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2010 DIGILAW 398 (GAU)

Md. Darog Ali v. State of Assam

2010-06-03

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2010
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Heard Mr. M.A. Sheikh, learned Counsel appearing for the convict appellant. Also heard Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State of Assam. 2. The convict appellant herein challenges the judgment and order dated 12.2.2007 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Barpeta, in Sessions Case No. 165/2006 whereby he was convicted under Section 457/376, IPC and sentenced to undergo rigourous imprisonment for a period of 1(one) year under Section 457, IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years under Section 376, IPC. Both these sentences were directed to run consecutively. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that one Azimon Nessa filed a complaint petition before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta, to the effect that her husband frequently goes from place to place for his business purpose and in absence of her husband she remains at home with her two minor children. In the night of 31.12.2005, at about 11 p.m., while her husband was absent, the convict appellant entered into her house by breaking open the wooden door, caught hold and gagged her mouth and thereafter, outraged her modesty forcibly and at the time of departure, snatched and took away a golden chain from her neck. The complainant informed the incident to her husband after his return who later on informed the same to the villagers. The villagers assured them that a village mel would be convened to settle the matter and as such, there was a delay in filing the complaint. However, as the complainant failed to get justice from the villagers/village mel, she filed a complaint petition on 17.1.2006 before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta, which was registered as Case No. 102C/2006 under Section 376, IPC. The case was made over to the Court of learned SDJM(S), Barpeta, for disposal and the learned Magistrate after examining the complainant and the listed witnesses, took cognizance of the case under Sections 376 and 457, IPC. Thereafter, on production of the appellant in the court, he was remanded to jail hajot on 26.10.2006. The learned SDJM(S) committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. Thereafter, on production of the appellant in the court, he was remanded to jail hajot on 26.10.2006. The learned SDJM(S) committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. The case being made over to the Court of learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Barpeta, framed charges under Sections 457/376, IPC against the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to stand the trial. The prosecution examined as many as 8(eight) witnesses to establish its case while the defence examined as many as 4(four) witnesses in his defence. 3. It may be noted that the complaint petition was filed on 17.1.2006, i.e., after more than 16 days from the date of occurrence which took place on 31.12.2005. The prosecutrix, as PW1, deposed that she was sleeping with her 2 minor children in her house in the night of the incident while her husband was away from home for his business. Taking advantage of absence of her husband, the appellant convict, at about 11 p.m. of 31.12.2005, entered into her house by breaking open the wooden door and forcibly raped her by gagging her mouth. While fleeing from the place of occurrence, the appellant convict also snatched away a golden chain from the victim woman's neck. The prosecutrix made a hue and cry after the accused left her house and upon hearing her cries, PW2 Fajila Khatun and her husband Bhumor Ali (PW3), neighbours, immediately came to her house. The prosecutrix told them about the incident. In the next morning also, she informed the said incident, to her neighbours. The village people suggested her to wait till return of her husband. After 3 days of the incident, the husband of the prosecutrix returned home. After hearing the incident, her husband convened village mel twice. In the first village mel, the appellant convict did not appear. In the second village mel which was conducted under the presidentship of Sri Dimbeswar Nath in the house of Hakim, the appellant convict appeared and admitted his guilt before the people present in the village mel. However, the village mel failed to provide justice to the prosecutrix and as such, she filed a complaint petition before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta. In cross-examination, the prosecutrix stated that she did not lodge any FIR with the police station. However, the village mel failed to provide justice to the prosecutrix and as such, she filed a complaint petition before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta. In cross-examination, the prosecutrix stated that she did not lodge any FIR with the police station. The prosecutrix also stated that after the arrival of his husband at home, the appellant convict attempted to assault him (her husband) and instituted a case against her husband. According to her, their minor sons aged about 8 and 7 years respectively, who were sleeping with her in that night were not aware anything about the occurrence. The prosecutrix further stated that she did not go to any Doctor for medical examination. She also stated that she had shown the broken wooden door to the villagers. 4. Mr. Sheikh, learned Counsel for the appellant convict, submits that the prosecution has built up a concocted story without an iota of truth inasmuch as the prosecutrix did not file any FIR with the police immediately after the alleged incident of rape and even the complaint petition was filed after a fortnight. According to the learned Counsel, there is no medical report or evidence to support the case of the prosecutrix. Moreover, her evidence is not corroborated by any independent witnesses. There is, according to him, no case of forcible sexual intercourse by the appellant convict upon the prosecutrix and no case under Section 376, IPC has been made out. The learned Counsel, however, submits that as per the evidence on record, there may be at best a case under Section354, IPC, i.e., an offence of assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The prosecution having failed to prove the charge under Section 376, IPC, the learned Counsel submits that the appellant convict is entitled to acquittal. 5. It is an admitted position that the prosecutrix lodged no FIR with the police and she also did not get herself examined medically by a Doctor and, therefore, there was no medical report to testify whether there was any sign of rape or injury on her person. The court has to examine whether non-lodging of an FIR could affect the prosecution case and her allegation made in the complaint petition against the appellant could be rendered false and unbelievable. The court has to examine whether non-lodging of an FIR could affect the prosecution case and her allegation made in the complaint petition against the appellant could be rendered false and unbelievable. The evidence, of the prosecutrix is that her husband used to go out from one place to another for his business activities and she was living as a housewife in her husband's house in that particular night. After the incident, being a married woman, she thought it proper to wait for return of her husband before any step was taken. The prosecutrix had disclosed the incident to co-villagers and after the return of her husband, two village mels were held. The prosecutrix and her husband, honestly expecting justice from the villagers did not lodge any FIR immediately after the incident. The fact of holding village mels has been corroborated by PW6, an independent witness. Even the defence witnesses have testified the same. The village mel yielded no result but in the process of holding the village mel, on two different occasions much time was lost and thereafter they thought it proper to file a complaint petition before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta. The reason for non-lodging of the FIR is found to be bona fide and the same, in my considered view, is acceptable. The learned SDJM(S), Barpeta, to whom the case was entrusted, also took cognizance of the case after recording their evidence under Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 6. The next question is whether the allegation of the prosecutrix could be treated as false for want of medical report or medical evidence. The medical evidence in the case of rape is necessary only when the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be inconsistent or suffering from contradiction. The well accepted law is that the victim of rape is not considered as an accomplice and the trial court may record conviction on the basis of sole evidence of the prosecutrix without seeking medical evidence and without even any corroborative evidence on record, if her statements are found to be cogent, reliable, trustworthy and inspiring confidence of the court. In the instant case, the offence of rape was committed in the mid night when the husband of the prosecutrix was away from home for his business activities. In the instant case, the offence of rape was committed in the mid night when the husband of the prosecutrix was away from home for his business activities. The prosecutrix was gagged by the appellant by her mouth making her unable to cry for immediate help at the time when she was being ravished. However, she made a hue and cry as soon as the appellant left her place. PWs 2 and 3, neighbours of the prosecutrix, upon hearing her cries immediately rushed to her house and the prosecutrix told them about the incident. PWs 2 and 3, though did not see the appellant convict, they being the persons who heard the cry of the victim and being told about the incident by the victim herself, have corroborated, at least the fact that the prosecutrix cried for help and they came immediately to her house hearing her cries. The prosecutrix categorically stated before the learned trial court that it was the appellant convict who entered her house by breaking open the wooden door and had sexual intercourse with her forcibly by gagging her mouth. If her evidence is to be accepted, there is no scope for accepting the submissions of Mr. Sheikh, learned Counsel, that the appellant convict committed offence under Section 354, IPC and not under Section 376, IPC. 7. An attempt was also made by the defence that there was consent from the prosecutrix in the act of sexual intercourse by the appellant convict inasmuch as her minor children who were sleeping with her at the time of the incident were not aware of such occurrence. Such defence is not at all acceptable because if the prosecutrix was a consenting party, she would not have raised any hue and cry after enjoying sexual intercourse with the appellant convict. The prosecutrix could have remained quiet because her husband was absent in that very night and nobody had witnessed or knew about the illicit act of sexual intercourse with the appellant convict. Why should a married woman, who if at all enjoyed illicit sexual intercourse voluntarily with a person other than her husband, would raise a hue and cry thereby taking the risk of exposure and humiliation and thereafter, inviting sure troubles, particularly from her husband. Why should a married woman, who if at all enjoyed illicit sexual intercourse voluntarily with a person other than her husband, would raise a hue and cry thereby taking the risk of exposure and humiliation and thereafter, inviting sure troubles, particularly from her husband. Why should a married woman having two minor children, take the risk of causing breach of peace and happiness in her blissful marital life, by exposing her extra-marital affair with another man. The prosecutrix was honest enough to disclose the incident to her husband who in his turn, arranged village mel on two different occasions. The rustic and simple couple honestly trusted the village elders with the hope that justice would be finally done to them. Under these circumstances, the approach made by the prosecutrix and her husband in getting the matter settled or getting justice through the villagers/village mel, cannot be faulted with and for that reason alone, the prosecution story would not be rendered false or fabricated. 8. The way the prosecutrix and her husband moved from village mel to judicial court does not leave any circumstance casting a shadow of doubt over the veracity of the prosecution story. There exists no element of improbability in the prosecution story. The evidence on record is very clear that the husband of the prosecutrix constantly used to go out for his business activities and she was alone in her house in that particular night with her 2 minor children. It was highly probable for any miscreant like the present appellant convict to take advantage of the situation. The defence witnesses stated that they also came to know that the accused committed sexual intercourse with the victim woman, for which her husband assaulted the accused. Why should, under such circumstances, the court disbelieve the evidence of this prosecutrix unless something contrary is proved or consent of the prosecutrix to having sexual intercourse with the appellant convict willingly is shown or proved. The evidence of the prosecutrix, in my considered view, is true, cogent, reliable and trustworthy and the same is of sterling quality gaining the confidence of the court and on the basis of which, alone, conviction could be sustained regardless of supporting medical evidence, which, in such a case, can be dispensed with. In this regard, the law has been well settled by the Apex Court as rendered in various decisions. In this regard, the law has been well settled by the Apex Court as rendered in various decisions. Without referring to all those cases, it would be apt to refer to few cases, namely - Sadashiv Ram Rao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 92 ; State of H.P. v. Gyan Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 ; Narayan v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 6 SCC 465 and Ram Das v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 170 . 9. In view of the foregoing appreciation of evidence and discussions made in the light of the law settled by the Apex Court, this Court is disinclined to interfere with the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial court vide impugned order dated 12.2.2007 in Sessions Case No. 165/2006, rather inclined to agree with the said judgment and order dated 12.2.2007 and affirm the same. The appeal, accordingly, fails. 10. Send down the LCRs to the court below forthwith. Appeal dismissed