Judgment :- 1. The appellant herein in Crl.A No. 175 of 1999, 1057 and 1058 of 1996, who is the accused is one and the same person. The appellant herein underwent the trial in C.C. Nos.40, 41, 42 of 1996 and he was convicted in all the three cases. In C.C. No.40 of 1996 he is convicted for the offences under Section 420, I.P.C. (2 counts); 467, I.P.C.; (one count); 467, I.P.C. r/w. 471 (one count), 409, I.P.C. 2 counts; 201, I.P.C.; 13(1)(c) r/w. Section 13(2); 13(1)(d) r/w. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him to undergo RI for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 420, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 467. I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 467 r/w, 471, I.P.C.; to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months’ for the offence under Section 409, I.P.C.; to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 201, I.P.C. and further to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act and one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of P.C. Act and sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently. 2. 2. The appellant underwent trial in C.C. No.41 of 1996 and he was convicted for the offence under Sections 409, I.P.C.; 407 I.P.C.; 467 r/w. 471 I.P.C.; 471 I.P.C.; 420 I.P.C. 477-A; 201 I.P.C.; and Section 13(2) r/w. Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year’s and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months’ for the offence under Section 409 I.P.C..; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 407, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months’ under Section 462 r/w. 471 I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 471, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 420, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 477, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to a pay fine of Rs.1,000/- default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 201, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to a pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of P.C. Act and further to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act and the sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently. 3. 3. The appellant underwent trial in C.C. No.42 of 1996 and he was convicted for the offence under Sections 420, I.P.C.; 409, I.P.C.; Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentencing him to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 420, I.P.C.; to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 409, I.P.C.; one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(c) of P.C. Act and to undergo one year’s rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo one year’s for rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act and the sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently. 4. Against the said conviction and sentence the appellant has preferred the Appeals in Crl.A. No. 175 of 1999 against C.C. No.42 of 1996 and Crl.A.No.1057 of 1996 against C.C. No.40 of 1996 and Crl.A. No.1058 of 1996 against C.C. No.41 of 1996. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and perused the records. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that now the appellant is not challenging the conviction on him and that the appellant is how focusing his argument only to the question of sentence and the request in all the three cases. He further submitted that the appellant already been in jail for more than two years and three months. Though, initially, the accused could not pay the fine amount subsequently, he paid all the fine amount in all the three cases. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the judgment in all the three cases were passed on the same day i.e., 20.9.1998 by same Court for the offences which were in similar nature. But, the Trial Court not passed an order directing the sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently in all three cases. The total imprisonment for the petitioner is three years. But, the Trial Court not passed an order directing the sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently in all three cases. The total imprisonment for the petitioner is three years. Though the Trial Court has ordered that the sentence of imprisonment to concurrently imposed in each of the cases, it has not directed the sentence of imprisonment imposed in one case to run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment imposed in the other case. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment in Cruz Fernandes v. The State, 1970 Crl.L.J. 96 (Vol. 76, C.N. 26), Sadashiv Chhoka Sabie v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Crl.L.J. 1469. 8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that in the record available before the Court there is no proof for the payment of fine being made. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant produced the original receipt for the payment of fine. This Court perused the original receipts as per the receipts payments were made on 20.9.2009. The accused paid the fine amount of Rs.8,000/- in C.C. No.40 of 1996, Rs.9,000/- in C.C. No.41 of 1996 and Rs.12,000/- in C.C. No. 42 of 1996. The receipts of the serial number are 2381949 to 2381951. 10. The appellant herein filed an affidavit before this Court. In the affidavit the appellant has stated that he underwent the sentence of imprisonment for more than two years and he also stated that restricting his plea only to question of sentence and not on merits of the case and he also stated in the affidavit that he had undertaken not to prefer any Appeal against the order to be passed by this Court in all three Appeals. The appellant also prayed for the leniency of this Court regarding sentence. The appellant has resisted his plea only to the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. 11. This Court perused the records, the judgment of the Trial Court and the Memorandum of grounds of Criminal Appeals. Since, the appellant has restricted his plea only to the sentence imposed on him this Court not narrating the facts of the case. 12. In all three cases the judgment was delivered by the Trial Court on 29.9.1998. Now, in all the three cases, the appellant/accused has paid the fine amount and there is no question of undergoing the default sentence. 12. In all three cases the judgment was delivered by the Trial Court on 29.9.1998. Now, in all the three cases, the appellant/accused has paid the fine amount and there is no question of undergoing the default sentence. As far as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned, in each cases, he has to undergo the sentence of one year’s imprisonment as per the judgment of the each case. Totally, the appellant has to undergo three years imprisonment as per the judgment of the Trial Court in three cases. Now it is pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant that if the sentence was made to run concurrently in all three cases, the petitioner need not to go again to the prison to serve the remaining part of the sentence. Section 427, Cr.P.C. runs as follows: “When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.” 13. Here, the appellant was sentenced in three cases on the same day one after the other. While so, the Trial Court was competent to exercise its discretion in directing the subsequent (in the case decided subsequently) for the sentence run concurrently with earliest sentence in the case earlier decided. The learned Trial Judge has not exercised his discretion. 14. It is observed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the decision reported in Cruz Fernandes v. The State, 1970 Crl.L.J. 96 (Vol.76, C.N.26), as follows: “The learned Magistrate did direct that the subsequent sentence passed on the same day in Criminal case No.168/P/68 should run concurrently with the sentence passed in Criminal case No.170/P/68. He exercised the discretion vested in him. This discretion is to be judicially exercised. Each case has to be considered on its own facts and circumstances the decisions in other cases being illustrative. There is no such discretion vested in him under Section 397(2), and for obvious reasons. This Provision operates of its own accord. Section 397(1) does not say that it is only when a person is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment in fall that it will have effect but not otherwise. There is no such discretion vested in him under Section 397(2), and for obvious reasons. This Provision operates of its own accord. Section 397(1) does not say that it is only when a person is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment in fall that it will have effect but not otherwise. The principle is that the sentence passed should operate and take effect immediately on conviction and cannot be postponed. This is understandable. The provisions of Section 35 of the said code are already inapplicable to the facts of this case. The Section visualizes sentences in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. There were two trials in the case under consideration and, therefore, Section 397(1) could properly be invoked; it contemplates more than one trial. The learned Magistrate exercised his discretion under this provision presumably because the two offences in both cases were of a similar nature. This discretion does not seem to have been improperly exercised. The petitioner must be deemed to have undergone the sentence passed in Criminal Case No.168/P/68 from the moment he was sentenced. Sentence 397(1) does not say that the sentence of imprisonment already undergone shall be on a different day and not on the same day and not on the same day. It has to be understood in its plain sense. It contemplates a sentence anterior in time which a person is undergoing and also a subsequent sentence on a subsequent conviction.” 15. In the above decision the Section referred 397 of the old Code is equal and corresponding to the Section of 427 of the new Code. 16. It is also observed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Sadasiv Chhokha Sable v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Crl.L.J. 1469, which runs as follows: “15. We must notice that the learned Public Prosecutor for the State had contended that Section 427, Cr.P.C. is not attracted in the instant matter because the petitioner was not undergoing a sentence of imprisonment” as contemplated under that provision, when subsequent sentence was awarded. According to him, unless the offender is physically in jail to suffer the sentence of imprisonment at the time of subsequent sentence, Section 427(1), cannot be pressed into service. In our view, such an approach to the provision would not be object oriented. Normal principle is that sentences should take effect immediately on conviction. According to him, unless the offender is physically in jail to suffer the sentence of imprisonment at the time of subsequent sentence, Section 427(1), cannot be pressed into service. In our view, such an approach to the provision would not be object oriented. Normal principle is that sentences should take effect immediately on conviction. Criminal Procedure Code provides that where several sentences are passed, such sentences should run one after the other i.e., consecutively unless the Court directs otherwise i.e., concurrently. A person sentenced to imprisonment must, for the purpose of Section 427, be deemed to be undergoing that sentence from the very moment the sentence is passed. The accused may be on bail or in custody in the earlier case at the time of passing of the subsequent sentence. There cannot be legislative intention to deny the benefit of the provision even in a deserving case by virtue of the only fact that the convict is on bail or in custody or could not be taken within the portals of prison for some genuine reason. Literal construction on the terminology “undergoing a sentence of imprisonment” as suggested on denial of the state would lead to absurd results specially where two separate sentences are awarded one after the other on one day in two different trials. Either the learned Judge would not exercise the discretion only because ion the earlier case he had not gone inside the jail by that time or he will have to actually send the convict inside the jail for some time, and call him back immediately to pronounce judgment in the second case. We do not think such absurd and farcical situation was intended by the legislature.” 17. As the appellant already been in jail for more than two years and already paid the fine amount in all the cases, this Court is of the opinion that ends of justice will be met if this Court now exercises its power under Section 427, Cr.P.C. and thereby directs that the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant/accused in all three cases to run concurrently. The sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant/accused in C.C. No.41 and 42 of 1996 is ordered to run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment imposed in C.C. No.40 of 1996. The sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant/accused in C.C. No.41 and 42 of 1996 is ordered to run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment imposed in C.C. No.40 of 1996. As the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant/accused is now made to run concurrently by this Court, the appellant need not surrender before the Court. With the above observation, all the three Appeals filed by the appellant are dismissed.