Judgment :- M.Y. Eqbal, C.J. 1. This Appeal filed byu the Writ Petitioner – Appellant is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.02.2010 passed in W.P. No.23929 of 2006, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition and refused to interfere with the order passed by the Principal Labour Court, Chennai. 2. The Writ Petitioner-Appellant’s case in brief is that he joined the services of the 2nd Respondent in the year 1977 as a “Press Assistant” Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of “Section head (Press)” and his scale of pay was fixed as per the Bhatchawad Award, which was subsequently revised. It was alleged by the Appellant that on attaining the age of superannuation i.e., 58 years his service had been extended by the 2nd Respondent from 01.04.1998 to 31.03.2000. During the period of his extended service, the Appellant submitted Application for voluntary retirement from service on medical grounds. The 2nd Respondent accepted the request of the Appellant treating it as a request for resignation. It was contended by the Appellant that the 2nd Respondent failed to pay the overtime wages, festival incentives and other monetary benefits. He, therefore, raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer on 11.04.2001. The Conciliation Officer directed the Appellant to approach the Labour Court under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was only then the Appellant moved the Labour Court by filing an Application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which was numbered as C.P. No.590 of 2001. 3. The Second Respondent contested the claim of the Appellant on various grounds inter alia that the Appellant was not a workman rather employed in a supervisory capacity and was drawing wages in excess of’ 1,600/- per month. The Second Respondent’s case was that the Appellant was not entitled to raise industrial dispute as he had not been dismissed, discharged, retrenched or otherwise terminated from service. As a matter of fact the Appellant resigned from the service voluntarily and his dues have been fully and finally settled. 4. The First Respondent, namely, the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Chennai after considering the facts of the case and materials brought on record rejected the claim of the Petitioner holding that the Application under Section 33(c)(2) is not maintainable in the absence of pre-existing rights, either under an Award or settlement. 4. The First Respondent, namely, the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Chennai after considering the facts of the case and materials brought on record rejected the claim of the Petitioner holding that the Application under Section 33(c)(2) is not maintainable in the absence of pre-existing rights, either under an Award or settlement. The Labour Court has also came to the conclusion that the question as to whether the Appellant is a “workman” or not could be decided only by a Labour Court in an industrial dispute raised before it. The Appellant challenged the order passed by the Labour Court by filing the above mentioned Writ Petition. 5. The 2nd Respondent contested the case of the Appellant before the learned Single Judge by filing a Counter Affidavit taking the same stand as was taken before the Labour Court. The 2nd Respondent’s case was that the Appellant having been employed as a Section Head in a supervisory capacity cannot be said to be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The 2nd Respondent’s further case was that the Appellant resigned from the service voluntarily and was not dismissed or discharged or retrenched from the service. Hence, claim UNDER Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not maintainable. The 2nd Respondent further stated that the Appellant at the time of retirement on attaining the age of 58 years received all monetary benefits in full and final settlement and he never raised any claim regarding the payment of overtime wages and other benefits. It was only after his application for voluntary retirement has been accepted as resignation, for the first time the Appellant raised the claim for payment of overtime wages and other monetary benefits. 6. It was only after his application for voluntary retirement has been accepted as resignation, for the first time the Appellant raised the claim for payment of overtime wages and other monetary benefits. 6. Learned Single Judge after considering the case of the Writ Petitioner-Appellant and the 2nd Respondent and after discussing the various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and that of this Court, came to the conclusion that the Writ Petitioner-Appellant had not raised the claim for payment of overtime wages during his service period from 1978 till he had submitted his Application for resignation, and the Labour Court has rightly held that the claim under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be maintained unless there was a pre-existing right or entitlement in favour of the Appellant Learned Single Judge also affirmed the finding of the Labour Court that the Appellant was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the present Appeal. 7. We have head the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant as also the learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd Respondent. Admittedly, the Appellant did not make any claim for overtime wages during the entire period of his service till attaining the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years or during the extended period before he left the service. Neither any evidence was produced before the Labour Court nor before the learned Single Judge to show that he is entitled to claim overtime wages for the period from 1978 to 1999. In our view, therefore, without going into the other grounds taken by the Appellant, the impugned order passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge needs no interference by this Court. Hence, this Appeal is dismissed. Ho9weever, there shall be no order as to costs.