1. The subject matter of challenge in this batch of writ petitions is that the order of assessment dated 31.3.2000 passed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Doom Dooma (respondent No. 4), the order dated 27.3.2004 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes (Appeal) (respondent No. 3) and the orders dated 24.12.2009 and 18.9.2008 passed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam. 2. Vide impugned order dated 31.3.2000 the Superintendent of Taxes passed various orders of assessment assessing the petitioner under section 17(5) of the Assam General Sale Tax Act 1993 read with section 9(2) of the Central Sale Tax Act, 1956, and vide impugned order dated 27.3.2004, the appeals filed by the petitioner challenging the assessment orders passed by the Superintendent of Taxes were rejected by the appellate authority. Vide impugned order dated 24.12.2009, the revision petitions filed by the petitioner challenging the appellate orders filed under section 36(2) of the AGST Act were rejected. 3. Heard Dr. A.K Saraf, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. N. Hawelia and Ms. L. Gope advocates appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned standing counsel appearing for respondents. 4. All those cases having involved similar questions of fact and law in respect of different assessment orders passed by the assessing authority and appellate and revisional orders passed by the respective authorities, and as prayed for by the learned counsel for the appearing parties, are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 5. The common case of the petitioner inter alia is that the petitioner was managing and running the Tonganagaon Tea Estate deriving their rights on the basis of a registered deed of lease executed on 7.12.1976 leasing out the tea estate by the owners for a period of 51 years which was further renewed for another period of 41 years. It is alleged that due to the reasons beyond the control of the petitioner the financial condition of the tea-estate gone down and at the behest of the labourer of the garden and initiation of the local administration the tea estate was allowed to be managed by a third party and to that effect an agreement executed on 27.5.2002 between the original owner and the said third party. The petitioner challenged the said agreement by filing Title Suit No. 46/2006 which was decreed in their favour on 14.8.2006 setting aside the agreement dated 27.5.2002 with declaration that the lease agreement dated 7.12.1976 and subsequent agreement dated 5.10.1988 between the petitioner and the original owner are subsisting and binding and the defendants were injuncted and restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiff/petitioner over the tea estate. Thereafter, on, and around September, 2008, the petitioner was served with notices from the Superintendent of Taxes (Recovery), Tinsukia, informing that a bakijai case has been registered against them for recovery of an amount of Rs. 11,762,498 as taxes due, for the assessment year 1993-1994, 1998-1999 being numbered as TSK/4/CST/03-04/480 and directed to make the payment within seven days of receipt of the notice failing which appropriate actions as contemplated under law would be initiated against the petitioner. Upon enquiry by the petitioner, it was found that the aforesaid bakijai case was preceded by orders of assessments and demands made on summary and ex parte basis wherein the petitioner/assessee was not present and though notices for hearing were issued and sent to the Tea Estate, during that period the said tea estate being under disorderly situation the petitioner could not take any steps and accordingly the assessment proceeded ex parte. The defence of the petitioner is that during the relevant period tea was manufactured and stock was transferred by the petitioner outside the state and sold in course of export and in course of inter-state-sale to the registered dealers but the documents in support of such stock transfer could not be produced at the time of assessment proceeding. Thereafter the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes (Appeal) under section 33 of the AGST Act, 1993, challenging the order of assessment passed for the year 1994-1995, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997. There was delay of 431, 347 and 321 days respectively in filing the appeals and accordingly three separate applications were filed praying for condoning the delay, along with the appeals. The hearing of the condonation petition was fixed on 20.7.2001 but it was adjourned till 23.8.2001 on the prayer of the petitioner, on which date also on, the prayer for adjournment made by the petitioner time was extended. The hearing of the condonation petition was fixed on 20.7.2001 but it was adjourned till 23.8.2001 on the prayer of the petitioner, on which date also on, the prayer for adjournment made by the petitioner time was extended. Though further time was granted to the petitioner, they did not turn up and accordingly a fresh notice dated 12.1.2002 was issued by the appellate authority to the petitioner to show cause as to why the appeals should not be rejected for their non-appearance at the hearings fixing 4.2.2002. On that date also the petitioner did not turn up and another notice was issued to thorn fixing 4.4.2003. The notice having returned un-served, another notice dated 12.5.2003 fixing 4.6.2003 was issued. But in spite of service of the notice, the petitioner did not appear and prayed for further adjournment by sending a letter. This time also time was granted as last opportunity fixing 21.10.2003 but this time also the petitioner did not turn up. Accordingly, the condonation petition was dismissed and consequently the connected appeals were also dismissed. Subsequently, the petitioner filed revision petitions before the Commissioner of Taxes, against the assessment orders for the assessment year 1994-1995 and 2001-2002 under section 36(2) of the AGST Act. These Revision Petitions were filed in the month of December 2009. Admittedly the orders impugned in the revision petitions before the revisional authority were passed on or before 30.3.2005 and as the period of limitation prescribed under section 30(A) for filing such revisions is fixed by statute as 90 days from the date of passing such orders, the revision petitions were delayed by more than 4l/z, years. The petitioner along with the revision petitions also filed applications for condonation of the delay in filing the revision petitions. The ground for condoning the delay as revealed from the condonation petition inter alia is that the petitioner lost control over the management of the garden since 1999 which was regained in the year 2008 and thereafter the appeals were filed before the appellate authority which were rejected on 27.4.2009, and they applied for a certified copy of the appellate order on 15.12.2008 and thereafter they searched for the assessment records but could not locate the same in their office and accordingly from the office of the Commissioner of Taxes, Doom Dooma, obtained the copy of the demand notice on 7.9.2009. After receiving the demand notice they applied for a certified copy on 22.9.2009 and in the process there has been a delay in filing the revision petitions. 6. The revisional authority rejected such prayer of the petitioner on two counts - (a) in spite of their having problem of management of tea garden the petitioner filed appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Taxes (appeal) but due to their negligence they did not pursue the appeals, (b) Secondly, section 36(2) of the AGST Act having prescribed the period of limitation of 90 days from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be revised and the petitioner having filed such revision petitions much beyond such statutory period, the revision petitions were not filed within the said period of limitation as fixed by statute. 7. Dr. Saraf, learned senior counsel referring to the financial constraint and mis-management of the garden including introduction of a third party to manage the garden, submits that the grounds for delay in filing the appeals and the revision petitions have been sufficiently explained justifying condonation of delay as prayed for. Dr. Saraf further argued that the petitioner has got a very strong case on merit and, and in the event delay is not condoned and the matter is not disposed of on merit, grave injustice would be caused to the petitioner. 8. Mr. D. Saikia, learned counsel for the respondents however, referring to the various eventful dates as reflected from the statement of the petitioner as well as the condonation petition and other documents submits that the order passed in Title Suit No. 46/2000 clearly discloses that the petitioner were in fact in possession of the garden all through out and although a third party was sought to fact inducted by virtue of an agreement the same did not materialize. That apart, the order passed by the appellate authority clearly discloses the enormity of negligence of the petitioner in pursuing the appeals. Even the appellate court, though not required under the law to provide subsequent opportunities by issuing notices to the petitioner for their default to appear, such opportunities were given on various occasions but those were also not availed by the petitioner which clearly discloses willful negligence on the part of the petitioner in pursuing the matter. Consequently the appellate authority rightly rejected the appeals. Consequently the appellate authority rightly rejected the appeals. Similarly, the reasons disclosed by the revisional authority in dismissing the revision petitions are amply borne out of records and the same were not required to be interfered with by this court in exorcise of the extra ordinary power under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Saikia has also relied on the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in WP(C) No. 823 of 2008 reiterating the same stand in all the writ petitions. 9. The basic question that calls for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the order passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority rejection the prayer of the petitioner as barred by limitation are justified in law and are liable to be interfered with in this batch of writ petitions. 10. The facts as eluded herein above with regard to the dismissal of the appeals on the ground of those being filed after causing inordinate delay and failure of the appellant/petitioner to present themselves after filing the appeals in spite of providing them various opportunities are based on factual assessment based on materials available on record. The records placed before me clearly disclose that in spite of providing opportunities to the petitioner, petitioner did not proceed with the condonation petition filed along with the appeals, which demonstrates willful and culpable negligence on the part of the petitioner to pursue their case notwithstanding the ground of financial constraint and mis­management. The petitioner was not successful in establishing even prima facie that though they had control over the garden, and they were not in physical possession of the garden and the judicial orders and other materials available on record do not support such a stand. Materials on record disclose that the petitioner was in physical possession of the garden all through out. Section 36 of the AGST Act, 1993, authorises the Commissioner for revision of an order passed by the lower authority in the hierarchy. Sub-section (1) of section 36 confers suo motto revisional power upon the Commissioner to the effect that when on examination of the records of any proceeding under this Act, the Commissioner considers that any order passed therein by any officer is "erroneous in so far it is pro judicial to the interest of the revenue", the may revise the order. Sub-section (1) of section 36 confers suo motto revisional power upon the Commissioner to the effect that when on examination of the records of any proceeding under this Act, the Commissioner considers that any order passed therein by any officer is "erroneous in so far it is pro judicial to the interest of the revenue", the may revise the order. Proviso to section 36(1) mandates that no such suo motto revisional power is to be exercised after expiry of 8 years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed. Sub-section (2) of section 36 provides that the Commissioner may on his own motion or in an application made by the dealer or any aggrieved person revise an order passed by a person appointed by the Commissioner under sub-section (1) of section 3, not being an order to which sub-section (1) applies and not being an order against which an appeal under section 33 has been filed or an order in respect of which time allowed for appeal under section 333 has not expired. Proviso to section 36(2) mandates that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under the sub-section after expiry of 90 days from the end of the financial year in which the order is made, providing further that where an application is made within the aforesaid period of 90 days an order in the application may be mad6 at any time. Section 36 of the Act does not provide any power of condonation of delay in filing the revision petitions by the revisional authority and Dr. Saraf does not dispute this legal position. 11. The scheme of section 36 as exist in the statute would go to show that in respect of an order passed in favour of the assessee, if sought to be revised the period of limitation is prescribed as 8 years whereas, if such a revision is contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 36 by an, assessee or an aggrieved party, the period of limitation prescribed is 90 days and in both the cases the period would start from the end of the financial year in which the order was made. Section 36 do not provide for any power of condonation of delay in exercising the revisional power in either case by the authority. 12. Section 36 do not provide for any power of condonation of delay in exercising the revisional power in either case by the authority. 12. AGST Act, 1993 is a special law meaning which is enacted to deal with the special cases in special circumstances contradicting to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable to all cases with which the general law deals. AGST Act, 1983 is a special law within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the Act was enacted for special circumstances in contradistinction to general rules laid down, as applicable to all classes with which the general law deals. The provisions of the AGST Act as regards imposition, levy, collection of taxes referred to therein including the method of enforcement of the rights conferred under the Act for redressal of the grievances is a complete code in itself. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is supplementary is supplementary in character in so far as it provides that in case a different period of Limitation is prescribed by any special or local low then that what is prescribed by the Schedule of the Limitation Act, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 would apply provided they are not excluded by the special or local law. Section 36 of the AGST Act specifically provides that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under sub-section 2 of section 36 after expiry of ninety days from end of the financial year to which the order was made providing further that if an application for revision so filed before expiry of ninety days in that event the revision could be disposed of at any time. Although there is no application of specific language such as "express exclusion" the mandate of the law is that the Commissioner shall not revise any such order after expiry of ninety days. The aforesaid provisions contained in sub-section (B) of section 36 would, amount to "express exclusion" within the meaning of section 29(2) of the L.A. and consequently the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act would be excluded. An other interpretation of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 36 making section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable would make the legislative mandate, as indicated above, otiose. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. An other interpretation of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 36 making section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable would make the legislative mandate, as indicated above, otiose. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. had the occasion to deal with such a situation in a case arising out of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., 2001 (8) SCC 470 wherein the Apex Court held at para 12 and 13 as follows: "12. As far as the language of section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore, bar the application of section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further, to hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result." "13. Apart from the language, "express exclusion" may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law: [E]ven in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." 13. Now in the absence of any provisions or power contain in the AGST Act, which is special statute to condone the delay in filing the revision petitions under section 36(2) of the Act whether this court in exercising the power under article 226 of the Constitution can entertain such a plea. 14. Under the AGST Act different powers and procedures have been conferred upon different hierarchy of officers. Similarly, different rights of the assesses or persons aggrieved have also been provided under the law which is the special Act dealing with assessment, recovery and matters relating thereto in respect of sale tax. 14. Under the AGST Act different powers and procedures have been conferred upon different hierarchy of officers. Similarly, different rights of the assesses or persons aggrieved have also been provided under the law which is the special Act dealing with assessment, recovery and matters relating thereto in respect of sale tax. The Legislature in its wisdom has not provided any power to condone the delay in filing the revision petition under section 36 of the Act. When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its own notion of justice, when the Legislature has spoken, Judge cannot offer to be wiser, observed by the Apex Court in the case of Mandir Sita Ram Ji v. Governor of Delhi and Anr., 1974 SC 1868. That apart, when a power has to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain case, it should be exercised in that manner only or not at all and other modes of performances are naturally evident. (Ref: Hukum Chand Shyamlal v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789 ). It is also not the function of the court to direct an authority to do something in derogation of or in contravention of the provisions of law and by issuing a writ or similar direction, the court is not to direct the authority to disobey the provisions of the statute and that would be destructive of the rule of law. In fact in the case of [A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh And Another, Justice Chinaappa Ready, 1986 (2) SCC 667 ] speaking for the court held that the court cannot issue direction to the university to protect the interest of the students who had been admitted to the Medical College as that would be a clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and the regulations of the University. The court cannot direct the university to dis-obey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulation made by the University itself would be destructive of the rule of law. 15. In view of the above discussions, the submissions made by Dr. The court cannot direct the university to dis-obey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulation made by the University itself would be destructive of the rule of law. 15. In view of the above discussions, the submissions made by Dr. Saraf that the delay in filing the revision petitions by the petitioner to be directed to be condoned cannot be acceded in exercise of power conferred upon the court under article 226 of the Constitution of India and such a direction would amount to a direction to the authority to disobey the provisions of the law as contained in the AGSTAct, 1993. 16. In view of the above discussions, this batch of writ petitions stand dismissed. 17. No costs.