ORDER Sanjay Yadvav, J. 1. Shri Nitin Agrawal, learned Counsel for the Petitioners. Shri Vivek Rusia, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1. 2. Smt. Sheetal Dubey, learned Govt. Advocate, for the Respondent No. 2. With consent matter is heard finally. 3. The question which falls for determination is whether Collector, Respondent No. 2, was justified in rejecting the claim of the Petitioner for relief under Public Liability Insurance Act (No. 6 of 1991) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1991), in lieu of death of Sanju, who died due to electrocution, on the ground that he was negligent. 4. Few uncontroverted facts "Sanju (since deceased) aged 22 years on 18-10-2005 went to agriculture field, village Kathotiya to operate motor pump, during course whereof, he received the electric shock when he came in contact with the open parts of the live wire of the starter. The death was instant. Criminal case forming subject matter of Crime No. 94/2005 was registered at Police Station Gadarwara. In the post mortem, the cause of death was shock and syncop due to contact with live electric wire. 5. Legal representatives of the deceased, i.e. the Petitioners, filed an application under Section 6 of the Act of 1991 for relief, before the Collector, Respondent No. 2. The Collector by impugned order rejected the claim for relief by placing reliance on the provisions contained in Electricity Supply Code, 2004, holding that liability of the electric supply company is up to 'outgoing terminal' and since the death of Sanju was due to coming in contact with live wire attached with the starter, the company, Respondent No. 1, cannot be held liable. 6. Assailing the order, it is urged by learned Counsel for the Petitioners that, the electricity being hazardous substance and the death being due to electrocution, the Collector was not justified in rejecting the claim for relief merely on the ground that the death was due to electric shock received from the starter being beyond the precincts of the Respondent No. 1. It is urged that the liability to give relief under the Act of 1991 being on the principle of no fault as is contemplated vide Section 3 of the Act of 1991, the Collector was not justified in rejecting the same It is urged that the claim for relief was erroneously rejected. 7. It is urged that the liability to give relief under the Act of 1991 being on the principle of no fault as is contemplated vide Section 3 of the Act of 1991, the Collector was not justified in rejecting the same It is urged that the claim for relief was erroneously rejected. 7. Respondent No. 1 on its turn has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition by placing reliance on the judgment in M.P. State Electricity Board Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla and Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 156. 8. True it is and as has been held in the case of M.P. State Electricity Board Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla and Anr. (supra) that in respect of claim for compensation and where disputed question of facts are involved, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not be the efficacious remedy. 9. However, in a case as the present one, the Petitioners have not rushed to the Court directly but availed the remedy under 1991 Act and it is only when the Collector has declined to grant relief that the Petitioners have filed this petition against the order of the Collector. 10. Even otherwise, the facts in the case at hand that the death of Sanju is due to electrocution is not disputed. The only question is whether the Collector is justified in rejecting the claim for relief on the ground that Sanju was negligent. 11. Electricity is a hazardous substance is no more resintegra and has been held to be in M.P. State Electricity Board Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla and another, AIR 2003 MP 156 wherein it was observed by His Lord Ship: 17. The next question for consideration is whether a notification is required to be made by the Central Government quantifying the electricity by notification as mentioned in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The definition of "hazardous substance" has been given in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 which is as under: 2(d) -- "hazardous substance" means any substance or preparation which is defined as hazardous substance under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and exceeding such quantity as may be specified, by notification, by the Central Government. The definition of "hazardous substance" has been borrowed from Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The definition of "hazardous substance" has been borrowed from Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. As per Section 2(e) of the said Act, definition of "hazardous substance" reads as under: 2(e) -- "hazardous substance" means any substance or preparation which, by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organism, property or the environment. 19. Hazardous Substance" has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, according to which it means any substance or preparation which, by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings. Physico-chemical properties of electricity are definitely liable to cause harm to human beings and other living creatures, plants, micro-organism etc. Thus, it has to be regarded as "hazardous substance" within the meaning given in Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and once when something is hazardous irrespective of quantity. In my opinion it is not necessary for the Central Govt. to issue a notification as it is not necessary to notify electricity as required in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 as it is hazardous irrespective of its quantity. A thing which is known as intensely hazardous has to be treated as hazardous substance so as to effectuate the purposes for the enactment of the Act of 1991. Whatever irrespective of proportion is hazardous has to be treated as hazardous one. Some article may not be hazardous is small quantity but electricity is not one of such article. Only these hazardous substances have to be notified which may be dangerous on exceeding such quantity then it becomes necessary to specify the quantity. In my opinion it is not necessary for the electricity to be notified under Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991 as in any quantity electricity is hazardous. It has to be taken as hazardous substance within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991. Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991 does not have effect narrowing down the meaning of "hazardous substance" as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1986. Similar question was answered in U.P. State Electricity Board AIR 1998 All 1 (supra) and in M.P. State Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla in W.P. No. 2165/2001 decided on 15-4-2002. Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991 does not have effect narrowing down the meaning of "hazardous substance" as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1986. Similar question was answered in U.P. State Electricity Board AIR 1998 All 1 (supra) and in M.P. State Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla in W.P. No. 2165/2001 decided on 15-4-2002. In U.P. State Electricity Board (supra), it was held in Para 42 as under: 42. Hence in my opinion 'hazardous substance' as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1991 Act is not to be confined to a substance specified in the notification issued by the Central Government, but it includes all substances which come under the definition of 'hazardous substance' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, with this exception that if any such substance is also notified by the Central Government under Section 2(d) of the 1991 Act then it will be a 'hazardous substance' only if it exceeds the quantity specified in the said notification. Thus the notification issued by the Central Government under Section 2(d) of the 1991 Act can only narrow down the scope of 'hazardous substance' as defined under the Environment (Protection Act, 1986, but substances which are not specified in the said notification will nevertheless be regarded as 'hazardous substances' under the 1991 Act if they come within the definition of 'hazardous substances' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. In the case of M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur (supra) it was held as follows: On a reading of aforesaid two definitions it cannot be construed that the substance which is not notified by the Central Government cannot be regarded as a 'hazardous substance'. The terms used under Section 2(d) of the Act are of wide amplitude and of immense magnitude. They are not to be understood in a narrow, restricted or confined manner. On the contrary, it covers a large canvas. The dictionary clause does not lay down a postulate that unless a substance is notified it cannot be regarded as a hazardous substance. The definition in the Act refers to Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. I have reproduced the aforesaid definitions hereinabove. The said definition is in a broad spectrum. It cannot be encompassed in a small region. The dictionary clause does not lay down a postulate that unless a substance is notified it cannot be regarded as a hazardous substance. The definition in the Act refers to Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. I have reproduced the aforesaid definitions hereinabove. The said definition is in a broad spectrum. It cannot be encompassed in a small region. If both the definitions are read together it is quite pronounced that the electricity should come within the ambit and sweep of the definition, and certain substances may become hazardous if they are notified as required under the provisions. Thus, notification by the Central Government is not the sine qua non to make a substance hazardous. 12. The question is whether the Respondent can be absolved from the liability on the ground that they are liable only upto outgoing terminal and if any accident occurs, as in the present case, at the consumer's end, the electricity supply Co. cannot be held liable; can be examined from the view point of the Statute itself. 13. Act of 1991 was enacted to provide for public liability insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons effected by accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance. The expression "handling" is defined under Section 2(c) to mean: (c) "handling" in relation to any hazardous substance, means the manufacture, processing, treatment, package, storage, transportation by vehicle, use, collection, destruction, conversion, offering for sale, transfer or the like of such hazardous substance; 14. The use of electricity thus tantamounts to handling the same. The expanse of its applicability cannot be curtailed as the Respondent No. 1 wants that, the accident occurred beyond the precincts of the Respondents. In the considered opinion of this Court since the death was due to 'handling' of hazardous substance being the proximate cause for death sufficient it is for the person who claims through such deceased to maintain the claim for relief under the Act of 1991. This aspect is further strengthened when Section 3 is taken into consideration which stipulates: 3. Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no fault.-- (1) Where death or injury to any person other than a workman or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage. Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no fault.-- (1) Where death or injury to any person other than a workman or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage. (2) In any claim for relief under Sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to in this Act as claim for relief), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person. 15. In Charan Lal Shahu v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1480 it was observed by their Lordships: 91. Over 120 years ago Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330 was decided in England. There A, was the lessee of certain mines. B, was the owner of a mill standing on land adjoining that under which the mines were worked. B, desired to construct a reservoir, and employed competent persons, such as engineers and a contractor to construct it. A had worked his mines up to a spot where there were certain old passages of disused mines; these passages were connected with vertical shafts which communicated with the land above, and which had also been out of use for years, and were apparently filled with marl and the earth of the surrounding land. No care had been taken by the engineer or the contractor to block up these shafts, and shortly after water had been introduced into the reservoir it broke through some of the shafts, flowed through the old passage and flooded A's mine. It was held by the House of Lords in England that where the owner of land, without willfulness or negligence, uses his land in the ordinary manner of its use, though mischief should thereby be occasioned to his neighbour, he will not be liable in damages. But if he brings upon his land anything which would not naturally, come upon it, and which is in itself dangerous, and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control, though in so doing he may act without personal willfulness or negligence, he will be liable in damages for any mischief thereby occasioned. But if he brings upon his land anything which would not naturally, come upon it, and which is in itself dangerous, and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control, though in so doing he may act without personal willfulness or negligence, he will be liable in damages for any mischief thereby occasioned. In the background of the facts it was held that A was entitled to recover damages from B, in respect of the injury. The question of liability was highlighted by this Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) where a Constitution Bench of this Court had to deal with the rule of strict liability. This Court held that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) laid down a principle that if a person who brings on his land and collects and keep there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. This rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the things which escape are present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is a statutory authority. There, this Court observed that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) evolved in the 19th century at a time when all the developments of science and technology had not taken place, and the same cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. In a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to be carried on as part of the developmental process, Courts should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in case of an enterprise engaged in hazardous and dangerous activity. This Court noted that law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. This Court noted that law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. This Court reiterated there that if it is found necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant to an industrial economy, the Court should not hesitate, to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. According to this Court, an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such activity resulting, for instance, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who were affected by the accident as part of the social cost for carrying on such activity, regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. Such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. The enterprise alone has the resources to discover and guard against hazards and to provide warning against potential hazards. This Court reiterated that the measure of compensation in these kinds of cases must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The enterprise alone has the resources to discover and guard against hazards and to provide warning against potential hazards. This Court reiterated that the measure of compensation in these kinds of cases must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and, more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise. The determination of actual damages payable would depend upon various facts and circumstances of the particular case. 16. In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 162 : ( AIR 2002 SC 551 ), it was held: 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the Defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the Defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 17. This being the law regarding no fault liability, the Collector, i.e. Respondent No. 2, in the considered opinion of this Court was not justified in rejecting the claim on the strength of the reasons therein. 18. In the result petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. 17. This being the law regarding no fault liability, the Collector, i.e. Respondent No. 2, in the considered opinion of this Court was not justified in rejecting the claim on the strength of the reasons therein. 18. In the result petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The Respondent No. 1 is directed to pay the amount to the Petitioners as per Sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with Clause (ii) of the Schedule within 30 days from the date of communication of this order, along with interest @ 6% from the date of claim application. 19. The petition is allowed to the extent above; however, no costs.