JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned counsel for opposite party nos. 2 to 4, 6 to 8 and 11 to 13. 2. This civil revision has been filed by all the three defendants-petitioners challenging order dated 28.11.2007 by which learned Subordinate Judge, III, Patna has allowed the intervenor application of opposite party nos. 11 to 13 dated 29.3.2007 and impleaded them as co-plaintiffs in Eviction Suit no. 16 of 2000. 3. The aforesaid suit was filed by the original plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 1 to 10 for eviction of the defendants-petitioners from the suit premises on the ground of expiry of fixed period of lease dated 24.2.1992 as according to the plaintiffs the said lease had expired on 31.8.1997 whereas according to the defendants it was to expire on 31.8.2002. Admittedly the owners of the suit premises were the original plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 1 to 10 and the defendants-petitioners were their tenants as per the aforesaid deed of lease. 4. From the materials on record, it transpires that an interlocutory application dated 30.8.2004 (Annexure 2) was filed by the intervenor-opposite party no. 11 for being impleaded in the said suit but the said application was rejected by the learned trial court vide order dated 7.1.2005 (Annexure-3) on the ground that the said intervenor was merely as a licencee dealer of the defendants. Subsequently, another interlocutory application was filed by by the intervenor-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 on 29.3.2007 (Annexure-4) and the same was allowed by the learned trial court vide impugned order dated 28.11.2007 on the ground that the said intervenors had chased entire suit properties from the original plaintiffs and impleaded them as coplaintiffs on the basis of eight sale deeds dated 18.3.2006 and 23.4.2006. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners challenges the aforesaid order of the learned court below stating that the law is well settled that a person who has transferred the suit lands can not seek a decree with respect to the said suit land and hence when the original plaintiffs had sold away the suit premises on 18.3.2006 and 23.4.2006 they cannot seek a decree with respect thereto in the aforesaid suit which has become infructous. In this connection, he relies upon a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Monghibai V/s. Cooverji Umersey reported in AIR 1939 PC 170. 6. In this connection, he relies upon a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Monghibai V/s. Cooverji Umersey reported in AIR 1939 PC 170. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further claims that admittedly the intervenor-plaintiff-opposite party no. 11 was licencee of the defendants-appellants and is, at present, in possession of the suit premises and hence no decree of eviction can be passed against the licencee himself and hence the suit has become a nullity. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relies upon Article 55 of Bowstead on Agency in which it has been provided that where an agent is in possession of property in his capacity as agent, he is estopped from asserting that he has a better title to it than the Principal, for his possession is deemed to be that of his principal. In the said circumstances, he claims that intervenor-opposite party no. 11 can not assert eviction of his principal claiming that he has better title to the said properties. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further avers that a dispute between the Principal and his licencee cannot be decided in this forum of an eviction suit and hence the same is infructuous. In this connection he relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. V/s. Machadeo Brothers & Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 2093 . 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argues that in the original plaint there is specific allegation of fraud against the defendants and since the intervenor-opposite party no. 11 was a licencee of the defendants he is also included in the said allegation and hence the said intervenor can not enter into the shoe of the plaintiffs. 10. It is also submitted on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioners that if intervenor-opposite party no. 11 can not be impleaded as plaintiff then opposite party nos. 12 and 13 who had purchased the other half of the suit properties can not also be impleaded in the suit as claimed. 11. Considering the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the opposite parties, it is quite clear that admittedly the original plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 1 to 10 were the owner of the suit property and the defendants-petitioner nos. 1 to 3 are their tenants and intervenor-opposite party no. 11. Considering the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the opposite parties, it is quite clear that admittedly the original plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 1 to 10 were the owner of the suit property and the defendants-petitioner nos. 1 to 3 are their tenants and intervenor-opposite party no. 11 was a partner of the firm M/s Shiv Narain Lal and Sons which was licencee of the defendants. It is also an admitted fact that the original plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 1 to 10 had sold away the entire suit premises to the intervenors-opposite party nos. 1 to 13 by eight registered sale deeds dated 18.3.2006 and 23.4.2006. 12. In the said circumstances the first question raised by the defendants- petitioners appears to be quite justifiable that the original plaintiffs after their sale in favour of intervenors can not get a decree of eviction in their favour. 13. However, when the intervenor- opposite party no. 11 had filed an interlocutory application on 30.8.2004 for being impleaded as a party to the suit merely as a licencee, his application was rightly rejected by the learned trial court on 7.1.2005 but when subsequently after their purchase in 1962 opposite party nos. 11 to 13 filed an application dated 29.3.2007 (Annexure-4) for being impleaded as coplaintiffs their application was rightly allowed by the learned court below vide impugned order dated 28.11.2007. As such the said co-plaintiffs can very well continue with the suit for decree sought. 14. So far the second question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it is quite apparent that neither the intervenors nor the firm of which intervenor-opposite party no. 11 was a partner was impleaded in the eviction suit as defendants and the eviction was sought only against the defendants-petitioners. Hence if decree of eviction of the defendants is passed in the suit, the intervenor- plaintiff-opposite party no. 11 who has already been impleaded as co-plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree of eviction not as a partner of the firm which was the licencee of the defendants, rather all the intervenors-plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 would be entitled to recovery of possession as absolute owners of the said property. It is to be noted that the defendants being the principals of the Agency can always cancel the licence granted to the firm of which intervenor-plaintiff-oppo- site party no. 11 to 13 would be entitled to recovery of possession as absolute owners of the said property. It is to be noted that the defendants being the principals of the Agency can always cancel the licence granted to the firm of which intervenor-plaintiff-oppo- site party no. 11 is party and create a new licence. In the said circumstances, there is no question of the suit having become a nullity as the intervenors-plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 have been impleaded as co-plaintiffs and they can legally proceed for the purpose of eviction of the defendants. 15. So far the third question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to Article 55 of Bowstead on Agency is concerned, it is quite apparent that the said provision is not applicable to the facts of this case as it is with respect to a situation where the agent has acquired land in his own name on behalf of his principal, but here there is no case, not even of the defendants, that the intervenors-plaintiffs-opposite party no. 11 to 13 had purchased the suit property for the defendants, rather it is not in dispute that intevenors-plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 had acquired the suit property for themselves from the admitted owners namely the original plaintiffs and hence they had stepped into the shoe of the plaintiffs by legal and valid registered deed of transfer. 16. So far the fourth question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, the dispute is not between the principal and licencee because the licencee is not intervenors-plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 rather licencee is the firm of which only intervenor-plaintiff-opposite party no. 11 is one of the partners and the said firm doing business on behalf of the defendants in the suit premises has to go along with the eviction of the defendants, as now the intervenors-plaintiffs-opposite party nos. 11 to 13 have stepped into the shoes of the original plaintiffs as admitted owners of the suit premises on the basis of their legal acquisition. Hence the case law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts of this case. 17. 11 to 13 have stepped into the shoes of the original plaintiffs as admitted owners of the suit premises on the basis of their legal acquisition. Hence the case law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts of this case. 17. So far the fifth question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, the question of fraud is not one of the issues to be decided in the suit and hence there can not be any contradictions in the matter to be decided in the suit. 18. So far the sixth question raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, this court in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, is of the view that intervenor-opposite party no. 11 was rightly impleaded as co-plaintiff along with opposite party nos. 12 and 13 on the basis of their purchase by registered deeds. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of this court in the case of Bharosi Sao V/s. Manik Chand Gupta & Others reported in AIR 1986 Patna 24 [: 1986 PLJR 5 ]. 19. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order of the learned court below nor does it find any jurisdictional error therein. Accordingly, this civil revision is dismissed. 20. Since the eviction suit was filed in the year 2000 and is only pending for arguments, the trial court is directed to expedite its disposal, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.