ORDERS ON JURISDICTION The petitioner was appointed as a peon on 5-2-1990 by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, for a period of two years, on probation. By an order dated 20-4-1992, it was declared that the petitioner has completed the period of probation satisfactorily. Thereafter he was transferred to the District and Sessions Judge Court, Bijapur. While working at the office of Civil Judge, Bagalkot, he was kept under suspension by order dated 12-1-1986 on certain charges of alleged misconduct, pending departmental enquiry. After enquiry, when all the charges levelled against him were proved and he was found guilty, he was dismissed from service by order dated 11-12-1996. He preferred administrative appeal before the Registrar General, High Court of Kamataka. The appeal was partly allowed. The order of penalty of dismissal was modified into reinstatement without back wages, consequential benefits and continuity of service. He was reinstated. Those two orders are challenged before this Court, in this writ petition. 2. This petition was filed in the year 2005 before the Principal Bench at Bangalore. On establishment of Circuit Bench at Dharwad, the case was transferred to the Circuit Bench at Dharwad. That is how this writ petition is listed before us according to roster. The petitioner filed Misc. W. No. 61874 of 2009 for amendment of the writ petition seeking quashing of the circular dated 5-6-2006 and also the notification dated 8-12-2008 before this Court, which was allowed. The petitioner was permitted to amend the writ petition. 3. The learned Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents submitted that the circular dated 5-6-2006 was issued by the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka on the instruction .of the Hon'ble Chief Justice in order to avoid conflict of decisions in similar matters by different Hon'ble Judges. This circular is being followed since 5-6-2006 till date. Therefore, the matter is to be heard by Court Hall No. 1. Therefore, he contended that this Bench has no jurisdiction to hear this writ petition. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the circular dated 5-6-2006 is contrary to the statutory provisions and the principle of natural justice, and as such it has no force of law, it is non est in the eye of law. Therefore, the circular is required to be quashed. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the circular dated 5-6-2006 is contrary to the statutory provisions and the principle of natural justice, and as such it has no force of law, it is non est in the eye of law. Therefore, the circular is required to be quashed. This case is listed before this Court according to roster, as the Chief Justice is not sitting in CH No.1 at the Circuit Bench of Dharwad. 4. It is necessary to point out at this stage that, at Dharwad while we are hearing this matter, there is C.H. No. 1 assigned to the Chief Justice. However, the Chief Justice is sitting at the Principal Bench at Bangalore. This writ petition is listed before us according to roster arranged by the Chief Justice, as C.H. No. 1 at Dharwad is not functioning at present for the aforesaid reason. In the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v Union of India and Others 1, the Apex Court has held that the power to frame roster vests with the Chief Justice for administrative control over distribution of judicial work of the Court. It has nothing to do with how a Judge is placed judicially in dealing with cases listed ~fore him as per roster. When a case is posted before a Judge for hearing as per roster, it may be heard or refused to be heard by him, depending on his opinion formed on the judicial side on the question whether he has jurisdiction to decide the matter listed before him as per roster. It is in this background before deciding the writ petition on merits, it is necessary to hear the preliminary objections as it raises the question of jurisdiction of this Bench to decide the writ petition on merits. Therefore, the preliminary points that arise for consideration are as under: (1) Whether this Bench has the jurisdiction to decide this writ petition in the light of the circular dated 5-6-2006? (2) Whether the circular dated 5-6-2006 is ultra vires and liable to be quashed? The answer to Point No. 1 is dependent on the validity of the circular dated 5-6-2006. Therefore, both these points are taken up for consideration together. Point Nos. 1 and 2: 5. (2) Whether the circular dated 5-6-2006 is ultra vires and liable to be quashed? The answer to Point No. 1 is dependent on the validity of the circular dated 5-6-2006. Therefore, both these points are taken up for consideration together. Point Nos. 1 and 2: 5. The necessary pleadings in the writ petition in this regard are as under: "16-A. That the petitioner submits that the objection was raised by the registry that the above noted petition is required to be heard before Court Hall No.1 in terms of the Circular bearing No. 747 of 2006, dated 5th June, 2006 is patently would deprive the petitioner of his valuable right to prefer a writ appeal before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. A true copy of the same is herewith produced and marked as Annexure-A. 16-B. That the petitioner submits that in terms of the said circular it is contemplated that no other Court except Court Hall No.1 alone is to hear the matters pertaining to the employment pertains to employees of High Court, Subordinate Court and judicial Officers, challenging the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and Hon'ble Judges on the administrative side. In this context, it is brought to the notice of this Hon'ble Court that the High Court of Karnataka (Chief Justice representing High Court of Karnataka) is party as respondent 1 and the Chief Justice of Karnataka is sitting in Court Hall No. 1. Hence, it cannot hear the petitions wherein he is a party. Even though the order impugned may be passed by his delegate, yet as per the principles of natural justice one cannot be a Judge in his own cause". 6. The statement of objections traversing those allegations which is set out in para 3 reads as under: "It is submitted that on the instructions of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, Circular bearing No. HCE 747 of 2006, dated 5th June, 2006 was issued for posting writ petitions that are filed/being filed by the employees of the High Court, Subordinate Courts and Judicial Officers challenging the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Judges on Administrative side, before Court Hall No. 1. This circular was issued in order to avoid conflict of decisions in similar matters by different Hon'ble Judge. This circular was issued in order to avoid conflict of decisions in similar matters by different Hon'ble Judge. This Circular is being followed since 5-6-2006 to till date and as per the circular instructions, the matter is to be heard by the Court Hall No. 1 of the Principal Bench of the High Court of Karnataka". 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the 'Ace), the writ petition is to be heard by the learned Single Judge. As against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner has the right of appeal under Section 4 of the Act read with Section 10(iv-a) of the Act. The circular directing posting of the matter before the Division Bench is not only contrary to the aforesaid statutory provisions but also would deprive a valuable right of appeal to the petitioner. Secondly, he contended that in all these cases, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority would be that of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Though the Hon'ble Chief Justice has unbridled power in the matter of deciding the roster and allotment of cases to the Hon'ble Judges in the High Court, that power would not include the power to assign the roster in such a manner as to constitute himself in a Bench to decide the orders passed by him on the administrative side. Therefore, it was contended that the impugned circular is contrary to the statutory provisions and also opposed to the principles of natural justice and fair-play. As such, it is liable to be quashed. 8. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate submitted that it is settled law that the Hon'ble Chief Justice is the master of roster and therefore in his discretion when he constitutes a Bench to hear a particular case, it is within his jurisdiction and the litigant has no say in the matter. Therefore, the impugned circular is issued in exercise of such power and for good administration and it cannot be found fault with. It is in pursuance of the said power conferred, he has allotted the work pertaining to the service matter of the High Court employees and the subordinate judiciary to be heard by him. It is reasonable classification and therefore it cannot be found fault with. 9. It is in pursuance of the said power conferred, he has allotted the work pertaining to the service matter of the High Court employees and the subordinate judiciary to be heard by him. It is reasonable classification and therefore it cannot be found fault with. 9. The entire argument proceeds on the assumption that the impugned circular directs the posting of cases before C.H. No.1 where normally a Division Bench sits and which is presided by the Chief Justice. In order to appreciate these arguments and answer the points that arise for consideration, it is necessary to trace the power of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 10. Though the erstwhile Chief Court and the Mysore High Court were abolished and the present High Court of Karnataka was established under the Constitution of India and in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Mysore High Court Act of 1884, continued to apply to the High Court of Karnataka. Section 18 provided for conferring power on the Chief Justice as specified in the said section from time to time and the Chief Justice empowered under this section shall exercise all the powers conferred upon him under this section and the exercise of such powers by him shall be deemed to be the exercise of the same by the High Court under the Act. The source of power under Section 18 would come into operation only when the State Government confers such powers on the Chief Justice. One of the powers so conferred is the distribution of the work of the High Court between himself and other Judges of the said Court. It is in pursuance of these powers conferred, which sections are not repealed with the passing of the Karnataka High Court Act of 1961 the Chief Justice has been exercising the powers. However, before the High Court Act, 1961' came into force by virtue of the power conferred under Section 19, High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959 came to be promulgated by the High Court. Section 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884 provided for High Court making rules in such manner as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more of its Judges of any powers conferred on it by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force. 11. Section 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884 provided for High Court making rules in such manner as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more of its Judges of any powers conferred on it by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force. 11. The Kamataka High Court Act, 1961 was enacted to make provision for regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Kamataka in relation to the administration of justice and to provide for its jurisdiction. It defines Chief Justice, Criminal Appeal, First Appeal, Full Bench, High Court and second appeal. It deals with the power of Single Judge, Bench consisting of two Judges and also the Full Bench. Section 6 of the Act mandates all second appeals shall be heard and disposed of by a Single Judge of the High Court. Section 8 deals with powers of Single Judge to dispose of revision cases by himself or refer the same to a Bench. It provides that, any Judge of the High Court sitting alone, shall have power to hear and dispose of civil and criminal revision cases in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court under any law for the time being in force, except cases relating to quashing of orders of commitment. The decision or order of the Single Judge shall be final. A Single Judge while dealing with both second appeal as well as a revision petition has been vested with the power to refer the second appeal or the revision petition to a Bench of two Judges for hearing and disposal. Even in respect of first appeal whether arising out of civil or criminal matters, Section 5 of the Act mandates that such appeal shall be heard by a Single Judge of a High Court if the value in civil matters is less than Rs. 15,00,000/- and in criminal matters if the offences are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. After specifically providing for the hearing of the appeals and revisions by the Single Judge, Section 9 confers on the Single Judge certain residuary powers. It reads as under: "9. 15,00,000/- and in criminal matters if the offences are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. After specifically providing for the hearing of the appeals and revisions by the Single Judge, Section 9 confers on the Single Judge certain residuary powers. It reads as under: "9. Other powers of a Single Judge.-The powers of the High Court in relation to the following matters shall be exercised by a Single Judge, provided that the Judge before whom the matter is posted for hearing may adjourn it for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges.- (i) determining in which of several Courts having jurisdiction a suit shall be heard; (ii) admission of an appeal in forma pauperis; (iii) exercise of original jurisdiction under any law for the time being in force; (iv) appeals under Rule 1 of Order 43 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (v) appeals in which the subject-matter is as to costs only; (vi) any matter of an interlocutory character in appeals and other proceedings; (vii) admission of an appeal presented after the expiry of the period allowed by the law of limitation; (viii) exercise of powers conferred by Section 389, Section 439 and Section 440 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974); (ix) exercise of powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974); (x) …….. (xi) appeals from interlocutory orders, where such appeals are allowed by law; (xii) exercise of powers under: (a) clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India except where such power relates to the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus; and (b) Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India; (xiii) ………" 12. A learned Single Judge can also exercise powers under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India except where such power relates to the issue of' a writ in the nature of habeas corpus under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution. Section 4 of the Act provides for an intra-Court appeal which reads as under: "4. A learned Single Judge can also exercise powers under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India except where such power relates to the issue of' a writ in the nature of habeas corpus under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution. Section 4 of the Act provides for an intra-Court appeal which reads as under: "4. Appeals from decisions of a Single Judge of the High Court.-An appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court under this Act or under any law for the time being in force, shall lie to and be heard by a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court". 13. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka v H. Krishnappa and Others\ dealing with the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Act, held at para 92 as under: . "Section 4 of the High Court Act, 1961, provides for appeals from judgments, decrees and orders passed by the Single Judges in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction of the High Court, in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, is, as stated by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 : (1962)45 ITR 414 (SC), an original jurisdiction though it is an extraordinary original jurisdiction. Hence, it follows that an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution". Again it is stated at para 95, as under: "It is true that Article 226, by itself, does not provide for an appeal from an order made in exercise of the powers there under. Nor does it prohibit expressly, or by necessary implication, such appeal. In such a situation it appears to us that the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Company Limited, Chidambaram v James Clwdwick and Brothers Limited, AIR 1953 SC 357 , applies. Nor does it prohibit expressly, or by necessary implication, such appeal. In such a situation it appears to us that the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Company Limited, Chidambaram v James Clwdwick and Brothers Limited, AIR 1953 SC 357 , applies. There, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following enunciation by Viscound Haldane L.C., in National Teleplwne Company Limited v Postmaster General, 1913 AC 546: "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches". 96. The same was the view expressed by the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v Chandrashekara Thevar, AIR 1948 PC 42, wherein it was said: ''Where a legal right is in dispute and ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms, confer a right of appeal" . 97. In the light of the above rulings, it follows that when Article 226 of the Constitution confers powers on the High Court, without more, the General right of appeal from the decisions in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, attaches to decisions in exercise of the powers under Article 226". 14. In the case of State of Rajasthan v Prakash Chand and Others 1, one of the issues which arose for consideration is, regarding the power of the Chief Justices in the matter of Constitution of Benches, providing roster and in particular, the prerogative to transfer even a part heard case from the Board of learned Single Judge to a Division Bench for disposal on being satisfied that the case involved Constitutional issues, which under the High Court Rules, was required to be heard by a Division Bench. Therefore, the said question was decided in the light of the Rules of the High Court of judicature for Rajasthan, 1952. Rule 54 reads as under: "Rule 54. Therefore, the said question was decided in the light of the Rules of the High Court of judicature for Rajasthan, 1952. Rule 54 reads as under: "Rule 54. Constitution of Benches.-Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts, as may be constituted from time to time and do such work, as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction". In that context, the Supreme Court held as under: "15. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance and Rule 54 shows that the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and that it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative. He alone, has the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted; which Judges is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear as also as to which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. In other words the Judges of the High Court can sit alone or in Division Benches and do such work only as may be allotted to them by an order of or in accordance with the directions of the Chief Justice. That necessarily means that it is not within the competence or domain of any Single or Division Bench of the Court to give any direction to the Registry in that behalf which will run contrary to the Directions of the Chief Justice. Therefore, in the scheme of things judicial discipline demands that in the event a Single Judge or a Division Bench considers that a particular case requires to be listed before it for valid reasons, it should direct the Registry to obtain appropriate orders from the Chief Justice. The puisne Judges are not expected to entertain any request from the Advocates of the parties for listing of case which does not strictly fall within the determined roster. In such cases, it is appropriate to direct the Counsel to make a mention before the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate order. This is essential for smooth functioning of the Court. The puisne Judges are not expected to entertain any request from the Advocates of the parties for listing of case which does not strictly fall within the determined roster. In such cases, it is appropriate to direct the Counsel to make a mention before the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate order. This is essential for smooth functioning of the Court. Though on the judicial side the Chief Justice is only the 'first amongst the equals', on the administrative side in the matter of Constitution of Benches and making of roster he alone is vested with the necessary powers. That the power to make roster exclusively vests in the Chief Justice and that a daily cause list is to be prepared under the directions of the Chief Justice as is borne out from Rule 73. 16. This is the consistent view taken by some of the High Courts and this Court which appears to have escaped the attention of Shethna, J., in the present case, when he directed the listing of certain part heard cases before him as a Single Judge by providing a separate Board for the purpose, while sitting in a Division Bench. 17. In State v Devi Dayal, AIR 1959 All. 421 (DB), a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered the scope and powers of the Chief Justice under the Constitution with particular reference to Rule 1, Chapter V of the Rules of that Court (which is in pari materia with Rule 54 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952) and held per Mukerji, J. (para 7): "..... It is clear to me, on a careful consideration of the constitutional position, that it is only the Chief Justice who has the right and the power to decide which Judge is to sit alone and which cases such Judge can decide; further it is again for the Chief Justice to determine which Judges shall constitute Division Benches and what work those Benches shall do. Under the Rules of this Court, the Rule that I have quoted above, it is for the Chief Justice to allot work to Judges and Judges can do only such work as is allotted to them. Under the Rules of this Court, the Rule that I have quoted above, it is for the Chief Justice to allot work to Judges and Judges can do only such work as is allotted to them. It is not, in my view, open to a Judge to make an order which could be called an appropriate order, unless and until the case in which he makes the order has been placed before him for orders either by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. Any order which a Bench or a Single Judge may choose to make in a case that is not placed before them or him by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions is an order which, in my opinion, if made, is without jurisdiction". Therefore, it is clear that the Rules of the High Court of judicature for Rajasthan, 1952, did not provide which matter is to be decided by a Single Judge and which matter is to be decided by the Division Bench. The said decision was left to the Chief Justice to be decided by the order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction. 15. The question is, if the statute provides which matter is to be decided by a Single Judge and which matter to be decided by the Division Bench, is it still open to the Chief Justice to constitute the Benches contrary to the Rules? We have three Judgments of this Court on the said question, one of the Division Bench, another of Full Bench consisting of three Judges, yet another judgment of Full Bench consisting of five Judges. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Narasimhasetty (deceased) by L.Rs v Padmasetty1, while answering the preliminary objection raised to the effect that keeping in view the mandatory provisions contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 and Rules 6 and 7 of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, it was not competent either on the part of the learned Single Judge or even the Hon'ble Chief Justice to refer the present appeal to the Full Bench for a final decision. The Court held as under: "11. The Court held as under: "11. In the backdrop of the above noted statutory provisions, we are required to analyse the rival contentions to examine two independent aspects, namely: (i) the extent of the administrative power of the Chief Justice to allot judicial work of the High Court to the Judges sitting singly or forming Benches; and (ii) the jurisdictional competence of the Judges to refer any case to a larger Bench. 12. So far as the first question is concerned, Rule 6 of the High Court Rules in unambiguous terms confers an absolute power on the Chief Justice to constitute Benches and allot/distribute judicial work amongst them. This power can be exercised only by the Chief Justice of the High Court and not by any puisne Judge or any Bench comprised of them. The provisions made in the said rule has now been recognised by the Supreme Court as an absolute procedural law ensuring maintenance of judicial discipline and proper functioning of the High Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v Prakash Chand and Others, 1997(10) Supreme 122 , on the review of catena of decisions on the point has approved the view taken by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Sanjay Kumar Srivastava v Acting Chief Justice, 1996 All. W.C. 644 (FB). In this decision it was inter alia held that: "In view of the above, it is clear that the Chief Justice enjoys a special status not only under Constitution but also under Rules of Court, 1952, made in exercise of powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution. The Chief Justice alone can determine jurisdiction of various Judges of the Court. He alone can assign work to a Judge sitting alone and to the Judges sitting in Full Bench. He alone has the jurisdiction to decide which case will be heard by two or more Judges. The conferment of this power exclusively on the Chief Justice is necessary so that various Courts comprising of the Judges sitting along or in Division Bench etc., work in a Coordinated manner and the jurisdiction of one Court is not overlapped by other Court. The conferment of this power exclusively on the Chief Justice is necessary so that various Courts comprising of the Judges sitting along or in Division Bench etc., work in a Coordinated manner and the jurisdiction of one Court is not overlapped by other Court. If the Judges were free to choose their jurisdiction or any choice was given to them to do whatever case they may like to hear and decide, the machinery of the Court would collapse and the judicial functioning of the Court would cease by generation of internal strife on account of hankering for a particular jurisdiction or a particular case. The nucleus for proper functioning of the Court is the "self' and "judicial" discipline of Judges which is sought to be achieved by Rules of Court by placing in the hands of the Chief Justice full authority and power to distribute work to the Judges and to regulate their jurisdiction and sittings". …….. 14. In view of the said pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court, since the existence and proper functioning of an independent judiciary, like the High Court, is a part of the essential basic structure of our Constitution, therefore, all the legislative Acts and the administrative or executive orders concerning the High Court administration must conform with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. If there be any irreconcilable statutory provision or order, then the same has to be read down so as to give supremacy to the powers of the Chief Justice in constituting the Benches and allocation/distribution of judicial work among them. All the provisions of the High Court Act and the Rules framed there under including the provisions for intra-Court appeal have to be read as being subject to the said power of the Chief Justice. 15. It also goes without saying that while exercising powers of allocation/distribution of judicial work among the Benches, it is open for the Chief Justice to devise his own method of classification of cases to ensure quick and effective disposal of cases and for effective administration of justice. 15. It also goes without saying that while exercising powers of allocation/distribution of judicial work among the Benches, it is open for the Chief Justice to devise his own method of classification of cases to ensure quick and effective disposal of cases and for effective administration of justice. Such classifications can be based on any intelligible criteria like the nature of disputes involved, valuation of the subject-matter, age of the case, the areas from which the cases are arising, as also as to whether the cases pertain to private or public litigation, whether the jurisdiction to be exercised is revisional, appellate, or original, whether the cases are to be instituted on regular petitions or on in-formations received from known or unknown sources and the like, keeping in view the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chand. "But it needs to be stressed here that the exercising of the said power by the Chief Justice by deviating from the normal rule based on the regular practice of the Court (See Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City v R.H. Pandit, Managing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, AIR 1974 SC 2269 , para 6), or the statutory provisions must stand the test of reason and objectivity since such exercise will be always subject to mandates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which absolutely prohibits the exercise of powers in a discriminatory, arbitrary or mala fide manner and always entitle the aggrieved party to seek remedy against the same by approaching the appropriate forum". No Judge of the High Court can claim to himself any inherent power to take cognizance of a particular cause ether on being moved or suo motu unless it is assigned by the Chief Justice to the Judge concerned. The extent of power of the Chief Justice and that of the Judges of the High Court has to be now treated as authoritatively determined and clearly delineated. But it may be clarified that if any learned Judge, either suo motu or on the basis of information coming to his possession, prima facie finds that any matter, not concerning the jurisdiction assigned to him, needs to be examined in the judicial side of the High Court, then, by recording his opinion in writing, he may refer the same to the Chief Justice for being placed before an appropriate Bench". 16. 16. In the Division Bench judgment in the case of A. V Amarnathan and Another v Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore and Another 1, the notification issued by the Chief Justice on 8-7-1997 directing that all the writ petitions filed as public interest litigations shall with effect from 11th August, 1997, be listed before the Division Bench dealing with the particular subject as per sitting list, was assailed. After referring to various judgments of the Apex Court and in particular, the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it was held as under: "44. The principles laid down by the various High Court in their judgments stated supra are approved by the Apex Court and became the law of the land. By reading provisions i.e., Sections 18 and 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884, and Section 10(v) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 along with Rule 6 of Chapter III, the Constitution of Benches and allotment of judicial work, and Rule 7 of Chapter XV along with Article 225 of the Constitution of India, it is evident that the Chief Justice is the sole authority for Constitution of Benches and distribution of work among his brother Judges of the High Court. 45. Therefore, posting of the public interest litigation writ petitions before the Division Bench instead of a Single .Judge is a sole prerogative of the Chief Justice. When all the power vests in the Chief Justice the other brother Judges will have no power or jurisdiction to entertain any petition, telegram or letter or a case on their own unless the subject is allotted to them. Hence, the petitioners cannot contend that the writ petition can be heard for admission and disposed off as it is not tenable. If the said contention is to be accepted it will lead to negation of the judicial restraint and judicial discipline. ………. 48. By reading Sections 8 and 9 together it is manifest that the learned Single Judge can dispose of revision petitions pertaining to civil and criminal subjects except cases relating to quashing of orders of commitment. If the said contention is to be accepted it will lead to negation of the judicial restraint and judicial discipline. ………. 48. By reading Sections 8 and 9 together it is manifest that the learned Single Judge can dispose of revision petitions pertaining to civil and criminal subjects except cases relating to quashing of orders of commitment. The Single Judge also can dispose of the civil cases having jurisdiction, admission of an appeal in forma pauperis, exercise of original jurisdiction under any law for the time being in force, appeals under Rule 1 of Order 43 of the First Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, appeals where subject-matter only relates to costs and any matter of an interlocutory character in appeals and other proceedings, admission of appeals and also the writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India except Habeas Corpus. Section 10 deals with other powers of a Bench of two Judges. Section 10(v) provides: "All other matters not expressly provided for in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force can be exercised by a Bench". This clause (v) of Section 10 confers residuary jurisdiction to Division Bench to deal with all other matters not referred to in other sub-clauses of the section. 49. It is to be noticed that public interest litigation is of recent origin of 1970. When the Act was enacted the locus standi principle dominated and public interest litigation was not in existence. Therefore, the conteA1;ual interpretation has to be applied. 50. The public interest litigation has got its special features distinguishable from inter-party litigation. ………. 52. The Apex Court has enlarged sphere of the public interest litigation to combat the inhuman prison conditions, horrors of bonded labour, right to speedy trial, right to legal aid, right to livelihood, a right against pollution, a right to be protected from industrial hazardous, right to human dignity and to basic needs etc. Thus, the public interest litigation is a special kind than others. ……… Therefore, the important task of the Court is to provide justice to the affected persons in public interest litigation and to discourage professional litigant to abuse the process of Court under the garb of public interest litigation to self-serve his personal interest. Thus, the public interest litigation is a special kind than others. ……… Therefore, the important task of the Court is to provide justice to the affected persons in public interest litigation and to discourage professional litigant to abuse the process of Court under the garb of public interest litigation to self-serve his personal interest. Therefore, treating it as a special case keeping in view the vitality of its nature, posting before the Division Bench cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. 54. The provisions of the Act cited supra has to be interpreted having the context in which they are being used. The provisions of the Act and Rules read with Article 225 of the Constitution have bestowed the sole power on the Chief Justice for constitution of Bench and distribution of work among the appropriate Judges. So, the Chief Justice has got power to post the public interest litigation cases before Division Bench and Division Bench has got jurisdictional authority as per Section 10(v) of the Act". 17. Again this matter surfaced before the Full Bench of five Judges. In the case of State of Karnataka and Others v B. Krishna Bhat and Others 1 , again the validity of the notification dated 8-7-1997, which was upheld by the Division Bench, came up for consideration. After referring to various judgments including the aforesaid judgments, it was observed as under: "It is significant that all these decisions only emphasise that the Chief Justice has the prerogative of constituting Benches and allocating work. But, none of the above decisions deal with the question of fixing the quorum, that is the minimum number of Judges required to decide each type of cases. 83. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the appellate and revision jurisdictions under the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, are conferred on the High Court and not on any individual Judge or Bench of the Court. If there was no statute or Rules governing the matter, all appeals, revisions and writ petitions have to be heard and disposed of by the entire Court. Having regard to the number of cases filed and the time required to hear them, it is not feasible, for the entire Court to sit together for deciding all the cases. If there was no statute or Rules governing the matter, all appeals, revisions and writ petitions have to be heard and disposed of by the entire Court. Having regard to the number of cases filed and the time required to hear them, it is not feasible, for the entire Court to sit together for deciding all the cases. Hence, it is necessary to distribute the judicial work of the High Courts to Benches of two Judges and Single Judges, depending on the comparative seriousness of different category of cases. This requires exercise of three administrative functions: (a) fixing a quorum or minimum number of Judges, required to decide different categories of cases; (b) Constitution of Benches, that is the number of Benches of two Judges and number of Benches of Single Judges, required for deciding the cases; and deciding who will sit in the Benches of two Judges and single Judges and who will sit in Full Benches; (c) allocation of judicial work to each of the Benches - Full, Division and Single Judge. These three functions relating to the practice and procedure of the Court, are parts of the power of administrative of justice". 18. After referring to the Mysore High Court Act, 1884, Mysore Chief Court Rules, 1884, High Court of Kamataka Rules, 1959 and the Kamataka High Court Act of 1961, the Constitutional provisions and in particular referring to Section 9 of the Act, it was held as under: "86.7 Prescribing the quorum is a matter relating to practice and procedure of the High Court falling under 'administration of justice'. It is not a matter falling under "constitution and organisation of the High Courts' which is within exclusive power of the Parliament under Entry 78 of the List I; nor is it a matter that affects any power of the High Court or the Chief Justice conferred under the Constitution. The Supreme Court in State of Bombay v Narottamdas Jethabhai and Another, AIR 1951 SC 69 , observed thus: ''Where there was no separate provision authorising the making of laws with respect of jurisdiction and powers of Courts and therefore the authority to make laws with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Court had of necessity to be found in the words "administration of justice", it might be urged that jurisdiction and powers of Courts have to be spelt out of the words "administration of justice". Prescribing of the quorum and prescribing the powers of Single . Judges and Division Benches has always been done by the Legislature ever since 1884 in the State and it was never part of the prerogative of the Chief Justice. 87. The quorum is regulated by special statutes or by the provisions of the Kamataka High Court Act, 1961. Several statutes providing for appeals or references, specify the minimum quorum. For example, Section 260-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires an appeal filed before the High Court should be heard by not less than two Judges; Section 259 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that a reference shall be heard by not less than two Judges; Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, requires that cases for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage under the said Act should be headed by a Bench of three Judges; and there are several other enactments which specify the quorum for hearing appeals or references under them. 88. Apart from the special provisions in various enactments in regard to quorum, the Kamataka High Court Act, 1961 specifies the quorum where no specific provision is made in the special statutes. 88.1 Section 5 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 provides that all first appeals, criminal appeals and all cases referred to the High Court for confirmation of a sentence of death, shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court. Section 10 lists the matters where the quorum required is two, that is, the matters where the powers of the High Court can be exercised by a Bench of two Judges. 88.2 Section 6 of the said Act provides that all second appeals shall be heard and disposed of by a Single Judge of the High Court. Section 8 provides that any Judge of the High Court sitting alone, shall have power to hear and dispose of civil and criminal revision cases in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court. Section 9 lists the matters where the quorum required is one, that is, the matters where the powers of the High Court can be exercised by a Single Judge. Relevant portion of Section 9 is extracted below: "9. Section 9 lists the matters where the quorum required is one, that is, the matters where the powers of the High Court can be exercised by a Single Judge. Relevant portion of Section 9 is extracted below: "9. Other powers of a Single Judge.-The powers of the High Court in relation to the following matters shall be exercised by a Single Judge, provided that the Judge before whom the matter is posted for hearing may adjourn it for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges.- xxx xxx (xii) exercise of powers under. (a) clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India except where such power relates to the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus; and (b) Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India. xxx xx'' Section 9 prescribes the minimum and not the maximum number of Judges who will have to hear a case. 89. It would be seen from the provisions extracted above (Section 18 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884 and Rule 6 of Chapter III of the High Court of Kamataka Rules, 1959), that insofar as Constitution of Benches and distribution of work among Judges, the power is expressly conferred upon the Chief Justice without any specific further regulation. As a consequence, the power of the Hon'ble Chief .Justice to constitute Benches and distribute work is absolute and thus it is treated as his prerogative. On the other hand, as far as fixing the quorum for the several types or categories of cases, the matter is not left to the discretion of the Chief Justice, but is fixed either by the special or general statute (High Court Act). Where the quorum has been fixed either by the special statutes or general statute, the Chief Justice has no discretion to allocate a case to a Bench with lesser number of Judges than the prescribed quorum. While it is the prerogative of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute the Benches and allocate work, the prerogative does not extend to fixing the quorum where it has already been fixed under the statutes. ……… 92. While it is the prerogative of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute the Benches and allocate work, the prerogative does not extend to fixing the quorum where it has already been fixed under the statutes. ……… 92. Sections 6, 8 and 9 of the High Court Act are enabling provisions which set out the category of cases which can be dealt with a minimum quorum of one (Single Judge) and Sections 5 and 10 of the High Court Act are the enabling provisions which set out the category of cases which can be dealt with a minimum quorum of two (Division Benches). It is no doubt true that the words 'not less than', does not precede the words 'Single Judge' in Sections 6, 8 and 9, which refer to cases which can be dealt by Single Judge, though the said words 'not less than' precedes the words 'two Judges', in Section 5 of the High Court Act and Sections 259 and 260-B of the Income-tax Act. The reason is obvious. The words 'not less than' if used before the words 'single Judge' will be meaningless, as there is nothing less than one. But Section 9 does not prohibit allocation of matters which can be tried by a Single Judge, to a Division Bench. This aspect is no longer res integra. 93. The Supreme Court in Rathinam v State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, District Crime Branch, Madurai, AIR 2000 SC 1851 : 2000 AIR SCW 423, where the Supreme Court has held as follows: "Every matter to be decided by a High Court is normally decided by a two Judges Bench of the High Court. For achieving expediency in disposal of cases, statutes have provided that certain categories of cases can be heard and disposed of by Single Judge of the High Court. But it must be pointed out that all matters which can be heard and decided by a Single Judge can as well be heard and decided by a Division Bench but not vice versa, subject to statutory restrictions passed by the Legislature. It is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of a High Court to allot cases to different Judges of the High Court for disposal, subject to such statutory provisions". 94. Any decision in PIL affects a large number of public. It is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of a High Court to allot cases to different Judges of the High Court for disposal, subject to such statutory provisions". 94. Any decision in PIL affects a large number of public. Many a time, the proceedings are initiated merely by a letter or they may even be on the basis of newspaper report; or the parties who approach the Court with a PIL may not have the financial capacity to fight the case before two Courts, once before a Single Judge and again before an Appellate Bench; mostly they are intended to help the needy and down trodden. In the circumstances, having regard to the importance of PIL and having regard to the financial inability of the beneficiaries of PIL to approach a hierarchy of Courts, if the Chief Justice thought fit to refer the entire class of PIL cases to the Division Bench for decision, exercise of such power is reasonable and within his discretion and prerogative. The same is not therefore open to challenge" . In the concluding para at 96, it is held as under: "(ii) But in regard to fixing the quorum for hearing the different category of cases, the Chief Justice should follow the statutory provisions or Rules. The power of Chief Justice in regard to constitution of Benches and allocation of judicial work has nothing to do with fixing of quorum for hearing of cases, under Section 9(xii) of the High Court Act. (iii) However, he has the discretion to refer any matter in regard to which a quorum has been fixed, to a larger Bench. Therefore, the notification dated 8-7-1997 allocating single Judge matter to Division Bench is valid". (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the law is well-settled. The power of the Chief Justice in regard to Constitution of Benches and allocation of judicial work has nothing to do with fixing of quorum for hearing of cases. If quorum is fixed for hearing of cases by the statutory provisions or rules, the Chief Justice should fix the quorum for hearing of cases as mandated in the statutory provisions or rules. However, in the absence of any prohibition he may In his discretion refer any matter in regard to which a quorum has been fixed under the statute or the rules to a larger Bench. This he has to do expressly by issuing a notification. However, in the absence of any prohibition he may In his discretion refer any matter in regard to which a quorum has been fixed under the statute or the rules to a larger Bench. This he has to do expressly by issuing a notification. Such a notification should specify that a single Judge matter will be heard by a Division Bench. In the absence of such express stipulation in the notification, the said matter cannot be heard by a Division Bench. In such matters the case has to be listed as per the statutory provision. In this context it is necessary to carefully look into the impugned circular issued. 19. The impugned circular reads as under: HCE.747/06 High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, dated 5th June, 2006 CIRCULAR Hon'ble the Chief Justice has directed to post writ petitions that are filed/being filed by employees of the High Court, Subordinate Courts and judicial officers challenging the orders passed by Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Judges on administrative side before Court Hall No. 1. Hon'ble the Chief Justice has also directed to withdraw such writ petitions already pending before Single Benches and to post them before Court Hall No.1. Therefore, the Assistant Registrars and Section Officers of all pending branches on Judicial side are hereby directed to post such cases before Court Hall No.1 by getting prepared the second set of such cases with immediate effect. By Order of Hon'ble The Chief Justice Sd/(A.P. Murari) Registrar Judicial 20. The aforesaid circular explicitly makes it clear that writ petitions challenging the order passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Judges on the administrative side are to be posted before Court Hall No. 1. Each Judge of the High Court has been assigned a Court Hall in the Principal Bench at Bangalore. Even in the Circuit Benches, Court halls are assigned to Judges. Court Hall No.1 is assigned to Chief Justice at the Principal Bench as well as at Circuit Benches. Therefore, Court Hall No.1 is Court where the Chief Justice sits. 21. A perusal of the aforesaid circular shows the Chief Justice has directed the posting of writ petitions before Court Hall No. 1. In the said circular he has not directed that such writ petitions should be heard by a Division Bench. Therefore, Court Hall No.1 is Court where the Chief Justice sits. 21. A perusal of the aforesaid circular shows the Chief Justice has directed the posting of writ petitions before Court Hall No. 1. In the said circular he has not directed that such writ petitions should be heard by a Division Bench. Therefore, the said circular cannot be construed as a notification allocating a Single Judge matter to a Division Bench. Probably, the office has misread the circular and is posting the matters before Court Hall No.1 where normally the Chief Justice sits and presides over a Division Bench. But, it is not uncommon that the Chief Justice sitting in Court Hall No. 1 also sits single. In the absence of a specific direction in the circular directing the office to post Single Judge matter before a Division Bench, the said circular cannot be read as the Chief Justice fixing the quorum of two Judges for hearing matters referred to therein. Under Section 9 of the Act, all writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India except where it relates to the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus and Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India are to be heard by a Single Judge. The Circular does not prescribe the quorum of the Judges to hear such matters. Therefore, in the absence of specific words in the circular allocating the matters referred to in the circular to a Division Bench, the Division Bench has no jurisdiction to decide a matter which exclusively falls within the jurisdiction of a Single Judge. The Chief Justice in the said circular has not allocated Single Judge matter to Division Bench. It is the High Court office which is listing such matters before the Bench of Judges. It is a mistake committed by the office which needs to be rectified. 22. However, the next question is, when the orders impugned are passed by the Chief Justice or his delegate and they are challenged before the High Court, while allocating such matters can he allocate such matters to himself or Division Bench presided over by him? C.H. No. 1 is where the Chief Justice sits and presides over the Bench. 22. However, the next question is, when the orders impugned are passed by the Chief Justice or his delegate and they are challenged before the High Court, while allocating such matters can he allocate such matters to himself or Division Bench presided over by him? C.H. No. 1 is where the Chief Justice sits and presides over the Bench. Therefore, as per the said circular, the Chief Justice sitting on the judicial side on a Bench will decide the correctness of the orders passed by the Chief Justice on the administrative side. The Hon'ble Judges when they pass orders on the administrative side, pass the orders as the delegate of the Chief Justice and in law they are passed by the Chief Justice only. 23. The Apex Court while dealing with the power of the Chief Justice for regulating the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court has held in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Another 1, held as under: "18. This Article makes Chief Justice of the High Court the Supreme Authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court Officers and servants. This article also confers rule-making power on the Chief Justice for regulating the condition of service of officers and servants of the High Court subject to the condition that if the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to have the approval of the Governor of the State. If the Legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate subject to the conditions made in that law. …….. 23. Just as the Chief Justice of India is the supreme authority in the matter of Supreme Court Establishment including its office staff and officers, so also the Chief Justice of the High Court is the sole authority in these matters and no other Judge or officer can legally usurp those administrative functions or power. 36. Article 235 shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over the members of the judicial service of the State. 36. Article 235 shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over the members of the judicial service of the State. The word "control", referred to in this article, is used in a comprehensive sense to include general superintendence of the working of the Subordinate Courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding Officers of the Subordinate Courts and to recommend the imposition of punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank or compulsory retirement. "Control" would also include suspension of a member of the judicial service for purposes of holding a disciplinary enquiry, transfer, confirmation and promotion. 37. The word "control" under Article 235 meant exclusive and not dual control. It vests in the High Court and not in any Judge or, Judges or any committee thereof However, there is no bar to have an enquiry made by a Committee of several Judges against a member of the subordinate judiciary provided and report of the Committee is circu1ated to all the Judges and the ultimate decision is taken in the meeting of the Full Court. 38. What is, therefore, of significance is that although in Article 235, the words "High Court" has been used, in Article 229, the words "Chief Justice" has been used. The Constitution, therefore, treats them as two separate entities inasmuch as "control over Subordinate Courts" vests in the High Court, but High Court administration vests in the Chief Justice". 24. This Court in the case of K. Sippe Gowda v High Court of Kamataka and Others1, dealing with similar question held as under. "11. Therefore, the position of the Chief Justice under the Constitution is very clear and well-settled. Article 229 makes the Chief Justice of the High Court the supreme authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court officers and servants, which included the power to suspend, dismiss, remove or compulsorily retire from service. The said power is the sole preserve of the Chief Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with the exercise of that power by the Chief Justice or his nominee except to a very limited extent indicated in the provisos. In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers on the Chief Justice, the object which the Founding Fathers had in view, was to ensure independence of the High Court. In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers on the Chief Justice, the object which the Founding Fathers had in view, was to ensure independence of the High Court. Under the Constitutional scheme, the Chief Justice is the Supreme Authority and the other Judges so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. All though in Article 235 the words "High Court" has been used, the Constitution treats them as two separate entities inasmuch as control over Subordinate Courts vests in the High Court administration independently so as not to brook any interference from any quarter, not even from his brother Judges who, however, can scrutinise his administrative action or order on the judicial side like the action of any other authority". Therefore, the administrative power exercised by the Chief Justice is subjected to scrutiny on the judicial side by the High Court like any action of any other authority. While passing any orders on the administrative side, there is an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice. When the said order is challenged on the judicial side, while exercising the judicial power, it has to be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. It is indispensable. In this context it is necessary to notice the principle underlining the concept of natural justice. Natural Justice 25. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. Natural Justice is a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. The principles of natural justice are those rules that have been laid down by Courts as being minimum protection of the rights of the individual against arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authorities while making an order affecting this right. These rules are made to prevent such authorities from doing injustice. In a broader sense, natural justice may mean simply "natural sense" or "what is right and wrong" and even in its technical sense, it is now often equated with fairness. 26. These rules are made to prevent such authorities from doing injustice. In a broader sense, natural justice may mean simply "natural sense" or "what is right and wrong" and even in its technical sense, it is now often equated with fairness. 26. Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua', that is, 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Yet another form is 'aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars', that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The other form 'nema potest esse simul actor et judex' that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem, that is, 'hear the other side'. 27. In addition to the aforesaid rules, a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the Constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the .observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. BIAS 28. In the case of Manak Lal, Advocate v Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Others 1, dealing with 'bias', the Supreme Court has held as under: ".... It is well-settle~ that every member of a Tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially, and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to set impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases, the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that 'justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. In dealing with a case of 'bias' attributed to proceedings constituting Tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small, it may be in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a Judge. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided in each cas. The principle, says Halsbury, "nemo debet esse judex in causa propria sua" precludes a justice who is interested in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein. In our opinion, there is and can be no doubt about the validity of this principle and we are prepared to assume that this principle and we are prepared to assume that this principle applies not only to the justices as mentioned by Halsbury, but to all Tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties". 29. In the case of AK. Kraipak and Others v Union of India and Others 1, it is held as under: "The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore, what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct". 30. In the case of Bhajan Lal, Chief Minister, Haryana v M/s. Jindal Strips Limited and Others 2, dealing with 'bias' the Supreme Court has held as under: "Bias is the second limb of natural justice. Prima facie no one should be a judge in what is to be regarded as 'sua cause', whether or not he is named as a party. The decision-maker should have no interest by way of gain or detriment in the outcome of a proceeding. Interest may take many forms. It may be direct, it may be indirect, it may arise from a personal relationship or from a relationship with the subject-matter, from a close relationship or from a tenuous one". 31. In the instant case, the complaint is of bias. The impugned circular states that the writ petitions filed by employees of the High Court, subordinate Courts and judicial officers challenging the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and Hon'ble Judges on the administrative side, are directed to be posted before Court Hall No. 1. The Chief Justice is a party to such orders, either directly or indirectly. The impugned circular states that the writ petitions filed by employees of the High Court, subordinate Courts and judicial officers challenging the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and Hon'ble Judges on the administrative side, are directed to be posted before Court Hall No. 1. The Chief Justice is a party to such orders, either directly or indirectly. The correctness of such orders is the subject-matter of the writ petitions. The orders are passed by him or his delegates on the administrative side. By the impugned circular, the Chief Justice wants to decide the correctness of those orders on the judicial side. Therefore, the Chief Justice wants to be a Judge in his own case. The rule is, no man ought to be a Judge in his own case, because he cannot act as a Judge and at the same time be a party. No one can be, at the same time, a suitor and a Judge. The bias attributed is not of any pecuniary interest, but what is attributed is prejudice. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the State of mind; there must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. The decision maker should have no interest by way of gain or detriment in the outcome of the proceeding. The test always is, and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that bias is attributable against him in the final decision of the Judge. It is in this sense it is often said, "Justice must not only be done, but must also appear to be don". Bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. In such circumstances, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant, a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. 32. When a Chief Justice or his delegate passes an order affecting the service conditions of the employees of the High Court or Subordinate Courts or of a judicial officer, they are aggrieved by such an order. Judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution. 32. When a Chief Justice or his delegate passes an order affecting the service conditions of the employees of the High Court or Subordinate Courts or of a judicial officer, they are aggrieved by such an order. Judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution. The Constitution and statutes provide for judicial review or orders passed on the administrative side by the High Court. When the correctness of such orders are to be reviewed, naturally it should be by an independent authority and certainly not by the very authority who has passed the said order. Howsoever high such an authority may be, the aggrieved person will have an apprehension that such an authority is already prejudiced against him, and he may not accept that he committed a mistake in passing the impugned order, and therefore, it is unlikely that he would change his mind. He would feel he may not get justice at his hands. He would have a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. Though the law provides for a remedy, in reality it is of no use, and not effective. Therefore, the impugned circular offends the principles of natural justice and render it void. It cannot be sustained. Accordingly it is quashed. Re: Circular dated 8-12-2008 33. The second circular that is challenged is dated 8-12-2008, where under all interlocutory applications are directed to be treated as miscellaneous cases by assigning separate miscellaneous number. The necessary pleadings in the writ petition in this regard are as under: "16-C. That the petitioner wanted to file an application for amendment of the petition by filing I.A as contemplated under the Chapter X of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, and the registry pointed out that in view of another Notification No. RPS 102 of 2008, dated 8th December, 2008 issued by the Hon'ble Court of Karnataka by its order directing that henceforth all the interlocutory application which are filed in the main petitions interlocutory application will be treated as miscellaneous writ petition same is applicable to civil matters and criminal matters also. Hence even in this pending writ petition instead of filing I.A. it is to be numbered as Misc. W. No. and ought to be part of the main petitions. Hence even in this pending writ petition instead of filing I.A. it is to be numbered as Misc. W. No. and ought to be part of the main petitions. The petitioner submits that in terms of the High Court Rules Chapter X, Rule 1 is to be called interlocutory application and to be consecutively numbered separated in each appeal reference of petition or matters as may be. A true copy of the said notification bearing No. RPS 102 of 2008, dated 8th December, 2008 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-AB" . 34. In the statement of objections to the said plea, it was stated that the said circular is issued in terms of the resolution of the Hon'ble Full Court dated 15-11-2008 and therefore it is valid. Therefore, the point that arise for consideration is: ''Whether the circular dated 8-12-2008 is valid?" 35. The Kamataka High Court Act, 1961 was enacted to make provisions for regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Karnataka in relation to administration of justice and to provide for its jurisdiction. It came into force from the First day of February, 1962. It repealed Sections 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 16-A, 16-B, 20 and 22 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884, Section 13 of the Act provides for application of the Act to pending proceedings. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, all appeals, applications and other proceedings pending in the High Court on the date of commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 36. In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 54 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 read with Sections 122 and 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 19 of the Mysore High Court Act (Act No.1 of 1884) and all other powers thereunto enabling the High Court of Kamataka, with the previous approval of the Government of Karnataka, the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959 were promulgated. The said rules deals with appeals, original side appeals, petitions, special rules regarding writ petitions, references and also interlocutory matters. 37. Chapter X of the Rules exclusively deals with interlocutory matters. The said rules deals with appeals, original side appeals, petitions, special rules regarding writ petitions, references and also interlocutory matters. 37. Chapter X of the Rules exclusively deals with interlocutory matters. Rule l (1) reads as under: "(1) All applications made during the pendency of an appeal, reference, petition or other matter presented to and pending in the High Court and connected with the same or with any decree, order or sentence or other proceeding of the Subordinate Court which is the subject-matter of the same, and praying for any interim relief or order, shall be called interlocutory applications and be consecutively numbered separately in each appeal, reference, petition or matter as the case may be". Rule 1(2) of Chapter X provides that every interlocutory application shall be supported by an affidavit. Rule 1(3) provides for the manner in which the cause title of the application should be. Rule 1(3-A) provides for serving a copy of the said application before the same is filed in Court. Rule (4) provides for the mode in which applications are listed if there is any urgency and other rules provide for the manner in which those applications are to be disposed of. What is of importance is how the said interlocutory applications have to be numbered. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 deals with applications filed during the pendency of an appeal, reference, petition. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 deals with all applications presented along with any appeal, petition. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 deals with applications filed after the disposal of any such appeal, petition or reference. The said rules also provide for the manner in which they have to be numbered. Sub-rule (1) mandates that all applications filed during the pendency of the appeal, reference or petition shall be called interlocutory applications and be consecutively numbered separately in each appeal, reference, petition. Similarly applications filed along with the appeal, petition shall also be called interlocutory applications and be numbered as provided in sub-rule (1). Same is the provision regarding the applications filed after the disposal of the appeals or petitions. Therefore, rules specifically provide for the manner in which an interlocutory application is to be numbered and how it has to be treated. In other words, on these aspects, the area is covered by ltigislation. Insofar as writ petitions are concerned, it is governed by the Writ Proceedings Rules of 1977. Therefore, rules specifically provide for the manner in which an interlocutory application is to be numbered and how it has to be treated. In other words, on these aspects, the area is covered by ltigislation. Insofar as writ petitions are concerned, it is governed by the Writ Proceedings Rules of 1977. However, Rule 39 makes the High Court of Karnataka Rules applicable to writ proceedings also. It provides that the provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the Rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was applied insofar as may be to proceedings under Article 226 and/or 227 and the writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made under the Rules. 38. In pursuance of the resolution of the Hon'ble Full Court dated 15-11-2008 directing that the interim application filed was also to be counted for disposal as miscellaneous cases, the notification came to be issued. The said notification reads as under: RPS No. 102 of 2008 High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore dated 8th December, 2008 NOTIFICATION It is hereby notified for the information of the Advocates and the litigant public that henceforth, interlocutory applications to be filed in all kinds of civil, criminal and writ proceedings will be treated as miscellaneous cases by assigning separate miscellaneous numbers. By order of Hon'ble High Court Sd/(A.P. Murari) Registrar (Judicial) 39. Rule 1 of Chapter X of the Rules exclusively deals with interlocutory matters. It categorically states that such interlocutory applications made during the pendency of an appeal, reference, petition or other matter should be consecutively numbered separately in each appeal, reference, petition or matter, as the case may be. That is the practice which is followed in this Court for more than fifty years. Absolutely there is no justification to alter the said practice. That can be done only by amending the rule and not by issue of circulars contrary to the statutory provisions. In fact, the existing practice of numbering interlocutory applications consecutively in pending proceedings is very helpful, it does not lead to any confusion and it causes no inconvenience either to the litigant or to the office or judges. In substance, these interlocutory applications are not miscellaneous cases as provided under the rules. 40. In fact, the existing practice of numbering interlocutory applications consecutively in pending proceedings is very helpful, it does not lead to any confusion and it causes no inconvenience either to the litigant or to the office or judges. In substance, these interlocutory applications are not miscellaneous cases as provided under the rules. 40. Chapter VII of the High Court Rules deals with petitions: Rule 1 reads as under: "1. All matters not being of an interlocutory character; other than appeals and references, presented to the High Court for the first time shall be designated as petitions which will be classified as follows.- Civil petitions in civil matters and criminal petitions in criminal matters, petitions invoking the Court's revisional jurisdiction or powers being called civil revision petitions or criminal revision petitions as the case may be. Writ petitions in cases invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or for issue of directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sales tax revision petitions in cases invoking the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under the Kamataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 for the time being in force and miscellaneous petitions in cases not falling within any of these descriptions". (emphasis supplied) A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that all matters not being of an interlocutory character other than appeals and references presented to the High Court for the first time shall be designated as petitions which will be classified as mentioned therein. Miscellaneous petitions are those cases which do not fall within any other description mentioned in Rule 1 and it is not a matter of interlocutory character. For a petition to be numbered as miscellaneous petition, it should not be of interlocutory character, and it should be presented in the High Court for the first time, otherwise it cannot be classified as a miscellaneous petition. From the inception in the High Court of Karnataka, when an interlocutory application is filed in pending proceedings, it is registered as an interlocutory application in the said proceedings and given a number as I.A. No.... in the case. This is the practice prevailing in this Court for more than 50 years. 'Cursus curiae est lex curiae' practice of the Court is the law of the Court. in the case. This is the practice prevailing in this Court for more than 50 years. 'Cursus curiae est lex curiae' practice of the Court is the law of the Court. Where a practice is existing, it is convenient to adhere to it, because it is the practice. The power of the Court over its own process is unlimited. It is power incidental to all Courts. (Commissioner of Income-tax) Bombay City v R.H. Pandit1). In this regard it is useful to refer to the observation of this Court in Narasimha Setty's case referred to supra where it is held as under: "But it needs to be stressed here that the exercising of the said power by the Chief Justice by deviating from the normal rule based on the regular practice of the Court (See R.H. Pandit's case, para 6) or the statutory provisions must stand the test of reason and objectivity since such exercise will be always subject to mandates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which absolutely prohibits the exercise of powers in a discriminatory, arbitrary or mala fide manner and always entitle the aggrieved party to seek remedy against the same by approaching the appropriate forum". 41. Therefore, when there is a specific provision which provides for miscellaneous petitions, when there is a specific provision for interlocutory matters as contained in Chapters VII and X respectively, when these provisions are followed for more than 50 years and it has become the practice of the Court, the Chief Justice has to issue directions or orders in conformity with the aforesaid statutory provisions and the practice of the Court. He cannot ignore them. The impugned circular serves no purpose. It only results in showing an increase in the number of cases filed and the cases which are pending, which would be quite misleading. It would affect the image of the High Court also. It does not stand the test of reason and objectivity. The impugned circular issued in this regard by the learned Chief Justice in contravention of the aforesaid statutory provisions and practice of the Court has no force of law. It would be illegal. Hence, it is liable to be quashed. And accordingly, it is quashed. 42. It does not stand the test of reason and objectivity. The impugned circular issued in this regard by the learned Chief Justice in contravention of the aforesaid statutory provisions and practice of the Court has no force of law. It would be illegal. Hence, it is liable to be quashed. And accordingly, it is quashed. 42. In the result, we pass the following: ORDER (1) The circular dated 5-6-2006 in HCE No. 747 of 2006 is opposed to the principles of natural justice and accordingly, it is quashed. (2) The writ petitions filed, being filed by the employees of the High Court, Subordinate Courts and judicial officers challenging the orders passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and Hon'ble Judges on administrative side shall be posted before a Single Judge in terms of Section 9 as the Chief Justice has not fixed the quorum for hearing such writ petitions by two Judges. (3) The circular dated 8-12-2008 in RPS No. 102 of 2008 is contrary to Rule 1 of Chapter X and Rule 1 of Chapter VII of the High Court Rules, 1959 and accordingly it is quashed. (4) List this matter before the appropriate Bench according to roster. (5) The High Court registry is directed to renumber all the miscellaneous petitions as interlocutory applications in the respective cases consecutively as required under Rule 1 of Chapter X of the High Court Rules, which are so numbered in pursuance of the circular dated 8-12-2008.