JUDGMENT : Ravi R.Tripathi, J. National Insurance Co. Ltd. is before this Court seeking condonation of delay of 53 days caused in filing the First Appeal against judgment and award dated 08.10.2009 passed by the MACT (Main), Banaskantha at Palanpur in MACP No.158 of 2003. 2. Heard learned Advocate Mr.Mehul S.Shah for the applicant - Insurance Company. 3. The delay is explained in para-3 of the application, wherein it is stated that:- "3. It is respectfully submitted that Award was pronounced on 18/11/2009. Certified copy was applied on 10/12/2009......" 3.1 The deponent - Shri Hitendra Desai, whose designation is not set out, stated to be the Administrative Officer of the applicant - Insurance Company, has not mentioned as to why learned Advocate appearing for the Insurance Company did not apply for certified copy for more than 20 days. Any lethargy on the part of the Insurance Company or the Advocate is required to be viewed and measured by different scale than so called the lethargy on the part of poor and illiterate claimants. 3.2 After the certified copy was ready for delivery on 24.12.2009, learned Advocate for the Insurance Company took 7 days to receive the same. That was received on 31.12.2009. Thereafter, the learned Advocate found time to send the certified copy of the award by letter dated 09.01.2010, which was received by the Divisional Office on 13.01.2010. This shows that in all, there was about two month's time taken by the learned Advocate in applying for the certified copy and after obtaining the same, forwarding the same to the Divisional Office. This two month's time, if taken care, there would not have been any delay, even if the applicant - Insurance Company was to take some time in completing certain formalities/procedures. 3.3 The Divisional Office, as if not aware of the matters being legal and governed by law of limitation, could sought opinion of the 'concerned' Advocate whether an appeal is to be preferred or not only on 20.01.2010. This 'concerned' advocate is from the trial court or High Court is not mentioned by the deponent of this application, but later on, it is mentioned that it is the same Advocate, who sent his opinion. Therefore, it can be presumed that the opinion was sought form the same Advocate. The Advocate sent his opinion by letter dated 27.01.2010, which was received by the Divisional Office on 01.02.2010. Therefore, it can be presumed that the opinion was sought form the same Advocate. The Advocate sent his opinion by letter dated 27.01.2010, which was received by the Divisional Office on 01.02.2010. 3.4 After having received the opinion on 01.02.2010, the Divisional Office sent the claim file to the Regional Office, Ahmedabad with a request to prefer an appeal by letter dated 31.03.2010. Here again, two month's time is taken by the Divisional Office for forwarding the papers to the Regional Office. Thus, two month's time was taken by the Advocate at the Tribunal and thereafter, two month's time is taken by the Divisional Office in forwarding the papers to the Regional Office. 3.5 The Regional Office seems to be acting with necessary promptness and therefore, it forwarded the papers to the learned Advocate at High Court to file an appeal on 12.04.2010. If with this promptness, Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company at Tribunal had acted and the Divisional Office had acted in sending the papers to the Regional Office, there would not have been any delay. 4. The aforesaid explanation of delay cannot be said to be satisfactory by any standard. 5. Learned Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ), wherein the Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:- "The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. In every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice" 6. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice" 6. The aforesaid decision is rendered by the Apex Court in the facts as set out in para-3 of the judgment, which reads as under:- "3. Facts barely needed for these appeals are the following : A suit for declaration of title and ancillary reliefs filed by the respondent was decreed ex parte on 28-10-1991. Appellant, who was defendant in the suit, on coming to know of the decree moved an application to set it aside. But the application was dismissed for default on 17-2-1993. Appellant moved for having that order set aside only on August 19, 1995 for which a delay of 883 days was noted. Appellant also filed another application to condone the delay by offering an explanation which can be summarised thus : Appellant engaged an advocate (one Sri MS Rajith) for making the motion to set the ex parte decree aside but the advocate failed to inform him that the application was dismissed for default on 17-2-1993. When he got summons from the execution side on 5-7-1995 he approached his advocate but he was told that perhaps execution proceedings would have been taken by the decree-holder since there was no stay against such execution proceedings. On the advice of the same advocate, he signed some papers including a Vakalatnama for resisting the execution proceedings, besides making a payment of Rupees Two Thousand towards advocate's fees and other incidental expenses. But the fact is that the said advocate did not do anything in the court even thereafter. On 4-8-1995 the execution warrant was issued by the court and he became suspicious of the conduct of his advocate and hence rushed to the Court from where he got the disquieting information that his application to set aside the ex parte decree stood dismissed for default as early as 17-2-1993 and that nothing was done in the Court thereafter on his behalf. He also learned that has advocate his left the profession and joined as legal assistant of M/s. Maxworth Orcheads India Limited. He also learned that has advocate his left the profession and joined as legal assistant of M/s. Maxworth Orcheads India Limited. Hence he filed the present application for having the order dated 7-2-1993 set aside." (emphasis supplied) 6.1 These facts go to show that there was a party, which was not only defrauded but was deceived by the Advocate, who allowed his genuine cause to be lost on account of delay and therefore, the Hon'ble the Apex Court held as aforesaid. In the case on hand, an Insurance Company, whose day-to-day working is of filing appeals against judgments and awards passed in MACPs, not streamlining and instructing its Advocates properly that on the day the case is decided, they must apply for certified copy, cannot be viewed in light of the observations made by the Hon'ble the Apex Court. 6.2 In the present case, as is mentioned in para-3, learned Advocate applied for certified copy only on 10.12.2009, though the matter was decided on 18.11.2009. After the copy was ready for delivery on 24.12.2009, he did not bother to get the copy till 31.12.2009. After having received the copy, he did not sent the same till 09.01.2010. This shows that there is something which is missing and what is missing is a 'proper coordination' by the Insurance Company and proper instructions to their Advocates so as to see that no delay is caused in the matter of applying for certified copy and obtaining the same once they are ready. 6.3 Besides, the Divisional Office of applicant - Insurance Company is having a pious duty to send the papers to the Regional Office. As if this was the first matter which the Divisional Office dealing with for filing an appeal, it did not sent the papers for two months, i.e. from 01.02.2010 to 31.03.2010. This lethargy cannot be looked into in light of the observations made by the Hon'ble the Apex Court. 6.4 In fact, there is no explanation rather than saying that delay is explained satisfactorily. Inaction on the part of the Advocate and inaction on the part of the Divisional Office in sending the papers to the Regional Office requires to be taken care of by the Insurance Company in an effective manner and for that, it has to gear up its machinery so as to avoid delay. Inaction on the part of the Advocate and inaction on the part of the Divisional Office in sending the papers to the Regional Office requires to be taken care of by the Insurance Company in an effective manner and for that, it has to gear up its machinery so as to avoid delay. It is not that there was a delay of a day or two in applying for certified copy and sending the papers to the Regional Office, but the papers are stranded for two months. 6.5 To test the bonafides, the applicant - Insurance Company has not deposited the amount awarded by judgment and award dated 08.10.2009. The accident took place on 20.11.2002 at about 01.00 pm and aged parents of the deceased are the claimants in MACP No.158 of 2003. That MACP is heard and decided by judgment and award dated 08.10.2009. For all this period, the claimants are eagerly waiting for the compensation to come and that compensation is withheld by the Insurance Company by getting itself involved in all aforesaid procedural delays, which by no standard can be said to be bonafide and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 7. Learned Advocate for the applicant next relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst.Katiji & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , wherein the Hon'ble the Apex Court in para-3 held as under:- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that :- 1. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay. every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State', which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 8. Learned Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company submitted that the Hon'ble the Apex Court had laid down that, "ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late"-. 8.1 This submission is belied in the facts of the present case. As set out hereinabove, the accident took place on 20.11.2002 and the claimants are eagerly waiting for compensation till date, though the claim petition is decided by judgment and award dated 08.10.2009, still the claimants are handing high and dry because the Insurance Company has its own time, consuming procedure and the time consumed in the same is put forward as a ground for condonation of delay. By doing so, the claimants, who, on the date of filing the claim petition, were aged 60 and 55 years, and today, they must be aged 67 and 62 years are dragged to this Court. 9. Learned Advocate for the Insurance Company submitted that the Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that, "refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties". 9.1 This does not hold good in the facts of the case on hand because if this matter is admitted, as at present this Court is hearing matters of 1984 and 1988 in 2010, this matter will also be heard not before 20 years from now. By that time, the claimants will not be there to received the compensation. Therefore, to apply the same yardstick to all cases is never warranted and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid decision and the aforesaid propositions of law is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 10. Learned Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company submitted that the Hon'ble the Apex Court was pleased to hold that, ""Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay. every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner"-. 10.1 This Court has not applied any proposition of law in a pedantic manner. It is set out on para-3 of the application itself that the learned Advocate for the Insurance Company before the Tribunal did not find time to apply for certified copy for long 22 days; he did not find time to receive that copy for long 7 days and did not find time to forward the same to the Divisional Office for long 10 days. This is, therefore, a unique case wherein the question is not of explaining every day's delay, but the question is of explaining the conduct of the Advocate, who is engaged by the Insurance Company. This is, therefore, a unique case wherein the question is not of explaining every day's delay, but the question is of explaining the conduct of the Advocate, who is engaged by the Insurance Company. Both the learned Advocates for the Insurance Company and the Insurance Company, are conscious of the fact that the matter pertains to motor accident claim and the claimants are eagerly waiting for receiving compensation. The conduct of the Insurance Company, whose Divisional Office does not find time to forward the papers to the Regional Office for two long months, can never be pardoned and the explanation put forth in this application can never be said to be satisfactory explanation much less an explanation sufficient to get the delay condoned and therefore, the proposition of law which laid down by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 11. Learned Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company submitted the Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that, "There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay"-. 11.1 The suggestion of the learned Advocate for the applicant - Insurance Company seems that this Court is giving step-motherly treatment to the applications seeking condonation of delay by Insurance Companies. In a given case, if required such a treatment can be given, if there is reason for the same. An Insurance Company, in a matter of explaining delay, cannot be put at par with the illiterate, ignorant and innocent claimants. An Insurance Company is a legal entity - a corporate being, dealing with a large number of motor accident claim cases every day and that is why it is supposed to have and in fact, it has an upto date paraphernalia to deal with such type of cases. If the Advocate appearing for the Insurance Company does not find time to apply for certified copy for long 22 days, it is a high time that the Insurance Company should find out a better, efficient alternative. He cannot be pardoned for not applying 'certified copy' for long 22 days; he cannot be pardoned for not obtaining the copy for 7 days after the same was ready and he cannot be pardoned for not forwarding the papers for long 10 days. He cannot be pardoned for not applying 'certified copy' for long 22 days; he cannot be pardoned for not obtaining the copy for 7 days after the same was ready and he cannot be pardoned for not forwarding the papers for long 10 days. Similarly, the Divisional Office, who did not forward the papers for 'two months' to the Regional Office, can also not be pardoned. It is a high time when the Insurance Company must put its house in order rather than complaining that the Court is giving step-motherly treatment and not condoning delay in the applications filed by the Insurance Company. 11.2 The Insurance Company cannot be put at par with the poor, illiterate, ignorant and innocent claimants because the resources at the disposal of the two have no comparison. 11.3 Let there be a clarification here that 'insurance' is not a business for earning profit, but it has a flavour of social service, it is a vocation by which social service is to be rendered and this cannot be done by filing such an application seeking condonation of delay by just mentioning the dates and then saying that the delay stands explained and that too be treated as satisfactory of this Court. 12. This Court is of the opinion that the delay is not satisfactorily explained. In the result, the application fails and the same is dismissed. The Court restrains itself from dismissing the application with costs as the other side is not called upon by this Court. Appeal dismissed.