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2010 DIGILAW 367 (JHR)

Rajdeo Shukla v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coal Fields Ltd.

2010-03-25

D.G.R.PATNAIK

body2010
Order Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner, In this writ application has prayed for quashing the office order dated 30.4.2002 (Annexure-5) issued under the signature of the Project Officer, Central Saunda Colliery, P.O. and P.S.Saunda, District-Hazaribagh by which the petitioner was retired from service from the post of Store Keeper of the Company with effect from 30.4.2002 (A.N.) and his name has been struck off from the muster roll of the Colliery. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the Respondents to the maintainability of this writ application on the ground that earlier, the petitioner had filed a writ application containing the same prayer, which was• registered as W.P. (S) No. 3081 of 2002. The petitioner had, however, sought for withdrawal of the writ application with liberty to file a suit for redressal of his grievance. The prayer of withdrawal in terms of the liberty, as prayed for, was granted and accordingly, by order dated 21.9.2006, the writ application was disposed of. 4. Learned counsel for the Respondents argues that after having obtained the permission for withdrawal with liberty as prayed for, the petitioner did not file any civil suit nor did he avail any other Forum for redressal of his grievance and therefore, the present writ application on the same facts and for the same reliefs, is not maintainable. Learned counsel, in this context refers to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submits that the petitioner having not filed any suit. before the Civil Court in terms of the liberty given to him, he is debarred from filing a fresh writ application on the same issues and facts. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner 'argues on the other hand that the petitioner though had filed a writ application earlier but on the advice of his lawyer, had prayed for withdrawal of the writ application with liberty to file a suit and such prayer having been granted by the Court while disposing of the writ application, this in itself shall not debar the. petitioner from filing a fresh writ application for the same reliefs, as because the issues involved in the earlier writ application, were never decided on merits and the principles of res judicata would not apply to debar the petitioner from filing the present writ application. 6. petitioner from filing a fresh writ application for the same reliefs, as because the issues involved in the earlier writ application, were never decided on merits and the principles of res judicata would not apply to debar the petitioner from filing the present writ application. 6. I find force in the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. The provisions of Order 23 Rule 4, may not have strict application in respect of writ applications and in the light of the facts of the case. Even otherwise, the mere fact that the petitioner sought to withdraw the earlier writ application on the advice of his counsel, in itself would not deprive him of seeking redressal of his grievances by filing this writ application, since the reliefs claimed are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The objections taken by the Respondents regarding the maintainability of this writ application is therefore, overruled. 7. As regards the main dispute, the facts of the petitioner's case is that he was inducted in service under the Respondents Colliery and at the time of his appointment, his service records were opened, wherein, his date of birth was recorded. It appears from the statements as contained in the counter affidavit of the Respondents that much later, a complaint was received against the petitioner in respect of the entry of the petitioner's date of birth in his service records and on verification, it was found that there was tampering in the entry in as much as, the figure 1942 was interpolated to represent 1952. On the basis of the aforesaid alleged interpolations, the Respondent-employer proceeded to take a decision to terminate the services of the petitioner by striking off his name from the muster roll on the presumption that the petitioner's actual year of birth is 1942 and not 1952. 8. The petitioner's contention, on the other hand, is that the original entry in his service records, had confirmed the year of his birth as 1952 and this is in consonance with the entry in his matriculation certificate. 8. The petitioner's contention, on the other hand, is that the original entry in his service records, had confirmed the year of his birth as 1952 and this is in consonance with the entry in his matriculation certificate. Learned counsel for the petitioner informs that at the lime of his entry in service, the petitioner had declared himself to be a matriculate and as such, on the basis of his matriculation certificate, the entry of his date of birth in his services was accordingly, made, Learned counsel argues further that before proceeding to take any unilateral decision regarding the correctness of the entry of the date of birth in his service records, the concerned authorities of the Respondents did not either inform the petitioner nor give him any opportunity to explain the matters. Referring to the counter affidavit of the Respondents-Bihar School Examination Board, learned counsel submits that, as informed by the School Examination Board, the date of birth as entered in the matriculation certificate issued to the petitioner by the Board, does maintain the date as 18.1.1952 and there could be no occasion or reason for the petitioner to mention any other date of birth in his service records. 9. From the counter affidavit of the Respondents, it appears that the only ground taken by the Respondents is that the petitioner had apparently not produced his matriculation certificate and had he produced the Certificate, there would have probably be no occasion for any doubt regarding his date of birth. It also appears that such a doubt has been raised on the basis of the purported interpolation in his service records. 10. It is not disputed that the service records of the employee are in possession and custody of the employer and the employee is not expected to have any access to such records. Even otherwise, the date of birth in the matriculation certificate is of importance and significance, on which the petitioner has based his reliance and such certificate having been produced, the Respondent-employer ought to have considered the same and ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to explain the purported discrepancies, if any, before taking an administrative decision regarding the genuineness of the entry of the date of birth in his service records. This, having not been done, the decision taken by the Respondents treating the date of birth of the petitioner of a date, other than what have been certified in his matriculation certificate, and that too without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to explain, is manifestly illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. The impugned notice of the Respondents, cannot therefore, be sustained in law and is, therefore, hereby quashed. 11. The Respondents are therefore, directed to treat the entry of the date of birth mentioned in the petitioner's matriculation certificate to be the correct date and to allow the benefits of the petitioner's continued service till the date of his retirement in accordance with the aforesaid date. If the services of the petitioner have been terminated prematurely, then the Respondent-employer shall give the petitioner the salary, which was due for the period of his service till the date of his retirement as per his age according to his matriculation certificate, and give him all consequential benefits thereto, within the three months from the date of this order. 12. With these observations, this writ application stands disposed of. 13. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the Respondents.