Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 39 (GAU)

Harimaya Dahal v. Union of India

2010-01-25

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. In this writ petition, a claim in public law for compensation, is made by the writ petitioner for the death of her husband late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad, such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is distinct form, and in addition to the remedy in private law for damages for the tort resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest. The right to individuals is the true bastion of democracy. The State must repair the damage done by its officers to the rights of the citizens. 2. Heard Mr. A. Sachikumar Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 3. A short factual panorama, sans unnecessary details, of the present writ petition, is recapitulated. The petitioner is the wife of late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad of Serou Part-II, P.O. and P.S. Sugnu, Thoubal District, Manipur. Her husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was working as Chowkidar in a stone crushing firm called "A.M. Stone Crushing, Pheidinga" owned by one Aribam Narendra Sharma of Lamsang Bazar, Imphal West District, Manipur. Late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was getting Rs. 3,000 (rupees three thousand) per month for working as Chowkidar in the said stone crushing firm and with that money, he was maintaining his family consisting of the petitioner (wife), his father, Shri Shamananda Churamani Dahal, his mother, Smt. Bhagiratha Dahal and one minor son aged about 14 months at the time of his death. 4. The petitioner's husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad used to stay inside the campus of the stone crushing firm by constructing a kutcha house and he was looking after the workers who came to work in the said stone crushing firm as authorized by his employer. Her husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was a hard working, laborious, innocent and peace-loving citizen of India without any connection with any unlawful elements/organizations. 5. Her husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was a hard working, laborious, innocent and peace-loving citizen of India without any connection with any unlawful elements/organizations. 5. On 29.3.2001, at about 8.30 a.m., the petitioner's husband was inside the said kutcha house constructed inside the campus of the said stone crushing firm. At that time, there were some workers working in the said stone crushing firm. Suddenly, there was a sound of loud blast. The petitioner's husband and the said workers remained inside the said kutcha house out of fear. After about half of an hour, about 9/10 personnel of 15 JAT A/P, Leimakhong, Imphal entered into the said stone crushing firm. The personnel of 15 JAT called out the persons from inside the said kutcha house and, as such, they came out. Suddenly and surprisingly, the personnel of 15 JAT without any reason and saying anything started firing indiscriminately. In the said unprovoked and meaningless firing of the personnel of 15 JAT A/P Leimakhong, the petitioner's husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad received serious bullet injuries. The petitioner's husband, was then, evacuated to Military Hospital, Leimakhong where he was declared brought in dead as a result of the bullet injury. The workers, who were present at the time of the incident are (i) Smt. Chingambam Rani Devi, W/O Ch. Tomba Singh of Loitang, (ii) Shri Phijam Nobojit Singh, S/o Ph. Basan Singh of Khurkhul, (iii) Shri Maibam Shyama Singh, S/o Late M. Ginamadhop Singh of Loitang and (iv) Shri Khuraijam Premananda Singh, S/o Late Kh. Apabi Singh of Loitang. The said workers watched helplessly the said merciless and indiscriminate firing of the personnel of 15 JAT. They also could not help the deceased after he was hit by bullet as they were restrained to do so by the said personnel of 15 JAT. 6. One personnel of the 15 JAT, namely J.C. No. 488973 Nab. Sub. Maniram, after the said incident, lodged a report dated 29.3.2001 to the O.C., Sekmai P.S. by falsely stating that after the said blast, the petitioner's husband tried to jump the cordon and was trying to run away by firing and the personnel of the 15 JAT returned the fire. In the said encounter, the said person got hit by bullet and succumbed to his injury. In the said encounter, the said person got hit by bullet and succumbed to his injury. On receiving of the said report, the O.C., Sekmai P.S., accordingly, registered a case being FIR No. 25(3)2001, Sekmai P.S. under Section 302, 326, 34, IPC, 25(1B)A Act. And 5 Explosive Substance Act. After thorough investigation of the case, because of lack of evidence, F.R. No. 25/02 dated 29.7.2002 was submitted in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal on 13.11.2002. Accordingly, the said criminal case was ended in F.R. 7. On 30.3.2001, post mortem examination over the dead body of the petitioner's husband was conducted at Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS) Morgue on production by the Investigation Officer of the said FIR No. 25(3)2001, Sekmai P.S., namely, S.I. A.K. Khogen Singh by one Dr. Th. Bijoy Singh. The post mortem report clearly says that death was due to shock and heamorrhage resulting from laceration iliac vessels and associated with fracture of pelvis produced by firearm injury in pelvis and abdomen. 8. The Governor of Manipur issued order being No. 1(1)26/76-H(Pt.2), Imphal, dated 15.7.1996 for grant of ex gratia in the event of death or grievous injury due to unjustified police or extremist action and the amount payable in the case of death of a civilian is Rs. 50,000 (rupees fifty thousand). The Governor of Manipur, further amended the orders dated 15.7.1996 and 2.5.1997 by further passing orders of even number dated 6.8.1998, wherein the ex gratia grant payable to civilian in the event of death due to unjustified police/security force action was further increased to Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh). The petitioner is entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) from the Government of Manipur as ex gratia being the wife of late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad who was killed by unjustified firing of the personnel of 15 JAT on 29.3.2001. For granting ex gratia, the elder brother of the petitioner's husband filed a representation dated 30.3.2001 to the hon'ble Chief Minister, Manipur which was forwarded by Shri K. Ranjit Singh, hon'ble M.L.A. under his U.O. No. 2/MOS(GAD/H & FW)01 dated 30.3.2001. For granting ex gratia, the elder brother of the petitioner's husband filed a representation dated 30.3.2001 to the hon'ble Chief Minister, Manipur which was forwarded by Shri K. Ranjit Singh, hon'ble M.L.A. under his U.O. No. 2/MOS(GAD/H & FW)01 dated 30.3.2001. After enquiry regarding the facts leading to the death of the petitioner's husband, the Under Secretary(Home), Government of Manipur, under his letter being No. 4/14(14)/99-H dated 16.4.2001 requested the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal West District, within whose jurisdiction the incident of firing took place to take necessary steps for payment of ex gratia by sending a copy of the U.O. of the hon'ble M.L.A., Shri K. Ranjit Singh and also the copy of the representation dated 30.3.2001 addressed to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Manipur. 9. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal West District, Government of Manipur issued orders being No. 15/2/99-DC(IW)(Pt.-III) dated 24.12.2002 for payment of Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) as ex gratia for the death of Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad due to unjustified and indiscriminate firing by the personnel of 15 JAT on 29.3.2001 to the petitioner, Smt. Harimaya Dahal. The ex gratia of Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) was paid by the Government of Manipur after the finding that the firing by the personnel of the 15 JAT on 29.3:2001 which resulted to the death of the petitioner's husband was unjustified. 10. By this writ petition, the petitioner is praying for compensation of Rs. 20,00,000 (rupees twenty lakhs) for the death of her husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad. The respondent No. 1, the Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, South Block, New Delhi-110001, respondent No. 2, the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Union of India, New Delhi, respondent No. 3, the GOC, 57, Mountain Division, C/O 99 APO and the respondent No. 4, the Commanding Officer, 15 JAT, Leimakhong, Imphal West District, Manipur respectively filed joint affidavit-in-opposition wherein the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not denying the pleaded case of the petitioner in para 3 and para 4 of the writ petition that the petitioner's husband late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was working as a Chowkidar in the said stone crushing firm and also her husband was getting Rs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not denying the pleaded case of the petitioner in para 3 and para 4 of the writ petition that the petitioner's husband late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad was working as a Chowkidar in the said stone crushing firm and also her husband was getting Rs. 3,000 (rupees three thousand) per month for working as Chowkidar in the said stone crushing firm and also that the petitioner's husband was looking after the workers who come to work in the said stone crushing firm as authorized by his employer and also that he was a hard working, laborious, innocent and a peace loving citizen of India without any connection with any unlawful elements/organizations. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 pleaded that on 29.3.2001, an Improvised Explosive Device(IED) was initiated against the road opening party of the unit posted at leimakhong and while they were carrying out their task between leimakhong and Pheidinga, a blast was taken place at about 0830 hrs approximately 150 meters east of the road, close to Pheidinga. Immediately the area around which included the "A.N. Stone Crushing Unit" where the petitioner's husband worked, was cordoned to prevent escape of any underground, who might have triggered the IED. When the search was started it was fired upon from that direction and one person was seen running away and trying to jump the cordon. The individual was challenged, but did not stop. The fire drawn was returned with fire and in the crossfire, the individual got hit. He was immediately given first aid and evacuated to Military Hospital, Leimakhong, where he was declared dead and later on, he was identified as Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad, s/o Churamani Dahal. 11. The respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 also filed reply affidavit to the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner wherein it was stated that after the IED was triggered, the road opening party of 15 JAT cordoned the blast site. However, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad, the husband of the petitioner, was one of the suspects who would have triggered the IED, tried to jump the cordon. He was warned by the cordoned party and cautioned to stop. However, he did not respond to the warning. Therefore, the cordoned party was forced to open fire as a security measure. However, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad, the husband of the petitioner, was one of the suspects who would have triggered the IED, tried to jump the cordon. He was warned by the cordoned party and cautioned to stop. However, he did not respond to the warning. Therefore, the cordoned party was forced to open fire as a security measure. Late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad got injured and was immediately administered first aid. He was instantly evacuated to the Military Hospital, Leimakhong. The Medical authorities in Leimakhong Military Hospital declared him 'brought in dead'. In the last pleadings of the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in their reply affidavit, it is the case of the respondents that the petitioner's husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad, one of the suspects who could have triggered the IED, tried to jump off the cordon. He was warned by the cordoned party and cautioned to stop. However, he did not respond to the warning. Therefore, the cordoned party was forced to fire as a security measure and the late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad got injured and succumbed to his injury. 12. The respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not contending/alleging that there was a firing from the side of the petitioner's husband, late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasa. As such, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 resile from their earlier case that the unknown person, who later on identified as the husband of the petitioner, fired upon them when he tried to jump off the cordon. Over and above, it is the admitted case of the parties that no arms or ammunition was recovered from the petitioner's husband and he was only a civilian. But the questions to be decided in the present case arc that (i) whether the personnel of 15 JAT required to use the force to the extent of firing for preventing the petitioner's husband from jumping off the cordon and also (ii) the type of cordon made by the personnel of the 15 JAT. For justifying the firing which, resulted to the death of the petitioner's husband, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 should give the reasons which are cogent and rationale. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. For justifying the firing which, resulted to the death of the petitioner's husband, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 should give the reasons which are cogent and rationale. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, there is no material fact or material to show that the petitioner's husband who is admittedly a civilian tried to jump the cordon and required to be shot down for preventing him from jumping the cordon. It is clear that (i) the petitioner's husband was not armed with firearms, (ii) cordon was made by the personnel of the 15 JAT, armed with sophisticated weapons, (iii) the I.O., after thorough investigation of FIR Case No. 25(3)2001 which was registered for the said incident in which the petitioner's husband was killed, had submitted the F.R. that there was lack of evidence that the petitioner's husband had tried to jump the cordon by firing and (iv) also the Government of Manipur had granted the ex gratia of Rs. 1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) to the petitioner after coming to the finding, that too after enquiry, that the said firing by the personnel of the 15 JAT which hit the petitioner's husband, was unjustified. 13. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, except according to procedure established by law. 14. The word "life" has been used, prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. "Life" is recognized as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and it has to have the same meaning and interpretation as had been placed with that word by the Apex Court in its various decisions relating to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The meaning of words "life" cannot be narrowed down. Lord Diplock in Salomon v. Commnr of Customs and Excise(1996) 3 All ER 871 states that there is a prima facie presumption that the Parliamentarian does not intend to act in breach of international law. Again, Lord Bridge in Brind v. Secy. The meaning of words "life" cannot be narrowed down. Lord Diplock in Salomon v. Commnr of Customs and Excise(1996) 3 All ER 871 states that there is a prima facie presumption that the Parliamentarian does not intend to act in breach of international law. Again, Lord Bridge in Brind v. Secy. of State for Home Department (1991) 1 All ER 720 observed that it is well settled that, in construing any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous in the sense that it is capable of a meaning which either conforms to or conflicts with the internal law conventions the court would presume that parliament intended to legislate in conformity with the convention and not in conflict with it. 15. In the present case, for the reasons discussed above, this Court is constraint to hold that the fundamental right of the petitioner's husband right to live guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was taken away not in accordance with the procedure established by law. One of the telling ways in which violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection. The Apex court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 1983 SC 1086 , held that in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, the Supreme Court can pass an order for the payment of money in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right to life and liberty of a person. Para 9 of the AIR 1983 in Rudul Sah's case (supra) reads as follows: 9. It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal. A money claim has, therefore, to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it. It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal. A money claim has, therefore, to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it. But the important question for our consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his acquittal in a full-dressed trial. He filed a Habeas Corpus petition in this Court for his release from illegal detention. He obtained that relief, our finding being that his detention in the prison after his acquittal was wholly unjustified. He contends that he is entitled to be compensated for his illegal detention and that we ought to pass an appropriate order for the payment of compensation in this Habeas Corpus petition itself. 16. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India (I) (1984) I SCR 904 : AIR 1984 SC 571 , it was indicated that in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the burden was obviously on the respondents to make good the positive stand of the respondents in response to the notice issued by the court by offering proof of the stand taken, when it is shown that the person detained was last seen alive under the surveillance, control, and command of the detaining authority. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India (II) (1984) 3 SCR 544 : AIR 1984 SC 1026 , in such a writ petition, exemplary costs were awarded on failure of the detaining authority to produce the missing persons, on the conclusion that they were not alive and had met an unnatural death. The award was made in Sebastian M. Hongray-II apparently following Rudul Sah, but without indicating anything more. The award was made in Sebastian M. Hongray-II apparently following Rudul Sah, but without indicating anything more. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) 4 SCC 677 : AIR 1986 SC 494 , illegal detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh was held to constitute violation of his rights under Articles 21 and22(2) and the Apex Court exercising its power to award compensation under Article 32 directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner for violation of his constitutional right by way of exemplary costs or otherwise, taking this power to be settled by the decisions in Rudul Sah and Sebastian M. Hongray. In Saheli case (1990) 1 SCC 422 : AIR 1990 SC 513 , the State was held liable to pay compensation payable to the mother of the deceased who died as a result of beating and assault by the police. However, the principle indicated therein was that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. In State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil (1991)2 SCC 373 : AIR 1991 SCW 871 , the award of compensation by the High Court for violation of the fundamental right under Article 21 of an under trial prisoner, who was handcuffed and taken through the streets in a procession by the police during investigation, was upheld. However, in none of these cases, except Rudul Sah, anything more was said. In Saheli, reference was made to the State's liability for tortious acts of its servants without any reference being made to the decision of the Apex Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 . The decision in Saheli AIR 1990 SC 513 is, therefore, more in accord with the principle indicated in Rudul Sah ( AIR 1983 SC 1086 ). 17. The Apex Court in Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1960 held that compensation can be demanded in writ petition in case of violation of the fundamental right. Para 16 and para 17 of AIR 1993 SC 1960 in Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera case (supra) reads as follows: 16. The Apex Court in Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1960 held that compensation can be demanded in writ petition in case of violation of the fundamental right. Para 16 and para 17 of AIR 1993 SC 1960 in Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera case (supra) reads as follows: 16. It follows that a claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to the remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah AIR 1983 SC 1086 and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights. 17. A useful discussion on this topic which brings out the distinction between the remedy in public law based on strict liability for violation of a fundamental right enabling award of Compensation, to which the defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the private law remedy, wherein vicarious liability of the State in tort may arise is to be found in Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Torts, 22nd edn., 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 44 to 48. 18. 18. The Apex Court again reiterated in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610 that it is now a well accepted proposition in most of the jurisdiction, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must receive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrong doer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to address the wrong for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by the court and paid by the State to redress the wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a civil suit. 19. This Court in a number of cases had directed to pay compensation for the death of a citizen because of indiscriminate and unjustified firing by the security personnel. 19. This Court in a number of cases had directed to pay compensation for the death of a citizen because of indiscriminate and unjustified firing by the security personnel. There is no straight jacket formula to determine the amount of compensation to be paid for the death of a citizen of India and the amount is to be determined taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. A sum of Rs. 3,50,000 (rupees three lakhs fifty thousand) was awarded as compensation for death of deceased persons who were young men between 25-27 years of age by this Court in Hasabasumatary v. Union of India and Ors. 2009 (4) GLT 428. A sum of Rs. 4,00,000 (rupees four lakhs) was awarded as compensation for the death of Late Khundrakpam Tejkumar Singh who was aged about 23 years in W.P.(Cril) No. 3 of 2005(Imphal Bench) between Smt. Khundrakpam (Ongbi) Binashakhi Devi v. The Union of India and. Ors.. In another case, this Court in Khumanthem Ongbi Pangabam Ningol Ibemhal Devi v. State of Manipur and Ors. 2006 (Supp) GLT 265 awarded a sum of Rs. 3,50,000 (rupees three lakhs fifty thousand) as compensation. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner's husband was aged about 26 years only at the time of the death and he was earning Rs. 3,000 (rupees three thousand) per month for working as Chowkidar in the said stone crushing firm. The Apex Court in catena of cases held that even in the absence of evidence to show the earning of the deceased, the court has to apply some hypothesis, some guesses as well as human consideration in determining the quantum of compensation. In the case in hand, there is a clear evidence that the petitioner's husband was earning Rs. 3,000 (rupees three thousand) per month. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that normal life span of the residents of the State of Manipur is about 70 years. 20. After taking into consideration of the earlier judgments of this Court for awarding compensation in the cases of similar nature and also the earning capacity of the petitioner's husband, this Court considers just and appropriate that the amount of compensation would be Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand). Accordingly, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are directed to pay the amount of compensation of Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand). Accordingly, the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are directed to pay the amount of compensation of Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand) for the death of late Deepak Dahal @ Devi Prasad to the petitioner within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order. However, it is made clear that this amount of compensation is in addition to other remedies available to the petitioner and also the other remedies in the criminal proceeding against the personnel of 15 JAT. Further, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 (rupees five thousand) as fees for the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the present writ petition within four months. 21. The petitioner is directed to deposit half of the compensation amount, i.e., Rs. 2,25,000 (rupees two lakhs twenty-five thousand) in the name of her minor son as fixed deposit in any nationalized bank till her minor son attains the majority. It is also made clear that the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall deposit the said amount of Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand) in the registry of this Bench within the period stipulated above. The Registry, after receiving the amount of Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand), shall retain Rs. 2,25,000 (rupees two lakhs twenty-five thousand) out of Rs. 4,50,000 (rupees four lakhs fifty thousand) for depositing the same as fixed deposit in the name of the petitioner's minor son by the petitioner. After completing the formalities for depositing the said amount in the name of the petitioner's son by the petitioner, the registry shall release the same to the petitioner and, the petitioner shall furnish the authenticated copies of the documents for depositing Rs. 2,25,000 (rupees two lakhs twenty-five thousand) in the name of the petitioner's son to the registry. 22. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition is disposed of.