Article 5(e) and Section 34 clause (a) proviso of the Act. 5. The facts leading to filing of these writ petitions in brief are that, the petitioners have filed a suit for specific performance of contract based on agreement of sale wherein the petitioners claim that in part performance of the contract, they have been put in possession and they have also paid the advance amount. In the said suit, the petitioners sought to get unregistered agreement of sale marked in the evidence. In this regard objections were raised for production of the said document, on the ground that the said document is not duly stamped. Defendants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act seeking impounding of agreement of sale and for recovery of duty and penalty. The learned trial Judge, considering the nature of the tratlsaction and the document, found that the document is not duly stamped and called upon the petitioner to pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty in terms of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. Since the stamp duty was not paid, the document was inipounded. The learned trial Judge, considering the nature of the tratlsaction and the document, found that the document is not duly stamped and called upon the petitioner to pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty in terms of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. Since the stamp duty was not paid, the document was inipounded. At that stage, applications were filed by the petitioners seeking the Court to send the original agreement of sale to the District Registrar for impounding and collection of stamp duty and penalty. The said applications were rejected by the learned trial Judge. Hence these, writ petitions are filed questioning the validity of the provisions of the Act and the schedule as stated above. 6. Heard learned Counsel Sri. F.V.Patil, Sri. G.R.Andanimath for the petitioners and R.P. Ugargol, Sri. Arun L. Neelopanth and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents. 7. Sri. F.V.Patil, submitted that, the agreement of sale does not amount to conveyance and it is not conveyance within the meaning of Section 2 clause (d) of the Act nor it amounts to an instrument as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act. He referred to charging section and submitted that only the instrument as defined under Section 2 clause (j) is chargeable with a duty. Instrument referred to in Article 5 Clause (e) of the schedule does not come within the meaning of definition of instrument and as such agreement of sale referred to under Article 5(e) is not chargeable document as Section 3 of the Act refers to an instrument within the meaning of definition under Section 2 Clause (j). In this regard he also referred to provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and submitted that definition of sale does not include the agreement of sale or contract. they are not concluded contract, they do not part take the character of sale and it does not amount to conveyance, if it is not conveyance and is not a transfer provisions of Section 3 are not attracted as Section 3 being charging section, duty is chargeable only on the document which part take the character of conveyance and amounts to transfer. 8. 8. He further submitted that Section 34 of the Act is ultra vires and it confers unguided power on the Court to impose the penalty equal to 10 times of the duty whereas if the document is impounded under Section 33 of the Act and referred to the District Registrar under Section 37 of the Act in terms of Section 39 sub-section (1) clause(b), penalty is payable not exceeding 10 times of the duty. If the document is impounded otherwise and if the penalty is to be paid, it will not be exceeding 10 times of the duty vis-a-vis the discretion is conferred on the District Registrar to impose penalty up to ten times and not beyond, whereas the power conferred on the Court to impose penalty is equal to ten times in respect of a document chargeable with duty and penalty. One in the case of Court and another by the District Registrar, the charging section of penalty mutually are conflicting each other. If the penalty if levied after the default of payment of stamp duty, there cannot be any discrimination between two similarly placed documents in the matter of imposing penalty. As such if the document is referred under Section 39, it would not be chargeable with penalty equal to ten times of the duty but it may be up to 10 times. 9. Alternatively he also submitted that, the document impounded can be referred to the District Registrar for the purpose of determination of stamp duty as well as penalty. However the Court below without referring the document to the District Registrar for the purpose of determination of stamp duty and penalty, has impounded the document by imposing 10 times of the duty and penalty. In support of the contentions he relied on the judgment reported in 2000(4) Karnataka Law Journal 55 and submitted that document should have been sent under Section 37 of the Act for the purpose of deten11ination of duty as well as penalty by the District Registrar. 10. Further, he also submitted that there was no reason for the civil Court to determine the duty as well as penalty, as the document was not admitted in evidence. If the document is not admitted in evidence, the document could have been referred to the District Registrar for the purpose of levying the duty as well as penalty. 10. Further, he also submitted that there was no reason for the civil Court to determine the duty as well as penalty, as the document was not admitted in evidence. If the document is not admitted in evidence, the document could have been referred to the District Registrar for the purpose of levying the duty as well as penalty. Only in case the document is admitted, the Court can call upon the party to pay the duty as well as penalty. 11. Sri. G RAnd ani math, learned Counsel submitted that, he provision:) of Section 34 and 39 are arbitrary and discriminative in nature and are' unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the discretionary power has been conferred on the District Registrar to fix the penalty up to ten times. Such power is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that the penalty cannot be the market value of the subject matter. In this regard he refened the value of the property under the agreement of sale and the penalty imposed and submitted that 10 times penalty imposed is more than be subject matter of the agreement of sale and submitted that as the power, conferred on the district Registrar to Impose penalty is unsustainable under Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. 12. In furtherance of his argument, he also referred to Section 17A of the Registration Act and submitted that, an agreement of sale coupled with part performance requires compulsory registration and if the said document' is not registered, it is inadmissible in evidence. If that is so, there was no reason for the Court to impose duty and penalty the portion of the document which states the part performance, could 'have been ignored and only the remaining portion of the document could have been treated as evidence. He also referred to Section 53Aof the Transfer of Property Act and submitted that reading of Section 53A and Section 17(1A) makes it clear that if the agreement of sale is not registered it is inadmissible only to the extent of part performance is concerned and Court could have ignored the same and in turn could have admitted the document in evidence for the remaining part. He relied on the decision reported in (1993)4 SCC 380 and submitted that Apex Court while considering the penalty has held that the penalty cannot be the market value of the subject matter of the assessment. He also submitted that non-compliance of Section 17(1A) of the Indian Registration Act would take away the effect of part performance and to this extent there was no need for the Court below to impose the duty on the document. 13. Sri. R.P. Ugargol learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that, the Trial Court has determined the stamp duty as well as penalty and against the determination of the stamp duty as well as the penalty, IA 12 was filed in the Court below and the same was rejected and has become final. As regards the contention, as to whether the transaction amounts to conveyance or not, he relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 807 and submitted that agreement of sale part takes the character of conveyance and this aspect has been considered by the Apex Court and further he relied on the another decision of this Court reported in ILR 2002 KAR 5163 wherein this Court has consisered the question as to whether the agreement to sale coupled with part performance is chargeable or not under Article 5 clause (e) and (I) of the schedule and submitted that this Court has held that it is an instrument and it is chargeable and as such issue as regards to whether agreement of sale is instrument of conveyance or not is no more res integra and has been settled by the decision of this Court as well as the Apex Court. He further relied on another decision reported in 2009(4) KCCR 54 and submitted that hardship to pay the duty is not a relevant factor to consider the validity of legislation and as such the power conferred on the Court to impose penalty cannot be questioned on the ground of hardship. 14. He also submitted that the procedure contemplated for impounding of a document produced in the Court and the document impounding by the persons of the in charge of public is entirely different. A document is required to be sufficiently stamped and for the default of the person producing the document is penalized by the Court. 14. He also submitted that the procedure contemplated for impounding of a document produced in the Court and the document impounding by the persons of the in charge of public is entirely different. A document is required to be sufficiently stamped and for the default of the person producing the document is penalized by the Court. Section 34 contemplates separate procedure in the matter of a document produced in the Court and also determination of duty and penalty. In this regard he submitted that the Trial Court had determined the duty as well as penalty and called upon the petitioner to pay the duty and on failure of the same, the document is not admitted in evidence. He further submitted that, the tax law has to be strictly interpreted and validity of such provisions cannot be determined on the basis of as to what would be its effect. He submitted that agreement of sale coupled with part performance has to be understood in the light of the delivery of possession and contract having partly performed and being compulsory registered under Section 17(IA) of the Registration Act and the duty payable being adjustable. It covers the requirement of conveyance and being a part conveyance, the legislation in its wisdom has decided to levy the duty. No fault can be found either under the charging section and machinery section and submitted that there is no violation of provision of Articles 14 and 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that Section 39 does not include determination of duty and penalty. As far as determination by the Court under Section 34 is concerned and as such no reliance can be placed on Section 39. 15. In the light of the rival contentions, the points that arises for consideration is: 1. Whether Section 34(1) clause a proviso is ultra vires and unconstitutional? 2. Whether Article 5 clause (e) is ultra vires, unconstitutional as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the constitution of India 3. Whether the Court is required to refer the impounding document to District Registrar under Section 39 for redetermination of the stamp duty and penalty? 16. It is not in dispute that in all these cases petitioners-have sought to produce agreement of sale coupled with delivery of possession in part performance of the contract and the said document was sought to be marked in evidence. 16. It is not in dispute that in all these cases petitioners-have sought to produce agreement of sale coupled with delivery of possession in part performance of the contract and the said document was sought to be marked in evidence. At' that stage an objection was raised as regards to its admissibility, on the ground that the said document is not duly stamped. The Trial Court after hearing both sides determined the stamp duty as well as penalty by invoking the provisions of Section 34 of the Act and called upon the petitioners to pay the stamp duty. Document was Impounded as the stamp duty and penalty was not paid. At that stage an application was filed for sending the document to District Registrar for redetermination of the same duty as well as penalty. At that stage matter has come up before this Court. 17. Principle argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that, in the light of provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, agreement of sale does not part take the character of conveyance as defined under Section 2 clause(d) of the Karnataka Stamp Act. 1957. For the reference it is extracted as under: 2(d) Conveyance includes: (i) a conveyance on sale: (ii) every instrument; (iii) every order made by the High Court under Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 in respect of amalgamation of companies by which property, whether moveable or immovable or any estate is transferred to, or vested in, any other person, and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by the schedule. By reading of definition of conveyance it includes instrument other than the sale, decree and order. Instrument is also defined under Section 2 clause (k) which reads as under Instrument is also defined under Section 2 clause(j) of the Karnataka Stamp Act which reads as under 2(j) Instrument includes every document (and record created or maintained in or by an electronic storage and retrieval device or medial) by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited extended, extinguished or recorded; 18. In this case Article 5 clause (e) of the Stamp Act refers to the sale of immovable property wherein in part performance of the contract, possession of the property is delivered or is agreed to be delivered without executing the conveyance, the said document requires stamp duty to be paid on the market value and the said duty is adjustable when actual deed of transfer or conveyance is registered. 19. Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, deals with part performance of the contract, in case of part performance of contract, if the possession is delivered, the vendor has only option to seck for the performance of the remaining part of contract, the provision refers to part performance of the contract and by virtue of which the possession of the agreement holder is protected. In this regard, the legislation in its wisdom thought it fit to levy duty as large number of transactions by means of agreement of sale, possession is delivered and the duty was avoided and in order prevent the abuse of such transaction, the legislation has amended the provisions. 20. This Court in a decision reported in 2003(5) Karnataka Law Journal 263 in the matter of Jayalahshmi Reddy v. Thippanna and Others, considering the provisions of Article 5(e) of the schedule to the Act has observed: "Conveyance is executed in pursuance of such agreement the stamp duty already paid is adjustable towards the total duty levied on conveyance." Thus it has held that where the agreement of sale under which possession is delivered, it amounts to conveyance and the stamp duty is adjustable and this Court in' another decision reported in 2003(1) Karnataka Law Journal 518A in the matter of Mahadeva Vs. The Commissioner, Mysore City Corporation and others 'has observed: "The proviso to Section 34 prescribes the conditions, subject to which a document which is not duly stamped can, be admitted in evidence. It inter alia provides for payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, the amount which is required to make up such duty together with the prescribed penalty. There no conflict between what is permitted by the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act on the one hand and Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, on the other. There no conflict between what is permitted by the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act on the one hand and Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, on the other. The demand of duty and penalty in terms of the proviso to Section 34 before the document could be marked in token of its having been admitted in evidence did not therefore suffer from any error of law to warrant interference." 21. The tax statute have to be Interpreted strictly. It must be borne in mind that the Rule of strict construction applied primarily to charging section and it should be construed strictly whereas the machinery section to be construed liberally. Reading of provisions to Section 2(j), makes it clear that, It refers even right purported to be created. Reading of Section 2(j) of the Act and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 1 7(1A) of the Registration Act indicates that the contract has been partly performed, rights are created under the agreement and such document requires compulsory registration. If the instrument is understood in the light of these provisions and further delivery of possession and the vendor having no other option except to seek part performance of the remaining contract, it leaves no option except to treat the document as conveyance. 22. The Apex Court in the matter of Veena Hasmukh Jain and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in AIR 1999 SC 807 , while considering the provision of Article 25, Explanation 1 of Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act and Section 4 of Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963, had considered identical issue as to what constitutes conveyance. It is, thus, observed:. "The duty in respect of an agreement covered by the Explanation is leviable as if it is a conveyance. The conditions to be fulfilled are if there is an agreement to sell immoveable property and possession of such property is transferred to the purchaser before the execution or at the time of execution or subsequently without executing any conveyance in respect thereof such, an agreement to sell is deemed to be a "conveyance". The conditions to be fulfilled are if there is an agreement to sell immoveable property and possession of such property is transferred to the purchaser before the execution or at the time of execution or subsequently without executing any conveyance in respect thereof such, an agreement to sell is deemed to be a "conveyance". In the event a conveyance is executed in pursuance of such agreement subsequently, the stamp duty already paid and recovered on the agreement of sale which is deemed to be a conveyance shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the conveyance. In the instant case the agreement entered into dearly provides for sale of an immoveable property and there is also a specific time possession has to be delivered. Therefore, the document in question clearly falls within the scope of the Explanation 1. It is open to the legislature to levy duty on different kinds of agreement in different rates. If the legislature though that it would be appropriate to collect duty at the stage of agreement it self fit fulfils certain conditions instead of postponing the collection of such duty till the completion of the transaction by execution of a conveyance deed inasmuch as all substantial conditions of a conveyance have already been fulfilled such as by-passing of a consideration and delivery of possession of the property and what remained to be done is a mere formality of• execution of a sale deed, it would be necessary to collect duty at later stage itself though right, title and interest may not have passed as such. Still by reason of the fact that under the terms of the agreement there is an intention of sale and possession of the property has also been delivered, it is certainly open to the state to charge such instruments at a particular rate which is akin to a conveyance and that is exactly what has been done in the present case. Therefore, it cannot be said that levy of duty is not upon the instrument but on the transaction." 23. Thus, from the observations made by the Apex Court, it is clear that, it is open to the legislature to levy duty on different kinds of agreement at different rates. Therefore, it cannot be said that levy of duty is not upon the instrument but on the transaction." 23. Thus, from the observations made by the Apex Court, it is clear that, it is open to the legislature to levy duty on different kinds of agreement at different rates. If the Legislature thought that, it would be appropriate to collect duty at the stage of agreement itself if it fullfills certain conditions instead of postponing the collection of such duty till the completion of the transaction by execution of a conveyance deed, where possession is delivered and substantial contract is complete and only formalities of execution of conveyance deed remains. Legislature is empowered to legislate law for imposing duty. 24. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 in the matter of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Smt. P.Laxmi Devi, while interpreting the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, has observed that the legislation providing for impounding of the document insufficiently stamped and Imposing of duty and penalty is not violative of Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India. 25. There is no illegality in the levy of duty, levy of duty is not dependent upon the benefit that the party derives, even assuming that the suit filed based on the said document ultimately fails. It does not empower the party either to seek refund or would amount to unjust enrichment. Article 265 of the Constitution of India prohibits levy of tax except authority of law, if the legislation is valid, it empowers the authority to levy duty It cannot be said that, the party could be absolved or exempted from paYl~1ent of duty on the basis of his success or failure in the suit. The question of hardship caused to the party is not a consideration in the matter of levy of tax. Tax is compulsorily leviable. It is neither fee nor it depends on the capacity of the party or on the success or failure of the party to get the benefit from out of the said transaction. As such, It does not amount to unjust enrichment. 26. None of the petitioners have questioned the competency in the Legislature to enact the law. It is neither fee nor it depends on the capacity of the party or on the success or failure of the party to get the benefit from out of the said transaction. As such, It does not amount to unjust enrichment. 26. None of the petitioners have questioned the competency in the Legislature to enact the law. If a contract is substantially performed except executing the conveyance deed and all other formalities having been performed, in my opinion, the legislature is within its competency to treat such transaction as conveyance to avoid evading of the duty. No doubt, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines the sale does not include the agreement of sale. However,' a reading of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and provisions of Section 17(IA) of the Registration Act making such agreement compulsorily registerable and further delivery of possession, the receipt of consideration amounts to performance of substantial part of the contract, coupled with the stamp duty that is levied, is adjustable with the duty that would be leviable when a conveyance deed is registered. All that the legislature has done is to prevent abuse of transaction and to make such transaction amenable for levy of duty, which otherwise, though in law possession is delivered and property is enjoyed by the holder of the agreement, but is not levied with any stamp duty A harmoniolls construction of the definitions of "Conveyance and instrument" read with section 3, the charging section, makes it clear that Instrument of agreement of sale where possession is delivered and which partakes the character of part performance it assumes the character of conveyance and it is the conveyance amenable for stamp duty. 27 Under Section 34, the power is conferred on the Court to levy stamp duty as well as penalty This provision is self complete providing for charging as well as machinery It is not dependent on the provisions of Section 39 of the Act nor it is required to be re-determined by the District Registrar What is contemplated under Section 34 is the power of the Court to determine and levy the stamp duty as well as penalty Once It is determined by the Court, there cannot be any other authority to sit in judgment over the determination arrived at by the Court and redetermine the duty as well as the penalty As such, Section 39 cannot be understood to mean that the District Registrar has still power to redetermine the duty as well as the penalty even after the Court having determined the same under Section 34. 28. Issue as regards the conflict between Sections 34 and 39 is not germane for the purpose of this case. Section 39 operates in a different field and Section 34 operates only when the document is presented before the Court and in both the cases, the penalty is leviable, legislation cannot be invalidated on the ground that there is disparity between these two provisions. Provisions have to be understood in the context and the purpose. 29. Insofar as the interpretation of provisions of Section 33, 34, 37 and 39 is concerned, this Court in a decision reported in 2000 (4) Kat.L.J. 55 in the matter of K.Amarnath Vs. Smt. Puttamma, observed that, on combined reading of Sections 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 41 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, what emerges is that when a document comes up before the Court, it has to examine and determine whether it is properly stamped; and when the other side objects to It, the Court should consider such objection and hear both sides: after hearing, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the document has been duly stamped. It shall proceed to admit the document into evidence; on the other hand, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the document is not duly stamped or insufficiently stamped. It shall proceed to admit the document into evidence; on the other hand, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the document is not duly stamped or insufficiently stamped. It shall pass an order holding that the document is not duly stamped and determine the Stamp duty/deficit stamp duty and penalty to be paid and fix a date to enable the party who produces the document to pay the Stamp duty/deficit Stamp duty plus penalty; if the party pays the duty and penalty the Court shall certify that proper amount of duty and penalty has been levied and record the name and address of the person paying the said duty and penalty and then admit the document in evidence as provided under Section 41(2) of the Act, and thereafter, the Court shall send an authenticated copy of the instrument to the District Registrar together with a certificate and the amount collected as duty and penalty, as provided under Section 37(1). It is only of the party does not pay the duty and penalty, the Court will have to pass an order of impounding the document and sent the instrument in the original to the District Registrar for being dealt with in accordance with law as per Section 37(2) of the Act. It is not contemplated that the District Registrar can sit in appeal as against the determination of the duty as well as the penalty it is, in this context, only for the purpose of further action, their document is referred under Section 37(2) of the Act, and, as such, the contention of the petitioners that even after determination of the duty and penalty by the Court, the District Registrar has power to redetermine the same under Section 39 is not acceptable. 30. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner as regards the hardship that would be caused in levying penalty is concerned, the Court cannot interpret the provisions on the basis of hardship that may be caused to the party, and no tax statute could be struck down on the ground of hardship or difficulty. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 has observed as under: "Stamp duty is a tax, and hardship is not relevant in construing taxing statutes which are to be construed strictly. As often said, there is no equity in a tax. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 has observed as under: "Stamp duty is a tax, and hardship is not relevant in construing taxing statutes which are to be construed strictly. As often said, there is no equity in a tax. If the words used in a taxing statute are clear, one cannot try to find out the intention and the object of the statute.' Thus, it makes clear that it is not the discretion of the Court to interpret tax statute liberally to find out its aims and objects or to do equity. 31. Considering the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1 am of the opinion that Section 34 of the Stamp Act and clause (e) of Article 5 of the Schedule to the Act does not suffer from any voice of unconstitutionality nor there is any error of exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court. 32. In the circumstances, I pass the following order: ORDER Agreement of sale coupled with possession coming within the purview of Article 5(e) of the Schedule to the Karnataka Stamp Act is a conveyance deed liable for duty and penalty. Section 34 clause (a) of the proviso, does not suffer from any voice of unconstitutionality nor is in violation of Articles 14, 19 or 21 of the Constitution of India. The definition of "Conveyance" and the definition of "Instrument" in clause 2(d) and 2(j) of the Karnataka Stamp Act includes agreement of sale coupled with possession, and is an instrument chargeable under Section 3 of the Act. Hence, the order of the Trial Court does not call for Interference. Accordingly, Writ Petitions fall and the same are dismissed Misc. W. applications do not survive for consideration and are disposed of accordingly. 30. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner as regards the hardship that would be caused in levying penalty is concerned, the Court cannot interpret the provisions on the basis of hardship that may be caused to the party, and no tax statute could be struck down on the ground of hardship or difficulty. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 has observed as under: "Stamp duty is a tax, and hardship is not relevant in construing taxing statutes which are to be construed strictly. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1640 has observed as under: "Stamp duty is a tax, and hardship is not relevant in construing taxing statutes which are to be construed strictly. As often said, there is no equity in a tax. If the words used in a taxing statute are clear, one cannot try to find out the intention and the object of the statute.' Thus, it makes clear that it is not the discretion of the Court to interpret tax statute liberally to find out its aims and objects or to do equity. 31. Considering the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1 am of the opinion that Section 34 of the Stamp Act and clause (e) of Article 5 of the Schedule to the Act does not suffer from any voice of unconstitutionality nor there is any error of exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court. 32. In the circumstances, I pass the following order: ORDER Agreement of sale coupled with possession coming within the purview of Article 5(e) of the Schedule to the Karnataka Stamp Act is a conveyance deed liable for duty and penalty. Section 34 clause (a) of the proviso, does not suffer from any voice of unconstitutionality nor is in violation of Articles 14, 19 or 21 of the Constitution of India. The definition of "Conveyance" and the definition of "Instrument" in clause 2(d) and 2G) of the Karnataka Stamp Act includes agreement of sale coupled with possession, and is an instrument chargeable under Section 3 of the Act. Hence, the order of the Trial Court does not call for Interference. Accordingly, Writ Petitions fall and the same are dismissed Misc. W. applications do not survive for consideration and are disposed of accordingly.