Judgment : In W.P.No.11504 of 2006 the petitioners have challenged the order dated 26.6.2001 passed by the third respondent declining the request of the petitioners seeking issuance of patta in respect of the land in Old S.No.84/6, Block No.34, Thiruvanmiyur Village, on the ground that the said land was acquired for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in Award No.4 of 1986 dated 23.9.1986. 2. In W.P.No.43770 of 2006 the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Government to issue NOC for the development of their land comprised in S.No.84/6A1A/A1A part of Thiruvanmiyur Village and T.S.No.84/6A/1A part and as per Urban Land Tax assessment. 3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ petitions are as follows: (a) Petitioners claim that they are owners of the land comprised in S.No.84/6A1A1 (part) measuring about 20 grounds. The said land is in S.No.84, Thiruvanmiyur Village. According to the petitioners they became owners by way of Settlement Deed executed in the year 1972. The said land was sub-divided prior to 1975 as per the Field Map dated 18.7.1975. Petitioners names are found in the said map as owners. (b) As per G.O.Ms.No.1096, dated 17.7.1978, a notification was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Part-II, Section-II on 9.8.1978 and the petitioners names have not been shown, instead the name of one K.T.Stephen was shown. According to the petitioners, even in the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, approved by the Government and published in the Government Gazette dated 8.8.1981, petitioners name do not appear, even though their names were found in the revenue records. Therefore the acquisition for the development of the said area as Besant Nagar Phase-II Scheme of the petitioners land in favour of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was not correct. (c) According to the petitioners, no Section 5A enquiry notice or notice under Section 9 (3) was served on the petitioners. On 25.11.1986, a notice was served on the petitioners stating that the award amount was deposited in the City Civil Court, Madras, and the petitioners were called upon to surrender possession of the said land. (c) According to the petitioners, no Section 5A enquiry notice or notice under Section 9 (3) was served on the petitioners. On 25.11.1986, a notice was served on the petitioners stating that the award amount was deposited in the City Civil Court, Madras, and the petitioners were called upon to surrender possession of the said land. (d) The petitioners filed W.P.No.13211 of 1986 to quash the notification issued under Section 4(1) and declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and in W.P.M.P.No.2011 of 1986, petitioners obtained an interim injunction from dispossessing them from the said land during the pendency of the writ petition. On 24.10.1991 this Court allowed the said writ petition and quashed 4(1) notification and 6 declaration. According to the petitioners, the said order was not challenged by the respondents by filing writ appeal. (e) The petitioners intended to develop their land and applied for planning permission before the CMDA. The CMDA directed the petitioners to obtain No Objection Certificate from the third respondent. Consequently, petitioners approached the Chairman, TNHB/third respondent in W.P.No.43770 of 2006, for the grant of NOC and according to the petitioners the third respondent then informed that appeal against the order of this Court was preferred. According to the petitioner, no notice in the writ appeal was served on the petitioners and the petitioners made enquiry through their counsel and they came to know that no writ appeal was filed against the order of this Court dated 24.10.1991 insofar as the petitioners writ petition was concerned. (f) According to the petitioners, they again approached the third respondent for the grant of NOC. Petitioners also approached the second respondent for the grant of patta by contending that the petitioners land was assessed to urban land tax upto Fasli 1415. The second respondent Tahsildar by his proceedings dated 26.6.2001 stated that as per the revenue records, the land comprised in Old S.NO.84/6 has been acquired by the Government and award has been passed on 23.9.1986 and therefore no patta can be issued to the petitioners. The second respondent Tahsildar by his proceedings dated 26.6.2001 stated that as per the revenue records, the land comprised in Old S.NO.84/6 has been acquired by the Government and award has been passed on 23.9.1986 and therefore no patta can be issued to the petitioners. (g) As against the rejection of request to issue patta by the Tahsildar and NOC having not been issued by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, petitioners have filed these writ petitions contending that the Housing scheme itself was abandoned by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and in view of the writ petition filed by the petitioners which was allowed in the year 1991, they have every right to develop the land. 4. The respondents have filed counter affidavit contending that the land of the petitioners was acquired by issuing Section 4(1) notification published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 9.8.1978 and Section 6 declaration was also published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 8.8.1981; award was passed on 23.9.1986; possession was also taken and handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board immediately. The award having not been challenged, and Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration alone having been challenged by the petitioners in the earlier writ petition, which was allowed along with the batch of cases on the ground of alleged vagueness in the notification regarding the purpose for which acquisition was made, and the said vagueness plea having not been accepted by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1996) 1 SCC 250 (State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan) and other issues in the said writ petition having not been decided and held in favour of the petitioners in terms of the judgment of the supreme Court, the order of this Court dated 24.10.1991 gets nullified and therefore the petitioners cannot rely on the said judgment for seeking patta from the Tahsildar and for the grant of NOC by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for getting planning permission from C.M.D.A. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the earlier order of this Court having been allowed to become final holding that the 4(1) notification and 6 declaration made are invalid, all the proceedings initiated against the petitioners in respect of the said land are lapsed and the petitioners being the true owners of the said land, the respondents are not justified in treating the said land as acquired land and the petitioners are entitled to get patta for the said land from the Tahsildar and NOC from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. 6. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents submitted that in respect of the petitioners land also award was passed in Award No.4 of 1986 on 23.9.1986 and possession was taken and handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 30.10.1986 and the said award was not challenged by the petitioners and the same has become final. The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that notification issued under Section 4(1) and the declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 alone were challenged by the petitioners in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 on 9.12.1986 i.e, about three months after the award was passed and this Court along with connected writ petitions by a common order dated 24.10.1991 allowed the writ petitions only on the ground of vagueness by following the judgment in W.P.No.3693 of 1986 etc., batch. The Government filed writ appeal against the said order made in W.P.No.3693 of 1986 and ultimately the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1996) 1 SCC 250 (State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan) held that the proceedings quashed by this Court on the ground of vagueness is unsustainable. Writ appeals filed challenging the order dated 24.10.1991 in W.A.No.508 to 521 of 1995 wherein S.No.84/6 of Tiruvanmiyur Taluk was also included were also allowed by his Court by common order dated 16.11.1996 and therefore the petitioners have no right to rely on the judgment of this Court made in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 dated 24.10.1991. Writ appeals filed challenging the order dated 24.10.1991 in W.A.No.508 to 521 of 1995 wherein S.No.84/6 of Tiruvanmiyur Taluk was also included were also allowed by his Court by common order dated 16.11.1996 and therefore the petitioners have no right to rely on the judgment of this Court made in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 dated 24.10.1991. The learned Additional Advocate General also submitted that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the decision rendered by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts and authorities and the said issue is no longer res integra as per the decisions of the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in (1985) 2 SCC 512 (Shenoy and Co v. Commercial Tax Officer); (2001) 2 SCC 549 (U.P.Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Limited); and (2002) 4 SCC 638 (Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R.Apparao). The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that possession of the land having been taken and vested with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on and from 30.10.1986, the petitioners prayer for issuing patta by the Tahsildar was rightly rejected on 26.6.2001 and the petitioners have no right to demand NOC from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for the development of the said land, which has already been acquired and is in possession of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and these writ petitions, are bound to be dismissed. 7. In reply to the said submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondents having not chosen to file any writ appeal against the order in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 wherein notification issued under Section 4(1) and declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was quashed on 24.10.1986, the entire land acquisition proceedings as against the petitioners have to be treated as lapsed and therefore the Tahsildar is bound to issue patta for the lands and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board is bound to issue NOC for the development of the land. 8. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. 9. 8. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. 9. The point for consideration in these writ petitions are, whether the writ petitions filed to quash the rejection of patta in respect of the petitioners land acquired through Award No.4 of 1986 dated 23.9.1986 and the request made before the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for issuing NOC for the development of the lands are sustainable ? 10. The acquisition of the petitioners subject land by issuing notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through G.O.Ms.No.1096 Housing & Urban Development Department dated 17.7.1978 and declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through G.O.Ms.No.667 Housing & Urban Development Department, dated 6.8.1981 and the appearance of the petitioners pursuant to Section 9(3) and Section 10 notices on 25.8.1986 before passing the award are not in dispute. The petitioners after receiving the notice issued under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through one K.L.Johan, filed a letter on 10.9.1986 and stated that the land measuring 20 grounds (1.04 acre) is owned by them. Hence the petitioners names had been included as interested persons. Therefore the petitioners were very well aware of Section 9(3) and 10 notices issued by the Land Acquisition Officer. Along with the petitioners names, other persons names, namely M.N.Philip, Mary Philip and Mohan Ninar Philip were also included as persons interested in respect of land in survey No.84/6A1A1A1A1, totally measuring 2.31 acres. The Award No.4 of 1986 was passed on 23.9.1986 under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Along with the petitioners names, other persons names, namely M.N.Philip, Mary Philip and Mohan Ninar Philip were also included as persons interested in respect of land in survey No.84/6A1A1A1A1, totally measuring 2.31 acres. The Award No.4 of 1986 was passed on 23.9.1986 under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The said award reads as follows: "Whereas an extent of land measuring acres 8.10 and situated in the village of 140 Thiruvanmiyur in the taluk of Mylapore-Triplicane in the registration sub-district of Saidapet, in the district of Madras and registered in the name after occupied by the persons specified below, has been declared by the Government at page 5 to 9 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, part-II, Section-2 dated 9.8.78 to be needed for the Besant Nagar Phase II Scheme, by the Tamilnadu Housing Board, Nandanam, Madras35 the undersigned after full enquiry into the case and on due consideration of the various circumstances connected with the acquisition as herebefore set forth, makes the following award under his hand: i. The true are of the .. 8.10 acres land in acres" (Emphasis Supplied) The petitioners names are mentioned in item Nos.79 and 80 in List-III as person or persons to whom the compensation is due. The amount of compensation is also mentioned therein. The said extent of land was acquired on the basis of a request made by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board through "The Chairman", Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras-35, vide his letter dated 21.6.1975. It was requested as follows: NOTE EXPLAINING THE AWARD No.4/86, DATED -9-1986 The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras-35, in his letter No.Nil, dated 21.6.75 has applied for the acquisition of an extent of 96.92 acres of land in S.No.102/2 etc., of No.140 Thiruvanmiyur Village, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Madras District for a public purpose to wit for the development of the area as "Besant Nagar Phase II Scheme" at Thiruvanmiyur by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Accordingly, the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for an extent of 96.92 acres in Thiruvanmiyur village was approved in G.O.Ms.No.1096 (H&UD Department) dated 17.7.1978 and published as Notification No.II(2) HUD/3911/78 at pages 5 to 9 of supplement to part II section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 9.8.78. Accordingly, the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for an extent of 96.92 acres in Thiruvanmiyur village was approved in G.O.Ms.No.1096 (H&UD Department) dated 17.7.1978 and published as Notification No.II(2) HUD/3911/78 at pages 5 to 9 of supplement to part II section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 9.8.78. The draft erratta to Draft Notification was approved in Govt.Memo No.51144/A1/78-1 (H&UD Department) dated 8.11.78 and published at pages 6 and7 of supplement to part II section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Govt. Gazette dated 6.12.78. Draft erratta to letter No.38332/A1/79-1 (H&UD Department) dated 12.9.79 and published at pages 10 of supplement to part II section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 10.10.79. For the purpose of taking further action to submit Draft Declaration and other follow up action, the entire extent of 96.92 acres was split up into 5 convenient blocks as noted below, as per special Deputy Collectors proceedings Rc.3708/78-dated 5.1.79. Block No. Extent as per 4(1) Notification 22.40 II 18.63 III 23.44 IV 15.78 V 16.67 Total 96.92 acres -------" 11. Section 9(3) and 10 notices were sent to the persons interested, including the petitioners, whose names are mentioned in item Nos.5 and 6. The extent of land acquired of the petitioners is also mentioned as item Nos.4 and 5 viz., 10 grounds (0.52 acres) each so far as the petitioners 1 and 2 are concerned. Thus, it is beyond doubt that award was passed as early as on 23.9.1986 against the petitioners land and petitioners were informed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 30.9.1986 that the compensation amount was deposited into City Civil Court, Madras, and also called upon the petitioners to hand over possession of the land, which is the subject matter of these writ petitions. Possession was also taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 30.10.1986 and from the said date onwards the Tamil Nadu Housing Board is in possession of the land. Handing over of 6.36 acres of land including 2.31 acres of dry land in Survey No.84/6A1A1A1A1, Thiruvanmiyur Village, is recorded by a Transfer of charge Certificate dated 30.10.1986, which reads as follows, "Rc.411/79.G1. Handing over of 6.36 acres of land including 2.31 acres of dry land in Survey No.84/6A1A1A1A1, Thiruvanmiyur Village, is recorded by a Transfer of charge Certificate dated 30.10.1986, which reads as follows, "Rc.411/79.G1. Award No.4/86, dt.23.9.86 BLOCK-II Transfer of Charge Certificate I, Thiru C.ELUMALAI, Assistant Grade Revenue Inspector, Office of the Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, State Housing Board Schemes, Madras have this day of 30th October, 1986 handed over and I, Thiru C.PARTHASARATHY, H.S., Besant Nagar Division, on behalf of the Madras State Housing Board have taken over the properties mentioned below: District : MADRAS Taluk: Mylapore-Triplicane Village : 140.THIRUVANMIYUR Survey No. Extent Structures Trees Wells 1. 78/4 Wet 0.59 - - - 2. 78/7 " 0.48 - - - 3. 78/8 " 0.33 - - - 4. 78/9 " 0.45 - - - 5. 78/14 " 0.56 - - - 6. 78/10 " 0.22 (out of 0.33)- - - 7. 78/11 " 0.34 - - - 8. 78/13 " 0.60 - - - 9. 84/6A1 Dry 1.88 (out of 2.31) A1A1A1 one pump 4 coconut one shed (not trees round in use) well 10.84/6A1 " 0.17 - - -A1C 11.84/6A1 " 0.39 - - -A1D 12.84/6B " 0.35 (out of 0.43) - - - Total 6.36 acres Total 6.36 acres only Handed over Taken over with sketches with sketches Sd/- xxx Sd/- xxx Assistant Gr. Head Surveyor Revenue Inspector, Besant Nagar Divn. (L.A.)VI, T.N.H.B. T.N.H.B.Schemes, Nandanam." 12. The earlier writ petition filed by the petitioners in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 was challenging notification issued under Section 4(1) and declaration made under Section 6 alone. Once the award is passed in land acquisition proceedings, the award has to be challenged by the erstwhile owners if mandatory procedures have not been followed without which no writ petition is maintainable. The said issue was already considered and settled by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1997) 2 SCC 627 (C. Padma and others v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu and Others); AIR 2000 SC 671 (Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig); (2003) 4 SCC 485 (Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab); and Division Bench decision reported in 2005 (3) CTC 691 (Harshavardhan v. State of Tamil Nadu). In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2005 (3) CTC 691 (cited supra) in para 3 it is held as follows: "3. In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2005 (3) CTC 691 (cited supra) in para 3 it is held as follows: "3. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court in Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2003 (4) SCC 485 , that writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings should not be entertained after the award has been passed. In that case, the award was passed on 15.3.1994 whereas the writ petition was filed on 12.4.1994, i.e., after the award was given. Hence the writ petition was dismissed as belated. Similarly in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 , the Supreme Court observed vide paragraph 17: "In any event, after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder." The Supreme Court also observed in that decision that this has been the consistent view of the Court e.g., in C.Padma and others v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, 1997 (2) SCC 627 ; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co.Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 482 , etc. Hence, without going into the merits of the case, we are of the opinion that the writ petition was rightly dismissed on the ground of laches. The writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed." (Emphasis Supplied) Applying the said decisions to the petitioners case the writ petition filed by the petitioners in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 without challenging the Award No.4 of 1986 dated 23.9.1986 is not maintainable. 13. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioners on 8.10.1991 along with connected batch of cases solely on the ground of vagueness, that too following the earlier order passed by this Court in order dated 8.10.1991 made in W.P.No.3693 of 1986, etc. 13. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioners on 8.10.1991 along with connected batch of cases solely on the ground of vagueness, that too following the earlier order passed by this Court in order dated 8.10.1991 made in W.P.No.3693 of 1986, etc. The prayer made in W.P.No.13211 of 1986 reads as follows: "Calling for the records of the first respondent relating to acquisition of the land comprised in S.No.84/6A and presently 84/6A1, A1B of Thiruvanmiyur Village in pursuance of the notification G.O.Ms.No.1096 Housing, dated 17.7.1978 and G.O.Ms.No.667 Housing dated 6.8.1981 and quash the said proceedings of the first respondent insofar as the petitioners lands are concerned and delete the said lands from acquisition." The order passed by this Court dated 8.10.1991 reads as follows: "The matters in issue in these writ petitions are similar to the matters in issued in W.P.No.3693 of 1986 etc., batch. This court by order in W.P.No.3693 of 1986 etc., batch dated 8.10.1991 quashed the land acquisition proceedings impugned therein and allowed the writ petitions. Following the said decision, since the matters in issue are the same in all these writ petitions, the acquisition proceedings are quashed and these writ petitions are allowed." In the decision reported in (1996) 1 SCC 250 (State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan) the Honourable Supreme Court held that the decision rendered by this Court in respect of the very same ground of vagueness cannot be sustained. Following the said judgment, writ appeal filed by the respondents viz., W.A.No.406 of 1994 was allowed on 29.8.1996 and W.A.Nos.508 to 521 of 1995 were also allowed by this Court by judgment dated 16.11.1996 and in the said writ appeal, namely W.A.No.521 of 1995 the very same notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, made as per G.O.Ms.No.1096 dated 17.7.1978 comprised in Survey No.84/6, presently S.No.84/6A Thiruvanmiyur Village, where the petitioners land is also notified was upheld. In the common order dated 16.11.1996, the Division Bench held thus, "These writ appeals are preferred against the common order dated 9th October, 1991 passed by the learned single Judge allowing writ petition Nos.8979, 8205, 8674, 8965, 8446, 8621, 8683, 7384, 7512, 9104, 8685, 7783, 7867 and 8932 of 1986 and quashing the acquisition proceedings relating to Survey Nos.22/1B, 22/2, 100/1, 113/4, 113/10A2, 148/3, B1 and 12/2B of Valsaravakkam Village, S.No.89, 153 and 154 of Porur Village, 76/1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7, 195/3, 216/1, 217/3, 44/2B, 44/2D Valasaravakkam and 84/6 and 84/6A of Thiruvanmiyur Village. The learned single Judge has allowed the writ petitions and quashed the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the public purpose mentioned in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act suffered from vagueness. The purpose for which the acquisition was made was for Housing Board Scheme. Similar question arose before the Supreme Court in STATE OF T.N. AND OTHERS v. L.KRISHNAN AND OTHERS ( (1996) 1 SCC 250 ), in which it was held that the mentioning of the public purpose as the Housing Board Scheme did not suffer from vagueness and it did not affect the validity of the acquisition proceedings. 2. Accordingly, following the said decision of the Supreme Court, the writ appeals are allowed. The order dated 9.10.1991 passed by the learned Judge allowing Writ Petition Nos.8979, 8205, 8674, 8965, 8446, 8621, 8683, 7384, 7512, 9104, 8685, 7788, 7867 and 8932 of 1986 is set aside. The writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. 3. However, we make it clear that if the writ petitioners satisfy the requirements of Resolution No.7/86 dated 2.7.1986 passed by the Housing Board it is open to them to make an application seeking reconveyance of the lands covered by the buildings. In such an event, the Housing Board shall consider such requests of the writ petitioners and take a decision in terms of Resolution No.7/86 dated 2.7.1986." (Emphasis Supplied) In W.A.Nos.507/1995, 706 to 720, 722 to 726/1995 also the Division Bench by Judgment dated 26.7.2001 set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 8.10.1991 and other orders and upheld the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 14. 14. Whether the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1996) 1 SCC 250 (State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan) will apply to the petitioners land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India is also answered affirmatively by the Supreme Court in the following decisions. (a) In (1985) 2 SCC 512 (Shenoy and Co v. Commercial Tax Officer) in paragraphs 22 and 23 it is held as follows: "22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause or controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case ( (1980) 4 SCC 697 ). When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as follows: “The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. A mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed, the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the Court to hear them also. In cases like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed, the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by this Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment. We would like to observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before this Court by them. We do not find fault with the State for having filed only one appeal. It is, of course, an economising procedure.” 23. The judgment in Hansa Corporation case rendered by one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows: “As we are not able to uphold the contentions which found favour with the High Court in striking down the impugned Act and the notification issued thereunder and as we find no merit in other contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent for sustaining the judgment of the High Court, this appeal must succeed. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs throughout.” To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases." (b) (2001) 2 SCC 549 (U.P.Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Limited) in para 18 it is held as follows: "18. ................ when the Supreme Court declares a law and holds either a particular levy as valid or invalid it is idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only those parties who are before the Court and not others in respect of whom appeal had not been filed. ................ when the Supreme Court declares a law and holds either a particular levy as valid or invalid it is idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only those parties who are before the Court and not others in respect of whom appeal had not been filed. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. To contend that the conclusion reached in such a case as to the validity of a levy would apply only to the parties before the Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory. When the main judgment of the High Court has been rendered ineffective, it (sic the judgment of the Supreme Court) would be applicable even in other cases, for exercise to bring those decisions in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court will be absolutely necessary. Viewed from that angle, we find this contention to be futile and it deserves to be rejected." (Emphasis Supplied) (c) In (2002) 4 SCC 638 (Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R.Apparao) in para 7 it is held thus: "7............. Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has “declared law” it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. An “obiter dictum” as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a given case. ........." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. In the light of the decisions cited supra, petitioners have no right to contend that the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, having been set aside by this Court on the ground of vagueness, petitioners have become owners of the land and they are entitled to get patta from the Tahsildar and NOC from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. 16. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the Housing Board having been given possession as early as on 30.10.1986, the petitioners have no locus standi to demand patta and NOC for the land, which has already vested with the TNHB, which has not been divested and reconveyance is also not possible as per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 2 SCC 786 (Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran). In paragraph 29 the Supreme Court held thus, "29. ........ we may notice the judgment of this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal ( (2007) 9 SCC 255 ). The question considered in that case was whether the Division Bench of the High Court could direct release of the acquired land which had been transferred to the appellant Board. While setting aside the impugned order, this Court observed: (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-16) “13. The question considered in that case was whether the Division Bench of the High Court could direct release of the acquired land which had been transferred to the appellant Board. While setting aside the impugned order, this Court observed: (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-16) “13. It is clearly pleaded by the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board that the scheme had not been suspended or abandoned and that the lands acquired are very much needed for the implementation of the scheme and the steps in that regard have already been taken. In the light of this position, it is not open to the Court to assume that the project has been abandoned merely because another piece of land in the adjacent village had been released from acquisition in the light of orders of the Court. It could not be assumed that the whole of the project had been abandoned or has become unworkable. It depends upon the purpose for which the land is acquired. As we see it, we find no impediment in the lands in question being utilised for the purpose of putting up a multi-storied building containing small flats, intended as the public purpose when the acquisition was notified. Therefore, the High Court clearly erred in proceeding as if the scheme stood abandoned. This was an unwarranted assumption on the part of the Court, which has no foundation in the pleadings and the materials produced in the case. The Court should have at least insisted on production of materials to substantiate a claim of abandonment. 14. We have already noticed that in the writ petition, there are no sufficient allegations justifying interference by the Court. Mere claim of possession by the writ petitioners is not a foundation on which the relief now granted could have been rested either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench of the High Court. On the materials, no right to relief has been established by the writ petitioners. 15. We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. ............" The said position is reiterated in the Supreme Court decision reported in 2010 (4) CTC 724 (May George v. Special Tahsildar) wherein in para 27 the Supreme Court held as follows: "27. We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. ............" The said position is reiterated in the Supreme Court decision reported in 2010 (4) CTC 724 (May George v. Special Tahsildar) wherein in para 27 the Supreme Court held as follows: "27. In fact, the land vest in the State free from all encumbrances when possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act. Once land is vested in the State, it cannot be divested even if there has been some irregularity in the Acquisition proceedings. ........" Therefore the learned Additional Advocate General is right in his submissions. Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass-Book Act, 1983 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1986) mandates issue of patta by the Tahsildar to the owner of the land. The petitioners not being the owners of the land on and after 30.10.1986, they are not entitled to get patta in their favour. 17. No case is made out to interfere with the order passed by the Tahsildar and no case is made out to issue direction to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to give NOC to the petitioners for getting planning permission as the petitioners are no longer owners of the land as the land is owned by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.