JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - All these three Letters Patent Appeals have been filed assailing the common judgment dated 07.07.2009 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos. 14954 of 2005, 15692 & 12631 of 2005. The controversy in all the three writ petitions was with regard to the orders passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rayagada in Title Suit Nos. 1 of 1994 and 19 of 2001. The facts and the parties being one and the same, and the point of law being intricately connected with each other, the appeals are heard together on the request of the learned Counsel for the parties and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. This Court does not intend to delve into the facts in detail as the same have been discussed in extenso by the Hon'ble Single Judge in his judgment as well as by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rayagada and also by the Addl. District Judge, Rayagada. This Court however, intends to deal with only those facts, which are necessary for appreciating the inter se disputes. 3. It appears that one Smt. Palasa Venkayamma ( hereinafter to be referred to as 'Venkayamma') was the exclusive owner of land appertaining to plot No. 279/332/1 under Khata No. 52/3 and lands appertaining to plot Nos. 279/332/2 and plot No. 279/331 under Khata No. 25 in village Barijolla in Rayagada. According to learned Counsel for the Appellant, the said Venkayamma on 2.10.1990 had executed an agreement undertaking to alienate the aforesaid properties in favour of the Appellant for a consideration of Rs. 1,30,000/-. On the said date, it is averred, a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- was paid and possession was handed over. It was agreed that the balance of Rs. 10,000/- shall be paid at the time of registration. The said Venkayamma, it is alleged, did not execute and register the sale deed. Consequently, the Appellant filed Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 seeking a direction to the vendor for specific performance of the agreement and the sale deed. In the said suit a petition was also filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC being M.J.C. No. 3 of 1994 to injunct Venkayamma from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff-Appellant and the said prayer was allowed. In the said suit a petition was also filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC being M.J.C. No. 3 of 1994 to injunct Venkayamma from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff-Appellant and the said prayer was allowed. The notice of the suit issued to Venkayamma, as would be evident from the records, was served upon her personally on 24.2.1994 along with the notice of M.J.C. No. 3 of 1994. However, Venkayamma did not appear in the suit INDIAN LAW and an ex parte decree was passed. Thereafter, the Appellant filed execution petition to execute the decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 and the same was registered as Execution Petition No. 17 of 1994. The said Venkayamma also did not appear in the execution case, consequently, the decree was executed. 4. In the year 2000, to be more specific on 24.10.2000 a petition was filed by Venkayamma under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree. The same was registered as M.J.C. No. 17 of 2000. In the said petition, it was alleged that she had absolutely no knowledge with regard to filing of the suit and/or passing of the ex parte decree and only on 10.10.2000 in course of mutation proceeding, it was brought to her notice that the Appellant had filed T.S. No. 1 of 1994 and an ex parte decree has been passed. The specific case of Venkayamma in the said petition was that the address given in the suit was a fictitious one, inasmuch as, she never resided in Rayagada and she was a permanent resident of Paralakhemundi. Several other allegations with regard to the fraud practiced by the Appellant were also alleged. 5. The petition filed under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC was resisted by the Appellant, mainly on the ground that the same is grossly barred by time and that there is no decree available to be set aside inasmuch as the decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 had already been executed. 6. 5. The petition filed under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC was resisted by the Appellant, mainly on the ground that the same is grossly barred by time and that there is no decree available to be set aside inasmuch as the decree passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 had already been executed. 6. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, the trial court allowed the petition filed under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., (M.J.C. No. 7 of 2000) inter alia holding that the notice issued to Venkayamma, the sole Defendant in the suit, was not duly served upon her inasmuch as the address given in the plaint was not correct. From the evidence produced before the court, it was concluded that in fact Venkayamma was residing permanently at Paralakhemundi and the address furnished in the suit was that of Rayagada. A suspicion also arose with regard to impersonation and receipt of notice by some other person. The entire materials available before the trial court threw a cloud of suspicion on the way notice was served upon the sole Defendant, i.e., Venkayamma and the court below being satisfied that the notice was not properly served and there are allegations of fraud and impersonation, set aside the decree and restored the suit to file. The said order was assailed by the Appellant before learned Addl. District Judge, Rayagada in Civil Revision No. 3 of 2005. The revisional court though admitted the revision declined to grant any interim order. Being aggrieved, the Appellant filed W.P.(C) No. 12210 of 2005 before this Court. Thereafter, it appears, learned Addl. District Judge, Rayagada dismissed the revision filed by the Appellant. The said order as well as the order dated 20.7.2005 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rayagada in MJC No. 17 of 2000 is assailed in W.P.(C) No. 14954 of 2005. 7. It appears that during pendency of the said proceeding Venkayamma, the sole Defendant expired. On 30.7.2004 a petition was filed under Order 22, Rule 3, CPC by Y. Veerabhadra Rao to substitute him in the suit. It is averred that the said Venkayamma had executed a 'Wilnama' in his favour bequeathing the entire disputed properties and as such, he should be substituted in place of the deceased Venkayamma and should be permitted to prosecute the lis. The trial court also allowed the said petition by a reasoned order. 8. It is averred that the said Venkayamma had executed a 'Wilnama' in his favour bequeathing the entire disputed properties and as such, he should be substituted in place of the deceased Venkayamma and should be permitted to prosecute the lis. The trial court also allowed the said petition by a reasoned order. 8. The Appellant also filed W.P.(C) No. 15692 of 2005 assailing the order passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rayagada allowing the Respondent to be substituted in place of the sole Respondent under Order 22, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 9. In course of hearing it further appears that Y. Veerabhadra Rao, the Respondent had also filed a suit bearing Title Suit No. 19 of 2001 impleading the Appellant and Venkayamma as Defendants and prayed to declare his right, title and interest in respect of the disputed lands on the plea that by virtue of 'Wilnama' he had succeeded to the properties. 10. After restoration of Title Suit No. 1 of 1994, an application, it appears, was filed u/s 10, CPC contending that Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 having been restored and the said suit being an earlier suit and involves the same disputed property, the latter suit i.e. Title Suit No. 19 of 2001 should be stayed. The said petition was rejected on 12.8.2005 holding that the application for impletion of parties in the said suit is still pending and unless and until the written statements are filed, it was not possible to hold that the said matter in both the suits was one and the same. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 12.8.2005, the Appellant had filed W.P.(C) No. 10256 of 2005. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court holding that Title Suit No. 19 of 2001 as well as Title Suit No. 1 of 1994 should be taken up analogously so as to avoid conflicting judgments. It further appears that the Defendant filed another petition under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC The said petition was resisted by the Appellant. The petition being allowed by order dated 25.8.2005, the Appellant assailed the same in W.P.(C) No. 12631 of 2005. 11. The facts narrated above would indicate that the dispute in all the aforesaid cases is intermingled with each other. Therefore, the Hon'ble Single Judge heard all the three writ petitions, i.e., W.P.(C) Nos. The petition being allowed by order dated 25.8.2005, the Appellant assailed the same in W.P.(C) No. 12631 of 2005. 11. The facts narrated above would indicate that the dispute in all the aforesaid cases is intermingled with each other. Therefore, the Hon'ble Single Judge heard all the three writ petitions, i.e., W.P.(C) Nos. 14954 of 2005, 15692 & 12631 of 2005 and disposed of the same by a common judgment. The Hon'ble Single Judge on the basis of the pleadings and arguments advanced noted the following facts. i. On 21.1.1994, T.S. No. 1 of 1994 was filed by the Petitioner-Plaintiff before the Sub-Judge, Rayagada. ii. On 25.1.1994 on a petition filed by the Petitioner under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 seeking injunction against the Defendant, was granted in M.J.C. No. 3 of 1994, i.e., within a period of one day of filing of the suit. iii. Thereafter, the matter appears to be listed on 11.2.1994 in which the trial court recorded that S.R. of summons not back and the registered cover was received back without service with a report that "addressee not known". iv. On 24.2.1994 the trial court recorded that the notice issued against the opposite party back after personal service. v. On 27.3.1994 due to the alleged absence of the Defendant the suit was decreed. 12. After discussing the facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Single Judge held as follows: .... the present batch of writ petitions merits no further consideration whatsoever, since the earlier directions of this Court are binding on all the parties and accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed by reiterating the earlier direction passed by this Court dated 5.9.2005 in W.P.(C) No. 10256 of 2005 and direct the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Rayagada to take up T.S. Nos. 190 of 2001 and 1 of 1994 analogously and dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order and the lower court order. No necessary adjournment shall be granted and expeditious steps may be taken for disposal of the same. The said judgment is assailed in these writ appeals. 13. In course of hearing, in reply to the preliminary objection raised with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition (WPC No. 14954 of 2005) in which the order passed by the learned Addl. The said judgment is assailed in these writ appeals. 13. In course of hearing, in reply to the preliminary objection raised with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition (WPC No. 14954 of 2005) in which the order passed by the learned Addl. District Judge in Civil Revision No. 3 of 2005 is assailed, in view of the provisions of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, Mr. Rao submitted that the writ jurisdiction being supervisory, any error committed by any of the subordinate courts, if brought to the notice of the High Court, it should exercise its jurisdiction and correct the same, and as such, the writ petition is maintainable. 14. Heard Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Nanda, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent. 15. The controversy in these writ appeals being intermingled with each other and several other orders passed in course of hearing of the suits are assailed and each order is connected to the other, this Court refrains from dealing with the preliminary objection with regard to maintainability so as to put an end to the controversy. 16. The main thrust of argument advanced by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the trial court has completely lost sight of the cardinal principles of law, i.e., the burden to show that service of notice had not been duly made, rests upon the Defendant and not upon the Plaintiff. It is submitted that the records of the case would clearly reveal that notice issued by the court was received by the sole Defendant. The report of the process server was duly accepted and thereafter, the court proceeded with the hearing of the suit and as the Defendant did not appear in the court, passed the ex parte decree. After lapse of considerable length of time, a petition was filed under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC by the Defendant taking the stand that the notice was never served upon her. Thus, according to Mr. Rao, the burden was upon the Defendant to prove that notice was not served. After lapse of considerable length of time, a petition was filed under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC by the Defendant taking the stand that the notice was never served upon her. Thus, according to Mr. Rao, the burden was upon the Defendant to prove that notice was not served. The trial court however, basing upon the statement made by the Defendant to the effect that she had no house at Rayagada and resides permanently at Paralakhemundi and that the address given in the plaint was an intentional act, accepted the said statement and arrived at a conclusion that there was sufficient reason to believe that the notice was not duly served. Such a conclusion, it is stated, is not in accordance with law. 17. The submissions made are stoutly repudiated by learned Counsel for the Respondent. According to the learned Counsel, the court below has examined the witness and found that the address of the Defendant given in the plaint was not correct. The trial court also arrived at a conclusion that the Plaintiff by practicing fraud and suppressing the notice, obtained the exparte decree. Thus, the order passed under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC suffers from no infirmity and requires no interference. 18. To appreciate the inter se submissions, this Court perused the evidence of P.W.1, the sole Defendant. She has clearly stated that she has no house at Rayagada and is a permanent resident of Paralakhemundi. In view of the said statement, it was incumbent upon the Plaintiff to establish the fact that Respondent has a house at Rayagada and she resided in the address given in the plaint. It appears that the Plaintiff totally failed to establish the fact that the address given in the plaint to which notice was issued was the place where the Defendant permanently or usually resides. In absence of such proof, the trial court rightly arrived at a conclusion that there were sufficient reasons to throw a cloud of suspicion in the mind of the court with regard to service of summons on the Defendant. That apart, there are also allegations of fraud, suppression of summons as well as impersonation. 19. Mr. S.S. Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant relied upon number of judgments being Sambhunath Das Vs. Sirish Ch. Mohapatra 95 (2003) CLT, 324 (Basant Singh and Anr. v. Roman Catholic Mission), Bidyadhar Behera Vs. That apart, there are also allegations of fraud, suppression of summons as well as impersonation. 19. Mr. S.S. Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant relied upon number of judgments being Sambhunath Das Vs. Sirish Ch. Mohapatra 95 (2003) CLT, 324 (Basant Singh and Anr. v. Roman Catholic Mission), Bidyadhar Behera Vs. Smt. Kanakalata Nayak 1987(I) OLR 88 (Smt. Usha Jagani v. Shri Bharat Kumar Jagani) and 1949 PC 278 (Kumbhan Lakshmanna and Ors. v. Tangirala Venkataswarlu and others). Though there is no quarrel with regard to the legal proposition enunciated in the said judgments, but the facts and circumstances in the case in hand are completely different. As has been stated earlier, the court entertained a doubt with regard to the address of Defendant given in the plaint and the Plaintiff totally failed to establish that address furnished by him is the place where the Defendant used to reside at the relevant time or the same is her permanent address. In absence of any materials to reach the said conclusion and added to it there are allegations with regard to fraud and impersonation, the court below has rightly come to the conclusion that there are sufficient reasons for setting aside the ex parte decree against the Defendant and she was prevented from appearing in the suit. 20. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., the Supreme court dealing with the words "sufficient cause" observed as follows: Sufficient Cause is an expression which is used in large number of Statutes. In ordinary dictionary meaning is 'adequate' or 'enough', 'any justifiable reason' for which the party could not act. It means the party should not be negligent or want of bona fide cannot be imputed in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or party cannot be alleged 'not acting diligently' or 'remaining inactive'. Facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court to exercise discretion for the reason that when court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (emphasis supplied) 21. In the case of Banarasi Das v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd., AIR 1959 PB 232, the Supreme Court observed as follows: the word 'sufficient' means: 'adequate', 'enough', as much as may be necessary to answer the purposes intended. (emphasis supplied) 21. In the case of Banarasi Das v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd., AIR 1959 PB 232, the Supreme Court observed as follows: the word 'sufficient' means: 'adequate', 'enough', as much as may be necessary to answer the purposes intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when done suffice to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of the existing circumstances and when viewed from reasonable standard of practical and cautious-men. 22. In the case of Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others the Supreme Court explained the difference between the good cause and the sufficient cause and observed that every sufficient cause must be a good cause and must afford an explanation for non-appearance, nor conversely of a sufficient cause, which is not a good one. 23. A cumulative reading of the decisions leads to a conclusion that the expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides are not imputed to the party concerned. The question as to whether sufficient cause has been furnished or not has to be decided on the facts of a particular case, no strait-jacket formula can be stipulated in that regard. The application should be allowed after being fully satisfied that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance. {See: Srei International Finance Ltd. v. Fair Growth Financial Services Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 95 . 24. In the case in hand, after going through the records as well as the evidence of P.W.1., this Court finds that the court below has not committed any error and the decision to set aside the ex parte order was just and proper. The Hon'ble Single Judge has also elaborately dealt with the said aspect of the case and has confirmed the conclusions arrived at by the court below. This Court finds no error apparent and therefore, not inclined to interfere with the aforesaid findings. 25. The further contention of Mr. Rao is that on the ground of fraud or suppression of summons, a petition under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC is not maintainable and under the said contingencies, the person has to file a separate suit for setting aside the ex parte decree. Even otherwise, it is submitted by Mr. 25. The further contention of Mr. Rao is that on the ground of fraud or suppression of summons, a petition under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC is not maintainable and under the said contingencies, the person has to file a separate suit for setting aside the ex parte decree. Even otherwise, it is submitted by Mr. Rao that the decree having been executed, the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC is not maintainable inasmuch as there being no decree existing in the eye of law, the petition to set aside the same under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., does not arise. 26. We failed to appreciate the argument advanced by Mr. Rao. If a suit can be filed for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud, impersonation or suppression of summons and in the said suit an ex parte decree can be set aside, we find no reason as to why the ex parte decree cannot be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C.. The said provision gives a right to the Defendant to apply to the court, who has passed the decree to set aside the ex parte decree and stipulates that if the court is satisfied that summons were not duly served or that the Defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, make an order to set aside the decree. Thus, in a case where irregularity of the service of summons, fraud or impersonation etc. are alleged and the court after perusing the materials is satisfied that there was sufficient cause, it has the power to set aside the ex parte decree. It is well settled that once a decree is set aside all other consequential events/ orders/ action taken thereafter stands automatically annulled. 27. In view of the aforesaid clear proposition, the submission that in all cases to set aside an ex parte decree where fraud is alleged, a separate suit has to be filed, has no legs to stand. 28. It is well settled that once a decree is set aside all other consequential events/ orders/ action taken thereafter stands automatically annulled. 27. In view of the aforesaid clear proposition, the submission that in all cases to set aside an ex parte decree where fraud is alleged, a separate suit has to be filed, has no legs to stand. 28. The second contention that an application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., is not maintainable after the decree is executed, also cannot be accepted more so because once the decree is set aside by exercising the power under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., the parties are relegated to the position where the Defendant was set ex parte. In other words, if the decree is set aside, the suit has to be tried de novo from the same position where the Defendant was set ex parte or ex parte decree was passed. The facts of the decision in Uma Shanker (dead) and others Vs. Sarabjeet (dead) by L.Rs. and others, is distinctly separate and does not apply to the facts of the case in hand. The court below as well as the Hon'ble Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the matter and this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the conclusions arrived at. 29. Admittedly, after the death of Venkayamma, the sole Defendant, a petition was filed by Y. Veerabhadra Rao under Order 22, Rule 4, Code of CPC with a prayer to substitute him. It alleged that a 'Wilnama' has been executed by Venkayamma in favour of Y. Veerabhadra Rao. According to him, after the death of Venkayamma, he succeeds to the entire property and as such, under Order 22, Rule 4, Code of CPC his right to prosecute the lis after the death of the sole Defendant exists as the cause of action survives as far as he is concerned. 30. The properties are situated in the district of Ganjam where a will need not be probated. Thus, by virtue of a 'Wilnama', it is open for a Defendant to put-forth his claim over the property. In the case of Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino Vs. Nalini Bai Naique, the Supreme Court observed that even for the purpose of prosecuting a lis, the person claiming interest in the property can be added as a party. Thus, by virtue of a 'Wilnama', it is open for a Defendant to put-forth his claim over the property. In the case of Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino Vs. Nalini Bai Naique, the Supreme Court observed that even for the purpose of prosecuting a lis, the person claiming interest in the property can be added as a party. In the case in hand, as stated earlier, Defendant No. 1 put-forth his right over the disputed property by virtue of a 'Wilnama'. The genuineness of the 'Wilnama' has to be gone into in the suit itself, which is pending. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the trial court allowing the petition filed by the Respondent under Order 22, Rule 4 and permitting him to be substituted in place of the sole deceased Defendant. 31. The proposition advanced by Mr. Rao that as and when a dispute arises with regard to the legal heir ship, there must be an enquiry under Order 22, Rule 5, Code of CPC is not applicable to the case in hand. Admittedly, Venkayamma is the sole owner of the properties. She had no progeny. On the basis of a 'Wilnama' said to have been executed by her, Y. Veerabhadra Rao put-forth his right over the properties. Whether the Respondent has acquired right, title or interest in respect of the properties bequeathed in his favour is a question, which has to be determined in the suit itself, thus, not permitting the said Respondent to prosecute the suit would be unjust and improper. This aspect has also been dealt with by the court below as well as the Hon'ble Single Judge and the conclusions arrived at requires no interference. 32. Admittedly, Venkayamma was the absolute owner of the properties in dispute. According to the Appellant, Venkayamma had agreed to alienate the properties in his favour and had entered into an agreement. She had also received part payment. But then, as she adopted dilly dally tactics, the Appellant had to file a suit for specific performance of contract and the suit was decreed ex parte. 33. Venkayamma admittedly filed a petition under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree. Such a petition was filed during her life time. It was resisted on the ground of delay and also on merits. 33. Venkayamma admittedly filed a petition under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of CPC with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree. Such a petition was filed during her life time. It was resisted on the ground of delay and also on merits. According to Venkayamma, the address furnished in the plaint was not her address and that there is no evidence to reveal that she was residing in the said address. She also alleged fraud and impersonation. The court below after discussing the evidence rightly arrived at a conclusion that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance, set aside the ex parte decree and directed de novo trial of Title Suit No. 1 of 1994. 34. During pendency of the said trial, admittedly Venkayamma died and Y. Veerabhadra Rao who has filed another suit bearing Title Suit No. 19 of 2001 for declaration of right, title and interest, filed a petition under Order 22, Rule 4, Code of CPC to get himself impleaded in Title Suit No. 1 of 1994. The said petition has been allowed. That apart, this Court in W.P.(C) No. 10256 of 2005 directed to try both the suits analogously one after the other. The revisional court as well as this Court after vivid discussion of the materials available had arrived at a conclusion that there are sufficient reasons to set aside the ex parte decree and to permit the Defendant to contest the suit in place of the deceased Defendant. The Hon'ble Single Judge has confirmed the orders passed in his judgment impugned. After going through the orders, we find no reason to interfere with the same as the said orders do not suffer from any infirmity and the conclusions arrived at by the Hon'ble Single Judge are just and proper. That apart, no error apparent could be brought to our notice. Consequently, all the writ appeals stand dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Final Result : Dismissed