Judgment Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. On 25.2.2008, this Court had passed the following order :- "Jaspal Singh (Pal Singh) son of late Dalip Singh resident of village Dhanas, Chandigarh, was convicted by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, under Section 7(iii) read with Section 16(l)(a)(i) to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved against his conviction and sentence, petitioner had filed an appeal. The same was decided by Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, on 11th March, 1996. Conviction of the petitioner was maintained and his sentence was reduced to six months. Mr. M.S. Chaddha, who has filed the petition, is stated to have left the practice. Mr. Gurvinderpal Singh, who is present in the Court and is a very seasoned lawyer, is requested to argue this matter for the petitioner and is appointed as amicus curiae. Registry is directed to supply photocopy of the file to Mr. Gurvinderpal Singh. The matter be listed for arguments on 10th March, 2008". 2. Thereafter Mr.Gurvinderpal Singh, Advocate, who was appointed as Amicus Curiae, sought adjournment on 13.3.2008. Case was again adjourned on 10.4.2008, 1.5.2008 and 20.5.2008. A Coordinate Bench, on 19.11.2008, had passed the following order :- "Adjourned to 21.1.2009 in the interest of justice. In the meantime, counsel for the parties be informed of the date fixed. It is made clear that if no one appears on the next date of hearing, this revision petition shall be disposed of on merits, after going through the file". 3. In these circumstances, the Court has no option except to proceed and decide the case on basis of record available. 4. Petitioner Jaspal Singh (Pal Singh) was apprehended by Balbir Singh, Food Inspector, in Sector 16, Chandigarh, on 29.9.1987 at 7.30 A.M. He was found in possession of 20 Kgs. of un-in- dicated milk. The milk was being carried in a drum. Food Inspector served a notice Ex.PA and purchased 750 mls. of milk by paying Rs. 3/-. Receipt Ex.P3 to this effect was executed by the accused. Food Inspector has stated in the complaint that the milk was made homogeneous and it was divided into three equal parts and the sample was taken in three dry and clean bottles. Complaint submitted by the Food Inspector is Ex.PE. of milk by paying Rs. 3/-. Receipt Ex.P3 to this effect was executed by the accused. Food Inspector has stated in the complaint that the milk was made homogeneous and it was divided into three equal parts and the sample was taken in three dry and clean bottles. Complaint submitted by the Food Inspector is Ex.PE. The complaint was instituted on 11.11.1987. Complaint reveals that the sample sent to Public Analyst was not in consonance with the standards prescribed for un-indicated milk. The report of Public Analyst has been exhibited as Ex.PD. Public Analyst had found that the milk fat was 3% and milk solids not fat was 8.2%. Thus, it was opined as under :- "Milk fat is 50 per cent deficient and milk solids not fat is 9 per cent deficient of the minimum prescribed standards". 5. The report of Public Analyst is dated 25.10.1987. The Medical Officer of Health- cum-Local Health Authority, Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh, on 17.11.1987, had sent a notice to the petitioner that complaint has been instituted in the Court of Mr. Gopi Chand, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh. This was done to comply with the provisions of Section 13(2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "1976 Act"). The petitioner appeared in the Court and on 14.2.1989, he was charged for offence under Section 7(iii) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of 1976 Act. 6. The prosecution, in support of its arguments, examined Balbir Singh, Food Inspector, as PW. 1. In examination-in-chief, he stated that he took the sample in accordance with the rules prescribed. The cross-examination elicited no gains for the defence. 7. Gangai Yadav, Senior Clerk, in the office of the Local Health Authority, Chandigarh, was examined as PW.2. He proved the postal receipt Ex. PW.2/A regarding intimation sent to accused under Section 13(2) of 1976 Act. 8. Thereafter, statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and while giving his version, he stated as under :- "i am innocent. No sample was taken from me by the Food Inspector. I have been falsely implicated in this case. There are other Jaspal Singh in village Dhanas and two of them are milk vendors. The sample might have been taken from them. Food Inspector has close relations with the other two Jaspal Singh of Dhanas, who are milk vendors". 9. In defence, accused examined Bhag Singh as DW. 1. I have been falsely implicated in this case. There are other Jaspal Singh in village Dhanas and two of them are milk vendors. The sample might have been taken from them. Food Inspector has close relations with the other two Jaspal Singh of Dhanas, who are milk vendors". 9. In defence, accused examined Bhag Singh as DW. 1. He stated that petitioner was not engaged in the sale of milk and rather this work was done by one Pandit and petitioner was doing work of agriculture in Jagadhri. 10. DW.2 Gurmail Singh also testified to say that the petitioner was residing at Jagadhri and doing agricultural work. 11. DW.3 Mehma Singh also testified that accused was his nephew. He proved pass-book Ex.DW.3/A of the accused. 12. DW.4 Amrik Singh also stated to the same extent that the accused was residing at Jagadhri and was not engaged in the work of selling milk. 13. DW.5 Puran Singh was also examined to corroborate this version of the accused. 14. I have perused the testimony of PW.l Balbir Singh, Food Inspector. The same not only aspire confident but gave minute details regarding the procedure followed for taking the sample. Two Courts below have appreciated the evidence and have returned the finding of fact regarding the guilt of the accused. No patent illegality or irregularity is discernible. The judgments of two Courts below are neither perfunctory nor perverse. Therefore, in revision, this Court will not be in a position to set aside the well reasoned judgments. In the present case, petitioner was convicted by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, had reduced the sentence to six months. 15. Petitioner was taken into custody on 11.3.1996. He was granted bail by this Court on 26.3.1996. Therefore, accused-petitioner had undergone about 15 days of his actual sentence., 16. A period of more than 22 years is going to elapse. Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, had reduced the sentence to six months. 15. Petitioner was taken into custody on 11.3.1996. He was granted bail by this Court on 26.3.1996. Therefore, accused-petitioner had undergone about 15 days of his actual sentence., 16. A period of more than 22 years is going to elapse. Petitioner has already suffered a protracted trial and has undergone about 15 days of his actual sentence, therefore reduction of sentence can be considered and same can be reduced to already undergone taking into consideration the fact that in the last 22 years petitioner has been in the corridors of the Court and much misery has been inflicted upon him. In Mahavir v. State through Govt. Food Inspector, 2000(4) Recent Criminal Reports 208, it was held as under : "6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, further contends that the occurrence in this case pertains to the year 1984, to be precise, February 17, 1984 and a period of 16 years has already gone by. Petitioner has already suffered the agony of protracted trial, spanning over a period of one and half decades. Petitioner was 40 years of age at the time of occurrence and further that he was already undergone sentence for a period of 25 days. For the contention that petitioner should be dealt with leniently in these circumstances his counsel relies upon Manoj Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) RCR 563. Learned State counsel has, of course, been able to defend this case on merits but practically has nothing to say insofar as reduction of sentence imposed upon the petitioner is concerned. 7. In totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court is of the view that ends of justice would be met if sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone by him. So ordered. Order of payment of fine and so also consequences in default thereof are, however, maintained. Learned counsel for the petitioner informs the Court that fine has already been paid." 17. A single Bench judgment Des Raj v. State of Haryana, 1996(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 689:1995 (XXII) Criminal Law Times 082), which reads as under: "9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. A single Bench judgment Des Raj v. State of Haryana, 1996(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 689:1995 (XXII) Criminal Law Times 082), which reads as under: "9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. These are meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This is how the courts shall understand this right; and have gone to the extent of quashing the prosecution after such inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 10. An identical question had arisen before the apex Court in Braham Dasss case (supra), wherein their lordship were pleased to observe as under :- Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court and High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not made clear reference to clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an antisocial offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Court should take strict view of such matter. This view was followed by this Court in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, and Ishwar Singhs case (supra). The present case is fully covered by the view expressed by the apex Court and by this Court in the judgments cited above and 1 have no reason to differ therewith. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, the conviction of the petitioner for an offence under Section 16(l)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act is hereby maintained. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the petitioner has already faced the agony of the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long period of eight years, his sentence is reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. Sentence of fine is, however, maintained along with its default clause." 18. In another Single Bench of this Court Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 1997(3) R.C.R(Criminal) 649 : 1997(3) RCC (469), a following view was taken :- "The facts indicate that incident pertains to more than 14 years ago. The short question that thus arises for consideration is as to whether it would be appropriate to direct the petitioner to undergo the rest of the sentence. There is no over-emphasizing the fact that speedy trial which is the essence of justice has been lost. A reference of some of the precedents in this regard would make the position clear. In the case of ManjitSingh v. The State of Punjab, 1993(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 363 : 1993(2) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases, 67, 11 years had expired before the revision petition was decided. Keeping in view the inordinate delay, the sentence was reduced to the one already undergone. The same question again was considered by this Court in the case of Pardeep Kumar v. State (U. T.) Chandigarh, 1994 (1), Chandigarh Criminal Cases 58. Therein the sample had been taken in the year 1984. Keeping in view the inordinate delay, the sentence was reduced to the one already undergone. The same question again was considered by this Court in the case of Pardeep Kumar v. State (U. T.) Chandigarh, 1994 (1), Chandigarh Criminal Cases 58. Therein the sample had been taken in the year 1984. 9 years had expired by the time the revision petition was heard. Once again the sentence was reduced to the one already undergone. The view point of the Delhi High Court is the same in the case of Vir Singh Chauhan v. State (Delhi), 1994(2) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 253. When the revision came up for hearing, 7 years had expired. Learned Single Judge of the said Court reduced the sentence to the one already undergone. Before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jamnalal v. The State o/M.P., 1995 (I) Prevention of Adulteration Cases 78, the same view prevailed. 8. All these decisions are based in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1988(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 184 : AIR 1988 SCI 789. Therein the accused had been convicted for selling masur whole. The accused had been acquitted by the trial Court, but High Court held him guilty. 8 years were lost. Part of the sentence had been undergone. The Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the one already undergone. 9. The position in the present case is not different. As already noted above, 14 long years have expired, when the sample was taken. The petitioner has already undergone a part of the sentence. In these circumstances, it will not be in the ends of justice that petitioner again to undergo the rest of the sentence. Consequently, the sentence must be reduced to the one already undergone. 10. For these reasons, revision petition fails and is dismissed, but the sentence is reduced to the one already undergone." 19. In another judgment of this Court rendered in Moliinder Singh v. State (Chandigarh Administration), 1997(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 168:1997-1 Vol. CXV (Punjab Law Reporter) 623, it has been held as under :- "8. The last submission made in this regard was pertaining to the sentence. It was argued that incident pertains to the year 1980 and the petitioner is facing the agony of a prolonged trial and thereafter appeal and the revision, 16 years have elapsed. CXV (Punjab Law Reporter) 623, it has been held as under :- "8. The last submission made in this regard was pertaining to the sentence. It was argued that incident pertains to the year 1980 and the petitioner is facing the agony of a prolonged trial and thereafter appeal and the revision, 16 years have elapsed. The decision in the case of Hyssainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360, had set the law into motion. The scope of Article 21 was extended and it was held that expeditious disposal of the cases was an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty. In paragraph 5 it was held: Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair and just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. 20. The same question was considered by a Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir and others, 1985 Crl. L.J. 584. It was concluded that the word trial would bring within its sweep, the appeal that would be pending against such an order. In paragraph 17 the Court had held : Therefore, there seems to be no option, but to hold that the word "trial in the context of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial includes within its sweep a substantive appeal provided by the Code to the High Court - whether against conviction or against acquittal. Thus, it would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial envisaged an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceedings in the original Court alone. 21. Thus, it would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial envisaged an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceedings in the original Court alone. 21. Subsequently, the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Anurag Baithd v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 Patna 274 reiterated the same view and in paragraph 11 it was held : If Article 21 and the right to speedy public trial is not merely a twinkling star in the high heavens to be worshipped and rendered vociferous lip-service only but indeed is an actually meaningful protective provision, then a fortiori expeditious hearing of substantive appeals against convictions is fairly and squarely within the mandate of the said Article 9. Reverting back to the fact of the present case as already mentioned above, the incident pertains to a period of more than 16 years ago. The petitioner had already undergone nearly 2 months of the sentence. As pointed out above, fair, just and reasonable procedure is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. A fter such a prolonged period, though the petition is without merit, it would be inappropriate to insist that petitioner can well be sent to undergo the rest of the sentence. It would be unfair. Article 21 of the Constitution would bring within its sweep, not only expeditious trial but disposal of appeals and revisions. The fairness to the accused petitioner, therefore, demands in the peculiar facts of this case that giving predominance to the said article, the sentence should be reduced to the one already undergone. Order is made accordingly." 22. In Bihari Lal v. State of(U. T.) Chandigarh, 2000(1) RCR (Criminal) 222, a single Judge of this Court also reiterated the same view and held as under : "5. Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides that the person found guilty of the offence shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides that the person found guilty of the offence shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. The proviso further provides that in cases covered by Clauses (i) and (ii) to Section 15(1) of the Act, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, the Court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than five hundred rupees. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. It is now well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Right to speedy trial following from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. 6. In Chancier Blum v. State of Haryana, 1996(1) Recent Criminal Reports 125, it has been held by this Court as under :- "It is correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes on account of a protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction." 7. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 380, the Apex Court held as under:- "Though adulteration of an article of food is a serious anti- social offence which must be visited with exemplary punishment, it will be rather harsh to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 380, the Apex Court held as under:- "Though adulteration of an article of food is a serious anti- social offence which must be visited with exemplary punishment, it will be rather harsh to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Under Section 16 as in force at the material time, the Court had the discretion for special and adequate reasons under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 16 not to pass a sentence of imprisonment. In the instant case, the accused is a man aged 75 years. The offence was committed more than 11 years ago. The order of acquittal was based on the decision of the High Court. The samples were taken from sealed tins. These are mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, instead of passing a substantive sentence of imprisonment, the accused could be sentenced to period already underg one and directed to pay a fine." 8. In Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1988 (4) SCC 130, the Supreme Court held as under :- "Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court and the High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not made clear reference to clauses (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the court should take strict view of such matter. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to be period already undergone and sustain the fine along with the default sentence." 9. All the three cases cited above were under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 10. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to be period already undergone and sustain the fine along with the default sentence." 9. All the three cases cited above were under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 10. The mitigating circumstance in this case is that the petitioner is undergoing the agony of this protracted trial for the last more than 15 years and he can be compensated suitably by reducing the substance sentence imposed upon by him to the one already under- these competing interests as reflected in the text of the Constitution and its subsequent interpretation. There is absolutely no ambiguity on the status of principles such as the right against self- incrimination and the various dimensions of personal liberty. We have already pointed out that the rights guaranteed in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been given a non-derogable status and they are available to citizens as well as foreigners. It is not within the competence of the judiciary to create exceptions and limitations on the availability of these rights. 217. Even though the main task of constitutional adjudication is to safeguard the core organising principles of our polity, we must also highlight some practical concerns that strengthen the case against the involuntary administration of the tests in question. Firstly, the claim that the results obtained from these techniques will help in extraordinary situations is questionable. All of the tests in question are those which need to be patiently administered and the forensic psychologist or the examiner has to be very skilful and thorough while interpreting the results. In a narcoanalysis test the subject is likely to divulge a lot of irrelevant and incoherent information. The subject is as likely to divulge false information as he/she is likely to reveal useful facts. Sometimes the revelations may begin to make sense only when compared with the testimony of several other individuals or through the discovery of fresh materials. In a polygraph test, interpreting the results is a complex process that involves accounting for distortions such as countermeasures used by the subject and weather conditions among others. In a BEAP test, there is always the possibility of the subject having had prior exposure to the probes that are used as stimuli. In a polygraph test, interpreting the results is a complex process that involves accounting for distortions such as countermeasures used by the subject and weather conditions among others. In a BEAP test, there is always the possibility of the subject having had prior exposure to the probes that are used as stimuli. All of this is a gradually unfolding process and it is not appropriate to argue that the test results will always prove to be crucial in times of exigency. It is evident that both the tasks of preparing for these tests and interpreting their results need considerable time and expertise. 218. Secondly, if we were to permit the forcible administration of these techniques, it could be the first step on a very slippery-slope as far as the standards of police behaviour are concerned. In some of the impugned judgments, it has been suggested that the promotion of these techniques could reduce the regrettably high incidence of third degree methods that are being used by policemen all over the country. This is a circular line of reasoning since one form of improper behaviour is sought to be replaced by another. What this will result in is that investigators will increasingly seek reliance on the impugned techniques rather than engaging in a thorough investigation. The widespread use of third-degree interrogation methods so as to speak is a separate problem and needs to be tackled through long-term solutions such as more emphasis on the protection of human rights during police training, providing adequate resources for investigators and stronger accountability measures when such abuses do take place. 219. Thirdly, the claim that the use of these techniques will only be sought in cases involving heinous offences rings hollow since there will no principled basis for restricting their use once the investigators are given the discretion to do so. From the statistics presented before us as well as the charges filed against the parties in the impugned judgments, it is obvious that investigators have sought reliance on the impugned tests to expedite investigations, unmindful of the nature of offences involved. In this regard, we do not have the authority to permit the qualified use of these techniques by way of enumerating the offences which warrant their use. By itself, permitting such qualified use would amount to a law-making function which is clearly outside the judicial domain. 220. In this regard, we do not have the authority to permit the qualified use of these techniques by way of enumerating the offences which warrant their use. By itself, permitting such qualified use would amount to a law-making function which is clearly outside the judicial domain. 220. One of the main functions of constitutionally prescribed rights to safeguard the interests of citizens in their interactions with the government. As the guardians of these rights, we will be failing in our duty if we permit any citizen to be forcibly subjected to the tests in question. One could argue that some of the parties who will benefit from this decision are hardened criminals who have no regard for societal values. However, it must be borne in mind that in constitutional adjudication our concerns are not confined to the facts at hand but extend to the implications of our decision for the whole population as well as the future generations. Sometimes there are apprehensions about judges imposing their personal sensibilities through broadly worded terms such as substantive due process, but in this case our inquiry has been based on a faithful understanding of principles entrenched in our Constitution. In this context it would be useful to refer to some observations made by the Supreme Court of Israel in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, H.C 5100/94 (1999), where it was held that the use of physical means (such as shaking the suspect, sleep-deprivation and enforcing uncomfortable positions for prolonged periods) during interrogation of terrorism suspects was illegal. Among other questions raised in that case, it was also held that the necessity defence could be used only as a post factum justification for past conduct and that it could not be the basis of a blanket pre-emptive permission for coercive interrogation practices in the future. Ruling against such methods, Aharon Barak, J. held at p. 26 : "... This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individuals liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security." CONCLUSION 221. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individuals liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security." CONCLUSION 221. In our considered opinion, the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the right against self-incrimination. This is because the underlying rationale of the said right is to ensure the reliability as well as voluntariness of statements that are admitted as evidence. This Court has recognised that the protective scope of Article 20(3) extends to the investigative stage in criminal cases and when read with Section 161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 it protects accused persons, suspects as well as witnesses who are examined during an investigation. The test results cannot be admitted in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of compulsion. Article 20(3) protects an individuals choice between speaking and remaining silent, irrespective of whether the subsequent testimony proves to be inculpatory or exculpatory. Article 20(3) aims to prevent the forcible conveyance of personal knowledge that is relevant to the facts in issue". The results obtained from each of the impugned tests bear a testimonial character and they cannot be categorised as material evidence. 222. We are also of the view that forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of substantive due process which is required for restraining personal liberty. Such a violation will occur irrespective of whether these techniques are forcibly administered during the course of an investigation or for any other purpose since the test results could also expose a person to adverse consequences of a non-penal nature. The impugned techniques cannot be read into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in criminal cases, i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such an expansive interpretation is not feasible in light of the rule of ejusdem generis and the considerations which govern the interpretation of statutes in relation to scientific advancements. We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms. We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms. Furthermore, placing reliance on the results gathered from these techniques comes into conflict with the right to fair trial. Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the right against self- incrimination. 223. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The National Human Rights Commission had published Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused in 2000. These guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the Narcoanalysis technique and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile test. The text of these guidelines has been reproduced below : (i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test. (ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer. (iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate. (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer. (iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate. (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer. (v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a confessional statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police. (vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation. (vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer. (viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record. 224. The present batch of appeals is disposed of accordingly.