JUDGMENT PANKAJ MITHAL, J.-The plaintiff-appellant, a widow of age and a "little Indian", instituted a suit for permanent injunction in respect of one room portion of house No. 6/1011 situate in Mohalla Nai Basti, Saharanpur on the basis of her long possession. The suit was decreed by the Court of first instance finding her to be in actual possession for the last over 40 years but in appeal preferred by the defendants, though her possession was accepted the decree was reversed and the suit was dismissed as her possession was held to be that of trespasser. 2. Accordingly, she preferred this second appeal which was admitted on 28.2.1989 on the following substantial question of law: Whether the plaintiff-appellant being in settled possession of the house in question, any decree for injunction could be passed in her favour and the Appellate Court erred in law in dismissing the suit? 3. At the time of admission the plaintiff-appellant was granted interim injunction in the following words "meanwhile plaintiff-appellant shall not be dispossessed from the property in dispute." 4. The second appeal was finally heard and allowed vide judgment and order dated 3.11.2004 and the decree of prohibitory permanent injunction passed by the first Court was affirmed after setting aside the judgment and order of the Lower Appellate Court. 5. The defendants-respondents moved application for the recall of the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court on the ground that they were not heard. Another application for recall of the above order was moved by Smt. Munawar Rana on the allegation that she is a bona fide purchaser in good faith of the aforesaid house from one Satya Pal son of Jagdish Prasad (one of the defendants to the suit) vide sale-deed dated 22.11.1999 and therefore she should also be heard before deciding the appeal. Both the above applications were rejected by separate orders dated 30th March, 2006. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders as well as the judgment and order dated 3.11.2004 deciding the appeal, Smt. Munawar Rana alone preferred SLP No. 12130 of 2006 which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 5927 of 2008. Both the above applications were rejected by separate orders dated 30th March, 2006. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders as well as the judgment and order dated 3.11.2004 deciding the appeal, Smt. Munawar Rana alone preferred SLP No. 12130 of 2006 which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 5927 of 2008. The said civil appeal was disposed of by the Supreme Court vide judgment and order dated 29.9.2008 without expressing any opinion on merits of the case with the observation that the second appeal deserves to be reheard on merits after recalling the earlier judgment and order deciding the same. 7. This is how, this appeal has again come up for hearing. 8. I have heard Sri Arun Kumar Singh, learned Counsel who was appointed as an Amicus Curiae in this case as the plaintiff-appellant being a "little Indian" was unable to engage any Counsel. Simultaneously, Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, Senior Counsel assisted by Sri A.K. Singh, learned Counsel for Smt. Munawar Rana was also heard. No one appeared for the defendants-respondents probably for the reason that they have transferred their interest in the house in dispute to Smt. Munawar Rana and as such have no rights subsisting in the house in dispute. 9. In an attempt to answer the above substantial question of law, I would like to narrate in brief the relevant facts leading to the institution of the suit and the filing of the present appeal. 10. The plaint case is that the husband of the plaintiff-appellant Hukum Singh and Jagdish Prasad defendants-respondents were brothers. They used to live in an-ancestral house in village Behra Sandal Singh but after sale of the village property they jointly purchased the house in dispute and the whole family shifted to this house in the year 1960. The plaintiff-appellant ever since then, is residing the said house with her husband. Jagdish Prasad, his son Satya Pal and Smt. Premawati, wife of Satya Pal played a foul game with the plaintiff-appellant. They proclaimed that her husband has gone missing and is untraceable. Thus, they succeeded in getting the entire house registered in their names. Her husband 'was a man of weak intellect and as his whereabouts were not known, taking advantage of the situation the defendants-respondents threatened to-dispossess the plaintiff-appellant from the one room portion of the aforesaid house in which she had been living since 1960. 11. Thus, they succeeded in getting the entire house registered in their names. Her husband 'was a man of weak intellect and as his whereabouts were not known, taking advantage of the situation the defendants-respondents threatened to-dispossess the plaintiff-appellant from the one room portion of the aforesaid house in which she had been living since 1960. 11. The suit was contested by the defendants-respondents by repudiating the case set up by the plaintiff-appellant. They claimed exclusive ownership over the house in dispute through six separate sale-deeds alleged to have been executed between 1956 to 1961 and denied possession of the plaintiff-appellant over any part of the house. The suit as stated earlier was decreed but the decree was set aside in appeal though the finding of possession in favour of the plaintiff-appellant was maintained. 12. The first Court on the pleadings of the parties had framed the necessary issues and the issue No. 1 was with regard to the possession of the plaintiff-appellant over the house in dispute. The Court on the consideration of the entire evidence on record specially in view of the statement of the plaintiff appellant herself as P.W. 1 and of one totally independent witness Meharban Ahmad P.W. 2 coupled with the documentary evidence of the ration card Ext. 12 concluded that the plaintiff-appellant is in settled possession of the said house and that she had been living therein with her husband Hukum Singh. It was further recorded that no reliable contra evidence was adduced to prove or to indicate as to where actually the plaintiff-appellant and her husband used to live if not in the aforesaid house. 13. The Lower Appellate Court on the aforesaid issue held that though the plaintiff-appellant has not been able to prove her title over the said house but she is certainly in possession of the same. However, the said possession is not lawful. 14. In other words, both the Courts below concurrently found the plaintiff appellant to be in' possession of the house in dispute. The aforesaid finding is a finding of fact whichcanno1 be assailed in second appeal and in fact is not being assailed. 15. In the aforesaid background, I have to examine the impact of the aforesaid finding of possession in the matter of grant of permanent prohibitory injunction. : 16. The aforesaid finding is a finding of fact whichcanno1 be assailed in second appeal and in fact is not being assailed. 15. In the aforesaid background, I have to examine the impact of the aforesaid finding of possession in the matter of grant of permanent prohibitory injunction. : 16. Privy council in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy1 51 IA 293 = AIR 1924 PC 144. observed as under : "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled through a Court." 17. It means that no one in the country is supposed to dispossess anyone from settled possession of the property without taking recourse to the procedure prescribed by law. 18. In Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead) by His L.Rs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao2 AIR 1989 SC 2097 = 1990 SCFBRC 96 = 1990 (1) ARC 270., the Apex Court relying upon Lallu Yeshwant Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others1 AIR 1968 SC 620 . clearly observed that it is well settled law in his country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. 19. In Puran Singh and others vs. State of Punjab 2 AIR 1975 SC 1674 , the Apex Court placing reliance upon its earlier decision in Munshi Ram and others v. Delhi administration3 AIR 1968 SC 702 , defined the expression "settled possession" to mean such clear and effective possession of a person, even if he is a trespasser, who gets a right under a criminal law to defend his property against attack even by the true owner. It was observed as under: "This Court clearly pointed out that where a trespasser was in settled possession of the land he is not entitled to be evicted except in due course of law and he is further entitled to resist or defend his possession even against the rightful owner who tries to dispossess him. The only condition laid down by this Court was that the possession of the trespasser must be settled possession. " 20. The only condition laid down by this Court was that the possession of the trespasser must be settled possession. " 20. In another case in Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani4 2003 (51) ALR 699 (SC)-2003 (7) AIC 625., the supreme Court went on to observe that many legal systems treat possession as a temporary title even against the true owner and a wrongdoer who is deprived of his possession can recover it from any person simply on the ground of his possession. In Indian context it laid down as under: "........the person in possession may not have title to the property yet if he has been inducted into possession by the rightful owner and is in peaceful and settled possession of such property he is entitled in law to protect the possession until dispossessed by due process of law by a person having a title better than what he has. A person in possession of the property cannot be forcibly dispossessed by another rank trespasser and even if the latter does so, the former may be entitled to restoration of possession, because the law respects peaceful possession and frowns upon the person who takes the law in his own hands. 21. In Ram Gowda (Dead) by L.Rs. and another v. M Varadappa Naidll Dead) by LRs. and another (2004) 1 SCC 769 ., a similar view was expressed by the Apex Court after considering the entire case law on the subject starting from Midnapur Zamindary Company Ltd. (supra) upto Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya (s4pra) and opined as under: "It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere. with his possession. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere. with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force." (Emphasis supplied) 22. The above decision has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Subramaniaswami Temple Rantnagiri v. Kanna Gounder (Dead) through L.Rs1 2008 (68) AIC 210 (SC) = 2008 (72) ALR 650 (SC). 23. Accordingly, no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land; and unless he is evicted in the due Course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. 24. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid discussion that any person, who is in settled possession of the property cannot be thrown out forcibly without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. 25. The aforesaid decisions have been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sachin Jain v. State of U.P. and others2 2006 (3) ADJ 660 (All). (DB) and also by me in the case of Ram Ratan v. Block Development Officer, Talbehat, Lalitpur and others3 2008 (10) ADJ 454 . 26. The conclusion which can safely be drawn from the aforesaid authorities is that law respects possession even though it may not be supported by title. Possession itself is good enough to restrain forcible dispossession which is not permissible in law. In short, Law forbids forcible dispossession even with the best of title. 27. In view of above, it is inevitable that the Lower Appellate Court manifestly committed an error of law and failed to apply the well recognized above principle of law in reversing the decree of the Court of first instance and dismissing the suit despite finding the plaintiff appellant to be in possession. 27. In view of above, it is inevitable that the Lower Appellate Court manifestly committed an error of law and failed to apply the well recognized above principle of law in reversing the decree of the Court of first instance and dismissing the suit despite finding the plaintiff appellant to be in possession. Judicial comity demands that the subordinate Courts should follow the law laid down by the superior Courts specially those to which their attention has been drawn and the acknowledged principles of law should neither be ignored nor overlooked. Disregard to such authorities of the higher Court not only amounts to ignoring the settled principles of law but falls within the definition of a criminal contempt vide Shivarankanta v. Bheimsen Vixit4 1973 (3) SCC 446. 28. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the answer to the substantial question of law poised in this appeal stand already settled by the catena of decisions of the Apex Court. Accordingly, this Court has no option but to hold that the plaintiff-appellant who has been found to be in settled possession of the house in question is entitled for a decree of permanent injunction on the basis of her possession alone and that the Lower Appellate Court erred in law in dismissing the suit. 29. The question of law formulated stand answered accordingly. 30. At this stage, it may be pertinent for me to add that Smt. Munwar Rana is admittedly a subsequent purchaser of the property from the defendants-respondents and such her sale-deed is in contravention of doctrine of lis pen dense enshrined by section 52 of Transfer of Property Act unless proved to be a bona fide purchaser for value in good faith. Accordingly, she happens to be a 'representative' of the defendants-respondents equally bound by the decree passed in the suit. 31. Sri Jain raised another point and contended that as during the pendency of this appeal, Smt. Munawar Rana has obtained possession of the house being a bona fide purchaser for value from the recognized owners, the appeal is virtually redundant and maintaining a decree of permanent injunction in favour of a person who is in unlawful possession would be a futile exercise. 32. 32. The above argument has been countered by Sri A.K. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae on the ground that the decree has to be passed on the basis of the position existing on the date of cause of action. He has also submitted that plaintiff-appellant is still in possession and she is continuously residing in the house in dispute therefore, the submission as raised is baseless. 33. No doubt changes in law occurring during the pendency of the suit or the appeal are permissible to be taken into account vide Luxmi Narain Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak1 AIR 1985 SC 111 = 1985 SCFBRC 506 but subsequent events of facts cannot be considered unless they are admitted to the parties or they are otherwise brought on record in the form of evidence in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. 34. In the instant case, no additional evidence has been adduced by the defendants-respondents or even by Smt. Munawar Rana to establish that plaintiff-appellant has vacated the house in dispute or that she has been dispossessed or that the defendants-respondents have come in lawful possession of the same. Thus, such a change of fact is not relevant and liable to be considered. 35. Moreover, the factum of the dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant is strongly disputed. I have been taken to the various affidavits filed in support of the recall applications which were filed by the defendants-respondents and Smt. Munawar Rana for the recall of the judgment and order dated 30.11.2004 deciding the second appeal earlier as well as the counter-affidavits and supplementary-affidavits thereof and I find that even from the same no conclusion can be drawn that the plaintiff-appellant has ceased to be in possession of the house in dispute. The mere factual allegation of putting a lock by the defendants-respondents or Smt. Munawar Rana on the outer gate of the house is not sufficient to establish that they have come in lawful possession of the same when there is no specific evidence of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant and she asserts to continue to reside in one of the rooms of the house. The fact of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant is even otherwise difficult to accept as her dispossession from the house in dispute during the pendency of the appeal cannot take place as admittedly an interim injunction of this Court was operating in her favour. The fact of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant is even otherwise difficult to accept as her dispossession from the house in dispute during the pendency of the appeal cannot take place as admittedly an interim injunction of this Court was operating in her favour. If such a dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant is to be accepted it would entail breach of injunction by the defendants-respondents or their representative Smt. Munwar Rana. 36. In Rame Gowda (supra) it has been clearly observed that the law will help the person in peaceful and settled possession by restoring him possession even from the rightful owner if he is dispossessed by use of force. So the plaintiff-appellant who was found to be in settled possession by both the Courts below would be entitle to restoration of possession even if she has been evicted therefrom during the pendency of this appeal which would be actually in defiance of the injunction order operating in the appeal. 37. Sri Jain, submits that in the event it is not possible to draw any final conclusion in this regard the matter be remanded to the Lower Appellate Court for taking additional evidence and recording finding in this regard. 38. I am afraid to accept such a proposal though the Appellate Court in exercise of power under section 107, C.P.C. has ample power to remand a case to frame an issue and to remit it for trial to the Court below. However, such a power is to be exercised only where a fresh issue is required to be framed and a finding on it is necessary, which cannot be recorded by the Appellate Court for want of sufficient evidence. However, in the present case, no additional issue is required to be framed. The issue with regard to possession is already there and on that issue evidence is sufficient and complete and the findings of the Courts below are also clear. Thus, any remand or remittance for recording fresh finding on said issue would amount to giving a fresh lease of life to the litigation which would mean that if such contentions are permitted to be raised, there will be no finality or end to any litigation which would be against public policy. 39. In the end, I am of the view, that the submission has no merit and has to be rejected. It is accordingly rejected. 40. 39. In the end, I am of the view, that the submission has no merit and has to be rejected. It is accordingly rejected. 40. The second appeal as such has to succeed and is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal Allowed.