JUDGMENT Hon'ble Devendra Pratap Singh, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This petition by the landlord is directed against concurrent judgments dated 30.8.1998 and 27.1.2006 by which the release application of the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) and 21(1-A) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been rejected by both the courts below. 3. The landlord filed an application for release under the Act with the allegation that he was appointed as a Personal Assistant to Pro-Vice Chancellor in the Aligarh Muslim University w.e.f. 1.10.1956 and therefore, he left his ancestral house situated in Mohalla Talab Keleywala, Near Masjid Milan, Thana Kunda in Rampur where his father and other brothers and sisters stayed back. However, the father of the petitioner Late Shri Salamatullah Khan also shifted to Aligarh to ensure better educational facilities for his sons and daughters and allowed Shri Mushtaq Hussain Khan, the deceased respondent (who has been now substituted by his heirs) as tenant at Rs. 30/- per month in the disputed premises on the ground floor consisting two bed rooms, one verandah , court yard, kitchen, sitting room, latrine and bathroom etc. with the promise that on the return of the petitioners he would vacate it. During his life time Slamatullah Khan used to go periodically for collecting his pension at Rampur and used to stay at the said accommodation. After his demise in 1979 the respondent tenant started paying rent to the petitioner no. 1. Upon his retirement on 30.9.1993 he continued to stay in the official accommodation provided by the University at enhanced rent but despite several requests the respondent tenant did not vacate the premises and therefore, the petitioners could not shift to their ancestral house in Rampur forcing him to file aforesaid application for release for his own and his family's occupation. 4. The respondent tenant filed his objections admitting tenancy at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month but contested the need of the landlord. He claimed that the wife of the landlord had succeeded to two house at Rampur itself which could satisfy their need. It was also stated that earlier a release application under Section 21(1)(a) had been filed in 1989 for release of the disputed accommodation setting up the need of petitioner nos. He claimed that the wife of the landlord had succeeded to two house at Rampur itself which could satisfy their need. It was also stated that earlier a release application under Section 21(1)(a) had been filed in 1989 for release of the disputed accommodation setting up the need of petitioner nos. 3 and 4 but the same was dismissed on 16.3.1993 and the consequential appeal was also dismissed on 4.9.1995 holding that they had available two rooms on the first floor of the disputed house and the said finding having become final and as these facts were not disclosed in the release application, it showed that there was no genuine need but only to harass and evict the tenants, the motivated release has been filed. 5. The parties filed their respective evidence and the trial court relied heavily upon the findings rendered in the release application filed on behalf of petitioner nos. 3 and 4 and held that two rooms were available on the first floor which can be utilized for the alleged need of the landlord after repairs. It also held that the filing of the earlier release application having been suppressed, pointed towards the suspicious need of the landlord. It also held that even though the landlord had retired in September, 1993 he did not amend the release application to add his need with motives and considering these facts, it held that the landlord had no intention of coming to Rampur. The appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court and went on to hold that the landlord had a house in Aligarh. 6. The very approach of both the courts below was erroneous, to say the least. Assuming, as both the courts below have found, that the petitioner had two rooms in their possession on the first floor, but it also found that there were no amenities such as toilet, kitchen, bathroom etc. but yet the courts have gone on to hold that the same could be constructed since the landlord had the means. It is also evident from the record that the two rooms on the first floor were in a dilapidated condition and had wooden planked roof. It has time and again been held by this court and the Apex Court that neither the tenant nor the court can dictate to the landlord as to how should he manage his affairs. It is also evident from the record that the two rooms on the first floor were in a dilapidated condition and had wooden planked roof. It has time and again been held by this court and the Apex Court that neither the tenant nor the court can dictate to the landlord as to how should he manage his affairs. Why should a landlord, and that too a retired person, be forced to add constructions or carry out repairs of the dilapidated portion of his own house to use it while the tenant continues to enjoy the possession of the habitable portion thereof. The Apex Court in the case of R.C. Tamrakar and another Vs. Nidi Lekha has held in para 10 as under:- "Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bona fide requirement. It is unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself." 7. Both the courts below have erroneously held that since the landlord did not make any effort after his retirement in 1993 to shift to the two dilapidated rooms after repairs, leads to the conclusion that he would not shift to Rampur. Though the appellate court has considered the view of the Apex Court in this regard but it has overlooked it on the ground that no effort was made to establish even a temporary habitation in Rampur in all these years. The courts have also erroneously held that since no effort was made by the landlord to temporarily shift in the house belonging to his wife and therefore, it would show that he did not want to settle at Rampur. Both the courts below have laid great stress upon the decision in the earlier release case of 1989. It is apparent that the said release was moved on behalf of the petitioner nos. 3 and 4 and not on behalf of the petitioner no. 1 who retired in 1993. There is no bar under the Act for moving subsequent release application especially when the cause of action was entirely different. It is apparent that the said release was moved on behalf of the petitioner nos. 3 and 4 and not on behalf of the petitioner no. 1 who retired in 1993. There is no bar under the Act for moving subsequent release application especially when the cause of action was entirely different. It has also to be kept in mind that the landlord is a native of Rampur from where he had migrated to Aligarh to serve in the University and has every right to shift back to his native place for which he has no other premises except his ancestral house. 8. From the record it is apparent that the application was moved both under Sections 21(1)(A) and 21(1)(a). It is admitted to the parties that the petitioner retired from the Aligarh Muslim University, which is a Central University and had to vacate his service quarter after retiring and he was also asked to pay penal rent for occupying it beyond his retirement. Though both the courts below were conscious of this fact and the appellate court, though has considered the aspect of 21(1)(A) but has refused to go into its object merely on the ground that it was found that the wife of the landlord had an ancestral house in Rampur and a plot at Aligarh. It would be appropriate to notice Section 21(1)(A) which reads as under: "(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation." 9. It is apparent that this section uses the word "shall"------------ order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy." Though it has been contended that the building of the University is not a public building, the argument appears to be totally devoid of merit. It is apparent that this section uses the word "shall"------------ order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy." Though it has been contended that the building of the University is not a public building, the argument appears to be totally devoid of merit. The word "public building" is defined in Section 3(o) in the following words: "Public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) and includes and building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation;" 10. Admittedly, Aligarh Muslim University is a Central University receiving all funding from the Central Government and the President of India is the Visitor. For the purposes of this Act, it can safely be said that the building belonging to the University will partake the nature of a public building. This fact is further fortified by the notification dated 16.6.1983 where an officer of the University has been declared to be the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 from which it is apparent that buildings belonging to the Aligarh Muslim University within the territorial limits of Aligarh District are public premises. This Court in the case of S.M. Hussain Vs. Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others had held that in such circumstances the landlord becomes entitled for release as a matter of course, in the following words: "Pointing out the distinction between an application under Section 21 (1)(d) and 21 (1-A) of the Act it was held in the case of Kalyan Rai (supra) that under Section 21(1-A) upon the proof of the mere fact that the landlord was in occupation of an official residence which he has had to vacate in consequence of the cessation of his employment, the landlord becomes entitled straightway to the release of the accommodation as a matter of course. The authorities are bound to release the accommodation under the provision without any consideration of the hardship which the tenant might suffer by the grant of the application. The impugned orders cannot therefore be quashed on this ground either." Again this court in the case of Dhano Mal Navani Vs. III Addl. The authorities are bound to release the accommodation under the provision without any consideration of the hardship which the tenant might suffer by the grant of the application. The impugned orders cannot therefore be quashed on this ground either." Again this court in the case of Dhano Mal Navani Vs. III Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another [ARC 1990 (2) 93] has held that where twin requirements are met, the Prescribed Authority has no option but to allow the release application in the following words:- "As observed by the respondent No. 1 himself, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 mandates that the Prescribed Authority shall order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if he is satisfied (I) that the landlord of such building in occupation of a public building for residential purposes, (ii) which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment." 11. So far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, the trial court has held that even though both the parties were retired personels but since the landlord received a higher pension and was a man of means and had also available two rooms on the first floor of the disputed house, the tenant would suffer greater hardship. The appellate court has affirmed those findings and also held that the landlord has alternative accommodation. The court has already found that the alternative accommodation available to the landlord was not habitable as found by the courts below themselves and that it can be utilized only after repair and construction of necessary amenities. The landlord cannot be forced to go to his wife's ancestral house and that too when it was in a dilapidated condition. There is no substantive evidence on record to show that the respondent tenant had ever made any effort to search out a alternative accommodation. Even during the pendency of this writ petition for the last four years, nothing has been brought on record to show that any effort has been made by the tenant to find a alternative accommodation. In every case of release or eviction the tenant is bound to face some hardship but that cannot be the sole ground for rejecting the genuine requirement of the landlord. Thus, there can be no two opinions of the fact that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the application is rejected. 12. In every case of release or eviction the tenant is bound to face some hardship but that cannot be the sole ground for rejecting the genuine requirement of the landlord. Thus, there can be no two opinions of the fact that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the application is rejected. 12. Thus, considering the facts from any angle, it is apparent that both the courts below committed manifest error of law in rejecting the application on the basis of facts proved before it. Normally, the court may have remanded the matter for decision afresh but considering the fact that the matter is pending for the last 14 years and the court can itself pass an order on the basis of facts found proved before the courts below, it would not be appropriate to do so in the present case. 13. For the reasons above, this petition succeeds and is allowed and both the impugned orders dated 13.8.1998 and 27.1.2006 are hereby quashed. The respondent tenant shall vacate the premises forthwith. 14. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.