I.A. Ansari, J. - At the center of the controversy, in three writ petitions, namely, WP(C) 591/2008, WP(C) 1048/2008 and WP(C) 2814/2008, lies the controversy with regard to the correct interpretation of the three notifications, namely, NotificationNo.69/2003-CE, dated 25.08.2003, Notification No.08/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004, and Notification No.28/2004-CE, dated 09.07.2004, issued by Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), New Delhi, granting exemption from payment of excise duty and additional duty of excise in exercise of powers under Sub-Section (1) of Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with Section 3(3) of Additional Duty of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, and Sub-Section (13 6) of Section 3 of the Finance Act, 2001. 2. Having arisen out of the same Notifications, which embody the schemes of exemption from payment of excise duty and, being inextricably linked with each other, all the three writ petitions, which include the present one, namely, WP(C) No. 591 of 2008, have been heard together on the request made by the learned counsel for the parties concerned. For the sake of clarity and precision and, also to avoid repetition of same facts in each case, all the three writ petitions aforementioned are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3. The facts, which are common in all the three writ petitions, may, in brief, be set out asunder: (i) Pursuant to a policy decision, taken by the Government of India, in December, 1997, two Notifications, bearing Nos. 32/99-CE and 33/99-CE, both dated 08.07.1999, were issued by the Central Government. Under these two notifications, the Government exempted certain goods, manufactured in the specified areas, in the North Eastern Region of India, from, inter alia, payment of excise duty or additional duty of excise, which were, otherwise, leviable on these goods. (ii) Both these Notifications, dated 08.07.1999, were conditional in nature in- asmuch as exemptions were made available to only those manufacturing units, which having been established after 24.12.1997, manufactured any of the goods, mentioned in the 1st and 2nd Schedules to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and also those goods, which were specified in the Schedule to the Notifications. (ii) Both these Notifications, dated 08.07.1999, were conditional in nature in- asmuch as exemptions were made available to only those manufacturing units, which having been established after 24.12.1997, manufactured any of the goods, mentioned in the 1st and 2nd Schedules to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and also those goods, which were specified in the Schedule to the Notifications. Yet another condition, necessary for enabling a manufacturer to receive exemption, from payment of excise duty or additional duty of excise, was that the manufacturing unit must be located in any of the seven North Eastern States, namely, the States of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh. (iii) By Notification No. 45/99-CE, dated 31.12.1999, the Central Government amended its earlier said two Notifications, both dated 08.07.1999, and excluded all tobacco related products, including pan masala, from the purview of exemption from payment of excise duty, or additional duty of excise. By Notification, dated 17.01.2000, the Central Government restored the exemptions, but, later on, the exemptions, so granted, were, once again, withdrawn by the Central Gov-ernment by Notifications, dated 22-01.2000 and 01.03.2001. Thereafter, the Parliament enacted Section 154 of the Evidence Act, 2003, (sic) stipulating therein that the Central Government has the power to amend the two Notifications, dated 08.07.1999, aforementioned with retrospective effect. What it signified was that the Central Government became empowered to recover the money, already refunded to the manufacturers, in terms of its schemes of exemption as had been embodied in its earlier two Notification Nos. 32/99-CE and 33/99-CE, both dated 08.07.1999. (iv) Though the exemptions, granted under the said two notifications, dated 08.07.1999, were, at some stages, as indicated above, withdrawn, the exemptions, which had been earlier withdrawn, were, once again, restored, in respect of certain excisable goods including pan masala, by Notification No. 69/2003 CE, dated 25.08.2003, to the extent of 50% of the duty payable. (iv) Though the exemptions, granted under the said two notifications, dated 08.07.1999, were, at some stages, as indicated above, withdrawn, the exemptions, which had been earlier withdrawn, were, once again, restored, in respect of certain excisable goods including pan masala, by Notification No. 69/2003 CE, dated 25.08.2003, to the extent of 50% of the duty payable. (v) The above scheme of partial restoration, covered by Notification, dated 25.08.2003, stipulated thus: (a) The scheme would be available only in respect of those units, which would manufacture specified goods, including pan masala; (b) The manufacturing unit must be located in any of the seven North Eastern States, namely, the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura; (c) The scheme would be applicable to only those units, which had commenced commercial production on or after 24.12.1997, but not later than 28.02.2001; (d) The unit should have had continued its manufacturing activities after 28.02.2001 and should have had availed the benefits under earlier Notification Nos. 32/99-CE and 33/99-CE, both dated 08.07.1999; (e) The sum of duty payable, but for the exemption, would have to be utilized by the manufacturer only for 'investment' in 'plant and machinery' in a manufacturing unit; (f) The said 'investment's were to be made before expiry of a period of six months from the end of each quarter; (g) The manufacturer was obliged to furnish, to a Committee, within one month of the expiry of the period of six months as described hereinbefore, details of the investments made by the manufacturer; (h) The said Committee was to consist of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industry of the State in which the unit was located and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industry of the State in which the investment was made; (i) The manufacturer was required to prove to the satisfaction of the Committee that the investment was made, in plant and machinery, in a manufacturing unit located in any of the seven States aforementioned; and, (j) Finally, once the Committee (which came to be known as the Investment Apprisal Committee, in short, 'the I AC') was satisfied that the 'investment' was made in 'plant and machinery ', in a manufacturing unit in terms of the Notification, dated 25.08.2003, aforementioned, it was to issue a certificate to this effect to the manufacturer within a period of three weeks after the period of one month described above; (k) The certificate, granted by the IAC, was to be produced by the manufacturer, within a period of two weeks from the date of issue of the certificate, to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer; (l) The investment, made under this Notification, dated 25.08.2003, was required to be for a period often years from the date on which the' investment' was made, (vi) While the petitioners' units stood covered by the Notification, dated 25.08.2003, aforementioned and were eligible to receive benefit of exemption from payment of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, in terms of the Notifications, issued, in this regard, by the Central Government, another Notification, No. 8/2000/4-CE, dated 21.01.2004, was issued by the Central Government, wherein a scheme, for complete exemption from payment of excise duty or additional duty of excise, was made available subject to compliance of certain new conditions by the manufacturers. The Notification, dated 21.01.2004, expanded the scope of exemption by making it clear that this exemption, to the extent of 100%, would be available not only to those manufacturers, who make their investment in 'plant and machinery', in a manufacturing unit, located in any of the seven States of the North Eastern Region, but also to the one, who has a manufacturing unit, located in any of the said seven States, and who makes investment in' infrastructure' or civil work or social projects in any of these States. The procedure for receiving exemption, however, remained same as embodied under the earlier Notification, dated 25.08.2003. (vii) In effect, thus, with the coming into force of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, not only the extent of 'exemption', but also the scope of 'investment' stood expanded inasmuch as a manufacturer became eligible to receive exemption from payment of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, if he could prove, to the satisfaction of the IAC, that the 'investment' was made either in plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit, located in any of the States aforementioned, or that the 'investment' was made, in' 'infrastructure" or 'civil work', or a 'social project', in any of the said States; (viii) By, however, yet another Notification, dated 09.07.2004, a series of procedural amendments were introduced to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, aforementioned. (ix) The subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, stipulates: (a) That the sum, equal to the excise duty that was payable, but for the exemption, would be deposited by the manufacturer, within 60 days from the end of the quarter, in an Escrow Account to be opened by the manufacturer in a bank authorized for excise duty collection; (b) The Notification provides that operations, including withdrawals from, and closure of, the said Escrow Account, shall be made with the prior approval of the jurisdictional Commissioner of Central Excise, who has been given the onus of granting approval to such withdrawal on taking into account the 'conditions', specified in the said Notification, dated 09.07.2004; (c) The jurisdictional Commissioner is also enjoined to safeguard, while granting such approval as aforesaid, interest of revenue; (d) The Notification, dated 09.07.2004, requires the manufacturer to invest the amount, deposited in the said Escrow Account, within two years from the date of its deposit and the amount, withdrawn from the Escrow Account, has to be utilized for the purposes specified within 60 days of its withdrawal; (e) The manufacturer is also required to submit a quarterly statement, within sixty days of the end of the quarter, to the IAC, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, consisting of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industry of the State concerned in which the unit is located and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industry of the State in which the investment is made; (f) The manufacturer is also required to furnish, within one month of the expiry of the said period of two years, all details of the 'investment' made, to the IAC; (g) If the I AC is satisfied that the 'investment' has been made in accordance with the conditions embodied in the said Notification, dated 09.07.2004, it has to issue a certificate to the manufacturer within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the details (described hereinbefore) by the manufacturer. (x) Finally, Condition (EA) of the said Notification No. 28/2004-CE, dated 09.07.2004, clarifies that if the manufacturer fails to make the deposit or invest the amount specified within the stipulated period and in accordance with the Notification, then, the duty, which is equivalent to the amount not deposited or invested, shall be 'recoverable' from the manufacturer along with interest thereon at the rate specified under Section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and, further, without prejudice to any action that may be taken under the provisions of the said Act, or under any law, for the time being, in force, by 'forfeiture' of amount in the said Escrow Account. (xi) Pursuant to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, as amended by Notification, dated 09.07.2004, the Petitioner No. 1 herein has entered, on 21.06.2005, into a tripartite escrow agreement, dated 21.06.2005, with Respondent No. 2, namely, State Bank of India, New Guwahati Branch, Guwahati, and respondent No. 3, namely, Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong (who is the jurisdictional Commissioner). Under this agreement, respondent No. 3 has been appointed as Escrow Agent. It is stipulated in the agreement that operations, including withdrawals from, and closure of, the said Escrow Account, are to be made with the prior approval of the jurisdictional Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong. It has also been provided therein that if the balance amount, lying in the Escrow Account, is not re-invested in terms of the Notification No.8/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004, as amended by Notification No.28/2004-CE, dated 09.07.2004, the Petitioner No. 1 shall bind itself to pay, on demand of the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise or Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, to the extent of duty, which is equal to the amount not re-invested along with interest thereon at the rate specified under section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, from the amount lying in balance in the Escrow Account. The said Escrow Agreement, dated 21.06.2005, further provides that where the Petitioner No. 1 fails to make the deposit or does not invest the amount specified in condition (B) of the Notification No.8/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004, as amended by Notification No.28/2004-CE, dated 09.07.2004, as detailed in condition (EA), the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, shall have the right to forfeit the amount in the said Escrow Account and, in that event, the Escrow Agent shall release the amount to the jurisdictional Commissioner of Excise to the extent of 'forfeiture' made. (xii) The petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 too have entered into similar agreements, both dated 24.06.2005, with Respondent No. 2, namely, State Bank of India, New Guwahati Branch, Guwahati, and Respondent No. 4, namely, Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Main Bazar Branch, Agartala, respectively. 4. Bearing in mind the above undisputed factual aspects, which govern all these three writ petitions aforementioned, let me, now, turn to the individual writ petitions. To begin with, let me point out that this series of writ petitions commenced with the filing of a writ application, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which gave rise to WP(C) No. 591/2008. Let me, therefore, deal with the first writ petition made in this series. WP(C) 591/2008 5. While considering this writ petition, it needs to be pointed out, at the very outset, that in this writ petition, material facts are not in dispute. In fact, none of the material facts, in this writ petition, can be, strictly speaking, described as disputed fact. What really the parties dispute, in this writ petition, are the correctness of the legal contentions raised by them in support of their respective cases. 6. Let me, therefore, take note of those facts, which are neither in dispute, nor contended to be in dispute. What really the parties dispute, in this writ petition, are the correctness of the legal contentions raised by them in support of their respective cases. 6. Let me, therefore, take note of those facts, which are neither in dispute, nor contended to be in dispute. These facts are, in brief, as under: (a) By a show cause notice, dated 14.07.2005,.pertaining to Petitioner No. 1 s unit, at Guwahati, Respondent No. 2 stated therein to the effect, inter alia, that the exemption for payment of excise duty was subject to the condition, amongst others, that the manufacturer invests, in the North East, an amount, at least, equal to the excise duty payable but for exemption, in the manner specified in the notifications mentioned above, within a period of six months from the closure of the quarter and a certificate, to that effect, issued by a Committee referred in clause (D) of the said notifications, is submitted to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within a period of two weeks from the date of issue of such certificate, but the petitioner No. 1 had failed to submit the certificate from the department concerned, and, for having failed to comply with the provisions contained in the said notification, the Petitioner No. 1 was liable to pay back the amount equivalent to the duty exemption, availed of, amounting to Rs. 13,20,44,167/- along with interest at the rates applicable under the provisions of section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944. (b) The Respondent No. 2, therefore, directed the Petitioner No. 1 to show cause as to why, on the failure of the Petitioner No. 1 to submit the required certificate, the sum of Rs. 13,20,44,167/- be not demanded in terms of Section 11 AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the same be not recovered, with interest at the rate as may be applicable, under the said Section of the Act. This notice also made it clear that if no cause was shown and if the petitioner did not appear before the authority concerned on the specified date and time, then, the case would be decided ex parte based on the record available. It was further clarified in the notice that the notice was being issued without prejudice to any other action that may be initiated against the petitioner No. 1. It was further clarified in the notice that the notice was being issued without prejudice to any other action that may be initiated against the petitioner No. 1. (c) Similar Notices, as the one, dated 14.07.2005, aforementioned, were issued, on 29.07.2005 and one on 01.08.2005, pertaining to Petitioner No. 1 s unit, at Guwahati, for the amount of Rs. 16,64,82,8077-and Rs. 1,55,95,2007-respectively. As regards Petitioner No. 1 s unit, at Agartala, three similar notices of show cause were issued, on 10.01.2006, 29.07.2005 and 07.09.2005 in respect of the sums of Rs. 8,81,80,1987-, Rs. 9,37,81,667/- and Rs. 78,59,714/- respectively. (d) As far as the Petitioner No. 2 is concerned, it too was served with a similar notice, dated 29.09.2005, to show cause as to why, on the failure of the Petitioner No. 2 to submit the required certificate, the sum of Rs. 12,45,39,245/- be not demanded in terms of Section 11 AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the same be not recovered with interest at the rate as may be applicable under the said Section of the Act. (e) The petitioners responded to the said notices to show cause by furnishing replies thereto. While the proceedings, on being initiated pursuant to the notices to show cause aforementioned, were still pending with the Respondent No. 2, the petitioners carried their grievances to CESTAT, Kolkata, in respect of some investments, which, according to the petitioners, were being illegally disallowed by the authorities concerned. The CESTAT, Kolkata, passed an order, on 01.02.2007, observing to the effect, inter alia, that since effective steps towards investment had been taken, there would be no realization of the demands of Rs. 7,70,79,2837-, Rs. 6,47,86,431/- and Rs. 1,43,44,195/- till disposal of the appeals. (f) While the order, dated 01.02.2007, aforementioned, passed by the Tribunal, was still in force and the proceedings, which stood initiated by the Respondent No. 2 with the issuance of show cause notices, as aforesaid, were still pending with the Respondent No. 2, the petitioners came across, in the month of January, 2008, several unexplained debit transactions in the statements of their various escrow accounts maintained by respondent Nos. 3 and 4, namely, the bankers, the debits being of sums of Rs. 1,21,43,6007-(Rupees One Crore Twenty One Lacs Forty Three Thousand Six Hundred only), Rs. 15,92,23,600/- (Rupees Fifteen Crore Ninety Two Lacs Twenty Three Thousand Six Hundred only) and Rs. 3 and 4, namely, the bankers, the debits being of sums of Rs. 1,21,43,6007-(Rupees One Crore Twenty One Lacs Forty Three Thousand Six Hundred only), Rs. 15,92,23,600/- (Rupees Fifteen Crore Ninety Two Lacs Twenty Three Thousand Six Hundred only) and Rs. 15,75,28,3497-(Rupees Fifteen Crore Seventy Five Lacs Twenty Eight Thousand Three Hundred Forty Nine only) on 29.12.2007, 01.01.2008 and 03.01.2008 respectively from Escrow Account No. 10566984064 of the Petitioner No. 1 s, Guwahati Unit; debits being of sums of Rs.63,05,7607-(Rupees Sixty Three Lacs Five Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty only), Rs. 13,01,45,403/- (Rupees Thirteen Crore One Lac Forty Five Thousand Four Hundred Three only) and Rs.5,94,92,3477-(Rupees Five Crore Ninety Four Lacs Ninety Two Thousand Three Hundred Forty Seven only) on 29.12.2007, 01.01.2008 and 03.01.2008 respectively from Escrow Account No. 10566984086 of the Petitioner No. 1, Agartala Unit, with the Respondent No. 3; debits being also of Rs.73,82,513/- (Rupees Seventy Three Lacs Eighty Two Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen only) and Rs.5,33,54,969/- (Rupees Five Crore Thirty Three Lac Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Nine only) on 29.12.2007 and 02.01.2008 respectively from Escrow Account No. 10915025648 of the Petitioner No.2 with the Respondent No. 4 as well as debits of Rs.4,67,352/- (Rupees Four Lac Sixty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Two only) and Rs.85,43,003/- (Rupees Eighty Five Lac Forty Three Thousand Three only) on 01.01.2008 and 27.12.2007 respectively from Escrow Account No. 1091502863 8 of the Petitioner No.3 with the Respondent No. 4. (g) Upon further inquiry from the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, particularly, a request, vide letter dated 04.01.2008, issued by the Petitioner No.2 to the Respondent No. 4 seeking an explanation as to the debits of Rs.73,82,513/- (Rupees Seventy Three Lac Eighty Two Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen only) on 29.12.2007 and Rs.5,33,54,969/- (Rupees Five Crore Thirty Three Lac Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Nine only) on 02.01.2008 from Escrow Account No. 10915025648, the Respondent No. 4 responded vide its letter dated 04.01.2008 and stated therein that it was the Respondent No. 2, namely, the jurisdictional Commissioner, who had given instructions to this effect. (h) The fact that various debits, as mentioned above, from the petitioners' escrow accounts have been made by the escrow agents, namely, the bankers, on the instructions of Respondent No. 2, has not been in dispute. (h) The fact that various debits, as mentioned above, from the petitioners' escrow accounts have been made by the escrow agents, namely, the bankers, on the instructions of Respondent No. 2, has not been in dispute. (i) From the instructions, which were issued by the Respondent No. 2, to the bankers, it was also gathered by the petitioners that the Respondent No. 2 claimed that the amounts aforementioned were being purportedly 'forfeited' towards adjustment against alleged arrears under Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003. It was, however, stated in the letters, dated 27.12.2007, addressed to the respondent No. 3, by the Respondent No. 2, that these debits were being resorted to in accordance with the provisions of Clause (EA) of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, aforementioned inasmuch as Final Investment Certificate, in respect of the said amounts, had been denied by the IAC and was, therefore, 'recoverable' from the petitioners. (j) Thus, Respondent No. 2 has, by its action described above, got, in all, a sum of Rs.57,61,3 7,536/- transferred from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners towards payment of excise duty on the ground that the petitioners had not been granted Final Investment Certificate by the department concerned. (k) Subsequent to all these transfers having been made (in terms of the directions, which had been issued, as aforesaid, by the Respondent No. 2) Respondent No. 2 passed orders, on 18.01.2008, in the proceedings mentioned hereinabove (which were pending before Respondent No. 2 pursuant to the notices to show cause issued by the Respondent No. 2), and confirmed the demands raised under the said notices to show cause and ordered 'recovery' thereof from the petitioners. (l) Thus, the orders, confirming the demands for 'recovery' raised under the said notices to show cause and rejecting the petitioners' replies thereto, were passed subsequent to the 'recovery', which had already been made. In effect, thus, it is not in dispute that the orders, dated 18.01.2008, aforementioned, are in the form of post-confirmation orders of the actions, which had already been taken by the Respondent No. 2 by directing the said bankers, namely, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to debit the amounts, lying in the Escrow account of the petitioners, as mentioned hereinbefore. In effect, thus, it is not in dispute that the orders, dated 18.01.2008, aforementioned, are in the form of post-confirmation orders of the actions, which had already been taken by the Respondent No. 2 by directing the said bankers, namely, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to debit the amounts, lying in the Escrow account of the petitioners, as mentioned hereinbefore. (m) Coupled with the above, it is necessary to point out that Respondent No. 2 requested, vide an undated letter, the respondent No. 3, namely, the banker, not to allow any withdrawal from the Escrow account by the petitioner until the directions are received otherwise from the Respondent No. 2. On the basis of this undated letter, the Escrow account of the Petitioner No. 1, maintained by the respondent No. 3, came to be frozen. Similar instructions were issued by Respondent No. 2 by an undated letter addressed to the Respondent No. 4. The Escrow account of Petitioner No. 2 came to be similarly frozen by Respondent No. 4. In all, thus, the Respondent No. 2 has appropriated a sum of Rs.57,61,37,536/- from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts and directed that the accounts be not allowed to be operated. 7. By filing the writ application in the present case, the petitioners have put to challenge the action taken by the Respondent No. 2, obtaining transfer and withdrawal of the said sum of Rs.57,61,37,536/- from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners, as described hereinabove. The petitioners have also put to challenge the directions given by the Respondent No. 2 for freezing the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners. The record reveals that by order, dated 18.02.2008, this High Court stayed the respondents' impugned action of freezing the accounts of the petitioners. This order also reflects that this interim stay, in respect of the Respondent No. 2's action freezing the accounts, was granted on the ground that no money can, otherwise also, be withdrawn by the petitioners from their respective Escrow Accounts without approval of the Respondent No. 2. 8. This order also reflects that this interim stay, in respect of the Respondent No. 2's action freezing the accounts, was granted on the ground that no money can, otherwise also, be withdrawn by the petitioners from their respective Escrow Accounts without approval of the Respondent No. 2. 8. While the writ petition, namely, WP(C) 591/2008, was pending, the petitioner also brought it to the notice of the Court, by filing an application, that there were various applications made by them seeking withdrawal of money from their respective Escrow Accounts for the purpose of making investment in terms of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, but the same were not being considered and allowed by the Respondent No. 2. On the grievances, so expressed by the petitioners, an order (as the record reveals) was passed by the High Court, on 07.03.2008, directing Respondent No. 2 to take a decision on the petitioners' applications having regard to all the relevant materials. In view of the fact that the investments required to be made, under the scheme embodied in the notification aforementioned, are time-bound, the Court further ordered that the decision, as intended, should be taken within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order by the respondents. As conveyed by its letter, dated 26.03.2008, Respondent No. 2 has not, however, allowed any of the applications for withdrawal. Broadly speaking, the reasons, assigned for declining the requests of the petitioners for withdrawal, are as under: (a) With respect to the petitioners' withdrawal applications for making investment to a proposed five star hotel, at Guwahati, Respondent No. 2 contends that as the IAC has not approved the said project and that the report, on technical and financial details of the said project of five star hotel is awaited, the respondents cannot consider the petitioners' application in respect of the said hotel project till clearance of the project by the I AC. (b) With respect to the rest of the withdrawal applications for making investments in plant and machinery, the respondents have contended that as the petitioners are yet to clarify certain issues, the said applications also cannot be considered. 9. (b) With respect to the rest of the withdrawal applications for making investments in plant and machinery, the respondents have contended that as the petitioners are yet to clarify certain issues, the said applications also cannot be considered. 9. In the light of the stand, which the Respondent No. 2 has taken as regard the petitioners' various applications for withdrawal of diverse sums of money from their Escrow Accounts for the purpose of making investments in 'plant and machinery', 'civil works' and various other projects including the 'said hotel project', the writ petition has been amended by bringing on record the facts, surfacing subsequent to the institution of the writ proceeding, and the decisions of the respondents, in general, and of the Respondent No. 2, in particular, disallowing the petitioners' applications seeking withdrawal to be made from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners. With regard to their said hotel and other projects, the petitioners have set out their case, as under: (i) The five-star hotel project is a project of the Government of Assam. The petitioners have entered into a joint venture agreement with the Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (in short, 'the GMDA'), which is an authority created by the Government of Assam. The petitioners stand selected for execution of the said project consequent upon a tender, floated by the GMDA, in this regard. The said hotel project has been a longstanding infrastructural need of the State of Assam not only for economic growth, but also for employment generation. In fact, such a hotel is a need for development of tourism and the IT industry and this need has also been highlighted on numerous occasions. By a letter, dated 05.01.2007, addressed to the IAC, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, informed the IAC that the proposed five-star hotel is a long-standing infrastructural need of the State of Assam and the same should be considered as an investment under infrastructural projects in terms of the notification of exemption. This apart, even the IAC, in its meeting, held on 12.03.2007, had approved the project in principle. The petitioners, thereafter, invested a huge sum of money in the said hotel project, and the petitioners also applied to the jurisdictional Commissioner, in this regard, seeking to withdraw money, from its Escrow Account, on the ground that the amount to be withdrawn would be invested in the proposed five-star hotel. The petitioners, thereafter, invested a huge sum of money in the said hotel project, and the petitioners also applied to the jurisdictional Commissioner, in this regard, seeking to withdraw money, from its Escrow Account, on the ground that the amount to be withdrawn would be invested in the proposed five-star hotel. The petitioners also submitted, in this regard, requisite project report, as far back as on 08.08.2007. However, the respondents sought for, vide their letter, dated 13.02.2008, some clarifications from the petitioners with respect to the project report. The petitioners submitted their clarifications vide their letter, dated 26.02.2008. The respondents, vide letter, dated 20.03.2008, however, sought further clarifications from the petitioners, and the petitioners furnished their reply thereto by two letters, dated 25.03.2008 and 26.03.2008. However, even without waiting for response, the respondents, vide order, dated 26.03.2008, rejected the withdrawal application of the petitioners in view of the fact that without approval from the IAC, withdrawal from Escrow Account cannot be allowed. In fact, the IAC has, on 09.09.2008, rejected the said proposal on the ground that five-star hotel does not qualify as an ' 'infrastructure" within the meaning of condition (B) to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. In the meeting of the IAC, wherein the petitioners' proposal for making investment on the said hotel project was rejected, no statutorily competent representative from the Government of Assam was present inasmuch as the meeting was held without the presence of the Principal Secretary, or Secretary or Commissioner, Department of Industry, Government of Assam, though the investment, on the said hotel project was to be made within the territorial limits of the State of Assam and it is within the territorial limits of the State of Assam that the industrial unit of the Petitioner No. 1 (which is the applicant seeking withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making investment on the said hotel project) was proposed to be set up and, in such a case, the Principal Secretary, or Secretary or Commissioner, Department of Industry, Government of Assam, was an integral part of the I AC and no meeting of the 1AC could have been validly held in the complete absence of the officials aforementioned. The LAC's decision is, thus, untenable in law. The LAC's decision is, thus, untenable in law. (ii) The proceedings of the meeting of the IAC, held on 09.09.2008, which stand reproduced in the affidavit by respondents No. 2, read as under: "Although it was approved in principle by the IAC in meeting held on 01.03.2007 that five star project at Guwahati could be approved as 'infrastructure'. However, it is to be examined in detail taking into consideration various aspects. A clarification was sought from Central Board of Excise & Customs regarding eligibility of investment in five-star hotel under 'infrastructure' category in terms of Notification No. 08/04-CE dated 21.01.04 as amended. The CBEC vide letter (F. 356/44/2007-TRQlpart) dated 18.06.2008 expressed views that the Committee is to take a view on issue, especially on issue relating to investment made under the said notification. The benefit of the notification is available only if the Committee is satisfied. It is also communicated that it is for the Committee to take an appropriate decision on any specific issue relating to said notification taking into account the material facts. IAC discussed the issue at length and found that the proposed five-star hotel at Guwahati would not qualify as 'infrastructure." (iii) As regard the remaining applications for withdrawal of various sums of money from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners for the purpose of making investments in 'plant and machinery' and 'civil works', the petitioners had already clarified to the respondents that the investments are proposed to be made in new 'plant and machinery' and 'civil works' and that the same are not towards replacement of parts and machinery in any existing units or towards improvement of any existing factory. Thus, the clarifications, sought for by the respondents, were duly answered by the petitioners, but the respondents have arbitrarily refused to allow withdrawal of amounts from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners. (iv) Further, during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioners came to know by the letter, dated 29.09.2008, of their bankers (i.e., the respondent No. 3 and 4), that in the same manner, as in the past, Respondent No. 2 had got transferred a sum of Rs. 28,55,14,172/- and also a sum of Rs. 30,35,24,690/- from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts at Agartala and Guwahati, on the basis of instructions given by him (Respondent No. 2) by his letters, dated 27.09.2008 and 25.09.2008, to the bankers, namely, respondent Nos. 3 and 4. 28,55,14,172/- and also a sum of Rs. 30,35,24,690/- from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts at Agartala and Guwahati, on the basis of instructions given by him (Respondent No. 2) by his letters, dated 27.09.2008 and 25.09.2008, to the bankers, namely, respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Thus, the Respondent No. 2, even during the pendency of this writ petition, has got the said two sums of Rs. 28,55,14,172/- and Rs. 30,35,24,6907-, totaling to a sum of Rs. 58,90,38,8627-, appropriated from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners without giving any notice to the petitioners and, in fact, without their knowledge. Thus, the Respondent No. 2 has, by its actions, as described above, got, in all, transferred from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners, towards payment of excise duty, a large sum of Rs. 116,71,76,398/- (Rs. 57,61,37,536/- + Rs. 59,10,38,8627-) on the ground that the petitioners have not produced Final Investment Certificate from the IAC within the stipulated period, though the IAC has not till date, with regard to the sums so appropriated, held that the investments, claimed as exemption by the petitioners, were not made or are not investments within the meaning of the notifications aforementioned. (v) Based on the facts, so pleaded, the petitioners have sought for the reliefs, which are as follows: (a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the action of the Respondent No.2 in appropriating a sum of Rs.57,61,37,536/- (Rupees Fifty Seven Crore Sixty One Lac Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Six only) from the Escrow Accounts of the Petitioners with the Respondent Nos.3 and 4. (b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the action of the Respondent No.2 in freezing the Escrow Account Nos.10566984064 and 10566984086 of the Petitioner No. 1, Escrow Account No. 10815025848 of the Petitioner No. 2 and Escrow Account No. 10815028838 of the Petitioner No. 3 with the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 and direct the Respondent No. 2 to extend the period of investment of two years from the date of deposit under the Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004 by the period for which the impugned instructions of freezing the Escrow Accounts were in effect. (c) Issue a Writ of Mandamus and or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondent No. 2 to act in accordance with the terms of the Notifications and to consider the applications and take a decision in its regard expeditiously within the framework of the parameters laid down under the Notification. (d) issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the action of the Respondent No.2 in appropriating a sum of Rs. 28,55,14,172/- (Rupees Twenty Eight Crores Fifty Five Lakhs Fourteen Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Two Only) andRs.30,35,24,690/-((Rupees Thirty Crores Thirty Five Lakhs Twenty Four Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety Only) from the Escrow Accounts of the Petitioners with the Respondent Nos.3 and 4. (e) issue such other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. 10. Let me, now, turn to the case of the respondents. It may be noted that no affidavit has been filed by or on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 nor have the bankers, namely, respondent Nos.3 and 4, filed any affidavit. It is only the Respondent No. 2, who has filed affidavits resisting the writ petition. This respondent's contentions are, briefly described, as under: (i) The notifications, dated25.08.2003, 21.01.2004 and 09.07.2004, if read together, make it clear that the notifications stipulate various conditions and time frame for completion of different acts. The conditions, amongst others, require that if a manufacturer intends receiving the benefit of exemption from payment of excise duty, he must famish, within the stipulated period, to the jurisdictional Commissioner, requisite certificate from the IAC, inasmuch as the notifications provided that if the IAC is satisfied that the investments have been made in accordance with the notifications, it shall issue a certificate to the manufacturer and, on issuance of such certificate, the liability of the manufacturer shall stand discharged to the extent the investment is so certified. The exemption granted under the notifications is, thus, conditional in nature and failure to furnish Investment Certificate from the IAC is, in itself sufficient to disentitle a manufacturer from receiving the benefit of exemption and in such circumstances, the amount, claimed as exemption, becomes 'recoverable' from the manufacturer and such 'recoverable' amount can be 'forfeited' by resorting to Clause (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. This power of 'forfeiture' is independent of any other power of'recovery', which the jurisdictional Commissioner has under the law. As the petitioners had not, within the stipulated period, submitted to the Respondent No. 2, who is the jurisdictional Commissioner, any of the certificates, as were required to be granted by the IAC, Respondent-No. 2 was duty bound to 'recover' the amount in respect whereof the IAC had not granted any certificate to the petitioners. It was for 'recovery' of such amount that the notices had been served on the petitioners, in the month of July, 2005, directing them to show cause, if any, as to why the amount, which had been claimed as exemption, but in respect whereof, no Investment Certificate had been granted by the IAC, be 'recovered' from them along with interest accruing thereon. (ii) Though these notices were issued under Section 11A read with Section 11 AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, Respondent No. 2 had brought the said fact to the notice of the Chief Commissioner, who, in turn, directed that the amounts, covered by the said notices, may be adjusted from the available balance from the Escrow Accounts of the parties concerned and the Respondent No. 2, being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner, adjusted accordingly, and in terms of the said directions of the Chief Commissioner, the amounts, so recoverable, from the available balance of the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners. (iii) Notwithstanding the fact that the said adjustment had been made in terms of the directions given by the Chief Commissioner, Respondent No. 2 did have such power under Clause (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, which, as already indicated above, empowers 'forfeiture' of an amount, lying in an Escrow Account, if claim for exemption made by a manufacturer, is turned down by the IAC. (iv) Thus, the recourse, taken by the Respondent No. 2 to Clause (EA) aforementioned, is legally valid and wholly justified. This apart, even the Respondent No. 2, by its order, dated 18.01.2008, has confirmed the demands for 'recovery', which had been made by the said show cause notices issued in the month of July/August, 2005. Hence, the demands for 'recovery' stand formally confirmed. (v) In all, according to the Respondent No. 2, a sum of Rs. This apart, even the Respondent No. 2, by its order, dated 18.01.2008, has confirmed the demands for 'recovery', which had been made by the said show cause notices issued in the month of July/August, 2005. Hence, the demands for 'recovery' stand formally confirmed. (v) In all, according to the Respondent No. 2, a sum of Rs. 96.62 Crore of excise duty exemption had been availed by the petitioners in terms of the notifications, dated 25.08.2003, and 21.01.2004, but the petitioners could provide Investment Certificate for Rs. 34.03 Crore only. Thus, the balance amount of Rs. 62.59 Crore, which had not been certified by the IAC, became a sum due to the Government and was 'recoverable' from the petitioners under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Respondent No. 2 had accordingly issued various notices to show cause for 'recovery' of the said amount of Rs. 62.59 crores from the petitioners in exercise of his power under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. However, the Respondent No. 2 had, independent of the power of 'recovery' given to him under Section 11, the power to 'forfeit' by taking recourse to Clause (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, the amount, so 'recoverable', if such amount was found lying in the Escrow Account. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the 'recovery' proceedings, initiated pursuant to the notices to show cause aforementioned, were pending, Respondent No. 2 opted to 'forfeit' the amounts by taking resort to Clause (EA) of the said Notification. This action of 'forfeiture' of the amounts, lying in the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners, was, thus, within the powers of the Respondent No. 2 and was, therefore, wholly legal and justified. (vi) The onus of proving, by production of necessary Investment Certificate from the LAC, that an investment has been made in terms of the scheme of exemption, lies on a manufacturer and, since the petitioners, as manufacturers, had failed to produce the Investment Certificates, with in the prescribed period, the Respondent No. 2 merely discharged his duty of 'recovering' the amounts, in respect whereof, the requisite certificates had not been issued. Thus, the acts of getting transferred the various amounts from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners towards payment of excise duty are acts done in conformity with law. Thus, the acts of getting transferred the various amounts from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners towards payment of excise duty are acts done in conformity with law. The petitioner cannot contend that the lAC's approval for a project is not necessary for the purpose of allowing withdrawal of money from Escrow Account. No notice of'recovery', and no opportunity of hearing needed to be given to the petitioners, as manufacturers, before 'recovery' of any amount or before 'forfeiture' of any amount, which the petitioners, as manufacturers, claimed as exemptions, but in respect whereof, no Investment Certificate had been issued by the lAC. (vii) Prior to the issuance of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, it was the IAC, which was required to be satisfied by a manufacturer on the question as to whether the manufacturer has, or has not, made investment in terms of the notification granting exemption of payment of excise duty. The IAC is an experienced body and its decision is based on its 'subjective satisfaction' and, for this purpose, the IAC takes views from other technical experts like engineers, etc. The lAC's conduct has been judicious and since the 1AC has not granted Investment Certificates within the stipulated period, the said amounts had become 'recoverable' from the petitioners. (viii) The LAC has issued guidelines with regard to withdrawal of money from Escrow Accounts. The petitioners have, however, not followed the guidelines, while making the applications. Permission for releasing fund could not have been accorded if the procedural guidelines, issued by the IAC, were not followed by the petitioners. (ix) Although the said hotel project was approved, in principle, by the 1AC in its meeting held on 01.03.2007, the project was required to be examined, in detail, by the LAC taking into consideration various aspects. A clarification was sought for by the IAC from Central Board of Excise & Customs regarding eligibility of investment in five-star hotel under "infrastructure' category in terms of Notification No. 08/04-CE, dated 21.01.2004, as amended. The CBEC, vide letter, dated 18.06.2008, asked the IAC to form its own view on the issue of investment. It is the LAC, which is the competent authority to take a decision as to whether an investment can or cannot be allowed under the notification of exemption. The CBEC, vide letter, dated 18.06.2008, asked the IAC to form its own view on the issue of investment. It is the LAC, which is the competent authority to take a decision as to whether an investment can or cannot be allowed under the notification of exemption. It was also communicated to the IAC by the CBEC that it is for the IAC to reach appropriate decision on any specific issue, relating to said notification, by taking into account the material facts. The benefit of the notification is available only if the LAC is satisfied. Since the IAC found that the proposed five-star hotel, at Guwahati, would not qualify as 'infrastructure', the Respondent No. 2 could not have allowed withdrawal of any amount from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners for the purpose of making investment on the said hotel project. (x) As regards the petitioners' grievances that their applications seeking withdrawal of money from their Escrow Accounts to make investment in 'plant and machinery' and 'civil works', the Respondent No. 2 contends that the petitioners failed to provide necessary information to show as to whether the investments, which they intended to make on the 'plant and machinery' were for new manufacturing unit or for replacement of parts of machinery in the existing unit or towards improvement of an old unit. The petitioners merely wanted to withdraw the money without providing requisite information. The Respondent No. 2, being entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding revenue, could not agree to grant permission, which is not as per policy laid down in this regard. (xi) As regards the freezing of accounts, the stand of the Respondent No. 2 is as under: (a) The beneficiary units of the Notification deposited the Central Excise duty foregone in the Escrow Accounts open for this purpose in terms of the Notification. They stated withdrawal from the accounts during the quarter ended on 30.06.2005 with the permission of the Commissioner for investment in different projects and withdrawn around Rs. 273.15 crore up to February, 2009. They submitted quarterly statement as per the requirement of the Notification. But no appraisal.of these investments could be made due to various reasons. (b) The Govt. of India received several complaints from different MPs and MLAs of the North East Region that the beneficiary units of this Notification mis-utilized the money withdrawn from the Escrow Accounts. To investigate the allegations, the Govt. But no appraisal.of these investments could be made due to various reasons. (b) The Govt. of India received several complaints from different MPs and MLAs of the North East Region that the beneficiary units of this Notification mis-utilized the money withdrawn from the Escrow Accounts. To investigate the allegations, the Govt. of India formed a High Power Committee. It is viewed that until the previous withdrawal are justified, no further withdrawal from the Escrow Account should be allowed. The Respondent No 2 on 02.01.2008 instructed the state Bank of India, New Guwahati and the State Bank of India, Agartala Main Branch not to allow the Petitioners to withdraw money from the Escrow Accounts. However, the accounts so frozen were made operational subsequently and amount of Rs. 7.2 crore was released from the Escrow Accounts in June, 2008. 11. In short, thus, the case of the Respondent No. 2 is that a manufacturer is required to produce Final Investment Certificate from the IAC within a specified period and if such a certificate is not submitted to Respondent No. 2 within the specified period, this would ipso facto make the amount (sought to get exempted by a manufacturer, as an investment, in terms of the notifications aforementioned) 'recoverable' from the manufacturer and, in such a case, the Respondent No. 2, as jurisdictional Commissioner, is competent to recover such amount from the Escrow Account of the manufacturer by way of forfeiture of the amount lying in the Escrow Account of the manufacturer (such as, the petitioners), by taking recourse to Condition (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. As the petitioners had not furnished, within the period specified by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, requisite Investment Certificates to the Respondent No. 2, the Respondent No. 2 was duty bound to 'recover' the amount in respect whereof, Investment Certificates had not been granted to the petitioners and, for the purpose of making such a 'recovery', recourse could have been had by the Respon- dent No. 2 to Condition (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, which empowers the Respondent No. 2 to 'forfeit' the amount 'recoverable' from a manufacturer, such as, the petitioner, and this power of 'forfeiture' is independent of the power given to him under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. As the power, which has been given to a jurisdictional Commissioner, under Condition (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, to 'forfeit' the amount, lying in Escrow Account, to the extent to which no Investment Certificate has been issued to a manufacturer by the IAC, is independent of the 'recovery' proceeding contemplated under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, the fact that the petitioners had been served earlier with the notices to show cause in exercise of the respondent No.2's power under Section 11A and the fact that the said 'recovery' proceedings were pending, could not have created any legal impediment and did not, in fact, create any legal impediment, on the power of the Respondent No. 2, to 'forfeit' the amount in respect of which the petitioners had not furnished requisite Investment Certificate to Respondent No. 2 within the stipulated period. 12. In his affidavit filed, earlier, on 05.08.2008, Respondent No. 2 made it clear that during pendency of the proceedings, which had been initiated pursuant to the notices to show cause issued by him to the petitioners, he had, in the concerned file, brought the matter to the notice of the Chief Commissioner, that such adjudication proceedings, for determining the liability of the petitioners, were pending and, on receiving the file, the Chief Commissioner ordered, in the said file, that, pending adjudication, the amounts, covered by the said notices to show cause, may be adjusted from the available balance, in the Escrow Accounts of the parties concerned, and the Respondent No. 2, being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner, adjusted accordingly the amounts from the available balance lying in the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners concerned. Specifically dealing with the instructions, which had been issued by the Respondent No. 2 to the bankers, namely, respondent Nos. 3 and 4, Respondent No. 2 has clearly averred that being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise & Custom, Shillong Zone, he had, in compliance with the directions, issued by the higher authority, issued the letters to the bankers for debiting diverse sums of money. The categorical averments, so made, could not have been withdrawn and have, therefore, not been withdrawn by the Respondent No. 2 in his subsequent affidavit-in-opposition filed on 31.07.2009. The categorical averments, so made, could not have been withdrawn and have, therefore, not been withdrawn by the Respondent No. 2 in his subsequent affidavit-in-opposition filed on 31.07.2009. These averments make it explicit that while the adjudication proceedings, which had been initiated pursuant to the notices to show cause aforementioned, were pending, whereby the petitioners were required to show cause to the respondent No.2 as to why the "recovery' shall not be made from them of the excise duty, payable by them in respect whereof, the petitioners had not submitted the Final Investment Certificate(s) from the IAC, the Respondent No. 2 was directed by the Chief Commissioner to recover the amount from the available balance in the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners and, being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner and acting upon his direction, Respondent No. 2 instructed the bankers concerned to transfer the amounts lying in the Escrow Account as already mentioned above. No notice to show cause was required to be served on the petitioners before forfeiture of the amount by taking recourse to Condition (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. 13. Now, in the backdrop of the scheme of exemption, as unfolded by various notifications, issued from time to time, culminating into the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, when the material facts, as set out above, are considered in their proper prospective, the writ petitioners' case, impugning the action of forfeiture of the amounts aforementioned, emerges finally, in a nutshell, as under: (i) As many as five notices, under Section 11A read with Section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, were issued by Respondent No. 2 directing the petitioners to show cause, if any, as to why the amounts mentioned, in the said notices, be not recovered from the petitioners, along with the interest accruing thereon, on the ground that the said amounts were 'recoverable' from the petitioners as no Investment Certificate had been issued by the IAC within the stipulated period. Pursuant to the notices of show case aforementioned, though the petitioners had submitted their replies and the proceedings for recovery, so initiated, were still pending, the amounts, covered by the said notices, were debited from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts by the bankers concerned on the basis of instructions issued, in this regard, by the Respondent No. 2. Pursuant to the notices of show case aforementioned, though the petitioners had submitted their replies and the proceedings for recovery, so initiated, were still pending, the amounts, covered by the said notices, were debited from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts by the bankers concerned on the basis of instructions issued, in this regard, by the Respondent No. 2. The transfer of the amounts from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts to the Government are, according to the petitioners, wholly illegal and beyond the powers of the Respondent No. 2 inasmuch as the Respondent No. 2 could not have directed such transfer of amounts from the petitioners' Escrow Accounts without giving the petitioners opportunity of hearing and, particularly, when the proceedings, pursuant to the said show cause notices, were still pending adjudication before the Respondent No. 2 himself and when, in respect of a substantial part of the said amount, the CESTAT, Kolkata, had already directed not to recover the same from the petitioners. (ii) Before forfeiture of the amount, so ordered to be recovered, Respondent No. 2 ought to have given notice to the petitioners to show cause against the intended forfeiture. The forfeiture of the amount, without having preceded by any notice of show cause was against the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. In fact, the decision to order forfeiture was not even taken by the Respondent No. 2 inasmuch as the decision to cause forfeiture was taken by the Chief Commissioner, and the Respondent No. 2 has, admittedly, carried out the instructions, given in this regard, by the Chief Commissioner. The action of the Chief Commissioner, in giving the said direction, was beyond his powers and the action of the Respondent No. 2, in carrying out the said instructions, was wholly illegal and may be interfered with. The action of the Chief Commissioner, in giving the said direction, was beyond his powers and the action of the Respondent No. 2, in carrying out the said instructions, was wholly illegal and may be interfered with. (iii) As far as the petitioners' various applications seeking withdrawal of diverse sums of money from their respective Escrow Accounts, for the purpose of making investments in their hotel and other projects are concerned, the petitioners' grievance is that as far as the withdrawal of money from Escrow Account is concerned, it is the Respondent No. 2, who is the competent authority to take a decision on such matters of withdrawal and that the IAC is not a competent authority to direct the Respondent No. 2 as to when he would allow withdrawal and whether a project is or is not covered by the scheme of exemption under the notifications aforementioned. No approval of any project by the IAC is required to be obtained by the Respondent No. 2 for the purpose of enabling him to allow withdrawal from an Escrow Account by a manufacturer for making investment in a project. Contrary to, however, the clear scheme of exemption, which empowers the jurisdictional Commissioner to take decision in matters of withdrawal of amounts from Escrow Account, the Respondent No. 2 abdicated his authority under law, and has been acting as an authority subordinate to the IAC and has decided not to allow withdrawal of money from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners in respect of their hotel and other projects. (iv) The petitioners deny and dispute that the 1AC has rejected the petitioners' claim for Investment Certificate. There is nothing on record, even faintly, indicating that the I AC has rejected any of the investments, which the petitioner have claimed to have made. In the absence of any indication of such rejection by the IAC, or production of any such material by the Respondent No. 2, the fact, that the Investment Certificates have not been granted by the IAC within the stipulated period, cannot become automatically a ground for 'recovery' of the amount, which has been invested by the petitioners, particularly, when there has been no dispute, at any stage, with regard to the actual utilization of the amount from the Escrow Account for the purpose of investment. The provisions, with regard to Escrow Account, have been made only in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, and did not exist in the notification, dated 21.01.2004 and, hence, the money, lying deposited in such Escrow, Account cannot be appropriated for the purpose of purported 'recovery' of an amount, which had become due and payable before the scheme of Escrow Account was introduced by notification, dated 09.07.2004. Moreover, at the time of making 'recovery' of Rs. 56.03 Crore, the demands, raised by show cause notices were still pending adjudication before the Respondent No. 2 himself. The order, dated 18.01.2008, passed by Respondent No. 2, confirming the demands, raised by the said show cause notices, is nothing, but post facto confirmation and the same, having been challenged before the CESTAT, Kolkata, has been stayed. These facts have, however, not been disputed by Respondent No. 2. There is, therefore, no ground whatsoever, for disallowing the petitioners" application for withdrawal of money from their Escrow Accounts. (v) The CESTAT, Kolkata, vide order No. S-,831-833/Kol/2008, dated 16.10.2008, had directed the Department to verify of investments made by the petitioners and it is clear from the joint inspection reports, annexed to the writ petition (Annexure B (Colly), that the investment of substantial amount is visible on the ground at various places and that the plant and machinery have been received in the factory within two years from the end of the quarter as required under the terms of the Notification read with CBEC circular, dated 25.07.2006. It is submitted by the petitioners that further amount could not be invested as the permission for withdrawal was not granted within stipulated time. Therefore, the impugned actions of the Respondent No. 2 are bad in the eyes of law. (vi) By acting upon the directions and instructions of the IAC, Respondent No. 2 has acted ultra vires the notifications, particularly, Notification, dated 09.07.2004. The investment guidelines, issued by the IAC, are ultra vires in terms of the notifications inasmuch as the IAC does not have any power to direct the jurisdictional Commissioner to act in a particular manner under the terms of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. As far as the withdrawal application, as regard the various projects including the said hotel project, are concerned, the petitioners' case has already been described above in adequate details and need no further reiteration. 14. I have heard Mr. As far as the withdrawal application, as regard the various projects including the said hotel project, are concerned, the petitioners' case has already been described above in adequate details and need no further reiteration. 14. I have heard Mr. A. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. B. Sarma, learned Senior Standing counsel. Central Excise. 15. The Notification, dated 21.01.2004, was issued by the Central Government in supersession of its earlier Notification, dated 25.08.2003. Thus, to the extent that the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, differed from the scheme of exemption, embodied in the Notification, dated 25.08.2003, it was the Notification, dated 21.04.2004, which was to hold the field. As the scheme of exemption, embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, is in supersession of the earlier Notification, dated 25.08.2003, it goes without saying that the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, has to be considered as a notification issued anew embodying a complete scheme of exemption of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, in respect of certain specified goods. Notwithstanding the fact that Notification, dated 25.08.2003, stood superseded by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, some features of the later scheme, as embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, remained, however, same as in the earlier Notification, dated 25.08.2003. The unaltered and common features, in the two schemes, were, in brief, as under: (a) A manufacturing unit, in order to become eligible to receive benefit of exemption from payment of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, must be located in any one of the seven North Eastern States, namely, the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura; (b) The manufacturing unit must have commenced commercial production on or after 24.12.1997, but not later than 28.02.2002; and (c) The manufacturing unit must have continued its manufacturing activities even after 28.02.2001. 16. It is, now. of great significance to note that the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, is only an amendment to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, and it does not supersede the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. Thus, while the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, superseded the Notification, dated 25.03.2008, the Notification, dated 09-07-2004, amended the scheme, embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, by introducing certain new features in the earlier scheme. In this view of the matter, both these Notifications have to be read together. 17. Thus, while the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, superseded the Notification, dated 25.03.2008, the Notification, dated 09-07-2004, amended the scheme, embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, by introducing certain new features in the earlier scheme. In this view of the matter, both these Notifications have to be read together. 17. It is also not inappropriate to point out that the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, begins with the following expressions; "the conditions (C), (D) and (E) in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, stands substituted". What is, therefore, transparent is that the condition (B) in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, remains untouched. For the purpose of clarity, Condition (B) is reproduced hereinbelow: "(B) an amount equal to the sum of basic excise duty, special excise duty, additional excise duty and National Calamity Contingent duty, payable, but for the exemption in this notification, shall be utilised by the manufacturer only for'investment'in, - (i) plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit which is located in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura; or (ii) 'infrastructure' or civil works or social projects in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura;" 18. A careful reading of condition (B) shows that a manufacturer, who seeks to claim exemption from payment of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, must utilize the amount, (which he seeks to claim as exemption) in making' investment,' in plant and machinery, in a manufacturing unit, which is located in any of the said seven States, or in 'infrastructure', or 'civil works', or 'social project' in any of the said seven States. No manufacturer can, therefore, claim exemption unless he makes 'investment' in terms of condition (B) in 'plant and machinery' as indicated hereinbefore, or in 'infrastructure', or 'civil works', or 'social project', as mentioned hereinbefore. What is necessary to bear in mind is that the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, which amends the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, merely reiterates the four categories of 'investments', which the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. had allowed as 'investments' for the purpose of allowing exemption. 19. What is, now, imperative to note is that the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, had not prescribed the manner of making 'investment' except laying down that having made 'investment', the manufacturer shall provide all details to the IAC, relating to the 'investment' made in terms of condition (B). had allowed as 'investments' for the purpose of allowing exemption. 19. What is, now, imperative to note is that the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, had not prescribed the manner of making 'investment' except laying down that having made 'investment', the manufacturer shall provide all details to the IAC, relating to the 'investment' made in terms of condition (B). within one month after the expiry of the period of six months within which the' investment' is made, and shall have to prove to the satisfaction of the IAC that the 'investment' has been made for a purpose specified in Condition (B). If the IAC were satisfied that the' investment', as specified in condition (B), had been made, it was to issue, to this effect, a certificate, which came to be popularly called 'Investment Certificate' or 'final Investment Certificate', to the manufacturer within a period of three weeks and the manufacturer, then, was required to produce the 'Investment Certificate', within a period of two weeks from the date of issue of the certificate, to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer. 20. As against the earlier scheme of examination of an 'investment' by the authorities of the Central Excise after the 'investment' already stood made by the manufacturer, the condition (C) of the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, lays down a new scheme of the manner of examination of an 'investment' even before the 'investment' is made. 20. As against the earlier scheme of examination of an 'investment' by the authorities of the Central Excise after the 'investment' already stood made by the manufacturer, the condition (C) of the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, lays down a new scheme of the manner of examination of an 'investment' even before the 'investment' is made. Thus, condition (C), which embodies the manner of' investment', reads as under: "(C) The ' investment' in terms of condition (B) shall be made in the following manner, namely: - (i) an amount equal to the sum of basic excise duty, special excise duty, additional excise duty and National Calamity Contingent Duty, payable in a quarter, but for the exemption under this notification, shall be deposited by the manufacturer, within sixty days from the end of the quarter, in an Escrow Account opened by the manufacturer, for this purpose, in a bank authorized for excise duty collection; (ii) operations including withdrawals from and closure of the said Escrow Account shall be made with the prior approval of the jurisdictional Commissioner of Central Excise, taking into account the conditions specified in this notification and to safeguard the revenue; (iii) the manufacturer shall, pending' investment' in the manner specified in condition (B), execute a bond, as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise or the Assistant Commissioner of Central Eixcise, as the case may be, binding himself to pay on demand an amount equal to the amount referred to in clause (i) along with interest thereon at the rate specified under section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and not so invested, in terms of condition (B), with the amount lying in balance in said Escrow Account as security or collateral; (iv) the amount deposited in the said Escrow Account, in terms of clause (i), shall be invested, in the manner specified in condition (B), within two years from the date of its deposit in such account; (v) the amounts withdrawn from the Escrow Account shall be invested for the purposes specified in condition (B) within sixty days of its withdrawal from such account." 21. Both the schemes, one under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, and the other, under the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, must, now, be read as one cohesive and workable scheme. Both the schemes, one under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, and the other, under the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, must, now, be read as one cohesive and workable scheme. If the scheme of exemption, as envisaged by these two Notifications, are not construed in a manner, which makes the scheme, as a whole, workable, such construction would not be justified inasmuch as the obvious reason for making the amendment was not only to enlarge the scope of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, but also to make the scheme, envisaged by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, a rational, effective and workable one. Though the parties are free to give their own differing interpretations of the scheme of exemption, as embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, vis-a-vis the Notification, dated"09.07.2004, the fact remains that the onus lies on the Court to correctly construe the two Notifications, so that, as already mentioned hereinbefore, the scheme of exemption becomes meaningful, orderly, and devoid of red-tapism. One cannot but point out that the concept of single-window clearance, which all developed countries have, is the one, which India has also been trying to comprehensively adopt and it is this concept, as I shall show, which has brought the changes, in the manner of' investment', from the one, which the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, to the one, which stood embodied has been introduced, at a later stage, by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. 22. Thus, condition (B) prescribes the manner in which an 'investment' has to be made, namely, that the amount, sought to get exempted, must be deposited, in the Escrow Account, within 60 days from the end of the quarter. For the purpose of, and at the time of, making the 'investment', the jurisdictional Commissioner, now, comes into the picture inasmuch as it is he, who has to grant permission for withdrawal and without whose permission, no withdrawal from the Escrow Account can be made. What is however, of utmost importance to note is that no withdrawal from the Escrow Account can be permitted by the jurisdictional Commissioner unless the conditions, specified in the Notification, are complied with inasmuch as condition (C) (ii) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, clearly imposes, on the jurisdictional Commissioner, the responsibility to allow withdrawal only upon taking into account the conditions, specified in the Notification, and also by safeguarding the interest of revenue. 23. 23. Thus, before allowing any withdrawal from the Escrow Account, the jurisdictional Commissioner must be told as to why the withdrawal was being sought for by a manufacturer and, unless the manufacturer shows that the withdrawal, sought to be made, is for a purpose, mentioned in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, no such withdrawal can be allowed by the jurisdictional Commissioner. Hence, it is the liability of the manufacturer to submit such materials, as he may seek to rely upon, in order to show that the amount, to be withdrawn, would be invested in such a project, which is envisaged and permitted by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, meaning thereby that withdrawal application must show that the withdrawee seeks to make 'investment' in 'plant and machinery', or in 'infrastructure" or 'civil work' or 'social project'. 24. In the case at hand, while considering the applications, which the writ petitioners have made, seeking withdrawal of money from respective Escrow Accounts for the purpose of making investment on various projects under the scheme, it is the duty of the authority concerned to determine, by restrictive interpretation, if the 'investment', sought to be made, are or are not covered by the notifications. However, once 'investment', sought to be made, is found covered by the notifications, the authority concerned shall liberally construe the provisions for exemption given in the notification. [See Collector of Central Excise Vs. Himalayan Cooperative Milk Product Union Ltd., reported in (2000) 8 SCC 642 , and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 642 ] 25. An Escrow Account, I may point out, is a bank account, generally held in the name of the depositor and an Escrow Agent and the amount lying therein is returnable to the depositor or to be paid to third person on fulfillment of a specified condition. That is why, Escrow Accounts are, at times, described as Escrow Deposits. An Escrow Account, I may point out, is a bank account, generally held in the name of the depositor and an Escrow Agent and the amount lying therein is returnable to the depositor or to be paid to third person on fulfillment of a specified condition. That is why, Escrow Accounts are, at times, described as Escrow Deposits. Clearly, therefore, even in the present case, if respondent No.2 finds that the excise duty, which has become payable after the scheme has come into force and the excise duty has not been deposited in such an account or when he finds that having deposited, the manufacturer has withdrawn the amount for specific purpose to make investment, but has not made the investment, respondent No.2, as jurisdictional Commissioner, would be within the scope of his authority if he directs 'forfeiture' of such an amount by the banker concerned. Before, however, such momentous power, having serious civil consequences, is exercised, duty it is, and not a mere formality, of the jurisdictional Commissioner to ensure that an opportunity is given to the manufacturer to have his say against the proposed "forfeiture'. In the present case, admittedly, no notice to show cause was, however, given to the petitioners before the money, lying in their Escrow Accounts, was forfeited not in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the respondent No.2, as jurisdictional Commissioner, but by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, under the directions of the Chief Commissioner of Excise. 26. Moreover, if the jurisdictional Commissioner takes the view that an' investment' is not covered by the scheme of exemption, he cannot straightway reject the request for withdrawal by a manufacturer. What the jurisdictional Commissioner has to do is that, keeping the request for withdrawal pending with him, he shall inform the manufacturer about the jurisdictional Commissioner's tentative view, supported by reasons, as to why, in his opinion, the request, for withdrawal made by the manufacturer, cannot be allowed. This information to be given to the manufacturer shall be subject to showing of cause by the manufacturer against such tentative view formed by the jurisdictional Commissioner. If the jurisdictional Commissioner, on so being shown cause, still takes the decision not to allow withdrawal, it has to inform the manufacturer of his final decision with, of course, reasons assigned therefor so that the manufacturer comes to know why his request stands, ultimately, disallowed. If the jurisdictional Commissioner, on so being shown cause, still takes the decision not to allow withdrawal, it has to inform the manufacturer of his final decision with, of course, reasons assigned therefor so that the manufacturer comes to know why his request stands, ultimately, disallowed. A mere rejection order, bereft of reasons, in a case, which will have serious civil consequences, can never be sustained. The notifications, embodying the scheme of exemption, have not specifically prescribed the mode of disposal of an application for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account. Necessary it is, therefore, that a procedure, which would satisfy the requirements of the principles of natural justice be evolved and followed by the jurisdictional Commissioner for the purpose of deciding such applications. The procedure, prescribed hereinbefore, meets this requirement. 27. I may also point out that it has been contended, on behalf of the respondent No.2, that to grant or not to grant withdrawal of money from Escrow Account or to allow or not to allow 'Investment Certificate', in every given case, depends on the 'subjective satisfaction' of the IAC and, hence, the lAC's decision taken on such matters does not remain open to challenge. Apart from the fact that it is not for the IAC to decide which application for withdrawal shall or shall not be allowed inasmuch as it is the jurisdictional Commissioner within whose authority and power such applications fall, it is also imperative that one clearly bears in mind the distinction, which exists between subjective satisfaction, on the one hand, and objective satisfaction, on the other. Subjective satisfaction denotes a personal satisfaction of an individual subject to his mental operation peculiar to himself, which is not capable of being tested in an objective manner. Subjective satisfaction makes the authority sole judge of the existence of conditions, which make the power exercisable. Subjective satisfaction indicates that instead of judging objectively whether the condition, in fact, exists, the court is merely to judge subjectively whether the requisite state of mind exists in the person vested with the power to take a decision in the matter. There is a subjective element in all direction, and expressions, such as "if the A is satisfied" differ only in degree from a power to act "as he thinks fit”. The person vested with the power to decide must act reasonably and in good faith, and upon proper grounds. There is a subjective element in all direction, and expressions, such as "if the A is satisfied" differ only in degree from a power to act "as he thinks fit”. The person vested with the power to decide must act reasonably and in good faith, and upon proper grounds. In principle, the same limits should operate however subjective the language of the statutory provisions may be so that the courts may afford protection against an abuse of power. The only exception to this principle is a situation, when the discretion granted is exceptionally wide, the most obvious example of such exceptionally wide discretion is emergency powers in time of war or in other extraordinary conditions. 28. When satisfaction of a person is based not on his consciousness or perception but on the analysis of external materials, factors and conditions presented before him, the satisfaction is treated to be objective. When the exercise of discretion has to be on the basis of relevant considerations and the fulfillment or otherwise of the conditions relevant to decision making, the formation of satisfaction in such circumstances is considered to be objective. To act or not to act, in a given manner, in the case of objective satisfaction, must always be on examination of relevant materials that satisfies the requirements of the scheme. The authority required to act objectively must act reasonably, fairly, in good faith and must apply its mind to all those relevant materials on the basis of which decision has to be made. 29. In substance, the question of subjective satisfaction arises, when there is an element of discretion given to an authority to exercise a given power. In the case at hand, the withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account will not depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the jurisdictional Commissioner or the IAC. When an application, made, under the scheme, seeking withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account, is in order and there is no other legal impediment in permitting such withdrawal, neither jurisdictional Commissioner nor the IAC can refuse to grant the permission. When an application, made, under the scheme, seeking withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account, is in order and there is no other legal impediment in permitting such withdrawal, neither jurisdictional Commissioner nor the IAC can refuse to grant the permission. If permission to withdraw money from the Escrow Account is held to be dependent on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, the consequence would be that two different authorities, namely, two jurisdictional Commissioners, in the same set of facts, may take two different decisions; whereas the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, does not perceive any situation, where two jurisdictional Commissioners, acting on same fact situation, can take two different decisions, one allowing withdrawal and the other declining to allow such withdrawal. Such chaotic and unreal interpretation of an exemption Notification is not legally feasible. Similarly, the granting of the 'investment certificates', cannot be said to depend on lAC's 'subjective satisfaction' inasmuch as the Notifications envisage that in a given fact situation, no two lACs can take two different decisions; or else, what would happen is that while one I AC may allow 'Investment Certificate' in respect of an 'investment' made by a manufacturer, another I AC may refuse to grant 'Investment Certificate' in same fact situation. Such a construction of the scheme of exemption cannot, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, be accepted. 30. What is, now, of prime importance to borne in mind is that the liability of the manufacturer to satisfy the jurisdictional Commissioner that the withdrawal, sought for by the manufacturer, is for such a purpose as is envisaged by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, imposes a corresponding duty, on the jurisdictional Commissioner, to ensure that he does not permit any withdrawal by a manufacturer from the Escrow Account unless the withdrawal, sought to be made, is for the purpose of making 'investment' on such a project, which is envisaged and permitted by the notification aforementioned, namely, that the 'investment' is in 'plant and machinery', or in 'infrastructure', or 'civil works', or 'social project'. 31. Once the jurisdictional Commissioner has granted the withdrawal, the manufacturer cannot be penalized except when the withdrawal is proved to be fraudulent or is proved to have been allowed by the jurisdictional Commissioner on extraneous considerations or in collusion with the manufacturer for a purpose, which is not envisaged and permitted by the Notifications aforementioned. The reason is very simple. Once the jurisdictional Commissioner has granted the withdrawal, the manufacturer cannot be penalized except when the withdrawal is proved to be fraudulent or is proved to have been allowed by the jurisdictional Commissioner on extraneous considerations or in collusion with the manufacturer for a purpose, which is not envisaged and permitted by the Notifications aforementioned. The reason is very simple. The Notification, dated 09.07.2004, promises exemption from payment of excise duty if a manufacturer, who is, otherwise, eligible to make 'investment' under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, invests such sum of money, as he may be liable to pay as excise duty, or additional duty of excise, or special excise duty, etc., in 'plant and machinery', in a manufacturing unit or in "infrastructure", or 'civil works', 'social projects', which are mentioned in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. Having so invested the money with the permission of the jurisdictional Commissioner, the manufacturer is required to satisfy the IAC that he not only has made the 'investment', as claimed by him, but also that he has invested the money for a purpose, which meets the conditions embodied in Clause (B) of the Notifications. It is easily understandable that a manufacturer, if honest, would be hesitant to make 'investment' freely unless he is satisfied that he would receive refund of the amount, which is invested by him. For this purpose, it was not only necessary that the manufacturer be sure that he was investing money in any of the four categories of specified activities, but he be also sure that the IAC would not reject his 'investment' on the ground that the 'investment', though made, was for a purpose not envisaged or allowable under the Notification aforementioned. In other words, in order to enable a manufacturer make 'investment' without reservation and freely, the scheme, now, embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, assures that if the investor makes an 'investment', his 'investment' would not be rejected on the ground that his 'investment' is for a purpose, which is not permissible under the Notifications, particularly, in a case, wherein the fact that he has made the 'investment' is not in dispute, for, hesitation, on the part of a person to invest on the ground that his investment may or may not be allowed, could have validly created obstacles in the free flow of investment'. 32. 32. It was, obviously, therefore, that the Central Government deemed it fit that before an 'investment' is made, the scheme of 'investment' is examined by an appropriate authority, to be appointed by the Central Government, so that no 'investment' is made unless it is covered by the purposes, which are specified under the Notifications. At the same time, it was also necessary that the interest of revenue be safeguarded so that a manufacturer, who invests on a project, which is not covered by the Notifications, does not, having already made such impermissible 'investment', claim exemptions and drags thereby the Central Government into litigation by trying to justify that his 'investment' falls within the scheme of the Notifications. 33. Thus, in order to make the earlier scheme workable, the scheme, introduced later by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, has brought into picture the jurisdictional Commissioner, who has been vested with the power to allow, or not to allow, withdrawal from the Escrow Account. This apart, safeguarding the interest of revenue, all such amounts, which would be claimed as exemption, are required, now, to be deposited in the Escrow Account. No withdrawal from such an account can be allowed by a jurisdictional Commissioner unless the 'investment', sought to be made, is for the purposes as envisaged by the Notifications. Once the jurisdictional Commissioner has allowed an amount to be withdrawn from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making 'investment', there is no separate appellate or revisional authority including the IAC under the scheme of exemption, which can sit on the wisdom of the decision of the jurisdictional Commissioner. 34. It needs to be clearly understood that before the scheme, dated 09.07.2004, came into force, the IAC was required to do both, namely, enquire if the 'investment' had, at all, been made, and, if so, whether the 'investment' was for a purpose mentioned in the Notification. If, on such enquiry, it was found that the 'investment' had been made for a purpose other than what the Notifications, dated 21.01.2004, had envisaged, the IAC was not required to undertake any further exercise to determine if the manufacturer had or had not really invested the amount as claimed by him. If, on such enquiry, it was found that the 'investment' had been made for a purpose other than what the Notifications, dated 21.01.2004, had envisaged, the IAC was not required to undertake any further exercise to determine if the manufacturer had or had not really invested the amount as claimed by him. Thus, the manufacturer was required to make, under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, 'investment', at his own peril and without knowing as to whether his 'investment' would or would not be allowed as an 'investment' within the meaning of the scheme of the Notification. Howsoever honest may be a manufacturer, the fact remains that any such kind of scheme, which the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, had embodied, could have, many a times, led to a serious controversy and dispute inasmuch as it might have become a matter of mere opinion whether an 'investment', already made, was really covered by the scheme of the Notifications or not. No 'investment' can be undertaken by a manufacturer on the basis of such an unsure and uncertain scheme. 35. The only way, therefore, to make the scheme workable was that either the Central Government, or some authority, appointed by the Central Government, examines die 'investment', which is sought to be made, and allows 'investment' to be made if and only if the 'investment' is for a purpose mentioned in the Notifications. It is this power, which, now, a jurisdictional Commissioner, apparently, exercises. He can, therefore, by no means, be said to be an authority subordinate to the IAC as far as his role of examining the question, as to whether an 'investment', sought to be made, is for a purpose, as mentioned in the Notification, or not, is concerned. If a manufacturer seeks to make an 'investment' and it is allowed by the jurisdictional Commissioner, the inference would be that the 'investment' is for a purpose covered by the Notification. The Central Government is bound by the permission, which the jurisdictional Commissioner grants, even if he exceeds jurisdiction in granting such permission. When he grants permission to make an 'investment', it would be regarded as a valid 'investment'. The Central Government is bound by the permission, which the jurisdictional Commissioner grants, even if he exceeds jurisdiction in granting such permission. When he grants permission to make an 'investment', it would be regarded as a valid 'investment'. Even if he exceeds jurisdiction and allows an 'investment' to be made, which is, otherwise, found to be not covered by scheme, it has to be treated as an 'investment' made with the permission given purportedly in exercise of the powers given to a jurisdictional Commissioner by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. In such cases, the Central Government would be bound by the decision, which the jurisdictional Commissioner has taken. Such a decision would also be binding on the I AC. The IAC cannot, therefore, if an 'investment' has been made by a manufacturer after withdrawing money from Escrow Account with due permission from the jurisdictional Commissioner, re-examine and determine as to whether 'investment', already made, falls within the scheme of exemption notification or not. 36. It needs to be borne in mind that a State may have one or more departments. The number of departments is not material. What is material is that the State must speak in one voice. In fact, a State can speak only in one voice. Different departments of a State cannot speak in different voices. When eligibility certificate to a unit, covered by a notification of exemption, is granted by the Department of Industry of a State and when it is the Department of Industry, which is competent to grant such eligibility certificate in favour of a unit enabling it to obtain exemption from payment of sales tax, the Department of Finance of the State concerned cannot re-examine the question as to whether the Department of Industries granted the eligibility certificate correctly or not. Clarifying this position of law, the Apex Court, in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of A. P., reported in (2005) 6 SCC 292 , held that the State, which is represented by its various departments, can only speak in one voice and, having regard to the language of the relevant order, the Apex Court further held that it is the Department of Industries, which is the competent department to grant eligibility certificate under the scheme of the relevant Government Order and it is the voice of the Department of Industries, which shall be allowed to prevail in such circumstances. 37. 37. Though the decision, rendered in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd (supra), was considered in Pondicherry State Coop. Consumer Federation Ltd. Vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 206 , the Apex Court has agreed with the decision in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd (supra). 38. From the decision, in Vadilal Chemicals Ltd (supra), it becomes clear that a State Government cannot speak in different voices through its various departments inasmuch as all the departments of the State, eventually, represent one and the same State. Similarly, in the present case, it is the Central Government, which has the power, under Section 5(IA) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, to grant exemption from payment of excise duty. When the scheme of exemption, as modified by Notification, dated 09.07.2004, has brought into picture jurisdictional Commissioner empowering him to allow withdrawal from Escrow Account, if the conditions of exemptions are satisfied by a manufacturer, and also keeping in view the interest of revenue, it is the jurisdictional Commissioner, who is the competent authority to take a decision on such applications. The IAC, when it is not the appellate or supervisory authority, cannot impose any conditions on the powers of the jurisdictional Commissioner, which the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, issued by the Government of India, has not imposed. The IAC could not have, therefore, issued any guidelines, binding the jurisdictional Commissioner, as to when and how the jurisdictional Commissioner shall exercise his power, which has been vested in him by not the IAC but by the Central Government, nor could have the IAC imposed the conditions of project approval by it before the jurisdictional Commissioner grants permission for withdrawal from Escrow Account for making investment on a project. 39. The petitioners have considerable force, when they refer to the decision in Collector of Central Excise Vs. 39. The petitioners have considerable force, when they refer to the decision in Collector of Central Excise Vs. Himalayan Cooperative Milk Product Union Ltd., reported in (2000) 8 SCC 642 , and point out that the notifications, by which exemptions or other benefits are provided by a Government in exercise of its statutory power, have some purpose and policy decision behind them inasmuch as such benefits are meant to be provided to the investors and manufacturers and, hence, the purpose, embodied in such a notification, cannot be defeated nor can those, who may be entitled to a benefit under such notification, be denied the advantage, by insisting upon an interpretation, which is contrary to the object with which the scheme of exemption has been notified. This principle has been well described by the Supreme Court, in Collector of Central Excise Vs. Himalayan Cooperative Milk Product Union Ltd., reported in (2000) 8 SCC 642 , in the following words: "8. Such notifications by which exemption or other benefits are provided by the Government in exercise of its statutory power, normally have some purpose and policy decision behind it. Such benefits are meant to be provided to the investors and manufacturers. Therefore, such purpose is not to be defeated nor those who may be entitled to it are to be deprived by interpreting the notification which may give it some meaning other than what is clearly and plainly flowing from it." 40. It is, perhaps, necessary to bear in mind that the provisions of a fiscal statute or notification, which seek to grant a benefit to an assessee, ought to be differently interpreted at different stages. When a question arises as to whether a subject falls within ambit of a notification or not or whether a subject falls in the exemption clause or not, then, such exemption, being in the nature of exception, must be construed strictly; but once ambiguity or doubt as regards applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification, then, full play should be given to it and, for this purpose, such exemption has to be liberally construed. This principle has been highlighted in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. state of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 642 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "12. Literally, 'exemption' is freedom from liability, tax or duty. This principle has been highlighted in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. state of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 642 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "12. Literally, 'exemption' is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden of progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principle required to be construed strictly. Truly speaking, liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision is to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in the nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction." 41. The only role, therefore, which the IAC has been left with, after the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, has come into force, is that the IAC shall examine whether the manufacturer has really invested the money or not in terms of the withdrawal application, which the manufacturer had made to the jurisdictional Commissioner. For this purpose, whatever data, particulars or other materials are required, the same can be sought for by the IAC. The IAC may, perhaps, issue necessary guidelines to the manufacturers, in advance, as to what documents or papers it would look into for the purpose of satisfying itself that an' investment' has been really made in terms of the permission granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner or as to what methodology it would adopt to determine if the ' investment', as claimed by the manufacturer, has been made at all or not. It cannot, however, issue guidelines to the jurisdictional Commissioner as to what kind of projects the jurisdictional Commissioner shall consider fit to grant permission for withdrawal, for, it is, now, for the jurisdictional Commissioner to decide as to when he would permit withdrawal from the Escrow Account. It cannot, however, issue guidelines to the jurisdictional Commissioner as to what kind of projects the jurisdictional Commissioner shall consider fit to grant permission for withdrawal, for, it is, now, for the jurisdictional Commissioner to decide as to when he would permit withdrawal from the Escrow Account. The jurisdictional Commissioner derives this authority from the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, and not from the I AC. The I AC cannot, therefore, abridge or restrict his authority nor can the LAC interfere with his authority. 42. As observed above, the IAC enters into the picture, on the amendment of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, by the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, only and only after a manufacturer has already made an 'investment' in terms of his withdrawal application, made to, and allowed by, a jurisdictional Commissioner. No wonder, therefore, that the substituted Condition (D), now, reads as under: " The manufacturer shall, - (i) submit a quarterly statement, within sixty days from the end of the relevant quarter to a Committee, consisting of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary in the Department of Industry of the State concerned in which the unit is located and the Principal Secretary in the Department of Industry of the State in which the 'investment' is being made, giving details of deposits made in and with drawal made from, the Escrow Account, along with details of 'investment', made during the quarter; (ii) provide all details relating to the 'investment' made in terms of condition (B), not later than one month after the expiry of the period of two years referred to in condition (C), to the said Committee; (iii) prove to the satisfaction of the said Committee that the 'investment' has been made for the purposes specified in condition (B)." 43. A careful reading of condition (D) shows that a manufacturer is required to submit a quarterly statement to the IAC within sixty days from the end of the relevant quarter, giving the 'details of deposits' made in, and withdrawal made from, the Escrow Account along with the 'details of investment'. which the manufacturer may have made during the quarter. A careful reading of condition (D) shows that a manufacturer is required to submit a quarterly statement to the IAC within sixty days from the end of the relevant quarter, giving the 'details of deposits' made in, and withdrawal made from, the Escrow Account along with the 'details of investment'. which the manufacturer may have made during the quarter. The details of' investment', which a manufacturer is required to submit, under sub-Clause (i) of condition (D), is provisional in nature inasmuch as sub-Clause (ii) of condition (D) shows that a manufacturer has the duty to provide all details to the IAC, relating to the 'investment' made in terms of condition (B), not later than one month after the expiry of the period of two years referred to in condition (C). This, in turn, shows that while submitting quarterly statement, the manufacturer is required to furnish to the I AC not only the details of the deposits made in, and withdrawals made from, the Escrow Account, but also the details of the 'investment' already made during the quarter. Thus, a manufacturer owes a duty to the IAC to provide all details relating to the 'investment' made within a period of one month after the expiry of the period of two years, within which the amount, withdrawn from the Escrow Account, has to be invested in terms of sub-Clause (iv) of condition (C). 44. To put it a little differently, it is the 'details of investment' already made by a manufacturer, which the manufacturer is, now, required to submit to the IAC, meaning thereby that having withdrawn, from the Escrow Account, with the permission of the jurisdictional Commissioner, an amount for the purpose of making an investment on a project, which the jurisdictional Commissioner has permitted, and, having 'invested' such an amount on the project, so permitted, the manufacturer is, now, required to submit the details of the investment, already made by him, to the IAC and the lAC's role, now, is to examine the 'details of investment' and, if the investment has really been made on the project, in respect whereof, permission by the jurisdictional Commissioner was granted, then, such investment has to be certified by the IAC and, to the extent, so certified, the liability of the manufacturer to make payment of excise duty, etc., would stand discharged. Obviously, when the I AC comes into picture after the investment has already been made, and when the scheme envisages a specific role of the jurisdictional Commissioner in the matter of initial scrutiny of the project, on which investment is sought to be made by a manufacturer, the question of the I AC granting any prior approval for such a project for the purpose of enabling the jurisdictional Commissioner to allow withdrawal from Escrow Account would be alien to the scheme of investment, which the Notification, dated 09-07-2004, envisages. In fact, such a prior sanction of the project by the IAC would amount to usurpation of the power, which stands vested in and exercisable by, the jurisdictional Commissioner. Had the role of the jurisdictional Commissioner, under the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, remained confined to only ensuring or safeguarding the interest of revenue, the contention, raised on behalf of the respondents, that the IAC has a role to play in the matter of even initial scrutiny of a project, would have had some substance; but when the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, requires, under condition (C) (ii), that the jurisdictional Commissioner shall, while allowing withdrawal from the Escrow Account, take into account the conditions, specified in the Notification, and also safeguard the interest of revenue, the question of the jurisdictional Commissioner being merely an executor of the decision of the IAC does not arise at all. In short, and to be more specific, the scheme, embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, envisages no role for the IAC until the time investment has already been made. When such is not the scheme of the Notification, the I AC cannot usurp the power, which stands vested in, and exercisable by. the jurisdictional Commissioner. 45. The circumstances and conditions as to when a manufacturer would be discharged from his liability to pay excise duty, or additional duty of excise, or as to when an amount, withdrawn from a manufacturer's Escrow Account, can be recovered from him by way of recovery proceeding, as contemplated under the Central Government Excise Act, 1944, or by forfeiture of the amount, lying in the Escrow Account, stand embodied in Condition (E) and (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. Let me. now, examine as to how the scheme of 'forfeiture' embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, differs from the scheme, if any, of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. Let me. now, examine as to how the scheme of 'forfeiture' embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, differs from the scheme, if any, of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. conditions (E) and (EA) of the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004. read as under: "(E) If the Committee referred to in condition (D) is satisfied that the 'investment' as specified in condition (B), has been made, it shall issue a certificate to this effect to the manufacturer within a period of one month from the receipt of the details as referred to in condition (D), and on the issuance of which, the liability of the manufacturer shall stand discharged to the extent of 'investments' so certified; (EA) If the manufacturer fails to make the deposit or does not invest the amount specified in condition (B), within the stipulated period and in the manner, then, the duty which is equivalent to the amount not so deposited or invested shall be recoverable from the manufacture along with interest thereon at the rate specified under section 11AB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and without prejudice to any action that may be taken under the provisions of the said Act or any other law for the time being in force, by forfeiture of amount in the said Escrow Account." 46. As against what the Conditions (E) and (EA) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. now, lay down. Condition (E) and (F) of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read as under: "(E) if the Committee referred to in condition (D) is satisfied that the 'investment' as specified in condition (B), has been made, it shall issue a certificate to this effect to the manufacturer within a period of three weeks after the expiry of the one month referred to in condition (D), which shall be produced by the manufacturer, within a period of two weeks from the date of issue of such certificate, to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer" 47. How the provisions, as embodied in Conditions (E) and (EA). differ from what stood embodied in the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, is extremely important to. now, analyse and bear in mind in order to resolve the controversy, which the present writ petition has raised. 48. A microscopic reading of condition (E) of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. vis-a-vis Conditions (E) and (EA) of the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004. differ from what stood embodied in the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, is extremely important to. now, analyse and bear in mind in order to resolve the controversy, which the present writ petition has raised. 48. A microscopic reading of condition (E) of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. vis-a-vis Conditions (E) and (EA) of the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004. shows that under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, the IAC was required to issue a certificate to the manufacturer if it was satisfied that the manufacturer had made' investment' in 'plant and machinery', or in 'infrastructure', or in 'civil works', or in any 'social project' in terms of condition (B). The certificate was to be issued within a period of three weeks after the expiry of the period of one month from the date, when the manufacturer submitted, in terms of condition (D) of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, details of the 'investments' already made, to the I AC. Thus, under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. not only the manufacturer was required to provide the details of the 'investment', already made by him. within a prescribed period, but even the IAC was required to issue certificate to the manufacturer within the prescribed period of three weeks, as aforesaid. 49. What is, now, of great significance to note is that under condition (E) to the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, if the IAC were satisfied that 'investment' had been made by a manufacturer in terms of Condition (B) of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, the IAC was duty bound to issue an 'Investment Certificate' to the manufacturer, in this regard, within the prescribed period of three weeks and the manufacturer too was, then, required to produce the certificate before the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within the prescribed period of two weeks from the date of issue of such certificate. 50. Thus, while the IAC had the obligation to issue requisite certificate to a manufacturer, within a prescribed period of time, if it were satisfied with the correctness of the details of the 'investment' submitted to it by a manufacturer, the manufacturer too had, at the same time, the obligation to produce the certificate, so issued by the IAC, to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within a specified period. As against this requirement to produce certificate, popularly known as 'Investment Certificate', by a manufacturer, to the jurisdictional Commissioner, Condition (E) of the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, has done away with the requirement of production of the certificate by the manufacturer to the jurisdictional Commissioner and, instead thereof, Condition (E). now, lays down that on the issuance of the certificate, the liability of the manufacturer shall stand discharged to the extent the 'investment' is certified by the IAC. 51. Thus, under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, while the IAC had the obligation to issue certificate within the prescribed period, the liability of the manufacturer to produce the certificate arose only and only when the certificate was issued. Consequently, when the IAC failed to either issue certificate, or reject the 'investment' as not certifiable, within the prescribed period, no obligation was cast on the manufacturer to produce such a 'non-existent' certificate to the jurisdictional Commissioner. The later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, has, now, done away with the requirement of production of certificate by the manufacturer to the jurisdictional Commissioner. This provision had to be, obviously, made, because of the reason that the manufacturer had no authority to force the IAC to grant a certificate and his onus was only to produce the certificate before the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within two weeks from the date of issue of the certificate. If the IAC failed, within the prescribed period, in discharging its duty to either grant certificate, or reject the 'investment', already made by the manufacturer, as not certifiable, the onus would not have shifted to the manufacturer to produce an 'Investment Certificate', which was neither issued nor refused to be issued. I fail to understand as to how the manufacturer could have been, in the past, made liable for the failure, on the part of the IAC, to certify, within the prescribed period, an 'investment' as an "investment' made within the scheme of exemption embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, or, to take a decision, within the prescribed period, to reject the 'investment', made by the manufacturer, as an investment not fit to be certified. 52. 52. The entire emphasis of the contesting respondent, namely, respondent No. 2, for the purpose of justifying his action of issuance of show cause notices as well as appropriation of various amounts from the Escrow Accounts rests on the plea that since the petitioners, as manufacturers, had failed to produce the 'Investment Certificate' within the prescribed period, the respondent No. 2 was obliged, under the law, to recover the amount as an amount not certified by the 1AC. In the face of the scheme, as stood embodied in Condition (E) of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, such construction is rationally impossible to be put on the scheme of exemption. 53. Realizing that it was meaningless to in-sist on the production of certificate by a manufacturer before the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer, the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004, as pointed out above, has done away with the requirement of such production of 'Investment Certificate' by the manufacturer. 54. What transpires to be, now the scheme of exemption (as discussed above), is that the IAC is still required to issue certificate within the prescribed period, if it is satisfied with the correctness of 'investment', made by a manufacturer: but there is no obligation, now, on the part of the manufacturer to produce any such certificate to the jurisdictional Commissioner, who. as an authority, has come into the picture only under the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004. What the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, now, provides is that the liability of the manufacturer to pay excise duty, or additional duty of excise, etc., shall stand discharged only when an 'Investment Certificate' is issued by the IAC, and the discharge of liability would be to the extent as the 1AC may certify. 55. In the absence of rejection of the 'investment' by the LAC, no recovery, under the provisions of the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, was possible. Similarly, in the absence of rejection to certify an 'investment' by the IAC. no recovery of excise duty, or additional duty of excise, etc.. from a manufacturer is possible even under the provisions of the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004. What is, however, of importance to note is that there was no specific provision under the earlier Notification, dated 21.07.2004, with regard to recovery of duty, if the manufacturer's investment is refused to be certified by the LAC. from a manufacturer is possible even under the provisions of the subsequent Notification, dated 09.07.2004. What is, however, of importance to note is that there was no specific provision under the earlier Notification, dated 21.07.2004, with regard to recovery of duty, if the manufacturer's investment is refused to be certified by the LAC. Obviously, in such a case, the excise authorities were required to take resort to, and rely upon, the scheme of recovery as embodied under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Under the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, a scheme of 'forfeiture' of such dues has been made, and this power of 'forfeiture' is in addition to the power of 'recovery', which an authority can resort to under Section 11 A. Let me, therefore, analyse the scheme of 'forfeiture' as embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. 56. Let me, now, turn to Condition (EA) of the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004. What Condition (EA) has done is that it has made it possible for the excise authorities to recover an amount, which has been refused to be certified by the I AC, by resorting to 'forfeiture' of such an amount from the total amounts, lying in the Escrow Account, instead of the procedure of recovery, which is embodied under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. In fact, a patient reading of the provisions, contained in Condition (EA), shows that the jurisdictional Commissioner has, now, two alternative courses available to him, namely, (i) he can proceed to 'recover', by taking resort to the provisions contained in the Central Excise Act, 1944, an amount, which the I AC has refused to certify as an 'investment' made within the meaning of the scheme of the Notification, or (ii) he can 'forfeit' the amount to the extent not certified by the IAC, if such amount is lying in the Escrow Account of the manufacturer concerned. 57. What is. now, of utmost importance to note is that the power of the jurisdictional Commissioner to recover the amount, by way of any of the two alternative procedures aforementioned, becomes exercisable only and only when the manufacturer fails to make deposit of the excise duty, or additional duty of excise, etc., which is payable by him. 57. What is. now, of utmost importance to note is that the power of the jurisdictional Commissioner to recover the amount, by way of any of the two alternative procedures aforementioned, becomes exercisable only and only when the manufacturer fails to make deposit of the excise duty, or additional duty of excise, etc., which is payable by him. and does not, at the same time, invest the amount payable by him in any of the four categories of allowable 'investments', namely, 'investment' in 'plant and machinery', or in 'infrastructure', or in "civil works', or in any 'social project' in any of the seven States, which Condition (B) refers to. The jurisdictional Commissioner, therefore, must be satisfied, before he resorts to his power of 'forfeiture', as embodied in Condition (EA), that the manufacturer has either failed to make deposit of the duty, payable by him. or that the manufacturer, having withdrawn a specified amount of money from its Escrow Account, has not invested the amount in any of the projects as had been permitted by the jurisdictional Commissioner. Even the jurisdictional Commissioner, having permitted withdrawal of a given amount of money from the Escrow Account of a manufacturer, cannot, after the investment has already been made, re-examine if the investment was for a purpose, which is allowable under Condition (B). Such examination, as already mentioned above, has to be before the permission for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account is granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner and not after the permission has been granted. 58. It is, therefore, wholly incorrect to contend, as is being contended by the respondents, that on the failure of the petitioners, as manufacturers, to produce, within the prescribed, requisite 'investment certificate" from the IAC. with regard to the 'investment' already made by them under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004. respondent No. 2 automatically acquired the power and authority, under the law, to reali/e the amount, as the amount of excise duty payable by the petitioners. 59. The contention of the respondent No. 2, therefore, that under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, the failure, on the part of the manufacturer, to furnish, to the jurisdictional Commissioner, 'investment certificate', within the prescribed period, will ipso facto make the amount, in respect whereof, no 'investment' certificate is produced by the manufacturer, liable to be recovered from the manufacturer is not at all an acceptable proposition. In fact, this proposition is ex facie not in consonance with the scheme of the notifications, in question. If the failure of the manufacturer to furnish to the jurisdictional Commissioner requisite 'investment certificate' within the prescribed period (even when the IAC has not taken any decision on the question as to whether 'investment certificate' shall or shall not be issued, in a given case), is treated by itself sufficient to start necessary proceeding for 'recovery' or 'forfeiture', there is no reason as to why similar standard and same logic be not applied to the IAC itself in the sense that, when the I AC fails to take a decision, on the question of issuance of certificate, within the prescribed period, it be treated as if the I AC has issued the certificate. In the absence of any provision in the notification, dated 21.01.2004, allowing such a presumption to be raised, either in favour of the revenue authorities or against them, raising of such a presumption would be wholly untenable in law. 60. It cannot, therefore, be accepted as correct proposition that even when the IAC does not take any decision at all on the question as to whether requisite' investment' certificate shall or shall not be granted in a given case, the manufacturer shall become liable to pay the amount in respect whereof, the IAC has taken no decision at all. In fact, the conditions of recovery are clear and explicit. The condition precedent for making recovery from a manufacturer of an amount, under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, was subject to this condition: When the manufacturer did not deposit at all the duty, which he sought to receive as exemption on the basis of an investment, which he claimed to have made on any of the projects allowable under the said Notification, but the I AC either did not accept that the investment had been made or when the I AC refused to certify an investment on the ground that the investment, though made, was not covered by the scheme of exemption as allowable under the Notification, dated 21,01.2004. In the case of later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, the situation is, however, quite different. In the case of later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, the situation is, however, quite different. In this regard, it needs to be pointed out that an amount, which a manufacturer is, now, liable to pay as excise duty or additional duty of excise, etc, cannot be simply withheld by the manufacturer; what he has to do is that he shall deposit the amount, which he seeks to claim as exemption, in the Escrow Accounts, which he is required to open in terms of the later Notification, dated 09-04-2004, and, then, on withdrawing the amount from the Escrow Account with permission from the jurisdictional Commissioner, for the purpose of making investment on any of the four categories of projects as specified in condition (B) of the notification, he has to invest such an amount on the project for which he has so withdrawn the amount and it is only after making such an' investment', he has to seek a certificate from the I AC that he has made the 'investment' in terms of the permission as granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner and is entitled, therefore, to the refund of the amount invested by him. If the IAC finds that the 'investment' has been made in terms of the permission, granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner, it is the duty of the 1AC to issue requisite 'Investment Certificate". If the certificate is granted, the manufacturer becomes entitled to exemption, but the amount, so granted as exemption, would be refundable to him after ten years from the date of making of the 'investment'. 61. If the certificate is granted, the manufacturer becomes entitled to exemption, but the amount, so granted as exemption, would be refundable to him after ten years from the date of making of the 'investment'. 61. I may hasten to point out here that under the scheme of the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, when the jurisdictional Commissioner gives permission for withdrawal of an amount, from the Escrow Account, for the purpose of making 'investment' on a project, such withdrawal will, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, be deemed to be a withdrawal made for a project allowable under the Notification and, after making investment of the withdrawn amount, when the manufacturer gives the 'details of investment' to the I AC, the I AC cannot go behind the permission and determine, once again, whether the permission had been granted rightly or not, for, an order, passed by the jurisdictional Commissioner, permitting withdrawal of money from Escrow Account would be deemed to be an order passed by the Central Government and such an order would not only be binding on the Central Government, but also on the IAC, particularly, when the IAC does not come into picture at all at the lime, when the permission is granted and its (lAC's) role really starts after an investment already stands made. What the IAC would do, in such a case, is merely examine and satisfy itself that the investment has, as a matter of fact, been made and it has been made on the project for which the permission was obtained by the manufacturer from the jurisdictional Commissioner. 62. Logically, therefore, it follows that recovery from a manufacturer of an amount due is possible, under the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, only when the manufacturer either does not make 'investment' of an amount, which he has withdrawn from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making investment or when the IAC refuses to grant certificate on the ground that the 'investment', in terms of the permission granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner, has not been made. In the absence of any of the said two conditions being satisfied and a clear finding having been reached, in this regard, by the jurisdictional Commissioner, it is impossible to recover the amount, which the manufacturer may have claimed as exemption. In the absence of any of the said two conditions being satisfied and a clear finding having been reached, in this regard, by the jurisdictional Commissioner, it is impossible to recover the amount, which the manufacturer may have claimed as exemption. It, therefore, becomes necessary for the recovering authority, such as, the jurisdictional Commissioner to become satisfied, before commencing the proceedings for 'recovery' or 'forfeiture', as the case may be, that either the manufacturer has not deposited at all, in the Escrow Account, the amount, which he has claimed as an 'investment' made under the scheme, or though, having deposited and withdrawn the amount, he has not invested the amount, on the project for which the amount was withdrawn and the IAC has, therefore, refused to certify the 'investment' as an 'investment' within the scheme of the notification. Thus, when a jurisdictional Commissioner cannot recover any amount as duty payable without such satisfaction having been arrived at by him and a clear finding having been reached, in this regard, as mentioned hereinbefore, it logically follows that the jurisdictional Commissioner has to give a notice to the manufacturer (before he orders 'recovery' of the amount or 'forfeiture' of such an amount from the amounts lying in the Escrow Accounts) directing the manufacturer to show cause, if any, as to why the amount, which the IAC has refused to certify, be not recovered from him or be not forfeited from the amounts lying in the Escrow Account. 63. In view of the fact that a recovery or forfeiture of the amount, which is alleged to have not been deposited or invested, entails civil consequences, it logically follows that the recovery and/or forfeiture, as the case may be, must precede by, at least, a notice to show cause. Without giving any opportunity to a manufacturer, in this regard, to have his say in the matter, any recovery or forfeiture made cannot, but be interfered with by a High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 inasmuch as such recovery or forfeiture would be in complete disregard of the principles of natural justice, which, in such a case, must be adhered to by the authority making the recovery or ordering forfeiture. 64. 64. There can be no dispute and there is, in fact, no dispute that even when there is no specific provision, in a given statute or the rules, requiring giving of notice to show cause to the person against whom an order is proposed to be made, particularly, when such order is likely to adversely affect the rights of the individual, against whom the order is proposed to be made, a duty is case upon the authority, who proposes to pass such order, or is required to pass such an order, to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard before the order involving civil consequences is made. It does not matter really as to whether the authority exercising such a power is a judicial Tribunal or not. So long as a person is vested with the authority to adjudicate upon the matters involving civil consequences, it is implicit in such duty to act fairly and fairness demands that the person, who is likely to suffer civil consequences, be given an opportunity of having his say in the matter. Insisting upon the observance of this principle of law, the Apex Court, in State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. [AIR 1967' SC 1269], held as follows: "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed, it need not be shown to be super added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." 65. In The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." 65. In The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India & Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981 , while dealing with the question as to how the authorities concerned ought to have had proceeded to determine the correct amount of import duty chargeable, the Apex Court has pointed out that such a function is quasi-judicial function and the authority, passing such an order, must record its reasons in support of the order, which it makes. The Apex Court has emphasised that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. The relevant observations, made, in this regard, in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. (supra), read as follows: "Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M.Desai vs. The Test eels Ltd. and Anr. C.A. 245 of 1970 decided on 17th December, 1975. But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law." 66. Obviously, the reasons have to precede the decision and it cannot be that after a decision is already reached, reasons are sought to be given. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law." 66. Obviously, the reasons have to precede the decision and it cannot be that after a decision is already reached, reasons are sought to be given. In the present case, respondent No.2, having already appropriated the amounts, in question, from the Escrow Accounts, on the directions of his superior officer, merely passed an order, long after such appropriations had already been made, in the shape of formally rejecting the contentions raised by the petitioners against the notices to show cause given to them as regards recovery of the demanded amount under Section 11A read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The passing of the orders, on 18.01.2008, affirming the notices of demand, (subsequent to the appropriation of money from Escrow Accounts) was nothing but a mere formality. An action, which had such serious consequences as deduction of amount from Escrow Account, could not have been taken without appropriate notices having been given, in this regard, to the petitioners concerned and without assigning justifiable reasons therefor. Thus, appropriation of the amounts by way of 'forfeiture' without giving notice and also the order, dated 18.01.2008. affirming the notices of demand, as aforesaid, were nothing, but arbitrary decisions and orders and cannot, therefore, be sustained in law. 67. It needs to be pointed out that though Condition (EA) of the later notification, dated 09.07.2004, empowers a jurisdictional Commissioner to 'forfeit' the amount lying in the Escrow Account to the extent to which the investment has not been certified by the IAC, Condition (EA) does not lay down the procedure to be followed. The procedure, therefore, has to be a procedure, which embodies the principles of natural justice. Ideally, therefore, the procedure for making forfeiture, in a case of this nature, shall be same as the one, which is envisaged under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Apart from the fact that Section 11 can be invoked by an officer, who has been empowered to make recovery by the Central Excise and Customs Board, Section 11 deals with a situation, where the dues have been determined and the amount, so determined, becomes payable as due; whereas Section 11A comes into play, when no formal determination of the liability has been made. It is for this reason that Section 11A specifically mentions that notice to show cause has to be given before recovery of the unpaid dues is made. If a manufacturer, under Scheme of the earlier notification, dated 21.01.2004, does not produce requisite certificate within the prescribed period, he has to be given notice and it is only when the jurisdictional Commissioner is satisfied, after giving such a notice, that the 'investment', made by the manufacturer, has been rejected by the IAC as a not certifiable investment, can he order recovery, for, the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, is prospective in nature and, consequently, the power of 'forfeiture', which the latter Notification gives to the jurisdictional Commissioner, cannot be invoked in respect of the duty payable during pre-Escrow Account period. As against this scheme of recovery, envisaged under the earlier Notification, dated 21.01.2004, the later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, envisages that if, on coming into force of the scheme of Escrow Account, the manufacturer has not deposited in the Escrow Account, the duty, which was payable by him, or, when the manufacturer's investment has been refused to be certified by the I AC, the jurisdictional Commissioner acquires the power to either recover the amount by taking resort to a procedure of recovery, as indicated hereinbefore, or by forfeiting the amount, to the extent to which the amount has been refused to be certified by the IAC, from the amounts lying in the Escrow Account. In either case, however, even under the later Notification, notice to show cause has to precede such an action of 'recovery', or of 'forfeiture' as the case may be. A clear finding has to be, therefore, reached by the jurisdictional Commissioner, in this regard, in order to enable him to recover the amount by way of forfeiture or otherwise. 68. The provisions for forfeiture, as contained in Condition (EA), can be resorted to only when there is a clear finding recorded by the jurisdictional Commissioner that the I AC has refused to certify an 'investment', which a manufacturer claims to have been made by him after having withdrawn money from the Escrow Account with the permission of the jurisdictional Commissioner. In the absence of a clear satisfaction reached by a jurisdictional Commissioner in this regard, no question of 'forfeiture' or of'recovery' from the manufacturer arises. 69. In the absence of a clear satisfaction reached by a jurisdictional Commissioner in this regard, no question of 'forfeiture' or of'recovery' from the manufacturer arises. 69. In the present case, notices to show cause were given to the petitioners seeking to make recovery of the amounts mentioned therein on the ground that the petitioners had not, within the prescribed period, produced the 'investment' certificate. Clearly, therefore, without a clear finding having been reached, by the respondent No. 2, that the amounts, claimed as investments made, have been refused to be certified by the IAC, no recovery from the petitioners was legally possible. This apart, the petitioners submitted their replies to the said show cause notices. Without considering their replies and without determination of the correctness of the explanation, which had been offered by the petitioners in their said replies, respondent No. 2 abandoned the procedure, which he had commenced under Section 11 A. What respondent No. 2 did, instead, is that he got the amounts, mentioned in the show cause notices, transferred from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners towards payment of the excise duty. The act of abandoning the procedure of recovery, which had already been commenced, and the act of getting the amounts, covered by the said notices of recovery, transferred from the Escrow Account towards payment of excise duty was wholly illegal inasmuch as no notice was, admittedly, given to the petitioners to show cause as to why the amount, in question, be not forfeited. Curiously enough, the defence of respondent No. 2, in this regard, is: when the recovery proceedings were pending pursuant to the notices to show cause having been issued under Section 11 A, he had brought the matter to the notice of Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, who, in turn, ordered that notwithstanding the notices to show cause, which had already been issued under Section 11, amounts, covered by the said notices, shall be 'forfeited' from the Escrow Account and, on being so ordered by the Chief Commissioner to recover the amount by 'forfeiture', he (respondent No. 2), being a subordinate officer, merely carried out the directions of the Chief Commissioner. Such abdication of the authority is, to say the least, wholly impermissible and intolerable in a Court of law. Such abdication of the authority is, to say the least, wholly impermissible and intolerable in a Court of law. The act of forfeiture was an act, which had serious civil consequence on the petitioners and, in such a case, the act was quasi-judicial in nature. The respondent No. 2 could not have, therefore, acted upon the directions of his superior and ought to have, in the light of the law as discussed above, determined for himself the liability of the petitioners by giving appropriate notice or notices to the petitioners to have their say in the matter. 70. Above all, the petitioners have boldly asserted that the IAC has not passed any order rejecting their 'investments' as investments not made under the scheme of the notification. Though a vague and half-hearted attempt has been made by the respondent No. 2 to contend, during the course of hearing, that the IAC had rejected the petitioners' request for issuance of 'investment certificate", not even an iota of material has been placed on record to show that the IAC had consciously refused to issue 'investment certificate' to the petitioners before the impugned action of 'forfeiture' were taken. Imperative it is to point out that it is no more res integra that in a writ petition and/or counter affidavit, filed in a writ petition, if the facts are not pleaded or the evidence, in support of such facts, is not annexed to the pleadings, the Court will not entertain the point. The Apex Court has clearly held, in Bharat Singh Vs. The state of Haryana, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 , that there is a distinction between the pleadings under the writ petition/affidavit and plaint and that while in a pleading, that is, in a plaint or a written statement, facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or a counter affidavit, not only that facts have to be pleaded, but also evidence in proof of such facts are to be annexed thereto. Clearly, therefore, in the absence of any proof that the 'forfeiture' had preceded rejection of the petitioners' claim for issuance of'investment certificate', there can be no escape from the conclusion that the impugned actions of 'forfeiture' were not valid and cannot be sustained. 71. I may also pause here to point out that the notification, dated 09.07.2004. Clearly, therefore, in the absence of any proof that the 'forfeiture' had preceded rejection of the petitioners' claim for issuance of'investment certificate', there can be no escape from the conclusion that the impugned actions of 'forfeiture' were not valid and cannot be sustained. 71. I may also pause here to point out that the notification, dated 09.07.2004. is prospective in nature and cannot be retrospectively applied inasmuch as it is only on coming into force of the notification, dated 09.07.2004, that the Escrow Account is required to be opened and, upon opening of the Escrow Account only, a manufacturer becomes liable to deposit in the Escrow Account such sum, which he seeks to claim as exemption. After depositing the amount, the manufacturer has to apply to the jurisdictional Commissioner for permission to withdraw such amount as the manufacturer intends to invest in one of the four categories of projects mentioned in Condition (B). Without such permission, no amount, lying in the Escrow Account, can be withdrawn by the manufacturer. 72. It, therefore, follows that the mechanism of 'recovery' or 'forfeiture' from the Escrow Account can be availed of by a jurisdictional Commissioner only in respect of such amounts, which may become due after 09.07.2004 inasmuch as 'recovery' or 'forfeiture' from the amounts, lying in Escrow Accounts, is possible only when, after coming into force of the Condition (EA), a manufacturer, who intends to claim an amount as exemption, does not deposit the amount in Escrow Account or who, having withdrawn the money as aforesaid, has, according to the IAC, not invested in terms of the permission granted. Necessarily, therefore, no 'forfeiture' of an amount, under condition (EA), is, if I may reiterate, possible in respect of an amount, which may be claimed as due during the period, when the Escrow Account did not exist. 73. In the present case, respondent No. 2 claims that he had eventually, i.e., on 18.01.2008. confirmed the notices of demand, which had been issued to the petitioners. This confirmation is, as rightly contended by the petitioners, nothing but an act of post confirmation of an action, which had already been taken. 73. In the present case, respondent No. 2 claims that he had eventually, i.e., on 18.01.2008. confirmed the notices of demand, which had been issued to the petitioners. This confirmation is, as rightly contended by the petitioners, nothing but an act of post confirmation of an action, which had already been taken. The order confirming recovery, made by the respondent No. 2, is like placing a cart before the horse inasmuch as after having already recovered the amount by way of 'forfeiture' and that too, without giving to the petitioners any notice in this regard, the respondent No. 2 passed merely a formal order confirming the demands raised by him; such a procedure is against all canons of justice and the rule of law. 74. It needs to be emphasized that demand of tax and/or security is a quasi-judicial act and has to be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner in strict compliance of the provisions of the relevant statute. Tax and/or security cannot be demanded and/or collected by an authority without complying with the provisions of the relevant statute. No authority, superior to an assessing authority, can interfere with the quasi-judicial functions of an assessing authority by issuing administrative directions. The Apex Court has, in Orient Paper Mills Ltd Vs. Union of India, (1969) SC 48, made the position of law, in this regard, clear in the following words: "If the power exercised by the Collector was a quasi Judicial power, as we hold it to be. that power cannot be controlled by the directions issued by the Board. No authority, however high placed, can control the decision of a Judicial or a quasi judicial authority. That is the essence of our judicial system. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Board to issue directions to the assessing authorities or the appellate authorities in the matter of deciding disputes between the persons who are called upon to pay duty and the department. It is true that the assessing authorities as well as the appellate authorities are judge in their own cause; yet when they are called upon to decide disputes arising under Act, they must act independently and impartially. They cannot be said to act independently if their judgment is controlled by the directions given by others". (Emphasis supplied) 75. It is true that the assessing authorities as well as the appellate authorities are judge in their own cause; yet when they are called upon to decide disputes arising under Act, they must act independently and impartially. They cannot be said to act independently if their judgment is controlled by the directions given by others". (Emphasis supplied) 75. Guided by the Apex Court's decision in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. (supra), one can safely hold that an order of 'forfeiture' of money lying in Escrow Account, under the scheme of the notifications aforementioned, is an exercise of quasi judicial power. Consequently, the IAC or, for that matter, any other authority, cannot interfere with the function of the jurisdictional Commissioner in matters relating to forfeiture and, on the direction of any superior authority howsoever high, no jurisdictional Commissioner can pass an order of forfeiture under the said scheme except after giving notice to the manufacturer, who, as a person, is likely to be affected adversely by such an act of forfeiture. A jurisdictional Commissioner cannot be said to have acted independently if his decision is controlled by the direction given by others. Viewed thus, it is clear that the jurisdictional Commissioner could not have, in the present case, directed 'forfeiture' of the amounts aforementioned lying in the petitioners' Escrow Account merely because he had been directed by the Chief Commissioner to do so and that too, without giving notice to the petitioners providing them with opportunity of their showing cause against proposed action of 'forfeiture'. Formalizing the act of 'forfeiture' by subsequently making a formal order confirming the demands raised by the jurisdictional Commissioner, in the manner as has been done in the present case, cannot stand scrutiny of law and do call for interference. 76. It is well established principle of law that if law vests a particular authority with a power or assigns a specific role to him, such an authority has to exercise such power and discharge his function not according to the instructions or orders of his superior authority, but according to his conscious application of mind. This principle of law is well discernible from the case of Mahadayal Premchandra Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta & Anr. This principle of law is well discernible from the case of Mahadayal Premchandra Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta & Anr. reported in 1959 SCR 551 , wherein a Constitution Bench, while dealing with an order of Commercial Tax Officer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, observed and held as under: "From the detailed narration of the facts regarding this particular assessment it is quite clear that the first respondent did not exercise his own judgment in the matter of the assessment in question. Even though he was convinced to the contrary, he asked for the instructions of the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) and followed the same and assessed the appellants to sales-tax in respect of the disputed transactions. The order which he ultimately passed on January 15, 1955, further showed that he was merely voicing the opinion of the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) without any conviction of his own and the only thing he had to say in regard to the various grounds mentioned in the letters dated November 21, 1953, and June 19, 1954, was that they appeared to him to be "not at all satisfactory". This was hardly a satisfactory way of dealing with the matter. If the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) had been dealing with the same he could have by all means given in the assessment order which he made his reasons for doing so and these reasons would have been open to scrutiny in further proceedings taken by the appellants either by way of appeal or otherwise. The Assistant Commissioner (C.S.), however, had delegated this work of assessment to the first respondent and then it was the duty of the first respondent to make the assessment order giving his own reasons for doing so. The file of the assessee, however, shows that even though the 1st respondent was satisfied on the materials placed by the appellants and their representative before him that the appellants were not liable to pay sales-tax in regard to these transactions, he referred the matter first for instructions and then for obtaining the "valued opinion" of his superior, the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) and the latter expressed his opinion that the appellants were liable in respect of these transactions. All this was done behind the back of the appellants and the appellants had no opportunity of meeting the point of view which had been adopted by the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) and the first respondent quietly followed these instructions and advice of the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.). We are really surprised at the manner in which the first respondent dealt with the matter of this assessment. It is clear that he did not exercise his own judgment in the matter and faithfully followed the instructions conveyed to him by the Assistant Commissioner (C.S.) without giving the appellants an opportunity to meet the points urged against them. The whole procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice. The procedure adopted was, to say the least, unfair and was calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the impartial and fair administration of the sales-tax Department concerned. We would have simply, on this ground, set aside the assessment order made by the first respondent and remanded the matter back to him for his due consideration in accordance with law; but as the matter is old and a remand would lead to unnecessary harassment of the appellants, we have preferred to deal with the appeal on merits [Para [Para [Para ." (Emphasis is added) 77. In the present case too, same as in Mahadayal Premchandra (supra), respondent No.2 did not apply his own mind to the notices of demand issued by him to the petitioners nor did he apply his own independent mind to the question as to whether he shall or shall not cause 'forfeiture' of the said amounts. What the respondent No.2 did was to faithfully carry out the instructions conveyed to him by his superior authority, namely, Chief Commissioner of Excise and, that too, without giving any opportunity of even showing cause to the petitioners against whom the action of 'forfeiture' of huge sums of money was sought to be made. The procedure adopted was, therefore, to say the least, unfair and such action, unless interfered with by this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, would undermine the confidence of the public in impartial and fair administration of the Excise Department concerned and also in the rule of law. 78. The procedure adopted was, therefore, to say the least, unfair and such action, unless interfered with by this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, would undermine the confidence of the public in impartial and fair administration of the Excise Department concerned and also in the rule of law. 78. Broadly in tune with the principle of law, which was laid down by the Supreme Court, in Mahadayal Premchandra (supra), the Supreme Court, in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 1970(3) SCC 76 , wherein an order of assessment had been made by an officer subordinate to the Collector to whom appeal lied against such an order of assessment, the Supreme Court has pointed out that no authority, however high, can control the decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority is the essence of our judicial system and, hence, when the Collector issued directions by which Deputy Superintendent or Assistant Collector is bound, no room is left for exercise of his own independent judgment. Such an assessment would not stand the scrutiny of law. The relevant observations, made by the Supreme Court, in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. (supra), read as under: "4. Now it is common ground, it being admitted in the statement of case filed on behalf of the respondent that the paper was assessed to duty in accordance with the instructions from the Collector. The main question is whether an assessment made by a subordinate officer in accordance with the instructions issued by the Collector to whom an appeal lay against the order of that subordinate officer can be called a valid assessment in the eye of law. As has been pointed out in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1 in which the parties were the same as before us now no authority, however high, can control the decision of a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority that being the essence of our judicial system. In the present case, when the assessment is to be made by the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector, the Collector, to whom an appeal lies against his order of assessment, cannot control or fetter his judgment in the matter of assessment. If the Collector issues directions by which the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector is bound, no room is left for the exercise of his own independent judgment." 79. Even in State of U.P. Vs. If the Collector issues directions by which the Deputy Superintendent or the Assistant Collector is bound, no room is left for the exercise of his own independent judgment." 79. Even in State of U.P. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 , the Supreme Court has pointed out that an authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others, because such an action would amount to abdication and surrender of its own discretion and in such a case, it would not be the decision of the authority, who has taken action or passed the order, but of the authority, whose order has been carried out. Decrying such an approach, the Apex Court, in Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra), observed: "55. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind. consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authority's discretion that is exercised, but someone else's. If an authority "hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires". Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority. De Smith sums up the position thus : "The relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive." 80. From the line of authorities cited above, it becomes clear that respondent No.2 ought to have not allowed his decision to be influenced by his superior authority after he had already initiated the process of recovery by issuing notices under Section 11A read with Section 1 IB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, to the petitioners and he could not have, on the directions of his superior, made an order against the interest of the petitioners by way of 'forfeiture' of a huge sum of money as aforesaid and. that too, without giving any notice to show cause to the petitioners and without applying his own mind to what the petitioners had to say. Respondent No.2 acted, as already discussed above, as an executor of the direction of his superior authority by making an order of post confirmation of his earlier notices of show cause. Such an action is wholly impermissible in law and must be interfered with. 81. Thus, the 'forfeiture', in the present cases, on the direction of the superior authority, suffered from complete non-application of mind inasmuch as it is not the respondent No. 2, who has applied his mind to the facts of the present case and decided to forfeit the amount; rather, he merely carried out the directions given by his superior authority; whereas the law made the respondent No. 2 responsible to take a decision on this aspect consciously and after fully applying his mind. This was obviously not possible without giving a notice to the petitioners to have their say in the matter and when the respondent No. 2 has acted at the behest of his superior officer and not according to his own decision reached after applying his mind dispassionately and after taking into consideration all the relevant facts presented before him, such a decision and the action, taken on the basis of such decision, cannot be sustained. This apart, the petitioners also have considerable force in their submission that in respect of a part of the amount, which has been appropriated in the manner, as aforesaid, by the respondent No.2, the CESTAT, Kolkata, had already granted stay and the stay order was still in operation, when the 'forfeiture' was done. The respondents have not even made an attempt to explain this aspect of the petitioners' case. Thus, the petitioners have great substance in their contention that the action of the respondent No. 2 has been suffering from, if not malice in fact, malice in law. 82. Condition (EA) authorizes the Respondent No. 2, as jurisdictional Commissioner, to 'forfeit' the amount, which is liable to be paid by a manufacturer, but it does not empower him to throw to the winds the requirements of observing the principles of natural justice before 'forfeiture" is ordered. As no notice preceded the action of' forfeiture', there was, sadly enough, no fair play. 83. The mechanism of 'recovery' or 'forfeiture' does not envisage unilateral appropriation of an amount. ' Forfeiture' cannot be done secretly and without notice. The exercise of power, under Condition (FA), has to be judicious and fair. If a person does not have power to do a particular act, even consent, express or implied given by the person, who may be affected, is immaterial. 84. Coming to the application made by the Petitioner No. 1, seeking withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of their hotel project, it may be noted that the writ petitioners' case, in this regard, is as under: The petitioners applied to the respondent No.2 for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Accounts. The withdrawal application was made to the Respondent No. 2 by the petitioners stating, inter alia, that the amount, sought to be withdrawn, would be invested for establishing a five star hotel at Guwahati. The withdrawal application was made to the Respondent No. 2 by the petitioners stating, inter alia, that the amount, sought to be withdrawn, would be invested for establishing a five star hotel at Guwahati. The respondents, initially, called for technical and financial details of the project. However, the respondent, later on, denied permission for withdrawal on the ground that the IAC has not yet approved the project, though the hotel project already stood approved, 'in principle', by the IAC vide letter, dated 12.03.2007. 85. Coupled with the above, and as already pointed out above, the IAC has, eventually, rejected the proposal, on 09.09.2008, for withdrawal of money in respect of hotel project on the ground that a five star hotel does not qualify as 'infrastructure" within the meaning of Condition (B) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004. 86. The petitioners have canvassed before this Court that the proposed five star hotel would be ajoint venture enterprise between the Petitioner No. 1 and the Gauhati Municipal Development Authority (in short, 'GMDA'). Addressing the question of 'infrastructure', the petitioner has fortified its case by drawing attention of this Court to a letter, dated 05.01.2007, written by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Excise, wherein the Chief Secretary has stated that the proposed five star hotel is a long standing infrastructural need of the State of Assam and, therefore, should be considered as an 'investment' in 'infrastructure' project under the terms of the notification, dated 21.01.2004. 87. It is time, now, to pause and look into the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the contesting respondent. In his affidavit, respondent No.2 has categorically asserted that the jurisdictional Commissioner is subordinate to the IAC and is, therefore, bound to follow the directions issued by the Committee. The affidavit-in-opposition further discloses that the I AC has rejected, vide order, dated 09.09,2008, the hotel project on the ground that it does not qualify as 'infrastructure' within the meaning of condition (B) to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. Respondent No. 2 contends that in the light of the decision, which the IAC has, eventually, taken, on 09.09.2008, the application for withdrawal, made by the petitioners concerned, cannot be allowed. 88. Respondent No. 2 contends that in the light of the decision, which the IAC has, eventually, taken, on 09.09.2008, the application for withdrawal, made by the petitioners concerned, cannot be allowed. 88. Broadly speaking, two broad issues, which arise, while considering the controversy with regard to proposed five star hotel, are (i) whether it is the IAC, which is the competent authority to decide as to whether an application for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account for making investment on a project, under the Notification, dated body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive." 80. From the line of authorities cited above, it becomes clear that respondent No.2 ought to have not allowed his decision to be influenced by his superior authority after he had already initiated the process of recovery by issuing notices under Section 11A read with Section 1 IB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, to the petitioners and he could not have, on the directions of his superior, made an order against the interest of the petitioners by way of 'forfeiture' of a huge sum of money as aforesaid and. that too, without giving any notice to show cause to the petitioners and without applying his own mind to what the petitioners had to say. Respondent No.2 acted, as already discussed above, as an executor of the direction of his superior authority by making an order of post confirmation of his earlier notices of show cause. Such an action is wholly impermissible in law and must be interfered with. 81. Respondent No.2 acted, as already discussed above, as an executor of the direction of his superior authority by making an order of post confirmation of his earlier notices of show cause. Such an action is wholly impermissible in law and must be interfered with. 81. Thus, the 'forfeiture', in the present cases, on the direction of the superior authority, suffered from complete non-application of mind inasmuch as it is not the respondent No. 2, who has applied his mind to the facts of the present case and decided to forfeit the amount; rather, he merely carried out the directions given by his superior authority; whereas the law made the respondent No. 2 responsible to take a decision on this aspect consciously and after fully applying his mind. This was obviously not possible without giving a notice to the petitioners to have their say in the matter and when the respondent No. 2 has acted at the behest of his superior officer and not according to his own decision reached after applying his mind dispassionately and after taking into consideration all the relevant facts presented before him, such a decision and the action, taken on the basis of such decision, cannot be sustained. This apart, the petitioners also have considerable force in their submission that in respect of a part of the amount, which has been appropriated in the manner, as aforesaid, by the respondent No.2, the CESTAT, Kolkata, had already granted stay and the stay order was still in operation, when the 'forfeiture' was done. The respondents have not even made an attempt to explain this aspect of the petitioners' case. Thus, the petitioners have great substance in their contention that the action of the respondent No. 2 has been suffering from, if not malice in fact, malice in law. 82. Condition (EA) authorizes the Respondent No. 2, as jurisdictional Commissioner, to 'forfeit' the amount, which is liable to be paid by a manufacturer, but it does not empower him to throw to the winds the requirements of observing the principles of natural justice before 'forfeiture' is ordered. As no notice preceded the action of 'forfeiture', there was, sadly enough, no fair play. 83. The mechanism of 'recovery' or 'forfeiture' does not envisage unilateral appropriation of an amount. 'Forfeiture' cannot be done secretly and without notice. The exercise of power, under Condition (FA), has to be judicious and fair. As no notice preceded the action of 'forfeiture', there was, sadly enough, no fair play. 83. The mechanism of 'recovery' or 'forfeiture' does not envisage unilateral appropriation of an amount. 'Forfeiture' cannot be done secretly and without notice. The exercise of power, under Condition (FA), has to be judicious and fair. If a person does not have power to do a particular act, even consent, express or implied given by the person, who may be affected, is immaterial. 84. Coming to the application made by the Petitioner No. 1, seeking withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of their hotel project, it may be noted that the writ petitioners' case, in this regard, is as under: The petitioners applied to the respondent No.2 for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Accounts. The withdrawal application was made to the Respondent No. 2 by the petitioners stating, inter alia, that the amount, sought to be withdrawn, would be invested for establishing a five star hotel at Guwahati. The respondents, initially, called for technical and financial details of the project. However, the respondent, later on, denied permission for withdrawal on the ground that the IAC has not yet approved the project, though the hotel project already stood approved, 'in principle', by the IAC vide letter, dated 12.03.2007. 85. Coupled with the above, and as already pointed out above, the IAC has, eventually, rejected the proposal, on 09.09.2008, for withdrawal of money in respect of hotel project on the ground that a five star hotel does not qualify as 'infrastructure" within the meaning of Condition (B) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004. 86. The petitioners have canvassed before this Court that the proposed five star hotel would be a joint venture enterprise between the Petitioner No. 1 and the Gauhati Municipal Development Authority (in short, 'GMDA'). Addressing the question of 'infrastructure', the petitioner has fortified its case by drawing attention of this Court to a letter, dated 05.01.2007, written by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Excise, wherein the Chief Secretary has stated that the proposed five star hotel is a long standing infrastructural need of the State of Assam and, therefore, should be considered as an 'investment' in 'infrastructure' project under the terms of the notification, dated 21.01.2004. 87. 87. It is time, now, to pause and look into the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the contesting respondent. In his affidavit, respondent No.2 has categorically asserted that the jurisdictional Commissioner is subordinate to the IAC and is, therefore, bound to follow the directions issued by the Committee. The affidavit-in-opposition further discloses that the I AC has rejected, vide order, dated 09.09.2008, the hotel project on the ground that it does not qualify as 'infrastructure' within the meaning of condition (B) to the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. Respondent No. 2 contends that in the light of the decision, which the IAC has, eventually, taken, on 09.09.2008, the application for withdrawal, made by the petitioners concerned, cannot be allowed. 88. Broadly speaking, two broad issues, which arise, while considering the controversy with regard to proposed five star hotel, are (i) whether it is the IAC, which is the competent authority to decide as to whether an application for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account for making investment on a project, under the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, shall or shall not be allowed and, therefore, unless the IAC gives, in a case, such as, the one at hand, its prior approval to a project, no withdrawal from the Escrow Account can be permitted by the jurisdictional Commissioner for making investment on the project, though the power to grant permission, under the terms of the notification, stands, as discussed above, vested in the jurisdictional Commissioner ? and (ii) even assuming that the lAC's prior approval is necessary for any application made for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account in order to enable the jurisdictional Commissioner permit such withdrawal, whether the LAC's decision, in the present case, rejecting the proposal, for the proposed five star hotel, is, in the facts of the present case, sustainable in law? 89. I have already indicated above that LAC's prior approval is not envisaged by the notifications aforementioned in order to enable the jurisdictional Commissioner take his decision on a manufacturer's application to withdraw money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making investment on a project allowable under the notifications. 90. 89. I have already indicated above that LAC's prior approval is not envisaged by the notifications aforementioned in order to enable the jurisdictional Commissioner take his decision on a manufacturer's application to withdraw money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making investment on a project allowable under the notifications. 90. Be that as it may, leaving for a moment this aspect of the case for further consideration at a latter stage of this judgment, let me, first, consider the question as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the lAC's decision not to treat the proposal of the five star hotel, as an infrastructural need, under the notification, is justifiable, correct and valid. 91. While considering the controversy with regard to the hotel project, it needs to be taken note of that referring to lAC's meeting, held at Guwahati. on 06.11.2006, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, wrote a letter, as far back as on 05.01.2007, (which is on the record), to the Chief Commissioner. Relevant portion of this letter reads: "Star Category Hotel as Infrastructure : At present state of Assam and for that matter whole of the North Eastern Region does not have a five star hotel while this region is bestowed with abundant natural beauty and is the most sought after tourist destination for discerning visitors of India and abroad. Development of IT industries is lagging due to non-availability of suitable hotel accommodation. This is considered a serious infrastructural gap in the resources of the State. There is, therefore, urgent need to bridge this infrastructural gap. A good international brand five star hotel will act as catalyst to development. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that 'investment' in star hotel be considered for 'investment' out of excise duty exemptions available to eligible Industrial Units." 92. There is, therefore, urgent need to bridge this infrastructural gap. A good international brand five star hotel will act as catalyst to development. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that 'investment' in star hotel be considered for 'investment' out of excise duty exemptions available to eligible Industrial Units." 92. From a bare reading of the letter, dated 05.01.2007, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, it becomes clear that the State Government, in question, took the view that there being not even one five star hotel in whole of the North East Region, though this region is bestowed with abundant natural beauty and is the most sought after tourist destination for discerning visitors of India and abroad and also that the development of IT industries is lagging behind due to non-availability of suitable hotel accommodation, star hotels and, particularly, five star hotel, is a serious infrastructural deficiency in the resources of the State and this deficiency needs to be urgently removed by establishing a five star hotel so as to develop the region and that such a five star hotel does qualify as an infrastructural necessity within the scheme of exemption promised under the notifications aforementioned. 93. No wonder, therefore, that the letter aforementioned of the Chief Secretary signifies that the Government of Assam consid- 21.01.2004. Reacting to the said letter of the Chief Commissioner, so seeking clarification, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (Tax Research Unit), responded by saying that as per Black's Law Dictionary, 'in frastructure' refers to underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (like highways, schools, bridges, water systems, etc) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development. By its letter, dated 18.06.2008, Government of India also left it to the IAC to decide as to whether, in the context of the facts of the case at hand, establishment of a five star hotel would or would not qualify as an 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the Notification aforementioned. 98. By its letter, dated 18.06.2008, Government of India also left it to the IAC to decide as to whether, in the context of the facts of the case at hand, establishment of a five star hotel would or would not qualify as an 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the Notification aforementioned. 98. It, now, transpires that relying upon the letter, dated 18.06.2008, the IAC claims that a five star hotel would not qualify as an investment in the category of 'infrastructure' under the said notification and it is on this reasoning that the IAC has declined to grant prior approval to withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account for the proposed five star hotel and it is this decision of the IAC, which the Respondent No. 2 has decided to act upon. 99. Let me pause here for a while and point out as to what 'infrastructure' in a given system means. 100. The expression 'infrastructure', on a simple blush thereof, reveals that the same is a fusion of two words, namely, 'infra' and 'structure'. Infra is a latin word, whichmeans below, under, beneath, underneath, and antonym of supra. The expression 'structure', on the other hand, denotes that which is constructed, combination of related parts, as a building or machine, the manner of construction or organization. 101. 'Infrastructure', in common parlance, means permanent foundation or essential elements of a structure, system, plan of operations, etc. 102. The expression 'infrastructure' has been defined in the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, Encyclopedic Edition', in the following manner: - "Infrastructure: The permanent foundation or essential elements of a structure, system, plan of operations, etc. especially, the essential installation of a community, as schools, hospital, transportation facilities, power plants, etc." 103. As per Black slaw Dictionary, 7th Edition, 1999, infrastructure means: the underlying framework of a system; especially, public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development. 104. According to Etymology online, the word, 'infrastructure', has been used in English language since, at least, the year 1927 and meant the installations that form the basis for any operation or system. Other sources, such as, the Oxford English Dictionary, trace the word's origin as a word, which was, originally, applied in a military sense. 104. According to Etymology online, the word, 'infrastructure', has been used in English language since, at least, the year 1927 and meant the installations that form the basis for any operation or system. Other sources, such as, the Oxford English Dictionary, trace the word's origin as a word, which was, originally, applied in a military sense. In the military sense, the word, 'infrastructure', was, probably, first, used, in France, and imported into English language around the time of the First World War. In military sense, the word, 'infrastructure', refers to all building and permanent installations necessary for the support of military forces, such as, barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications facilities, stores of military equipments, etc. 105. There can be no doubt that the word, 'infrastructure', is a relative term. It changes with the needs of society. What was earlier not considered as 'infrastructure' is, now, considered, with the change of time and with ever DHARAMPALSATYAPAL LTD. & ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA& ORS. (HC) 793 demanding social, political and economic scenario, as infrastructure. 106. A few years back, space satellites were thought of only as devices for collecting information on weather. It is space science, which was considered to be an 'infrastructure'. But today, we have information technology as another infrastructure, recognized by the Government, though information technology is only one of the species of space science. The entertainment networks, mobile phones, internet, were all thought of as luxury a few years back: but today, these have become necessities of common man. So vast the market and use of these products are, that it cannot prosper and run without a policy underlying its all-round development, which can cater to a common man's needs and, therefore, today, information technology can be termed as the base or infrastructure upon which the aforesaid basic needs rest. 107. It is trite in interpretation of statutes that in the event, a statute defines a particular expression In a particular fashion, different from the ordinary/grammatical meaning, then only, that expression, appearing in that statute, can be given an artificial meaning, and in the absence of any definition, appearing in a statute, natural meaning of the word must be attributed. Although, it is judicially recognized that the legislature has the power to define a word, even artificially, such artificial definition should not be easily inferred, unless such artificial definition, as contradistinguished from grammatical meaning, is manifest. Although, it is judicially recognized that the legislature has the power to define a word, even artificially, such artificial definition should not be easily inferred, unless such artificial definition, as contradistinguished from grammatical meaning, is manifest. See Carter VsBradbeer- (1975) 3 All. ER158, at pages 164, 168. 108. Therefore, unless a particular statute - be it of the superior legislation, or of delegated legislation - defines the expression 'infrastructure', in a particular fashion, expressly excluding the word, hotel, from its purview, theory of natural/grammatical meaning must be applied to determine if hotel can or cannot be regarded as an 'infrastructure' for development of economy of a region, as a whole, and of tourism, in particular. 109. Before proceeding further, it is also necessary to note that whether a particular subject is an 'infrastructure', or can be regarded as an 'infrastructure', does not depend on the recognition of such a subject as an 'infrastructure' by the executive or the legislature. It is, therefore, not necessary to look to any statute or executive instructions for the purpose of determination of the question as to whether hotel can or cannot be regarded as an 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the notifications, dated 21.01.2004, read with the notification, dated 09.07.2004. It would be wrong to suggest that unless the State recognizes any particular subject as an' infrastructure', it cannot be regarded, or would not be legally regarded, as an 'infrastructure'. Recognition of a subject as an 'infrastructure' by the State depends on a variety of factors. If the State, for instance, takes the view that for development of sports in the country, every district headquarter shall have an appropriate stadium, it may come out with a policy of exemption from payment of tax, cess or duty for those, who build such a stadium. If the State does not specify, by any statute or policy, stadium as an 'infrastructure' for development of sports, it does not mean that the stadium would not be, or cannot be, regarded as an 'infrastructure' for the development of sports inasmuch as a stadium is, indeed, one of the basic pillars on which rests the development of sports. 110. If the State does not specify, by any statute or policy, stadium as an 'infrastructure' for development of sports, it does not mean that the stadium would not be, or cannot be, regarded as an 'infrastructure' for the development of sports inasmuch as a stadium is, indeed, one of the basic pillars on which rests the development of sports. 110. Similarly, when the Notifications, under consideration, have not specified as to what an 'infrastructure' would mean, it is logical to infer that any such subject, which becomes the basis for development of economy of the region, should and must be regarded as 'infrastructure'. If the Central Government today finds that in order to have Commonwealth Games, in Delhi, hotels, as an industry, is an essential 'infrastructure', it may give various schemes of exemption from payment of duties for those, who may build hotels, in Delhi, within a specified period of time. This does not mean that if a hotel is constructed, otherwise than under a scheme, it would not be regarded as being 'infrastructure' on which would rest holding of a world meet, such as, Commonwealth games. 111. In the case at hand, nothing stopped the Central Government from specifying the subjects, which would be regarded as 'infrastructure', under the Notifications aforementioned. In such a situation, the IAC was wholly incorrect in taking the view that five star hotel would not be regarded as 'infrastructure', when the necessity of a five star hotel, as discussed above, is so great that nothing convincing could be submitted, on behalf of the respondents, to show as to why a five star hotel, in the light of the discussions already held, would not be regarded as 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the Notifications aforementioned. 112. While considering the lAC's decision, whereby it has turned down the proposal for a five star hotel, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that the IAC appears to have proceeded on the premises that an 'infrastructure' would mean underlying framework needed in the realm of public services and facilities like highways, schools, bridges, etc. What the IAC fails to have appreciated completely is that the meaning, assigned to the term' infrastructure', in Black s Law Dictionary, by making reference to highways, schools, bridges, etc, is merely illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. What the IAC fails to have appreciated completely is that the meaning, assigned to the term' infrastructure', in Black s Law Dictionary, by making reference to highways, schools, bridges, etc, is merely illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. Even the meaning of 'infrastructure' given in Black's Law Dictionary, which the letter of the Government of India refers to, makes it clear that 'infrastructure' really means underlying framework of a system needed to support commerce, economic as well as residential accommodation. In other words, 'infrastructure' means the basic physical and organizational structures or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function. Though 'infrastructure' may signify public services and facilities, it does not mean that public services and facilities would mean access of the general public to a particular facility without incurring any expenses. Even a bridge may not be open to all inasmuch as a bridge may be meant for those, who pay toll for crossing the bridge. 113. In The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for the State of Maharastra Vs. M/s G & J Concerns (Hotel Samrat), Kolhapur, ( AIR 2000 Bom 403 ), which the petitioners have relied upon, a Full Bench of Bombay High Court had the occasion to deal with the question as to whether hotel can be considered as an industrial undertaking within the meaning of a given notification. Describing as to what a hotel is, the Full Bench observed: "6. At the same time, hotel as an industry does involve providing of comfortable accommodation, rendering services to the occupants including food, etc. The last mentioned aspect, i.e., food will require well established kitchen, catering to the need of the occupants of the hotel and for that there are manufacturing activities involved. 7. Thus, understood the hotel as such would be nothing if it is understood to be an industry giving services in the form of comfortable accommodation kept and maintained reasonably clean and rendering other assistance by providing suitable staff to look after the comfort of the occupants and their immediate needs during their stay in that particular premises. When the boarding aspect is considered, preparation of food and its supply, as may be expected by the customers, will also have to be considered. All these activities will be involved in the hotel industry when there is lodging and boarding both." 114. The Full Bench further observed at para 10 thus: " 10. When the boarding aspect is considered, preparation of food and its supply, as may be expected by the customers, will also have to be considered. All these activities will be involved in the hotel industry when there is lodging and boarding both." 114. The Full Bench further observed at para 10 thus: " 10. Thus, when the policy of the State while exempting such industries is considered, the first objective being development of areas as set out in the notification which are identified to be that part of the Maharashtra which requires special incentives for development and that too industrial development, the hotel industries being one supplying required infrastructure, in our opinion, shall be considered as industrial undertaking as contemplated by the notification." 115. From the above observations made in M/s G & J Concerns (Hotel Samrat), Kolhapur (supra), too, it becomes clear that hotel industry can be regarded and shall, in the context of the facts of the present case, be regarded as an infrastructure necessary for growth of industrial development, economy, commerce, tourism and employment generation. In this regard one may also usefully refer the case ofSankar Das & Ors. Vs State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in 2002 (2) CHN356, wherein the Calcutta High Court has explained the requirement of, amongst others, hotels as a necessity for the development of a township. The relevant observations, reflecting the importance of hotel in the development of scheme of a township, read as under:- "12. The contention that under section 27 land cannot be acquired for the purpose of construction or development of commercial area as advanced by Mr. Bose seems to be of no substance. Inasmuch as the long title of W.B. Act 25 of 1974 is "an act to make special provisions of securing development of trade, commerce and industries in an well planned basis in the State of West Bengal, and for the purpose of establishment of industrial infrastructure Development Corporation, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". The preamble proceeds to specify that" it is expedient to make special provisions for securing development of trade, commerce and industries on well planned manner in the State of West Bengal and for that purpose of establishing industrial infrastructure Development Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". The preamble proceeds to specify that" it is expedient to make special provisions for securing development of trade, commerce and industries on well planned manner in the State of West Bengal and for that purpose of establishing industrial infrastructure Development Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". Thus, the preamble and the long title include trade and commerce which is to be developed on well planned basis. It further includes of matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The development of industries requires development of trade and commerce. For the purpose of development of an industry it requires an infrastructure which includes supply of labour, power, raw materials, expertise machineries and transport. Thus, for the labour and experts it may require development of township and commercial complex. A township includes a commercial complex without which the township cannot be said to be a well planned township. The products of the industry may also be traded for which development of commerce is necessary. Then again, for the purpose of purchasing of raw materials of machineries trade is also necessary. As soon industry is developed people from different places come and visit the place in connection with industries for whom- various amenities are to be cratered to including accommodation in hotels and other various facilities. It may also requires medical facilities thus the construction of commercial complex with hotel accommodation or nursing home cannot be said to be a purpose outside the Act 1974 Act. Thus, construction of commercial complex is definitely a purpose within the scope and ambit of the 1974 Act. The Act has been enacted with the purpose and object for development of trade, commerce and industries. Commercial complex is definitely a step towards the development of trade, commerce and industries. Therefore, for the purpose for which the land had been acquired, section 27 can be resorted to." 116. North Eastern States have vast opportunities to tap tourism as an industry. To draw the attention of the tourists, both domestic as well as foreign, we need to have world class 'infrastructure'. The word, 'tourism', embraces in its fold, all the recognized 'infrastructures', which are, generally, understood as energy, railways, roads and national highways, ports, airports, telecommunications, information technology, housing and urban development including hotel and so on. Hotels, thus, is one of the infrastructural needs for development of tourism. The word, 'tourism', embraces in its fold, all the recognized 'infrastructures', which are, generally, understood as energy, railways, roads and national highways, ports, airports, telecommunications, information technology, housing and urban development including hotel and so on. Hotels, thus, is one of the infrastructural needs for development of tourism. It is the cumulative effect of world class hotels, resorts, transport, communications, information technology, etc., which, when comprehensively taken together, gives an attractive choice to the tourists. Hotels being one of the most basic components of tourism, a policy for development of tourism is incomplete without paying appropriate attention to its standards. The policy may involve public financing or private financing or private public financing, i.e., joint ventures. India, too, has a tourism policy in place. The policy recognizes the need for infrastructural development (samvarachana). The draft National Tourism Policy of India formulates six broad areas, such as, Welcome (Swagat), Information (Suchana), Facilitation (Suvidha), Safety (Suraksha), Cooperation (Sahyog) and Infrastructure Development (Samvarchana) to achieve the maximum inflow of tourists - both domestic as well as international. Suvidha (Facilitation) takes, within its sweep, good hotels in the North Eastern region. Hotels would, therefore, form an integral and inseverable part of infrastructural developments (Samvarachana). There can, thus, be no escape from the conclusion that hotels have to be regarded as infrastructure in the context in which it has been used in the scheme of exemption as notified by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004 read with Notification, dated 09.07.2004. 117. Guwahati being gateway of North East, a five star hotel, as pointed by the Government of Assam, is a necessary infrastructural deficiency and, therefore, needs to be encouraged under the exemption notifications aforementioned. Development of commerce, establishment of industries, and improvement in information technology require presence of people from different parts of the country and abroad and availability of proper accommodation to meet such needs cannot, but be regarded as an infrastructural need. Scheme of exemption, as the one at hand, can be an effective answer to meet this deficiency of the State's infrastructure. 118. The notification of exemption, in the present case, admittedly, aims at generating employment and boosting economic growth. For both these purposes, development of tourism, particularly, in a region, which has many unique places for tourists to visit, is of prime importance. Development of tourism is impossible without access to places of interest by tourists. 118. The notification of exemption, in the present case, admittedly, aims at generating employment and boosting economic growth. For both these purposes, development of tourism, particularly, in a region, which has many unique places for tourists to visit, is of prime importance. Development of tourism is impossible without access to places of interest by tourists. Access to places of interest, in order to boost tourism by attracting not only Indians but foreigners too, would obviously include facilities for appropriate accommodation; and appropriate accommodation, in turn, would mean not only accommodation for those, who may not afford much, but also for those, who may be rich and wealthy and can afford, and look for, suitable accommodation of international standard. Not only accommodation, but even appropriate facilities for eating and other forms of recreation, entertainment, sports and games would be necessary to attract tourists. Similarly, development of information technology requires visit of people from India and abroad and suitable accommodation for such people too is another prime necessity of any area, where such persons are required to come and stay. Considered in this light, it can. by no stretch of imagination, be said that a five star hotel is not a necessity for the development of economy and employment generation. Thus, lack of five star hotels, for the purpose of providing residential accommodation, is an 'infrastructural deficiency in the economic growth of the North Eastregion. Even the Black's dictionary, relied upon by the IAC, makes it clear that 'infrastructure' refers to underlying framework of a system especially public services and facilities. Such public services and facilities would, obviously, include proper residential accommodation for persons coming to an area. 119. There is no dispute, as pointed out by the petitioners, that the need of a five star hotel has been emphasized by the State of Assam on a number of occasions for the purposes of overall development of the region and the State. Such basic 'infrastructure' is imperative for attracting' investment' into this region and for its industrial and commercial growth. At present, the State of Assam and, for that matter, the whole of the North Eastern Region, does not have a Five Star Hotel, while this region is, as the said letter of the Chief Secretary reflects, bestowed with abundant natural beauty and is the most sought after tourist destination for discerning visitors of India and abroad. At present, the State of Assam and, for that matter, the whole of the North Eastern Region, does not have a Five Star Hotel, while this region is, as the said letter of the Chief Secretary reflects, bestowed with abundant natural beauty and is the most sought after tourist destination for discerning visitors of India and abroad. Further, development of IT industries has been suffering due to nonavailability of suitable hotel accommodation. This was considered by the State Government of Assam as a serious gap in the infrastructural resources of the State and there was, accordingly, felt to be an urgent need to bridge this infrastructural gap. A good international brand five star hotel, as the Chief Secretary observes, will certainly act as a catalyst to the development of the region. It was, therefore, strongly recommended by the State Government that' investment', in star category of hotels, be considered as 'investments' out of excise duty exemptions available to eligible industrial units. By some strange reasoning, which Mr. Sarmah, learned Senior Standing Counsel, has been unable to explain, the IAC claims to have taken the view that five star hotel does not fall within the meaning of 'infrastructure' and cannot, therefore, qualify as an 'investment' within the scheme of the notifications aforementioned. When the IAC had approved, in principle, the proposal for establishment of a five star hotel at Guwahati, the State Government has already entered into a joint venture agreement, which has the support of the Government of India, and when, even upon making clear enquiry from the Central Government, the Central Government did not categorically opine that a five star hotel would not qualify as an 'investment' in 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the notifications aforementioned, the lAC's decision to reject the proposal does not stand to reason nor could have the Respondent No. 2 been guided to take such a decision under the supervision of the IAC. The decision, in the matter of application for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Accounts for the purposes aforesaid, ought to have been of the jurisdic-tional Commissioner and not of any other authority. 120.1 may pause here to point out that the power of judicial review is directed not against a decision, but against the decision-making process. The decision, in the matter of application for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Accounts for the purposes aforesaid, ought to have been of the jurisdic-tional Commissioner and not of any other authority. 120.1 may pause here to point out that the power of judicial review is directed not against a decision, but against the decision-making process. The administrator must reach his decision by taking into account all such factors, which are relevant, in a given case, for taking a correct and effective decision. At the same time, the administrator must eschew from his consideration any factor, which is irrelevant. The fact that five star hotel is needed for employment generation and economic growth has never been in dispute in this proceeding. One of the main objects of exemption, granted by the notification, in question, is, admittedly, to generate employment in this region, where non-employment has allegedly compelled the youngsters to take up arms and break the rule of law. Nobody can dispute that the scheme of exemption, which the Central Government has-promised, is not a mere excise holiday, but an imperative necessity for a strong and united India. 121. Apart from employment generation, the scheme of the notifications aims at helping growth of economy so as to make people acquire, if not better, at least, a reasonable standard of living. One of the ways of achieving this object is to take advantage of the abundant natural beauty of this region and it is this need, which the State Government's letter, addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Excise, Shillong, has rightly emphasized. All such reasons, which are essential factors for a correct decision in the present matter, have been completely ignored and the IAC rejects the proposal on the ground that the five star hotel does not qualify as 'infrastructure' within the meaning of the notification, in question. Why the five star hotel does not qualify as an infrastructure, there is really no rational cause mentioned or specified. Such a decision, which is wholly devoid of any rational cause, cannot, but be termed as irrational and arbitrary. Underlying framework of a system would, obviously, mean and include accommodation in the field of tourism. Why the five star hotel does not qualify as an infrastructure, there is really no rational cause mentioned or specified. Such a decision, which is wholly devoid of any rational cause, cannot, but be termed as irrational and arbitrary. Underlying framework of a system would, obviously, mean and include accommodation in the field of tourism. If, for instance, a region has to have facilities for higher education, can it be said that proper building for running higher education would not be regarded as infrastructural necessity if an investor comes forward to make such an investment. Can it be said that only Government schools would be regarded as infrastructural facilities for education and not the private schools. Infrastructure does not really depend as to whether public spends money for sustaining infrastructure or not. When the Government is incapable of providing adequate public facilities and allows, therefore, joint venture agreements to be entered into between Government and a private individual for growth of economy, it cannot be said that the outcome of such a project would not fall within the public domain. Joint venture agreement, in the present case, relates to establishment of a five star hotel, which was a necessity for the region and of the State concerned and the petitioners were merely instrumental, in the scheme of the Government, in achieving this object and in the process, if the petitioners happen to earn profit, their proposals for 'investment' cannot be rejected. The exemption from payment of duty, which has been granted, is, obviously, meant to attract investment and no prudent businessman would make investment unless he has reasonable expectation of earning profits. The notifications do not promise exemption from payment of duty for the purpose of causing loss to the investors; rather, the investors are lured and attracted to make their investment, in the region, so as to help the growth of commerce, economics and employment generation. 122. The petitioners are correct, when they submit that there is definite and urgent need to develop better infrastructural facilities, in the State of Assam, to create an environment, which would be conducive for industrial growth so as to generate adequate employment opportunities and, eventually, boost economic growth of the State. 122. The petitioners are correct, when they submit that there is definite and urgent need to develop better infrastructural facilities, in the State of Assam, to create an environment, which would be conducive for industrial growth so as to generate adequate employment opportunities and, eventually, boost economic growth of the State. Recognizing this, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam had, in his letter, dated 05.01.2007, addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Excise, clarified, in no uncertain words, that 'investment', in five star hotel, should be considered as 'investment' within the meaning of the Notifications aforementioned. 123. The notifications make it crystal clear that the Central Government, in its wisdom, has created two separate and independent authorities. The jurisdictional Commissioner acts at the preliminary stage; whereas the IAC comes into picture after "investment' is already made. The jurisdictional Commissioner does not function as a subordinate to the IAC and is, therefore, not bound to follow the instructions issued by the IAC. What it has to consider is the scheme of exemption given in the notification. He must allow an' investment' to be made if it satisfies the conditions of exemption under the notification and it must not allow such 'investment' to be made if it does not qualify for exemption under the notification inasmuch as it is he, who has the power to take a decision at this stage and after 'investment' is made, the IAC comes into picture under the notification, dated 09.07.2004, for the purpose of examining the fact as to whether in terms of the permission granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner, the 'investment' has or has not been made. Once 'investment' has been made by a manufacturer with the permission granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner, it has to be treated as an investment, made on a project, which is allowable under the scheme of the notification. A second scrutiny as to whether investment made falls within the scheme of exemption or not by any other authority would make the scheme irrational and unworkable. Such an interpretation, therefore, has to be eschewed. A second scrutiny as to whether investment made falls within the scheme of exemption or not by any other authority would make the scheme irrational and unworkable. Such an interpretation, therefore, has to be eschewed. Consequently, the respondents' contention that the 1AC has the power, even under the notification, dated 09.07.2004, to determine, at the initial stage, as to whether an investment, sought to be made on a project, such as a five star hotel, shall or shall not be allowed to be made under the present scheme of exemption, cannot be allowed as valid. 124. Apart from the fact that the 1AC has wholly misconceived the meaning of the term 'infrastructure', which occurs in the notifications, in question, and has thereby failed to take into account, in correct perspective, a relevant factor, while reaching its decision in the matter the question, which also stares at us is: whether the decision, which is relied upon by the respondent No. 2 as the decision of the IAC, can be really regarded as a decision, consciously reached by the IAC, in terms of the notifications, whereunder the LAC stands constituted ? 125. A search for an answer to the above question takes me to the very constitution of the IAC, which has taken the decision resulting into the rejection of the hotel project as aforesaid. 126. While considering the question, so posed, it needs to be noted that the notification, dated 21.01.2004, clearly spells out as to who are the constituents of the LAC. Condition (D) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, clearly lays down that the 1 AC shall consist of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State concerned, in which the unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made. Though the later notification, dated 09.07.2004, introduced some changes in the earlier notification, dated 21.01.2004, what needs to be borne in mind is that as regards the members constituting the IAC, no change was made by the notification, dated 09.07.2004. Though the later notification, dated 09.07.2004, introduced some changes in the earlier notification, dated 21.01.2004, what needs to be borne in mind is that as regards the members constituting the IAC, no change was made by the notification, dated 09.07.2004. However, by a notification, issued, on 12.01.2009, by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), the constitution of the IAC has been modified by making it clear that such Committee shall consist of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State concerned in which the unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made and, further, that Principal Secretary can be represented by the Secretary or Commissioner of the Department of Industries of the State concerned, as a member of the IAC. 127. It is, therefore, transparent that since 21.01.2004, when the earlier notification had come into force, until 12.01.2009, when the Notification, dated 12.01.2009, was issued by the Government of India, the IAC could not have included anyone other than the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State concerned, in which the unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made, and it is only on and after 12.01.2009 that the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of a given State can be represented by the Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of the State concerned as a member of the I AC. Logically extended, it would mean that when the I AC rejected the proposal for the hotel on 09.09.2008, none could have constituted the IAC other than the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industry of the States concerned, i.e., the State, wherein the industrial unit or units are located, and the State or States, where 'investments' are made. 128. 128. Bearing in mind the fact that until 12.01.2009, the IAC could not have consisted of anyone other than Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, where the unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, in which the 'investment' is sought to be made, let me, now, turn to yet another important aspect of this writ petition. 129. In the case at hand, the Petitioner No. 1 has industrial units in the States of Tripura and Assam and 'investment,' on the 'hotel project', is sought to be made in the State of Assam. Thus, on 09.09.2008, i.e., the date on which the I AC rejected the proposal for hotel project, the IAC ought to have consisted of none other than the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretaries of the Departments of Industries, Government of Assam and Government of Tripura. Since after 12.01.2009, the IAC can, in the facts of the present case, consist of, besides the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, the Principal Secretary or Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of the States of Assam and Tripura. Presence of anyone other than the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries, Assam and Tripura must be taken to have made constitution of the Committee wholly illegal to take any decision in a matter, wherein the petitioner No. 1 s application for withdrawal of money to establish the proposed hotel, at Guwahati, was taken up for consideration. The IAC, which has taken the decision, at its meeting held on 09.09.2008, of not allowing'investment', in the present case, on the hotel project, did not have, admittedly, presence of the Principal Secretary or Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries, Government of Assam. 130. Clearly, therefore, in the absence of the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, the Committee, in question, was not competent to take any decision on the said hotel project. As a corollary, the rejection of the said proposal is not legally sustainable. 131. Had the notification, dated 21.01.2004, and/or the notification, dated 09.07.2004, prescribed quorum for such a meeting, it might have been contended that presence of all the members of the Committee, as demanded by the notifications, in question, was not necessary. As a corollary, the rejection of the said proposal is not legally sustainable. 131. Had the notification, dated 21.01.2004, and/or the notification, dated 09.07.2004, prescribed quorum for such a meeting, it might have been contended that presence of all the members of the Committee, as demanded by the notifications, in question, was not necessary. In the absence, however, of any quorum having been prescribed by the notifications themselves, there can be no escape from the conclusion that in the absence of any of the members of the Committee, no effective decision, in accordance with law, can be taken by the Committee even if the decision of the Committee may not necessarily be unanimous and may be based on majority opinion. Otherwise also, it stands to reason that the scheme, which the Central Government has introduced, requires views of not only the Chief Commissioner of Excise, Shillong, but also the views of the State, where an industrial unit is located, and the views of the State, where a manufacturer, as an 'investor', intends to make 'investment' to be taken into account before a final decision is reached on every project, which an 'investor' comes forward to make on. 132. Surprisingly, however, even before the notification, dated 12.01.2009, was issued by the Government of India by making the Secretary or the Commissioner, as the case may be, a member of the IAC, the IAC itself had issued a trade notice, on 05-03-2004, making Commissioner or Secretary of the Department concerned a member of the Committee. This action, as I would be showing, while discussing the case WP (C) No. 2814/08, was wholly beyond the powers of the IAC inasmuch as it is the Central Government, which is the only competent authority to make amendment to its such notification and has, in fact, amended its said Notification as late as on 12.01.09. 133. Coupled with the above, it is worth reiterating, as has been discussed above, that it is the jurisdictional Commissioner, who is the competent authority to decide as to whether an application seeking withdrawal from the Escrow Account shall or shall not be allowed and it is the jurisdictional Commissioner, who has to take a decision, on the basis of the materials placed before him, whether the'investment', sought to be made, would or would not qualify as an 'investment' within the scheme of the notifications granting exemption. The IAC cannot direct and could not have directed the jurisdictional Commissioner to decide the issue of withdrawal of any of such applications in any particular way. A jurisdictional Commissioner cannot act or take a decision under the guidance, supervision or direction of the IAC. It was not the business of the IAC to issue direction to the jurisdictional Commissioner as to which proposal it should or should not allow nor was any such role for the IAC conceived in the scheme of the notifications. Existence of two parallel bodies can never be reconciled as a workable policy. Merely on the ground that the IAC consists of an officer, who may be superior, in grade, to a jurisdictional Commissioner, it does not mean that the IAC is appellate or supervisory authority over the working of the jurisdictional Commissioner. Under the scheme of the notifications, the jurisdictional Commissioner exercises power, which the Central Government has, and a power, which is lawfully exercised, on behalf of the Central Government, by an authority appointed by the Central Government, would be, in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, the decision of the Central Government and, in the absence of anything in the Notifications aforementioned requiring the jurisdictional Commissioner to be guided by the IAC in the matter of making initial scrutiny of proposals for investment, the decision, to be reached, in this regard, by the jurisdictional Commissioner, has to be made by none other than the jurisdictional Commissioner himself, and nobody, not even the IAC, can influence his decision either way. It was, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction for the IAC to stand on the decision of the question as to whether the hotel project, in question, would or would not qualify as an 'investment' on 'infrastructure ' within the meaning of the notifications, in question. The IAC has clearly usurped the powers of the jurisdictional Commissioner and, in the process, the jurisdictional Commissioner too has, happily and freely, abdicated its authority to decide the issue, which was within the jurisdiction of the jurisdictional Commissioner to decide. 134. The petitioners have, therefore, considerable force, when they submit that the grant of prior project approval mechanism, which the IAC has introduced, necessitating thereby the requirement of prior approval of projects by the IAC, is wholly alien to the mechanism of the notifications and contrary to the scheme conceived therein. 134. The petitioners have, therefore, considerable force, when they submit that the grant of prior project approval mechanism, which the IAC has introduced, necessitating thereby the requirement of prior approval of projects by the IAC, is wholly alien to the mechanism of the notifications and contrary to the scheme conceived therein. It is the respondent No. 2, who has to take a decision on every application of withdrawal and he is not required to seek clearance from the IAC. 135. The contention of the respondent No.2 that while considering the application for withdrawal from Escrow Account, he is bound to act and has acted in accordance with the instructions of the higher authority, i.e., Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, suffice it to point out and reiterate, that when the power has been vested in respondent No.2 to take a decision on such an application, any action, which he takes under the influence of any other authority would be ultra vires and untenable in law. In the case at hand, respondent No.2 had declined to allow the application for withdrawal of various amounts for hotel project at the dictates of his higher authority, which respondent No.2 ought not to have done. Similarly, respondent No.2, it is clear, has been evading passing of any order either allowing or rejecting, in clear terms, the various applications seeking different sums of money to be withdrawn from the Escrow Account for making investment on 'plant and machinery' and other 'civil works', which the petitioners have made. Such inertness, on the part of an authority as important as respondent No.2 is under the scheme of exemption of the notifications aforementioned, would, if remains unchecked, wholly defeat the object of granting of exemption by the Central Government. 136. It may also be noted, as already discussed above, that there is no material, on record, to show that the petitioners' 'investments' have not been allowed by the IAC in respect whereof, notices to show cause, as discussed above, had been given. In such circumstances, any dispute, as regards the question as to whether an 'investment', already made, would or would not be allowed, cannot be a restraining factor for consideration of further proposals of the petitioners as regards withdrawal of money from their Escrow Account. In such circumstances, any dispute, as regards the question as to whether an 'investment', already made, would or would not be allowed, cannot be a restraining factor for consideration of further proposals of the petitioners as regards withdrawal of money from their Escrow Account. The notifications do not envisage that a manufacturer would have to produce 'Investment Certificate' before any withdrawal from Escrow Account is allowed by the jurisdictional Commissioner. The contention, therefore, of respondent No. 2 that the petitioners have not produced any 'Investment Certificate' in respect of their withdrawal made in the past and that is why, the request for withdrawal could not have been allowed is not correct. It needs to be clarified that the scheme of the notifications aforementioned does not bar withdrawal from an Escrow Account by a manufacturer, if any, if his earlier investments are still pending with the IAC for examination and granting of 'investment certificate'.. The reason is obvious and the reason is that the IAC may take time to take a decision as to whether it shall or shall not certify an 'investment' as an 'investment' made under the notifications and for the failure of the IAC to take a decision, on the matter of granting' investment certificate', the manufacturer cannot be made to suffer. 137. Unquestionably, therefore, unless the IAC takes a decision to reject an 'investment', the fact that the IAC has not yet granted certificate cannot make further withdrawal from Escrow Account by a manufacturer impermissible. Though time-frame has been prescribed under the notifications for the IAC on the question of granting or not granting of an 'investment certificate', the fact remains that this time-frame cannot be taken to be mandatory inasmuch as the IAC may opt to call for some clarifications from an investor or may even hold its own enquiry as to whether an 'investment' claimed has really been made or not. The time, which the IAC may consume in granting such certificate, cannot be taken to be putting a bar in the withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account by an investor, whose earlier investment is a subject of scrutiny by the IAC, particularly, in a case of present nature, wherein the materials on record, admittedly, disclose that the sittings, which were required to be held by the IAC, have never been held in time and, in fact, the number of sittings of the IAC has been far less than what is required. Pendency of consideration by the I AC of an 'investment' already made cannot, thus, be a relevant factor, when there is nothing on record to show that a legally constituted IAC has rejected the petitioners' 'investments' as untenable. 138. The petitioners have clearly pointed out that the project report of the hotel project was duly submitted by the petitioners to the respondents concerned as far back as on 07.08.2007 and further clarifications, which the respondents had sought for, had also been offered by the petitioners' letter, dated 13.02.2008, and, later on, by their letter, dated 26.02.2008. The respondent No. 2 has, however, vaguely averred, in his affidavit, that requisite information, which the petitioners were asked to give, had not been given by the petitioners. What information has been lacking or what information has not been furnished by the petitioners is not discernible from the affidavit filed by the Respondent No. 2. What further information is required is not clear. Such an explanation for rejection, based on vague statement, is not tenable in law, particularly, when the petitioners have had been persistently raising, during the course of hearing of these writ proceedings, the query as to what information was sought for or is required, which the petitioners have not furnished. 139. The hotel project has, in principle, the approval of the IAC. This project also has Governmental approval and support and 'investment' on this project ought to be treated as an 'investment' in infrastructure within the meaning of the relevant notifications. Clearly, therefore, there is no legally or factually tenable ground, for the respondent No. 2 or the IAC, to refuse to allow the withdrawal of amounts from Escrow Account for the purposes of 'investment', on the hotel project, in the present case. 140. Clearly, therefore, there is no legally or factually tenable ground, for the respondent No. 2 or the IAC, to refuse to allow the withdrawal of amounts from Escrow Account for the purposes of 'investment', on the hotel project, in the present case. 140. It is submitted by the petitioners that the respondent No. 2 has taken a wavering stand with respect to the hotel project inasmuch as the respondent No. 2 has cited multifarious reasons in this regard, which reflect lack of clear appreciation of the issue by the respondent No.2. The respondent No. 2, at first, contended, points out the petitioners, that the hotel project did not have the approval of the IAC, but when the petitioners placed before the Court that it had the IAC 's approval in principle, it was averred by the respondent No. 2 that the requisite financial and technical details, with respect to the hotel project, had not been provided and when the same were provided on 08.08.2008, respondent No. 2, in its reply, for the first time, stated that the project report, submitted by the petitioner, is not exhaustive, though the respondent No.2 does not clearly point out, till date, as to what information the petitioners have not provided in this regard. Lastly, it has been averred, points out the petitioners, that the hotel project does not qualify under the status of 'infrastructure' and, hence, cannot be approved. This is a clear reflection, contend the petitioners, of mala fide on the part of the respondent No. 2 to cause undue prejudice and economic loss to the petitioners without any justifiable cause or reason. In the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the grievances, so expressed by the petitioners, cannot be ignored and brushed aside as wholly unfounded. 141. As regards the rejection of the petitioners" remaining applications seeking withdrawal from their Escrow Accounts, suffice it to point out that the petitioners have clearly stated that the proposed 'investments' in 'plant and machinery' is not towards replacement or repair of any parts or machinery. The petitioners claim, and it has not been disputed, that the petitioners had clearly answered to all the queries raised by the respondent No. 2 in his letter, dated 19.03.2008, by their letters, dated 25.03.2008 and 26.03.2008. The petitioners claim, and it has not been disputed, that the petitioners had clearly answered to all the queries raised by the respondent No. 2 in his letter, dated 19.03.2008, by their letters, dated 25.03.2008 and 26.03.2008. Despite such a clear stand taken by the petitioners, Respondent No. 2 has not been able to present anything before this Court to show that any of the queries made by him has remained unanswered. It is transparent that the respondent No. 2 has abdicated his own authority in favour of the IAC and the IAC has been acting as the principal and the jurisdic-tional Commissioner as its agent. Such is not the scheme of exemption, which the two no-tifications, dated 21.01.2004 and 09.07.2004, embody. The respondent No. 2 has sought to take the shield of protection of superior authority by saying that he has acted in the matter under the instructions of superior authority. It needs to be understood very clearly that the IAC, being not supervisory authority, the jurisdictional Commissioner is competent to take decision on the withdrawal application, as already discussed, after the notification, dated 09.07.2004, has come into force. The concept of higher authority, which the respondents have sought to introduce, is wholly alien to the scheme of exemption inasmuch as neither the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise nor the IAC has any role to play at the stage, when withdrawal permission is required to be given by a jurisdictional Commissioner for making an 'investment', on a project, in accordance with the notifications. No higher authority, in the scheme of the notifications, exists so far as jurisdictional Commissioner's exercise of power, on the question of withdrawal application, is concerned. 142. Coming to the direction given by the Respondent No. 2 to the bankers not to allow the petitioners to operate the Escrow Accounts, suffice it to point out that no such blanket exercise of power is tractable to the notification under consideration. By definition, an Escrow Account is nothing, but an account, which the bankers) holds in trust. In such circumstances, except as has been provided under the terms of the agreement governing such account, no other action can be taken. By definition, an Escrow Account is nothing, but an account, which the bankers) holds in trust. In such circumstances, except as has been provided under the terms of the agreement governing such account, no other action can be taken. When the withdrawal of money from these accounts was not possible without permission from jurisdictional Commissioner, the question of directing the bankers not to let the petitioners operate the account was wholly illegal, for, the effect of such an order would be that even deposit of such amounts, (which the petitioners may, on a future date, seek to claim as exemption) in the Escrow Account, by the petitioners, would not be possible. Such is not the scheme of the notification; otherwise also, (as already indicated in the interim order passed by the Court) when withdrawal of money was not possible from the said account without permission from jurisdictional Commissioner, no such order was either needed or ought to have been passed. In fact, it is not discernible from the materials on record as to why such a direction freezing the account was given, when the manufacturer has a period of two years to make 'investment' of the amount withdrawn. 143. Amounts appropriated by the respondent No. 2 can be broadly divided into two periods, namely, between 25.08.2003 and 08.07.2004 and, then, 09.07.2004 onwards. The dues, which covered the period from 25.08.2003, (i.e., the date, when the scheme, granting of exemption to the extent of 50%, had come into force) until 09.07.2004, when the provisions for Escrow Accounts were made, are of pre-Escrow Account period. No dues of the pre Escrow Account period could have been recovered by taking resort to Condition (EA) of the Notification dated 09.07.04. At any rate, when the liability had not been lawfully determined, the question of recovery, by way of forfeiture or otherwise, did not arise at all. By no means, therefore, the impugned acts of appropriation can be sustained in law. WP(C) 1048 OF 2008 144. The petitioner No.1, in WP(C) No.591/2008, is the sole petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner has, admittedly, two industrial units, one at Guwahati, which falls within the State of Assam, and the other one at Agartala, which falls within the territorial limits of the State of Tripura. 145. WP(C) 1048 OF 2008 144. The petitioner No.1, in WP(C) No.591/2008, is the sole petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner has, admittedly, two industrial units, one at Guwahati, which falls within the State of Assam, and the other one at Agartala, which falls within the territorial limits of the State of Tripura. 145. Claiming to have made investments, on 'social projects', in the State of Assam, to the tune of Rs.57,23,8107-, for the quarter ending on 31.12.2004, and of another sum of Rs.09,25,58,736/-, for the quarter ending on 31.03.2005, the petitioner submitted the details of investments seeking requisite investment certificates from the I AC. The IAC did not approve, for the quarter ending on 31.12.2004, investments to the tune of Rs.34,54,981/- meaning thereby that the IAC approved, for the quarter ending on 31.12.2004, investments of a sum of Rs.22,68,829/- only. Similarly, the IAC did not also approve, for the quarter ending on 31.03.2005, investment to the tune of Rs.09,03,28,837/-. Thus, for the quarter ending on 31.03.2005, the IAC approved investments of a sum of Rs.22,29,899/-. The Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati, therefore, issued a letter, dated 11.03.2008, directing the petitioner to pay, within ten days from the date of receipt of the notice, the said two sums of money, namely, Rs.34,54,981/- and 09,03,28,837/- for the quarter, ending on 31.12.2004 and 31.03.2005, respectively, with appropriate interest. The IAC having turned down investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner on 'social projects', for the quarter, ending on 31.12.2004, to the tune of Rs.50,31,5357-, the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar, issued a letter, dated 11.03.2008, too, directing payment of the said sum of Rs.50,31,535/- to be made by the petitioner within a period often days. 146. The IAC having turned down investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner on 'social projects', for the quarter, ending on 31.12.2004, to the tune of Rs.50,31,5357-, the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar, issued a letter, dated 11.03.2008, too, directing payment of the said sum of Rs.50,31,535/- to be made by the petitioner within a period often days. 146. By making this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned both the order/letter, dated 11.03.2008, aforementioned, as illegal, without jurisdiction, unfair, contrary to the principles of natural justice and has accordingly sought for, inter alia, issuance of a writ, in the nature of certiorari, setting aside and quashing the impugned order/letter, dated 11.03.2008, aforementioned, the case of the writ petitioner being, in brief, as under: (i) In addition to the investments, which the petitioner had made, in plant and machinery, in terms of the two Notifications granting exemption (which we have already discussed above), the petitioner had also made certain investments, in "social projects", including that of the development, construction and maintenance of the School of Law and Sciences at Guwahati and a Museum at Kamakhya Temple, Guwahati, and, having so made investments, the petitioner had claimed to have made investments of Rs. 57,23,810/- and Rs. 9,25,58,7367-, in 'social projects', for the quarters ending at 31 st December, 2004, and 31st March, 2005, respectively. The petitioner further claimed to have made investments amounting to Rs. 50,31,5357-, in the 'social projects', including construction of School Building, sponsorship of 33rd National Games, at Guwahati, promotion and development of Indian Cultural Society and financial help to the flood affected people for the quarter ending on 31st December, 2004. (ii) As per the procedure, adopted by the IAC, a Verification Committee has been internally constituted, which conducts the site verification for examination, analysis and physical presence of the investments claimed to have been made in terms of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. The Verification Committee has accordingly conducted the site verification for all the investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner. The petitioner has not so far received any adverse finding or query from the said Committee with regard to the investments, which were claimed to have been made by the petitioner in terms of the notifications aforementioned. The Verification Committee has accordingly conducted the site verification for all the investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner. The petitioner has not so far received any adverse finding or query from the said Committee with regard to the investments, which were claimed to have been made by the petitioner in terms of the notifications aforementioned. (iii) However, on 6th February, 2008, the 1AC held its meeting for appraisal of various investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner. At the said meeting, the IAC has reached the conclusion that out of the investments, claimed to have been made by the petitioner, some investments, in the' social projects', are not valid investments and, as regard some of the other investments, the IAC has decided to obtain some more information and particulars from the petitioner. Following various decisions taken by the IAC in its meeting, held on 06.02.2008, with regard to the investments, which the petitioner had claimed to have been made, in 'social projects', the two demand letters/orders, as mentioned above, have been issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Guwahati, and the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Silchar, respectively. 147. Though, besides the Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the IAC and the Deputy Commissioners of the Central Excise, Agartala, were made parties to the writ petition, they have not filed any affidavit-in-opposition. It is only the respondent No. 4, namely, Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Guwahati, who has filed an affidavit-in-opposition seeking to sustain the two letters of demand, which stand impugned in the present writ petition. 148. In the light of the averments made by the respondent No. 4 in his said affidavit, the case of the respondent No. 4 emerges as under:- (a) The respondent is duty bound to realize the amount of duty, availed of by petitioner, which the petitioner has not invested in the manner as specified in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, aforementioned. The liability of a manufacturer, under the relevant Notifications, shall stand discharged only to the extent of investment as may be certified by the IAC; consequently, when the LAC has not certified an investment as an investment made under the scheme of the relevant Notifications, the contesting respondent is duty bound to recover the amount, which the petitioner may have availed of as the duty foregone. The recovery letters, in question, had been issued by the jurisdictional Central Excise Officers on the basis of the lAC's decision, dated 06-02-2008. Dealing with the reasons as to why the IAC has not approved the investments claimed to have been made by the petitioner, the contesting respondent has reproduced, in his affidavit, the decision of the IAC, reached on 06.02.2008, which reads as under: "(i) M/s Dharamapal Satyapal Ltd. Guwahati for the quarter ended on 31.12.04. M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., Guwahati has made claims of Rs. 56,46,060/- as investment in 'social projects'. On going through the details minutely, the Committee came to the conclusion that the details may be ascertained in respect of following investment- SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount inRs. 1 NE India Legal Education Society DS School of Law& Sciences 20,00,000 2. Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 2,68,829 In respect of the other following investment, it was found that claimants have not been able to establish that these are of durable and tangible in nature as stipulated in the notification DO. 08/04-CE dated 21.01.2004.: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 2,68,829 In respect of the other following investment, it was found that claimants have not been able to establish that these are of durable and tangible in nature as stipulated in the notification DO. 08/04-CE dated 21.01.2004.: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Assam Industrial Infrastru-ture Development Corporation Development of Bamunima-idan Industrial Estate 216450 2 Harpriaya Dev Shishu Mandir Salaries of Community Development 323000 3 B.N. Saikia Children Welfare Trust Welfare of Physically Handicapped & Mentally Challenged Children 690000 4 Ibemhal High School, Ron-gpur LP School, Cachar Development Work for social welfare of children community 100000 5 559, No. Saraspur LP School.Cachar Development Work for social welfare of children community 100000 6 43, Kanigram LP School, Cachar Development work for social welfare of children community 100000 7 Janta M. E. School, Cachar Development work for social welfare of children community 100000 8 Hazi Abdul Matlib M.E. School,Cachar Development work for social welfare of children community 100000 9 Tariniganj Model L.P. School,Cachar Development work for social welfare of children community 100000 10 Borakhal High School, Cachar Development work for social welfare of children community 100000 11 HCL Infosy-stems Ltd., Noida Procurement of IT equipment & provision for computer instructors in vari-.ous schools 481269 12 No. 43 Kandigram L. P. School Construction of school building 100000 13 HCL Infosyst-emsLtd., Guwahati Procurement of IT equipment & provision for computer instructors in various schools 43807 14 Haripriaya Dev Shishu Mandir Construction of school building 161500 15 XXXI Assam State Bridge Championship Donation for organization 50000 16 Krishna Enterprise, Guwahati Supply cum fitting of water pipe line 29404 17 Haripriaya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Salary Dec 05 & Jan 06 161500 18 Computer Education Programme, Margherita Teacher's Salary for 7 Schools 268829 19 Haripriaya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Salary Feb06 80750 20 Haripriaya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Sakary March 06 80750 The notification 08/04-CE stipulates as given below: (b) an amount equal to the sum of basic excise duty, special excise duty, additional excise duty and national Calamity Contingent duty, payable, but for the exemption in this notification, shall be utilized by the manufacturer only for investment in: (ii)" infrastructure or civil works or 'social projects' in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura (F) "the investment made under this notification shall not be allowed to be withdrawn before the expiry often years from the date on which the investment is made except in a case where the investment withdrawn is reinvested in the same manner as specified in this notification, in any one of the states mentioned in the condition (A). The asseessee has failed to satisfy the committee that these 'investments' will last for a period of at least 10 years. Moreover, the asseessee has not been able to establish how these expenditures could be verified and linked to 'social projects'. Under the circumstances, the Committee was of the view, that the assess has not been able to satisfy the genuineness of the claim and the same, therefore, could not be approved. (ii) M/S Dharamapal Satyapal Ltd., Guwahati for the quarter ended on 31.03.05. M/S Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., Guwahati has made claims of Rs. 9,25,58,736/-. On going through the details minutely, the Committee came to the conclusion that the details may be ascertained in respect of following 'investments: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 59.226 2 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 2,05,131 3 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 3,84,792 4 CM Relief Fund. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 15,00,000 In respect of other investment such as: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 59.226 2 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 2,05,131 3 Buildworth India (P) Ltd. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 3,84,792 4 CM Relief Fund. Museum at Kamakhya Temple 15,00,000 In respect of other investment such as: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Anwesha, Guwahati Children Book Fair 1,85,500 2 Silchar Senior Madrasa Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 3 78No.Ram-nagar LP School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 4 1235Chiruka-ndi L.P. School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 5 New Horizone School, Silchar Maintenance & Development of School 2,50,000 6 795 No. Panc-hgori L.P. School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 7 Harun Rashid L.P. School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 8 972 No. Thak-urbari Meher-purLP School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 9 83 No. Boali-pur L. P. School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 10 690 No. Boalijumukh L.P. School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 11 Haripriya Dev Shishu Mandii Teacher's Salary March 06 80,750 12 NE India Legal Education Society Development of Land& Construction of boundary wall 50,00,000 13 LalitJain High School, Athbasti Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 14 Hari Hamid Raja ME School Maintenance & Development of School 1,00,000 15 Global Education Management System Preparative fee for School management Services 13,24,842 16 IMRB International Location assessment study for school 1,01,000 17 YourselfA/C Income Tax TDS for payment credited to professional 78,709 18 YourselfA/C Income Tax TDS for payment credited to professional 5,982 19 Haripriya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Salary May 06 to Aug06 3,23,000 20 Global Education Management System TA relating to school at Guwahati 55,177 21 Emst.& Young PLtd. Advance against 1% success fee for school 5,29,717 22 IMRB International Location assessment study for school 1,00,646 23 National Games Secretariate Aquatic tea for National Games 4,00,000 24 Bharali Brothers (P) Ltd. PA System at KNCBP Auditorium 1,00,000 25 Bharali Brothers (P) Ltd. PA System at KNCBP Auditorium 1,44,496 26 Jajodia Engineering (P) Ltd. Auditorium chairs at KNCBP Auditorium 1,00,000 27 Veevek Trade & Agency Supply of materia & installation 50,000 28 Yourself A/C Income tax (TDS) TDS for payment credited to professional 5,982 29 Veevek Trade & Agency Supply of material & installation 44,042 30 Haripriya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Salary Sep 06 to Dec 06 3,23,000 31 Ernst. & Young PLtd. Fee for advisory service for schoo 5,29,717 32 Bharduage Construction Wood Work for LP School at Tinsukia 48,878 33 YourselfA/C Income Tax TDS for payment credited to professional 31,483 34 Haripriya Dev Shishu Mandir Teacher's Salary Jan 07 to Mar 07 2,42,250 35 HarpriyaDev Shishu Mandir Teacher's salary » 807,50 36 Jajodia Engineering (P) Ltd. Material for Auditorium 1,97,675 37 Roma Electricals L. P. School 1,44,684 38 Coastal Project (P)Ltd. Advance against EPC contract of school 5,70,00,551 39 Rajdhani Co. opp. Housing Society Ltd. Foracquization of land for school 30,00,551 40 YourselfA/C Income Tax (TDS) TDS for payment made to contractor 3,700 41 Rajdhani Co. opp. Housing Society Ltd. Foracquization of land for school 50,00,551 42 Rajdhani Co. opp. Housing Society Ltd. Foracquization of land for school 25,00,551 43 Rajdhani Co. opp. Housing Society Ltd. Foracquization of land for school 25,00,551 44 Rajdhani Co. opp Housing Society Ltd. Foracquization of land for school 33,43,551 45 Coastal Project (P) Ltd. Charges for development of land for school 55,00,551 It was found that the claimants have not been able to establish that above 'investments' made in 'social projects' are of durable and tangible nature as stipulated in the notification no. O8/04-Ce dated 21.01.2004 and the asseessee has failed to satisfy the Committee that these 'investments' will last for a period of at least 10 years. Moreover, the asseessee has not been able to establish how these expenditures could be verified and linked to 'social projects'. Under the circumstances, the Committee was of the view that the asseessee has not been able to satisfy the genuineness of the claim and the same, therefore, could not be approved. (iii) M/s Dharamapal Satyapal Ltd., Agartala for the quarter ended on 31.12.04 in 'social projects'. M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., Agartala has made claims of Rs. 50,31,5357-. On going through the details minutely, the committee came to the conclusion that the details may be ascertained in respect of following 'investments'. SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 HCL Infosys Ltd. Supply of 75 PCS for donatio: purpose 14,00,000 2 ChiefMinister ReliefFund, Assam Financial help to flood effected people 10,00,000 In respect of other investment such as: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Oswal Trading Co. SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 HCL Infosys Ltd. Supply of 75 PCS for donatio: purpose 14,00,000 2 ChiefMinister ReliefFund, Assam Financial help to flood effected people 10,00,000 In respect of other investment such as: SI. No. Where Invested Description of investment Amount in Rs. 1 Oswal Trading Co. Guwahati Development work of 'Kanal Barasi Bowa sil' park 7,89,285 2 Spicmacay, Guwahati Promotion & Development of Indian culture in Society 5,00,000 3 ABP Pvt. Ltd. ML 8,00,000 4 National Games Secretariat, Assam Sponsorship of National Games 2005, Guwahati 3,00,000 5 Hiranprava Dev Shishu Mandir, Silchar Construction of School Building 2,42,250 It was found that the above investment made in 'social projects' have not been found to be of durable and tangible in nature as stipulated in the notification no. 08/04-CE dated 21.01.2004 and the asseessee has failed to satisfy the Committee that these 'investments' will last for a period of at least 10 years. Moreover, the asseessee has not been able to establish how these expenditures could be verified and linked to 'social projects'. Under the circumstances, the Committee was of the view, that the asseessee has not been able to satisfy the genuineness of the claim and the same, therefore, could not be approved." 149. According to the affidavit of the respondent No. 4, the I AC, in its subsequent meeting, held on 15-03-2008, confirmed the proceeding of its earlier meeting, held on 06-02-2008,as under: "The minutes of the meeting held on 06.02.08 was confirmed with the observation of Member (Assam) that the Government effort to improve condition of the poor are not adequate in social sector therefore, private contribution for delivering good to people has become necessary. He further added that 'investments' made in Social Project which are visible and tangible should be made eligible. He expressed that investment in construction of school, Library, building etc. should qualify as an investment in Social Project, but not 'investments' like salary given to the teachers etc." 150. He further added that 'investments' made in Social Project which are visible and tangible should be made eligible. He expressed that investment in construction of school, Library, building etc. should qualify as an investment in Social Project, but not 'investments' like salary given to the teachers etc." 150. Reiterating as to why notices of demand have been issued to the petitioner, respondent No.4 has averred that in pursuance of the minutes of the meeting of the I AC, the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Government of India, directed, in its order, dated 28.02.2008, the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, to take necessary action for recovery of the amounts, which had not been approved by the IAC as investments made, in 'social projects', as specified in the Notifications aforementioned; and it was, thereafter, that the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati, and also the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar, have issued the letters of demand for payment of the amounts, which have not been approved by the IAC as investments made on social projects'. 151. The respondent No.4 further avers that the amount of duty foregone is required to be invested in the manner as specified in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. When the petitioner has failed, in its obligation to make the investments in terms of the Notifications aforementioned, the benefit of exemption is 'forfeited' to the extent of the investments not certified by the IAC and the said amounts are, therefore, required to be recovered from the petitioner by the Government. The later Notification, dated 09.07.2004, contains inbuilt provisions for recovery of the amount, which is not certified as an investment made in terms of the Notification, and no notice to show cause is required before the order directing recovery of the amount is made in terms of the provisions of 'forfeiture' embodied in the notification, dated 09.07.2004. In fact, the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer is duty bound to recover the amount, which the IAC has refused to approve as investment made under the scheme of the notifications. 152. Contesting the petitioner's claim that it had not been given any notice before the impugned notices of demand have been issued, respondent No.4 contends that the Notification, in question, do not provide any scope to the jurisdictional Excise Officer to question the decision of the IAC. 152. Contesting the petitioner's claim that it had not been given any notice before the impugned notices of demand have been issued, respondent No.4 contends that the Notification, in question, do not provide any scope to the jurisdictional Excise Officer to question the decision of the IAC. In these circumstances, the petitioner is incorrect in contending that the impugned letters of demand reflect non-application of mind. As the jurisdictional Excise Officer has no power to question the decision of the IAC, it falls entirely within the domain of the IAC to certify or not to certify an investment, claimed to have been made by a manufacturer, as an investment for the purposes specified in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, and once the IAC refuses to approve investment, the jurisdictional Excise Officer has to recover the amount, which the IAC does not approve. 153. The respondent No. 4 contends that IAC is constituted by Senior Officials from the Central Excise Department and Principal Secretaries from the respective States. Such a high power Committee has taken the decision having regard to all relevant facts and the submissions made by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have no option, but to recover the amount, which has not been certified by the IAC as investment. 154. The respondents, while issuing the impugned letters of demand, have not violated the principles of natural justice and fair play as contended by the petitioner inasmuch as the respondents have acted in terms of the provisions of the Notification and the decision taken by the I AC. In substance, the contesting respondent's case is that since there is no inbuilt mechanism in the two Notifications aforementioned for recovery of the amount not invested in the manner as specified in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, no formal show cause notice is required to be issued by the jurisdictional Excise Officer before recovering the amounts, which have not been approved as investment by the IAC or before forfeiting the amounts lying in the Escrow Account to the extent that the claim for 'investments' are not approved by the IAC. On the basis of the contentions, so raised, the contesting respondents seek dismissal of the writ petition. 155. On the basis of the contentions, so raised, the contesting respondents seek dismissal of the writ petition. 155. The contesting respondent submits that the petitioner's contention that the IAC has given no opportunity of hearing to the petitioner is incorrect inasmuch as the proceedings of the lAC's meeting, held on 06.02.08, clearly records that the petitioner was heard by the IAC in its said meeting, with regard to all the claims of investments having been made in 'social projects'. 156. While considering the present writ petition, it may be pointed out that the scheme of the two Notifications, namely, dated 21.01.2004, and dated 09.07.2004, have already been discussed in WP(C) No./591/2008, except, perhaps, some aspects, which were not very material for the purpose of disposal of the said writ petition. It is. now, time to take note of some of the left out aspects of the two notifications in the light of the factual setting of the present writ petition. 157. What is, however, necessary to bear in mind is that unlike the petitioners' case, in the writ petition, namely. WP(C) 591/2008, wherein unilateral directions to transfer various amounts, from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners, were given to the bankers by the jurisdictional Commissioner without any notice to, or without even knowledge of. the petitioners therein, and the amounts were accordingly transferred from the said accounts towards payment of alleged excise duty, the case, at hand, is one, wherein letters of demand have been issued by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, who are jurisdictional Excise Officers, purportedly in exercise of the powers conferred on them by condition E(A) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. These demand letters/orders have been issued under the direction of the jurisdictional Commissioner, who was, in turn, according to the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4. directed by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Government of India, to recover the amounts, covered by the impugned letters/orders of demand, from the petitioner, on the ground that the claim for' investments', which the petitioner had made, stood refused to be approved and certified by the IAC as 'investments', made under the schemes of the notifications, to the extent of the amounts aforementioned. 158. 158. Coupled with the above, it is necessary to note that in the earlier case, namely, WP(C) No.591/2008, the show-cause notices, under Sections 11A read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, had been issued, to the petitioners directing them to show cause as to why the amounts, covered by the notices, be not recovered from them on the ground that the IAC had not granted requisite 'Investment Certificates' within the prescribed period of time, and, while, pursuant to the notices, so issued, recovery proceedings were pending, the jurisdictional Commissioner, at Shillong, was directed by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Government of India, to forfeit the amounts in respect whereof, no certificate had been issued within the prescribed period, and, acting upon the directions, so given, the jurisdictional Commissioner, by taking resort to the provisions contained in condition E(A) of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. had issued directions to the bankers to transfer the amounts, as mentioned above, and the writ petitioners came to this Court after the amounts, so directed to be forfeited, already stood'forfeited'. 159. The present case is, however, one, wherein, immediately, upon receiving the letters/orders of demand of recovery, as described hereinbefore, the petitioner has approached this Court. Yet another distinguishing feature between the two cases, namely, WP(C) 591/2008 and the present one, is that in WP(C) 591/2008, while recovery proceeding, on the basis of the show-cause notices, issued under Section 11A and 11B of the Central Excise Act 1944, were still pending, the amounts, which form the subject-matter of controversy in the said writ petition, were 'forfeited' from Escrow Account of the petitioners without giving them any notice; whereas, in the case at hand, no recovery proceeding, under Section 11 A, has been initiated, but all the same, without giving any notice to show-cause, contesting respondents have claimed that they have issued the letters of demand in terms of the scheme of 'forfeiture' as stands embodied in the notification, dated 09.07.2004. 160. The common thread running through both the cases, therefore, remains that respondents dispute that any notice to show-cause is required to precede the act of 'forfeiture' of the amount, which is not certified by the IAC as an 'investment' made under the notification. 160. The common thread running through both the cases, therefore, remains that respondents dispute that any notice to show-cause is required to precede the act of 'forfeiture' of the amount, which is not certified by the IAC as an 'investment' made under the notification. I may, straightaway, point out that at great length, I have already discussed in WP(C) No. 59172008 and arrived at the conclusion that even under the provisions of 'forfeiture', as embodied in the scheme of exemption under the notification, dated 09.07.2004, the principles of natural justice bind the authorities concerned to give a notice to show cause as to why 'forfeiture' be not made on the ground that the IAC has refused to certify an investment, in respect whereof, such notice of 'forfeiture' is issued, and it is only upon giving such a notice that ultimate decision to 'forfeit' or not to 'forfeit' an amount can be taken by the authority concerned. While, in the earlier case, 'forfeiture' was ordered without any information to, or knowledge of, the petitioners, the case at hand is one, wherein, according to the contesting respondent, the amounts, claimed by the letters of demand, would be 'forfeited' from the Escrow Account if not paid within a period often days by the present petitioner. 161. In effect, thus, the respondents have, with the help of the letters/orders of demand aforementioned, threatened to 'forfeit' from the Escrow Account of the petitioner the amounts, so demanded, if the demands are not met within the said period often days. However, before making such a demand, no notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner. In the light of the decision, which I have reached in WP(C) No.591/2008, there can be no escape from the conclusion that these 'demand letters/orders, without having preceded by any notice to show cause, cannot stand scrutiny of law. 162. However, before making such a demand, no notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner. In the light of the decision, which I have reached in WP(C) No.591/2008, there can be no escape from the conclusion that these 'demand letters/orders, without having preceded by any notice to show cause, cannot stand scrutiny of law. 162. Turning to yet another aspect of the present writ petition, namely, as to whether the IAC was justified in rejecting the petitioner's proposal for granting 'investment certificates' in respect of the 'investments', which the petitioner claims to have made in 'social projects', on the ground that the 'investments' made are not durable and tangible, I am of the view that the nature of the grounds, on which the IAC has refused to approve the investments, invited this Court to take into account those aspects of the scheme of exemption, under the two Notifications, which have not been dealt with so far, be, now, discussed. 163. While dealing with the scheme of exemption under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, it needs to be, perhaps, borne in mind that nothing had been produced in the Writ Petition, namely, WP(C) 591/2008. to show that the claim for 'investments' made by the petitioners, in the said writ petition, had ever been disputed or had been turned down by the I AC as not 'certifiable'. As against this, the relevant proceedings of the meeting of the IAC are on record, in the present case, which show that the IAC has. while dealing with some of the claims of 'investment', neither rejected nor accepted that the 'investments ', as claimed, have been made and have, therefore, called for further particulars from the present petitioner. As against this, the relevant proceedings of the meeting of the IAC are on record, in the present case, which show that the IAC has. while dealing with some of the claims of 'investment', neither rejected nor accepted that the 'investments ', as claimed, have been made and have, therefore, called for further particulars from the present petitioner. The proceedings also show that some of the claims had not been accepted by the IAC on the ground (i) that the 1 AC has found that the investments could not be linked to any 'social project' meaning thereby that the investment, though not disputed, has not been treated as investment on 'social project', as mentioned in the notifications aforementioned, because of alleged lack of requisite materials on record, and (ii) that the investments were not found to be 'durable' and 'tangible' meaning thereby that the investments, though made, cannot be regarded as investments in 'social project" inasmuch as under the scheme of the notifications, investment have to be, according to the IAC, 'durable' and 'tangible'; whereas investments, made by the manufacturer in the present case, are. according to the IAC, not 'durable' and 'tangible'. Apart from these two categories of investments, there are. as already indicated hereinbefore, some investments, on which the IAC had decided to seek some more information from the petitioner. In such circumstances, whole of the amounts, which the petitioner has sought to get certified by the IAC as its investment, cannot be said to be recoverable. In fact, only those of the demands can. at best, be said to be recoverable, which, according to the IAC, did not qualify for being certified as 'investments' within the scheme of exemption, provided, of course, this Court, as contended by the writ petitioner, upholds the lAC's decision, (not to approve the 'investments'), as a decision validly arrived at in accordance with law. 164. at best, be said to be recoverable, which, according to the IAC, did not qualify for being certified as 'investments' within the scheme of exemption, provided, of course, this Court, as contended by the writ petitioner, upholds the lAC's decision, (not to approve the 'investments'), as a decision validly arrived at in accordance with law. 164. What, however, becomes abundantly clear from what has been pointed out above is that the impugned letters/orders of demand, issued by the respondent Nos.4 and 5, clearly suffer from complete non-application of mind and their exercise of power is in abdication of their authority inasmuch as they have merely carried out the directions issued by their superior authority and have not applied their own mind before issuing the impugned letters/orders of demand, when it is more than clear from what has been discussed above that the demand letters include demands for recovery of even those amounts in respect whereof, the IAC decided to call for further information or the I AC. due to alleged lack of materials on record, could not link the investments as investments made in 'social projects'. Viewed from this angle, it becomes clear that apart from the fact that the impugned letters/orders of demand are bad in law on the ground of the same having been issued without any notice to show cause, the impugned demand orders are also bad for the simple reason that these orders have been issued without application of mind inasmuch as even those amounts, which are not yet recoverable, have been demanded to be paid at the threat of 'forfeiture' of the demanded amounts from the Escrow Account of the petitioner. More importantly, the manner in which the demand orders have been issued clearly show that though jurisdictional Excise Officer exercise quasi-judicial power, while taking recourse to the provisions of 'forfeiture' embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, and while exercising such quasi-judicial powers, they cannot merely act on the directions of their superior, but on dispassionate application of mind to the facts of a given case, the jurisdictional Excise Officers have, in the present case, acted on the dictates of their superiors and have abdicated to that extent their own independent exercise of quasi judicial power. 165. 165. Be that as it may, while considering the scheme of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, it is also relevant to recall that prior to 09.07.2004, a manufacturer, having made 'investment', was required to submit, within a given quarter, the details of his 'investment' to the I AC and the I AC was required to take a decision, within the prescribed period of two months, as to whether it shall or shall not certify the 'investment' and, if the 1AC found any or all the 'investments', so made, as not certifiable, it could have refused to issue such certificate to the extent to which it did not either find the investment to have been made at all, or an investment, though made, did not, according to the IAC, qualify for exemption under the scheme of exemption. 166. In the post-Escrow Account period, however, on and after 09.07.2004, the scheme is different. There can be no examination from the end of the IAC, on the 'investments', which are made on the basis of withdrawal application submitted to the jurisdictional Commissioner, meaning thereby that the IAC cannot, since after 09.07.2004, re-examine as to whether an 'investment' made, with the permission so granted by the jurisdictional Commissioner, is or is not an 'investment', which can be or could have been allowed to be made, as 'investment', within the meaning of the Notifications, by a jurisdictional Commissioner. Such a scrutiny, I have already indicated above in WP(C) No. 591/2008, is, now, impermissible in law. 167. Coupled with the above, what cannot be ignored, and needs repetition, is that whenever an authority is required to pass such an order, which entails civil consequences, the person, who is likely to be affected by such an order, is required to be put to notice. Without giving any opportunity to such a person to show cause and have his say in such a matter, no order, adverse to the interest of such a person, can be passed, nor any decision, adverse to the interest of such a person, shall be taken. 168. Without giving any opportunity to such a person to show cause and have his say in such a matter, no order, adverse to the interest of such a person, can be passed, nor any decision, adverse to the interest of such a person, shall be taken. 168. I may say, at the cost of repetition, that if the IAC finds that the "investments" relate to pre-Escrow Account period, as is the case at hand, then, the examination, by the IAC, of the question, as to whether the 'investments', so made, fall under any of the permissible categories of 'investments' or not, would be a valid exercise of power under the notification, dated 21.01.2004. This exercise of power is subject to a caveat and the caveat is that if the IAC finds that an 'investment' or some of the 'investments' are not covered by any of the categories, mentioned in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, it cannot straightway reject the 'investments' as not certifiable. The principles of natural justice bind the IAC to give a notice to the manufacturer to show cause, clearly specifying, in the notice, as to why the 'investment' is, in the considered view of the IAC, not an 'investment' made in any of the allowable projects. 169. Coupled with the above, even though the I AC finds, in a given case, that the 'investments', claimed to have been made, are of 'doubtful' quality, it cannot straightway re-ject such 'investment' as an 'investment', which is not certifiable. When the IAC finds that the claim of investment is of 'doubtful quality', the opinion, which it so forms, or the view, which it so takes, must be treated as a tentative finding or opinion of the IAC and the IAC must allow the manufacturer to show cause against such a tentative finding of the IAC. What the IAC has to do, in such a case too, is that it has to issue notice, to the manufacturer concerned, stating therein the reasons, which did not satisfy the IAC that the details of 'investments', are correct. Only upon giving notice to show cause, in every case, as indicated hereinbefore, that necessary decision can be given either allowing the 'investment' as certifiable or disallowing the 'investment' as not certifiable. Only upon giving notice to show cause, in every case, as indicated hereinbefore, that necessary decision can be given either allowing the 'investment' as certifiable or disallowing the 'investment' as not certifiable. Whatever decision is, eventually, reached by the IAC, must be communicated, along with the reasons therefor, to the manufacturer so that the manufacturer knows as to why his claim for investment' has been rejected and he can, if required, take recourse to appropriate provisions of law. Extended logically, it would mean, as I have already discussed above, that when the I AC takes a decision refusing to approve an investment', the jurisdictional Excise Officer, in terms of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, or the jurisdictional Commissioner, in terms of the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, cannot straightway direct 'forfeiture' of the amount, which is not certified by the IAC. In such circumstances too, jurisdictional Commissioner, or the Jurisdictional Excise Officer, as the case may be, is required to issue notice to the manufacturer directing him to show cause as to why the amount, which has not been certified by the I AC, be not recovered from him in terms of the provisions of Section 11 Aread with the provisions of Section 11B, or be not 'forfeited' from the Escrow Account of the manufacturer in terms of the provisions contained in the notification, dated 09.07.2004, if the amount, sought to be recovered, relates to post Escrow Account period. 170. Reverting to the contesting respondents' contention that the petitioner had been heard by the IAC in its meeting, held on 06.02.08, with regard to the petitioner's claim of investments made in 'social projects' and before the petitioner's claim, on this score, was rejected, it may be pointed out that the relevant part of the minutes of the lAC's meeting, dated 06.02.2008, reads as under: "At the beginning of the meeting, it was informed that Brigadier M. Kumar, Territorial Head of M/s DSL, Bamunimaidan, Guwahati, was to attend the meeting of the I AC. The members including Chairman expressed surprise as to how the representatives of the claimants could be part of 1AC proceedings. On enquiry it was revealed that by mistake the office of the Chief Commissioner had, vide issuing letter C.No. IV(16)53/CCO/EMC/SH/2007/469-74 dated 28.01.08 for calling the IAC meeting, had inadvertently sent the letter to the Companies. The members including Chairman expressed surprise as to how the representatives of the claimants could be part of 1AC proceedings. On enquiry it was revealed that by mistake the office of the Chief Commissioner had, vide issuing letter C.No. IV(16)53/CCO/EMC/SH/2007/469-74 dated 28.01.08 for calling the IAC meeting, had inadvertently sent the letter to the Companies. Therefore, the Committee decided to give patient hearing to the representatives of the Companies later on but they could not be part of the IAC. Accordingly, Birg. M.Kumar, Sri Sanjay Goel and Sri Shashi Maheshwari were given opportunity to explain their points of view at the end of the IAC meeting. They requested the Committee to take a broader view in respect of the expenses already made especially in '"social projects'" and in future they would follow the guidelines very strictly and meticulously, if framed by the IAC. The Committee heard their point of view patiently and assured that the matter will be looked into on merits. Further, it is also on record in the minutes that: "The assesse has failed to satisfy the Committee that these 'investments' will last for a period of at least 10 years. Moreover, the assesses has not been able establish how these expenditures could be verified and linked to 'social projects'." 171. From the minutes of the IAC 's meeting, dated 06.02.08, reproduced above, what becomes transparent is that the IAC, at the beginning of the meeting, on 06.02.08, was taken aback on being informed that the petitioner's representative was also to attend the meeting of the IAC. This was seriously resented by the Chairman and other members of the IAC. On enquiry made by them, they found that by mistake, the petitioner's representative had been informed by the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise about the calling of the meeting inasmuch as a copy of the letter, calling the meeting, had been given to the petitioner too. On enquiry made by them, they found that by mistake, the petitioner's representative had been informed by the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise about the calling of the meeting inasmuch as a copy of the letter, calling the meeting, had been given to the petitioner too. The proceedings of the meeting more than clearly demonstrate that the petitioner was not to be associated, according to the IAC, in the decision making process of the LAC and the IAC did not, in fact, associate petitioner's representative in its meeting held on 06.02.08 and it was only after a decision had already been arrived at by rejecting the petitioner's claims of investment as mentioned above that the IAC called the petitioner's representative and, according to the IAC, the petitioner's representative was given an opportunity to explain their points of view and though the IAC assured the petitioner's representative that their point of view would be looked into on its merit, the decision of the IAC remained unaltered inasmuch as the petitioner had failed, in the view of the 1AC, to satisfy the Committee that the investments made by the petitioner on the 'social projects' would last for a period of. at least, ten years and that the petitioner had also failed to establish how these expenditures could be verified and linked to "social projects'. 172. From the narration of facts, as transpires from the minutes of the meeting of the IAC, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the IAC was not to associate, and did not, in fact, associate the petitioner in its decision making process inasmuch as the petitioner's representative was heard after the decision was already reached. Thus, apart from the fact that a dispassionate scrutiny of the said minutes leave enough room for doubt as to how effective the opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner's representative, when the IAC had resented even calling of the petitioner's representative to the said meetings; the hearing, if any, given to the petitioner's representative was post decisional hearing; whereas the hearing ought to have been pre decisional hearing. I have already pointed out above, while discussing the scheme of exemption, that when the IAC finds that a claim, by a manufacturer, as regards an investment already made, cannot be allowed, it must record its findings as tentative findings and shall reach a final decision in such a case only upon giving an opportunity of showing cause against its such tentative findings to the manufacturer. This would satisfy the requirements of pre decisional hearing. After the hearing so accorded, whatever decision is reached by the IAC shall be communicated to the petitioner. If the IAC decides not to allow the investment and/or not to grant investment certificate, it must assign its reasons therefor so that the manufacturer can, if so required, take recourse to appropriate provisions of law. 173. In the present case, the I AC had heard the petitioner's representative unwillingly and, that too, after it had already made up its mind that the investments, in question, are not allowable. No wonder, therefore, that the IAC has merely completed the formality of a hearing by simply mentioning, in the minutes of the proceedings, that the petitioner's representative was allowed to submit his point of view. The proceedings do not, however, give any indication as to what view point petitioner's representative presented before the IAC nor do the proceedings give any clear idea as to why the IAC did not agree with the point of view of the petitioner's representative. The minutes of the proceedings leave one to guess as to what really the point of view of the petitioner's representative was. Thus, till date, it remains unknown and shrouded in mystery as to what viewpoint of the petitioner was presented before the IAC. Hence, it is not difficult to infer that the respondents have not made complete disclosures of all the facts. The question, therefore, remains unanswered as to what was really heard and what petitioner's representative submitted. The proceedings, relied upon by the respondents, are too vague and cannot be made basis for confidently holding that an effective opportunity of hearing had, indeed, been given to the petitioner and that the IAC had taken into account the petitioner's point of view and still chose to reject the petitioner's claim made in this regard. 174. The averments, made by the petitioners, with regard to the quantum of' invest-ments', are not in dispute. 174. The averments, made by the petitioners, with regard to the quantum of' invest-ments', are not in dispute. In fact, there is not even a whisper, in the affidavit-in-opposition of the contesting respondents, nor even a particle of material, on record, to show that the petitioner has submitted any false statement as regard the 'investments" made. No wonder, therefore, that the IAC, in some cases, decided to obtain further information. We are not concerned, in the present writ petition, with those cases, wherein more information has been sought for except to the extent that the demand, raised by the impugned letters, could not have included those amounts, which are yet to be examined by the IAC. What we are concerned with, in the present case, is, however, the amounts, which the IAC has refused to certify as an 'investment' made within the meaning of the notifications without, however, disputing the fact that the petitioner had incurred the expenses, which it had claimed as the investments having been made in 'social projects'. In the light of the fact that the investment' has been made, the question, which falls for determination is as to whether certificate, in respect of the investment', so made, could have been refused to be granted by the IAC ? Bearing in mind the scheme of the exemption, as has been already discussed above, let me, now. turn to the merit of this aspect of the writ petitioner's case. 175. In the light of the scheme of exemption, which I have already discussed above, when I revert to the facts of the present case, what draws my attention is that the contesting respondents have reproduced the proceedings of the minutes of the lAC's meeting, held on 06.02.2008, wherein the decision was taken by the IAC that though the expenses had been incurred by the petitioner, the expenses, so incurred, did not qualify as investments in 'social projects' under the notifications of exemption. These proceedings have already been reproduced above. 176. From the proceedings, what transpire is that the IAC has, in many of the cases, not disapproved or rejected the petitioner's claim of investment in social projects, but has resolved to ascertain the validity of the claim, which the petitioner has made. These proceedings have already been reproduced above. 176. From the proceedings, what transpire is that the IAC has, in many of the cases, not disapproved or rejected the petitioner's claim of investment in social projects, but has resolved to ascertain the validity of the claim, which the petitioner has made. Obviously, such investments, in respect of which the IAC has not yet taken any final decision, either approving or rejecting the investments, letters/orders of demand (which are, admittedly, quite substantial), could not have been legally issued. In fact, this position could not be disputed at the time of hearing of this writ petition. Issuance of the impugned letters/orders of demand, thus, suffer from clear non-application of mind inasmuch as the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, as the affidavit, filed by the contesting respondents reveals, have done nothing except carrying out the orders of their superior, which, in the light of the scheme of the Notifications (which I have already discussed above), cannot be done irrespective of the fact as to whether the recovery, sought to be made, is under Section 11A read with Section 1 IB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, or such recovery is sought to be made by taking resort to the provisions of 'forfeiture', which stand embodied in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. 177. The second category of investments, which, however, the IAC has not approved and, as a matter of fact, rejected, are those, which, according to the IAC, are not 'durable' and 'tangible' in nature, because an 'investment', in order to qualify as an 'investment', under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, has to be, in the view of the IAC, permanent and visible in nature and must last for a period of, at least, ten years. The IAC seeks to derive support for this conclusion from Condition (F) to the Notification, though none of the Notifications, which we have discussed, mentions that an 'investment', in order to qualify as an' investment', under the category of 'social projects', shall be 'durable', 'tangible', 'visible' and/or 'permanent'. The IAC seeks to derive support for this conclusion from Condition (F) to the Notification, though none of the Notifications, which we have discussed, mentions that an 'investment', in order to qualify as an' investment', under the category of 'social projects', shall be 'durable', 'tangible', 'visible' and/or 'permanent'. Condition (F) of the said Notification, which the respondents rely upon, reads as under: "(F) the investment made under this notification shall not be allowed to be withdrawn before the expiry often years from the date on which the investment is made except in a case where the investment withdrawn is reinvested in the same manner as specified in this notification, in any one of the States mentioned in Condition (A) Provided that if the investment made under this notification is withdrawn before the expiry often years and is not reinvested as mentioned above, the duty which is equal to the amount so withdrawn and not so reinvested, shall be paid by the manufacturer on the date on which the investment is withdrawn." 178. Condition (F) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, postulates that the investment made under this notification shall not be allowed to be withdrawn before the expiry of a period often years from the date on which the investment has been made except in a case, where the investment withdrawn is reinvested in the same manner, as specified in this notification, in any one of the States mentioned in Condition (A), provided that when the investment, made under this notification, is withdrawn before the expiry often years and is not reinvested as mentioned above, the duty, which is equal to the amount so withdrawn and not so reinvested, shall be paid by the manufacturer on the date on which the investment is withdrawn. 179. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid condition of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, it is clearly seen that the Notification, nowhere, states that an 'investment' made shall have to last for a period often years. What the Condition (F) says is that an 'investment', if sought to be withdrawn, cannot be allowed to be withdrawn unless a period often years, from the date of the making of the 'investment', expires. What the Condition (F) says is that an 'investment', if sought to be withdrawn, cannot be allowed to be withdrawn unless a period often years, from the date of the making of the 'investment', expires. To put it a little differently, an' investment' may be made by a manufacturer on a project from which he can withdraw his 'investment'; but there can also be such an 'investment' by such a manufacturer, which 'investment' he can never withdraw. Does it, therefore, mean that if an 'investment' is made by a manufacturer on such a project from which he can never withdraw his 'investment', such a project would not qualify as an 'investment' under the Notification except, as mentioned above, for the purpose of re-investment. Does this mean that if a manufacturer makes' investment', on such a 'social project' from which he can never withdraw his investment, such an 'investment' shall not qualify as an' investment' within the meaning of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, though it is prudent and reasonable to infer that the Central Government's objective is to encourage more such investments in "social projects", which are not with drawable, or recoverable and are meant to be for ever? 180. Ordinarily, a manufacturer would prefer to make 'investment' in 'plant and machinery', or in' civil work', or on building' infrastructure', inasmuch as such nature of 'investments' would give him, apart from exemption from payment of excise duty, reasonable profit. When he is making fixed investments, he may, after enjoying the benefit of exemption from payment of excise duty, seek to transfer the 'plant and machinery' to some other place, or he may even seek to sell them and he may do the same, in the cases of 'infrastructure' or 'civil work' too, in the sense that he may, having obtained the benefit of excise duty exemption, sell off the 'infrastructure' and 'civil works', which he might have done, as had happened in the case of cigarette industries, which had been set up in the North East. Many cigarette manufacturing industries were set up in the North East pursuant to the Notifications No. 32/99-CE and 33/99-CE, both dated 08.07.99, issued by the Government of India, granting exemption from payment of excise duty to the manufacturers of some specified goods including cigarettes, tobacco, etc. Many cigarette manufacturing industries were set up in the North East pursuant to the Notifications No. 32/99-CE and 33/99-CE, both dated 08.07.99, issued by the Government of India, granting exemption from payment of excise duty to the manufacturers of some specified goods including cigarettes, tobacco, etc. These cigarette industries were, however, established by the manufacturers with the sole aim of obtaining excise duty exemption and no more. Consequently, the day the said exemption was withdrawn by the Government of India, the cigarette manufacturers wound up their industries and went away. So that an investment, which a manufacturer makes, is not withdrawn before expiry of a period often years and the investor does not run away after having taken the excise duty exemption, Condition (F) has been incorporated. This does not, however, mean that if a manufacturer comes forward to make an investment for the purpose of obtaining exemption from payment of excise duty, but, in the process, he does not seek to earn any profit and does not seek to withdraw, at any future point of time, the investment, which he seeks to so make, Condition (F) would debar him from making such investments. Such an interpretation of Condition (F) would defeat the objective of the excise duty exemption granted by the Government of India inasmuch as the exemption has been granted for the purpose of development of the North East Region by boosting its economic growth, by developing industries, including IT industry, and tourism. In fact, tourism, if properly developed, would not only improve the economy of this region, but can also change the commercial face of the region. 181. As already discussed, Condition (F) has been imposed so that having made some investment, and having obtained the benefit of exemption from payment of excise duty, a manufacturer shall not close the project on which he has made the investment. But, when the question of investment on a' social project' arises, there may be a manufacturer, who may be looking to make investment only on such a project, which would give him, apart from exemption of excise duty, some profit; whereas, there may be another manufacturer, who, being conscious of his social responsibility (rather national responsibility), would like to invest money, in the North East, not for earning profit, but as a social welfare measure and, in the process, merely earn the exemption from payment of excise duty. Whether the manufacturer of the later category should be discouraged and disentitled from receiving excise duty exemption? An answer to this question can be found only in the objective with which the Notifications have been issued. The Notifications give exemption, admittedly, for the purpose of augmenting economy and generating employment. If that be the underlying philosophy, a genuine investor, who makes an investment not for the purpose of earning profit, but for doing social work on such social projects, from which an 'investment', once made, can never be withdrawn, and, in the process, obtains excise duty exemption, but does not seek to ever withdraw his 'investment', such manufacturers must be, in the light of the objective of the Notifications, encouraged, not discouraged. Attributing such an interpretation to the word, 'investment', cannot be called irrational or impermissible in law, for, the word, 'investment' is not a word of any fixed meaning. In fact, the term 'investment' is recognised as a vague term and no general rule can be, or has been, laid down with respect to the meaning of the term 'investment'. The term, 'investment', has, over a period of time, ceased to have any technical definition and its meaning is frequently determined by the context in which the term,' investment', is used. 182. Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 48A, p. 214) reads: The word 'investment' is a vague term and no general rule can be laid down with respect to its meaning. The word has acquired no technical definition, and its meaning is frequently determined by the context. 183. The above definition clearly suggests that the meaning of the term 'investment' is dependent upon the context in which the term is used. Thus, as per Condition (B) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, a manufacturer, for claiming exemption of the excise duty, has to incur expenses in setting up 'plant and machinery', or in raising 'infrastructure', or in carrying out 'civil works', or in undertaking ' social projects'. The expenditures incurred, in any of these activities, in the form of' investment', would help the North East region. What, however, makes a 'social project 'distinct and different from all other projects, such as, setting up of 'plant and machinery' orraising of 'infrastructure' orcar-rying out of 'civil works', is that a 'social project' would, primarily, involve such activities, which are for the welfare of the society. 184. What, however, makes a 'social project 'distinct and different from all other projects, such as, setting up of 'plant and machinery' orraising of 'infrastructure' orcar-rying out of 'civil works', is that a 'social project' would, primarily, involve such activities, which are for the welfare of the society. 184. Thus, as far as 'social projects' are concerned, they are aimed at benefiting the society at large. Therefore, investment, in social projects, would include contributions towards any activity beneficial for the society, at large, such as promotion of education, sports, health, arts, preservation of culture, heritage, language, including various tribal dialects. 185. Let us assume, for a moment, that investment made on 'plant and machinery' in an industry, which was set up under the Notification aforementioned, has been completely destroyed in an earthquake or in any natural calamity. The 'plant and machinery' would no longer exist. Would it mean that the 'investment', which the manufacturer had made on setting up the industry, would be recovered, or become recoverable from him ? The answer to this question has to be an emphatic "no". It is, therefore, not necessary that the 'investment' must always and invariably last for, at least, ten years. What is necessary is that if an 'investment' is of a nature, which can be withdrawn, or is recoverable, by a manufacturer after excise duty exemption has been obtained, the manufacturer shall be debarred from withdrawing his investment unless a period often years expires and he can be allowed to withdraw his investment only for the purpose of making re-investment in the manner as is envisaged by the Notification. 186. If a holistic view is taken of the scheme of exemption, it becomes clear that the State, which has an obligation under the Directive Principles of State Policy, to undertake various welfare activities, may not have adequate means to undertake such activities. It is in order to help the State in such affairs that schemes of exemption, such as, the one at hand, are introduced. Say, for an instance, it is the fundamental right of every child to be educated. The State does not, however, have adequate fund to provide education to each and every child. The scheme, such as the one, at hand, aims at providing necessary support to the State. Say, for an instance, it is the fundamental right of every child to be educated. The State does not, however, have adequate fund to provide education to each and every child. The scheme, such as the one, at hand, aims at providing necessary support to the State. If, therefore, a manufacturer opens a school and runs it without profit, he, commercially construed, cannot be regarded to have made 'investment' if he provides free education. It is not really an' investment' from the end of the manufacturer, but it is an 'investment' from the end, and from the point of view, of the State inasmuch as the State is investing money on the children to make them grow up as educated, conscious and responsible citizens. The maintenance cost of the school, therefore, including payment of salary and allowances to the teachers of the school or its head would be 'investment' in the realm of 'social projects' and these 'investments' are in contrast to 'investments' in other projects, such as, investments in 'plant and machinery', investment in 'building infrastructure' and investments in carrying out civil works. 187. The term, 'investment', therefore, used in a scheme of the present nature, cannot be construed narrowly; rather, the term, ' investment', appearing in the scheme, in question, must be given a liberal interpretation, particularly, when the question of 'investment' on 'social projects' needs, or calls for or necessitates, such a liberal interpretation. It does not stand to reason that if a person spends money on a 'social project' and earns, apart from exemption of excise duty, some profit, he would receive the benefit of exemption, but a person, who does not earn profit, but merely obtains exemption from payment of excise duty and, in the process, helps the society by his welfare activities, shall be denied the benefit of the scheme of exemption. In view of the fact that the later category of persons are more useful for the society and the State, they need to be encouraged rather than the ones, who come and spend money only for the purpose of earning profits and enjoying exemption from payment of excise duty. 188. In view of the fact that the later category of persons are more useful for the society and the State, they need to be encouraged rather than the ones, who come and spend money only for the purpose of earning profits and enjoying exemption from payment of excise duty. 188. If, therefore, the IAC, in a given case, finds that a manufacturer claims to have made an 'investment' on a 'social project', which is not visible, it is still the duty of the IAC to verify whether such expenditures were really made or not, and, if, on verification, the expenditures, so claimed to have been made by the manufacturer, are found to be correct and genuine, it cannot be said that these would not be' investment' within the meaning of the scheme of exemption. To insist, therefore, that an 'investment', within the meaning of the Notifications, must be tangible or durable, or must last for a period of, at least, ten years, particularly, in a' social project', would really defeat the objects of the Notifications rather than giving life and meaning to the Notifications of exemptions. An interpretation, which would defeat the very object of the Notifications, has to be, therefore, eschewed, and a more meaningful, lively and thriving meaning has to be attributed to the term, 'investment', in the realm of' social project', so that a manufacturer is encouraged to spend more money, under the scheme of exemption, on 'social projects', which can prove more beneficial and helpful to the society, at large, rather than investments in other categories. 189. The term 'investment' can be interpreted both narrowly as well as liberally. The expenses, incurred by a manufacturer on 'social projects', which go towards the welfare of the society, must be treated as 'investments', for, such 'investments' are 'investments' of permanent nature in the sense that such expenses can never be recovered by the manufacturer. Thus, the expenses, so incurred, are really 'investments' so far as the State's interest is concerned. Because, unless such expenses are incurred, the State would be failing in its duty to give life to the Directive Principles of State Policy. Supposing there is an athlete, who has suffered injury and the State does not have adequate fund to spend on his treatment, but his treatment is necessary for the State to participate in an athletic competition. Because, unless such expenses are incurred, the State would be failing in its duty to give life to the Directive Principles of State Policy. Supposing there is an athlete, who has suffered injury and the State does not have adequate fund to spend on his treatment, but his treatment is necessary for the State to participate in an athletic competition. No manufacturer would, ordinarily, in such a case, come forward to spend money for treatment of the athlete on the ground that he would not, except, perhaps, exemption from payment of excise duty, receive any profit. Now, in such a situation, if a manufacturer, who is not keen to earn profit and would be contended if he receives exemption from payment of excise duty, spends money for the treatment of the athlete, can his expenses, which were not for earning any profit, be denied the status of 'investment' on the ground that though the expenses, incurred by him, are real, yet since his expenses cannot be seen, he has not earned any profit and cannot withdraw his expenses in future, his expenses shall not be regarded as 'investment'? Obviously, such a manufacturer has spent his money not for the purpose of recovering such expenses; but the expenses are still real. When the expenses incurred for earning profit, even for a limited period, can be regarded as 'investment', there is no reason as to why non-profit earning, non-recoverable and non-withdrawable expenses, incurred on a social activity, shall not be treated as 'investment', particularly, when the word, 'investment', as already discussed above, is a vague terms and, according to Corpus Juris Secundum, has no fixed meaning; rather, its meaning depends upon the context, in which the term is used. There can be readily given another illustration of expenses on "social projects".Supposing a manufacturer gives rupees one lakh to the Chief Minister's Relief Fund. Such a relief fund is not the personal fund of the Chief Minister. If the Government uses the fund, so made available by a manufacturer, for the purpose of giving computers to students, who are meritorious, so as to advance their career, such expenses, which the manufacturer has incurred, would not be recoverable or withdrawable by the manufacturer, but it is of greater benefit to the society. If the Government uses the fund, so made available by a manufacturer, for the purpose of giving computers to students, who are meritorious, so as to advance their career, such expenses, which the manufacturer has incurred, would not be recoverable or withdrawable by the manufacturer, but it is of greater benefit to the society. In such circumstances, non-recoverable and non-withdrawable expenses, incurred by the manufacturer, must nevertheless be regarded as 'investment' for the simple reason that as far as the expenses are concerned, they were directed towards the benefit of the society at large, though the expenses, so incurred, were not ever recoverable or withdrawable. In such circumstances, the provisions, as embodied in Condition (F), would not stand as a bar towards giving benefit of exemption under the scheme of the Notifications, in question. 190. If considered in the backdrop of the above discussion, one can also safely point out that the developmental activities, which the petitioner has carried out, and the expenses, which the petitioner has incurred in this regard, remain undisputed and, therefore, cannot but be regarded as investments in' social projects' inasmuch as these expenses are neither recoverable nor withdrawable. This Court fails to understand as to how expenses, incurred for the welfare of physically handicapped and mentally challenged children, can be refused to be treated as 'investment' under the present scheme of exemption, when the expenses, so incurred, are not in dispute. Similarly, one can also not reason out as to how one can refuse to recognize, as investments, the expenses, which the petitioner has incurred, in the present cases, on procurement of equipments relating to information technology including computers and supplies thereof to the needy students or when the petitioner bears the expenses of those, who act as instructors for making students learn how to operate computers. Why construction of school building or maintenance and development of schools, expenses incurred on children book fair, which help in developing interest of children in education, construction of boundary wall of schools, supply of chairs to institutional auditoriums or expenses incurred for preservation, protection and publicity of museum at Kamakhya, can be refused to be recognised and accepted as 'investments' made within the category of'social projects' under the present scheme, when the benefits receivable by the society is immense and the expenses incurred are not withdrawable. 191. 191. There appears to be also no visible reasons as to why the 'investment' made by the petitioner for the construction of boundary wall, development of land, which was purchased with prior permission from the concerned authority after making withdrawal from the Escrow Account, did not qualify as an 'investment' made in terms of Notification, dated 21.01.2004, in social projects. In this connection, it may be added that the cost of a fixed asset should comprise its purchase price and any attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use. Hence, the construction of boundary wall and development of land was necessary to bring the land purchased, with the due permission of the jurisdictional Commissioner, into working condition. 192. What surfaces from the above discussion is that Condition (F) would come into play only when an 'investment' is made with the aim of withdrawing such 'investment' in future or is withdrawable and/or recoverable. If an 'investment' is made with no objective of withdrawing an 'investment' in future, or when the investment' made is such, which is not ever withdrawable or recoverable, such an 'investment' would not fall within the ambit of Condition (F). Condition (F), therefore, has to be given a restricted meaning and must remain confined to only those 'investments', which are withdrawable in nature. Condition (F) shall, in other words, cover only those 'investments', which are withdrawable, and can be withdrawn at a future point of time. Logically, therefore, Condition (F) can be applied only in respect of those' investments', which are made by such a manufacturer, who is capable of withdrawing the "investments" after obtaining the exemption from payment of excise duty. Condition (F), thus, seeks to put a bar on such withdrawal of 'investments' before the period often years expires from the date of making of the investment. Condition (F) would not apply to the case of such a manufacturer, who makes 'investment' and, that too, in the realm of' social proj ects', with no object of ever withdrawing the 'investment', which he is making, or when his investment is not recoverable or withdrawable at all. The 'investment', made by the later category of investors, would be real 'investment', which the State would be looking for. This class of investors need to be encouraged rather than discouraged in the manner as the IAC seeks to have done. 193. The 'investment', made by the later category of investors, would be real 'investment', which the State would be looking for. This class of investors need to be encouraged rather than discouraged in the manner as the IAC seeks to have done. 193. In the case at hand, some of the investments made by the petitioners have been refused to be approved by the IAC, in its meeting, held on 06.02.2008. On applying the standard of legality, which ought to have been maintained with regard to the constitution of the I AC and the quorum prescribed therefor, there can remain no element of doubt (in the light of what has been noted and held even in WP (C) NO. 2814/08 that the proceedings of the meeting, held on 06.02.2008, were without jurisdiction inasmuch as those, who were not members of the IAC, had, according to the proceedings of the IAC, participated in the said meeting, and their views, having affected the outcome of the meeting, must be taken to have rendered the decisions, reached in the meeting, not only illegal, but inoperative in law. 194. I have already pointed out that the judicial review of an administrative action is directed not against merit of a decision, but against the decision making process. When, on a given set of facts, there can be two possible, but reasonable views and the administrator adopts one of such views, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, would not interfere with the decision of the administrator merely because the High Court takes the view that the view, which appeals to the High Court, would have been better to be adopted. What is, however, imperative for an administrator, in order to avoid interference with its decision by the process of judicial review, is that it must take into account, all factors, which are relevant for the purpose of taking the decision in a given case, and the administrator must keep excluded for the purview of its consideration every such factor, which is irrelevant. Examined on this principle, it becomes clear that the IAC ought to have, in the present set of facts, determined as to what the term 'investment' conveys, in general, and what the word 'investment', appearing in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, conveys, in particular. Examined on this principle, it becomes clear that the IAC ought to have, in the present set of facts, determined as to what the term 'investment' conveys, in general, and what the word 'investment', appearing in the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, conveys, in particular. The IAC ought to have determined as to when Condition (F) would be applicable and, further, whether the Conditions, stipulated in Condition (F), is invariable or depends on context. All these factors, which were relevant, have not, however, been taken into account by the I AC. The decision, thus, reached by the IAC, suffers from both, namely, non-application of mind to the relevant factors and its failure to recognize that the term' investment' as a term, whose meaning is variable and depends on the context of a given scheme. 195. What emerges from the above discussion is that the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise and Custom, Government of India, ought not to have directed the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, to recover whole of the amount, which the IAC has considered on 06.02.2008, particularly, when, as regards a substantial amount of money, the I AC had not even taken a final decision and wanted to ascertain the correctness and validity of the 'investments'. This apart, the IAC could not have brushed aside the petitioner's 'investments' on 'social projects', on the ground, as discussed above, that the 'investments' are not durable and tangible. Above all, before the decision to reject the petitioner's claim for 'investment', as not fit for approval was taken, the LAC ought to have given, against its tentative findings, reached in this regard, an opportunity to the petitioner to have its say against such tentative findings of the IAC. Without any notice to show cause having been issued against the action of' forfeiture', which the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati, and Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar, intended to resort to, no demand letters, on the threat of forfeiture, could have been issued by the respondents aforementioned. This apart, and, as already discussed above, the actions of the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati and Silchar, suffer from complete abdication of their own authority in the matter inasmuch as they, upon giving notice, as discussed in the earlier case, ought to have determined the liability of the petitioner and, then, take consequential action of 'forfeiture', if so required and justifiable in law. WP(Q2814OF2008 196. WP(Q2814OF2008 196. The three writ petitioners herein are also petitioners in WP(C) No.591/2008. It is, therefore, not necessary to re-describe as to what the legal status of these three petitioners is. Suffice it to point out that even in this writ petition, the subject-matter is scope and ambit of the three notifications, whose interpretation form the foundation of the present series of writ petitions. 197. Bearing in mind that the three writ petitioners have, admittedly, industrial units established and functioning under the notifications aforementioned and are eligible to claim exemption from payment of excise duty if their investments are found to be covered by the scheme of exemption as embodied in the notifications, dated 21.01.2004, read with the notification, dated 09.07.2004, let me point out, at the very outset, as to what this writ petition aims at. 198. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have put to challenge, amongst others, two trade notices, namely, trade notice No. 14/2004 and 05/2006-CE, dated 05.03.2004 and 27.03.2006, respectively, issued by respondent No.3, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, as ultra vires and illegal on the ground that the trade notices run counter to the three notifications, dated 25.08.2003, 21.01.2004 and 09.07.2004, aforementioned, which form subject-matter of discussion even in WP(C) No.591/2008 199. By this writ petition, the petitioners have also put to challenge the proceedings of various meetings of the I AC on the ground that the meetings were held and the decisions were taken in the name of the I AC by persons, who were not competent to be members of the IAC, and, for the purpose of such meetings, the IAC, which took the impugned decisions or issued the impugned notices/directions, cannot be said to have been a legally constituted body as warranted by the notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the notification, dated 09.07.2004. 200. 200. Resisting the writ petition, the contesting respondents have submitted to the effect, inter alia, that issuance of the trade notices were within the competence of the IAC and consistent with the scope and spirit of the notifications aforementioned and, further, that the meetings held by the 1AC, either in the absence of one or more of the members of the IAC or in the presence of one or more such persons, who are not covered by the relevant notifications, did not lack jurisdiction to take decision on various issues, which have been decided in these meetings. 201. Having laid out the area of controversy, which forms the subject-matter of this writ petition, let me, first, turn to the two trade notices, which form the subject-mater of challenge in this writ petition. The prominent one between these two notices is the notice, dated 05.03.2004. For the sake of convenience, this notice is reproduced hereinbelow: "Trade Notice No. 14/2004, dated 5th March, 2004. Attention of the Trade and all concerned is invited to the Notification No. 8/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004, issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs, New Delhi. The manufacturers of commodities falling under Tariff sub-heading Nos. 2401.90,2402.00, 2404.41,2404.49,2404.50 or 2404.99 and fulfilling the conditions laid down in Clause A of the Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21 st January 2004, clearing their goods without payment of Central Excise duty (hereinafter called beneficiary unit), shall have to utilize the total duty payable, but for the exemption in the said Notification, only for investment in - (i) plant and machinery in a manufacturing unit which is located in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur. Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura; or (ii) infrastructure or civil works or social projects in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura; The above investment shall be made before expiry of six months from the end of each quarter. The manufacturer shall provide all details relating to the investment made, within one month after the expiry of the period of six months referred to above to the Committee formed for this purpose as mentioned below: (i) Chairman: - The Chief Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Shillong Zone, Crescent Building, MG Road, Shillong. The manufacturer shall provide all details relating to the investment made, within one month after the expiry of the period of six months referred to above to the Committee formed for this purpose as mentioned below: (i) Chairman: - The Chief Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Shillong Zone, Crescent Building, MG Road, Shillong. (ii) Member:- Principal Secretary/Commissioner/Secretary of the Department of Industries, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura as the case may be where the beneficiary unit is located. (iii) Member:- Principal Secretary/Commissioner/Secretary of the Department of Industries, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura as the case may be where the investment is made by the beneficiary unit. (iv) Member-Secretary:- Commissioner. Central Excise, Shillong/Dibrugarh, as the case may be where the beneficiary unit is located. The first quarter in terms of the Notification No. 69/2003-CE, dated 25th August 2003 (subsequently superseded by the Notification No. 8/2004-CE, dated 21.01.2004) starts from 25th August 2003 and has ended on 25th November, 2003. thereafter, each quarter will be counted from 25th November, 2003 and so on and so forth. The beneficiary unit shall produce the first investment report before 25th June 2004 and subsequently, before expiry of each quarter from the above date. Investment report should be supported by the material documents to establish the fact of investment. If the Committee is satisfied that the investment as specified above has been made, it shall issue a certificate to this effect to the manufacturer within a period of three weeks. The manufacturer shall produce the certificate to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within a period of two weeks from the date of issue of the certificate. The investment so made shall not be allowed to be withdrawn before expiry often years from the date on which the investment is made except in a case where the investment withdrawn is reinvested in the same manner as specified in the said Notification, in any of the States mentioned above. If the investment made under the said notification is withdrawn before the expiry often years and is not invested as mentioned above, the duty, which is equal to the amount so withdrawn and not so reinvested, shall be paid by the beneficiary unit on the date on which the investment is withdrawn." 202. If the investment made under the said notification is withdrawn before the expiry often years and is not invested as mentioned above, the duty, which is equal to the amount so withdrawn and not so reinvested, shall be paid by the beneficiary unit on the date on which the investment is withdrawn." 202. While considering the contents of the trade notice, dated 05.03.2004, it needs to be recalled that I have already pointed out above that the notification, dated 21.01.2004, clearly spells out as to who would constitute the IAC inasmuch as the condition (D) of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, clearly lays down that the 1AC shall consist of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, in which the industrial unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, in which the 'investment' is made. 203. I have also pointed out that though the later notification, dated 09.07.2004, introduced some changes in the earlier notification, dated 21.01.2004, the fact remains that as regard the members constituting the IAC, no change was made by the notification, dated 09.07.2004, but by a notification, issued, on 12.01.2009, by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), the constitution of the 1AC has been modified by making it clear that such Committee shall consist of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made and, further, that in place of the Principal Secretary, the Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State concerned can act as a member of the IAC. 204. What transpires from the above discussion is that since 21.01.2004, (when the said notification had come into force) until 12.01.2009, when the Notification, dated 12.01.2009, was issued by the Government of India, the I AC could not have included anyone other than the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong. 204. What transpires from the above discussion is that since 21.01.2004, (when the said notification had come into force) until 12.01.2009, when the Notification, dated 12.01.2009, was issued by the Government of India, the I AC could not have included anyone other than the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong. the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, in which the industrial unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made; and it is only on and after 12.01.2009 that the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of a given State can be replaced by the Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State concerned as a member of the IAC. Logically extended, it would mean that until issuance of the notification, dated 12.01.2009, the IAC was to constitute of only the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, where the industrial unit concerned is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, where the industrial unit concerned has made investment. 205. From a perusal of the trade notice, dated 05.03.2004, it is seen that the Committee has been reconstituted by the Chief Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Shillong Zone, with him as Chairman of the IAC, and the Principal Secretary/Commissioner/Secretary of the Department of Industries, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland or Tripura, as the case may be, where the beneficiary unit is either located or where the investment is made by the beneficiary unit, as the members of the IAC. 206. Moreover, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong/Dibrugarh, as the case may be, where the beneficiary unit is located, has been made a member secretary of the said Committee. However, as per notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the notification, dated 09.07.2004, the IAC could not have been constituted by anyone other than the Government of India, for, the said Notifications were issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 5 A (1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. and none other than the Central Government could have amended the constitution of the IAC. This aspect of the case would become clearer as I proceed further. and none other than the Central Government could have amended the constitution of the IAC. This aspect of the case would become clearer as I proceed further. Suffice it to, however, reiterate here that until 12.01.2009, the IAC could not have been comprised of except the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, where the industrial unit concerned is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, where 'investment' has been made. No wonder, therefore, that the Central Government, in order to enable the Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of an eligible State to participate in the proceedings of the IAC, had to issue a Notification, in exercise of its powers under Section 5A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Notification, dated 12.01.2009, aforementioned, being such a Notification. 207. Further, there is no provision, in the notifications aforementioned, empowering the IAC to appoint any person as member Secretary as has been done under the impugned trade notice. It, therefore, clearly follows that the IAC has not been legally constituted by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, and all the decisions, taken by such a body, must be treated as ultra vires and beyond its jurisdiction. 208. Had it been legally possible for the IAC or the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, to reconstitute the Committee according to its own convenience, the question of the Central Government reconstituting the Committee or amending the provisions embodied in the notifications, relating to constitution of the IAC, by taking resort to the provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 5Aof the Central Excise Act, 1944, could not have arisen. It needs to be remembered that Sub-Section (1) of Section 5A empowers the Central Government to grant exemption from payment of excise duty either absolutely or subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, which is required to be issued, in this regard, by the Central Government. The exemption, in the present case, has been granted subject to certain conditions. One of such conditions, as already indicated above, is verification of a manufacturer's claim of investment by a body, which the Central Government has notified and which one popularly calls, now, as the Investment Appraisal Committee (in short, 'the IAC'). The exemption, in the present case, has been granted subject to certain conditions. One of such conditions, as already indicated above, is verification of a manufacturer's claim of investment by a body, which the Central Government has notified and which one popularly calls, now, as the Investment Appraisal Committee (in short, 'the IAC'). This body is, thus, a statutory body and its constitution could not have been varied by anyone other than the Central Government itself and it is for this reason that in order to enable a Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of a State to act, in place of the Principal Secretary of the said Department, as a member of the IAC, necessary amendment had to be made by the Central Government by the Notification, dated 12.01.2009, in exercise of its powers, amongst others, under Sub-Section(1) of Section 5 A. 209. There can. therefore, be no doubt that the impugned trade notice, dated 05.03.2004, is wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the IAC and this trade notice must be treated as ultra vires, illegal and inoperative in law and the decisions taken by the said body have to be, strictly speaking, treated as nonest in law. 210. Let me, now, come to the trade notice, dated 27.03.2006. This trade notice reads as under: "Trade Notice No. 05/2006-CE. dated 27th March, 2006. The manufacturing units (gutka/zarda) availing the benefit of exemption under the Notification 08/04-CE are hereby informed that the Investment Appraisal Committee in the meeting held on 16th March, 2006 has laid down the following investment guidelines for compliance: 1. investment in plant and machinery: (i) Investment in plaint and machinery should be in relation to new investment for setting up of industrial unit in the North East Region. It should not include investment made for replacement of parts and/or machinery in an existing unit or towards improvements in the existing factory unless appropriate increase in installed capacity is undertaken bearing in mind the NE1P. (ii) Investment claims on account of expenses incurred towards purchase of replaceable parts, consumable stores, tools, jigs etc will not be admissible as investment in an existing unit as they do not add to capacity. (ii) Investment claims on account of expenses incurred towards purchase of replaceable parts, consumable stores, tools, jigs etc will not be admissible as investment in an existing unit as they do not add to capacity. However, the same will be admissible when incurred on expansion of a project in terms of the NEIP or in a new industrial unit at the time of setting up of plant on case to case basis on merit. 2- Investment in social projects: Investment claims of expenditure incurred in social projects will be measured against the community orientation of the project undertaken as well as the permanent and visible asset generation involved in the projects. The following items will not be considered as investment: (i) Donation to any social project not intended for North East Region, by any organization. (ii) Doiuuion/Expenditureto an NGO/other social organi/,ation whose accounts are not audited. (iii) Donation/Expenditure to an NGO/other social organization, who do not undertake to invest the money in community development of visible nature or for creation of social infrastructure. (iv) Payment/sponsorship made to any individual/organization for contingent expenses or towards cultural/social events, celebrations of festivals etc. (v) Donation to political parties or social organization/bodies with political affiliation. (vi) Investment made towards social projects, which are not permanent/durable in nature for at least ten years. The above list is not exhaustive. The Committee will on a case-to-casc basis will consider the claims of in vestment on social projects. 3- Procedure of investment claims: Following guidelines are issued for making investment claims: (i) The units shall submit to the Members of the Investment Appraisal Committee, jurisdictional Commissioner of Central Excise and the jurisdictional Asstt. Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner beforehand a complete and approved project report containing the technical and financial details with reference to the investment planned. (ii) The units should also submit separated modules of such project containing the time period specified for the implementation of the project to enable easy verification by the department staff. (iii) The claims of withdrawal of amount from the Escrow Account may be made in relation to the technical and financial requirements as per the project report submitted. (iv) The claims of investment may be made as per the project report submitted. (v) Investment claims in plant and machinery will be considered for admission only on the basis of verification of the plant and machinery on the ground." 211. (iv) The claims of investment may be made as per the project report submitted. (v) Investment claims in plant and machinery will be considered for admission only on the basis of verification of the plant and machinery on the ground." 211. As one can see, this trade notice, dated 27.03.2006, provides, inter alia, that an 'investment', made towards 'social projects', which are not 'permanent' or 'durable' in nature for, at least, ten years, would not be eligible for exemption. However, no such condition was imposed in the original notification, dated 21.01.2004, nor has any such condition been imposed by the subsequent notification, dated 09.07.2004. Moreover, no such power has been given to the 1AC to formulate or lay down guidelines in this behalf. In fact, the power to clarify the scope or applicability of a notification of exemption vests, in the light of the provisions of Section 5A(2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, in the Central Government. Thus, the trade notice, dated 27.03.2006, is beyond the scope of the authority of the I AC and cannot, therefore, be sustained. 212. Furthermore, I have already discussed, pointed out and held, in WP(C) No. 1048/2008, that in the light of the scheme of the notifications aforementioned, it cannot be said that an' investment, in order to qualify as an 'investment' in 'social projects,' would have to be such as would not be possible to withdraw before expiry of a period often years unless permitted by the authority concerned for the purpose of making 're-investment'. I have also held that in order to qualify as an 'investment' in social projects, it is not necessary that the expenses incurred, towards execution of 'social projects' have to be, in all cases, permanent, durable and tangible as has been ill-conceived by the IAC. Viewed from this angle too, the impugned notification, dated 27.03.2006, cannot stand scrutiny of law. I have also held that in order to qualify as an 'investment' in social projects, it is not necessary that the expenses incurred, towards execution of 'social projects' have to be, in all cases, permanent, durable and tangible as has been ill-conceived by the IAC. Viewed from this angle too, the impugned notification, dated 27.03.2006, cannot stand scrutiny of law. In fact, if it were so, the Central Government itself, in exercise of its powers under Section 5A(2A), could have issued a Notification, either clarifying the scope of 'investment' in 'social projects' or restricting the meaning of the term 'investment' in respect of 'social projects', by making it clear that expenses, which a manufacturer incurs on a social project or activity, would not qualify as 'investment' even if the expenses are of such a nature, which can, at no future point of time, be withdrawn or recovered by the manufacturer. One must remember, in this regard, that the power to grant exemption from payment of the duty of excise or the power to clarify the scope or applicability of a scheme of such exemption or the power to impose any new condition on such scheme of exemption rests with the Central Government inasmuch as it is none, except the Central Government, who can do so by issuing a suitable notification, either under Section 5 A( 1) or under Section 5A(2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as the facts of a given case may warrant. 213. It is also established position of law that executive instructions ought to be in consonance with the statute, rule or notification, whereunder the executive instructions are issued. No executive instruction can go beyond the scope underlying the statute, rule or notification, whereunder the notification is issued. (See State of 'M.P. Vs. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150). 214.I have already pointed out and held above that until before issuance of the notification, dated 12.01.2009, the IAC could have comprised of none other than Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State, in which the industrial unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State in which the 'investment' is made. 215. 215. However, a bare perusal of the minutes of the meetings, held from 18.08.2004 to 25.03.2008, shows that the IAC has rarely been constituted correctly and in terms of the notifications aforementioned for the purpose of holding such meetings. It may be mentioned here that out of the fourteen meetings held on different dates, during the period from 18.08.2004 to 25.03.2008, the IAC was, on none of the occasions, stood constituted in terms of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with Notification, dated 09.07.2004, inasmuch as these meetings, as I would show, were attended either in absence of those, who ought to have attended the meeting or were attended by those, who were not qualified to attend the meetings of the 1AC, or were attended by those, who were competent to attend the meetings, but were not competent to attend such meetings along with those, who were not competent to become part of the IAC and could not have, therefore, been legally associated with the proceedings of the IAC. 216. Moreover, in the absence of a quorum having been prescribed by the relevant Notifications, no meeting of the IAC could have been held without the presence of all the members or in the presence of persons other than those, who are members of the IAC in terms of the Notification, dated 21.01.2004. There is nothing, in the proceedings of these meetings that the persons, who were not members of the I AC, had not participated in the proceedings. Such being the situation, the I AC could not have objected, as it had done in the case of WP(C) No. 1048/2008 (which I have already discussed, when the office of the Central Excise. Shillong, had issued a letter to one of the petitioners informing them about the meeting and the representatives of the petitioner concerned happened to arrive at the venue of the meeting for the purpose of being available there). 217. Be that as it may, suffice it to point out, at this stage, that in the absence of persons, who were members of the I AC, and also, in the presence of persons, who were not members of the IAC, the meetings, which have been held between 18.08.2004 and 25.03.2008. 217. Be that as it may, suffice it to point out, at this stage, that in the absence of persons, who were members of the I AC, and also, in the presence of persons, who were not members of the IAC, the meetings, which have been held between 18.08.2004 and 25.03.2008. which includes the meeting, wherein the IAC had decided not to approve some of the 'investments' of the petitioner No. 1 herein, made on 'social projects', as not 'durable' and 'tangible', must be held to be ultra vires, and the decisions, reached in such meetings, cannot be regarded as decisions of the IAC. There being, as already discussed above, no quorum prescribed for a meeting of the IAC, the three persons, namely. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries, where the industrial unit is located, and the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries, where the investment, under the schemes of the notifications, is made, ought to have constituted the Committee till 12.01.2009 and, in the absence of anyone of them, or in the presence of anyone else, the quorum could not have been said to be complete. It was for this reason that the subsequent amendment has been made by the Central Government, as already discussed above, by way of its Notification, dated 12.01.2009, aforementioned. Thus, the decisions, taken by the IAC in all its meetings, held between 18.08.2004 and 25.03.2008, were wholly illegal and the proceedings of these meetings cannot be sustained. 218.1 may also mention that it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, at the time of hearing of this writ petition, that since it was difficult for the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State to attend the meetings of the IAC, the matter was brought to the notice of the Central Board of Excise and Customs and, accordingly, the notification, dated 12.01.2009, has been issued making it possible for the Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of a given State to represent the Principal Secretary of the said Department. To my mind, rather than helping the respondents, the notification, dated 12.01.2009, thus, cuts the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. To my mind, rather than helping the respondents, the notification, dated 12.01.2009, thus, cuts the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. Had it been, as already pointed out above, legally permissible for the IAC to make the Commissioner or Secretary or anyone other than the Principal Secretary. Department of Industries of a State Government, to act as a Member of the I AC in its proceedings, the notification, dated 12.01.2009, amending the composition of the IAC, was not at all necessary. The notification, dated 12.01.2009, cannot, therefore, rectify the inherent defects in the constitution of the I AC and the meetings held prior to the issuance of the notification, dated 12.01.2009. 219. It is clear that when, even in the case of a Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries of the State Government, the Central Government had to issue a notification amending the original provisions as regards constitution of the IAC by including Commissioner or Secretary of the Department of Industries as a member of the IAC so as to enable the Commissioner or Secretary, as the case may be, to attend a meeting of the IAC as a member in place of the Principal Secretary of the said Department, if the situation so warranted, General Manager, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura, attending the meeting of the IAC as a person, qualified to attend such a meeting, could not have arisen at all, particularly, when the General Manager, Department of Industries and Commerce, of none of the State Governments, has been made a member of the IAC even by the Central Government under its subsequent Notification, dated 12.01.2009. This apart, the Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, and/or the Commissioner of Central Excise, Dibaigarh, could not have participated in the said meeting. 220. Let me, now, narrate the list of the persons, who had attended the meetings of the IAC during the period aforementioned so as to examine and determine if the decisions, in these meetings, can be treated to be the decisions, reached by a duly and validly constituted IAC in terms of the notifications of the Government. The attendance, in the meetings, were as under: Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials. who were not member of the IAC. The attendance, in the meetings, were as under: Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials. who were not member of the IAC. but attended meeting 18.8.04 Chief Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Commissi- General Manager, Department of Industries and Commer- oner & Secretary, Department of Industries. Government of Assam, and General ce, Government of Assam. General Manager, Department of Industries and Manager. Department of Industries and Commerce on behalf Commerce. Government of Tripura. and the Commissioner of of Commissioner & Central Excise, Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce. Govern- Shillong. Officials, who were members of the IAC, ment of Tripura. The meeting was also att- but did not attend thejmeetjng. ended by the Comm- Principal Secretary, Commissioner. Officials, who were issioner of Central Department of Central Excise, members of the IAC, Excise, Shillong. Industries. Govern- Shillong. but did not attend the ment of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials, who were not member of the IAC, but attended meeting Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. 29.11.04 Chief Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs, Shillong, Additional Chief Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Guwa-hati. Additional Sec- Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials, who were not member of the IAC. but attended meeting Secretary, Government of Assam, Guwa-hati, Additional Secretary, Home and Industris and Commerce, Government of Tripura, Agartala, Commissioner Central Excise. Shillong and the Commi- retary, Home and Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, Agartala, Commissioner Central Excise, Shillong, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Officials, who were 08.04.05 Chief Commissioner, of Central Excise & Customs, Shillong, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam. Guwahati, Commissioner & Secretary, Department of Industries & Commerce. Govern- Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam. Guwahati, Commissioner & Secretary. Department of Industries & Commerce. Government of Tripura. Agartala and the Commissioner Cent- ssioner, Central members of the IAC, ment of Tripura. ral Excise, Dibrugarh. Excise, Dibrugarh but did not attend the Agartala, and the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- Commissioner Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Officials, who were stries, Government members of the IAC, of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. but did not attend thenieeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Industries. ral Excise, Dibrugarh. Excise, Dibrugarh but did not attend the Agartala, and the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- Commissioner Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Officials, who were stries, Government members of the IAC, of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. but did not attend thenieeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Industries. Government Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials, who were not member of the IAC. but attended meeting of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government 07 01 05 AHHilinnal Phipf of Tripura. Central Excise & Customs. Shillong, Additional Chief Secretary, Governm- Secretary, Government of Assam, Guwahali. Additional Secretary, Depart- Date of meeting of the IAC Officials who attended the meeting Officials, who were not member of the IAC, but attended meeting ent of Assam, Guw-ahati. Additional Secretary. Department of Industries & Commerce, Government of Tripura, Agartala. and th'e ment of Industries & Commerce, Government of Tripura, Agartala, and the Commissioner, Central Excise. Shillong. 15.07.05 Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Shillong, Additional Chief Secretary. Government of Assam, Guwahati, Commissioner Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Guwahati, Commissioner Central Excise, Dibrugarh. and the Commissioner. Central Central Excise, Dib- Excise. Shillong. rugarh, and the Com- missioner, Central Excise, Shillong. Of ficja.kjjy ho _w ere members of the IAC, the_rneeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Govern- ment of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC. but attended IAC meeting 25.08.05 Chief Commissioner Joint Secretary, Ind- of Central Excise and ustries & Commerce. Customs. Shillong, Government of Tri- Joint Secretary, Ind- pura, Agartala. Add- ustries & Commerce, itional Commissioner. Government of Tri- Central Excise, Shill- pura, Agartala, Addi- ong, and the General tional Commissioner, Manager. District Central Excise, Shill- Industries Centre, ong. and the General West Agartala, Manager, District Tripura. Industries Centre, West Agartala, Tripura. Officials, who were members of the IAC, but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- stries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- stries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended IAC meeting 08.12.05 Chief Commissioner Additional Chief of Central Excise & Secretary. Governm- Customs, Shillong. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- stries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- stries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended IAC meeting 08.12.05 Chief Commissioner Additional Chief of Central Excise & Secretary. Governm- Customs, Shillong. ent of Assam.Gauhati Additional Chief the Commissioner, Secretary. Government of Assam. Gau-hati, the Commiss- Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Cent- ioner. Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Cen- ral Excise, Shillong. tral Excise, Shillong. Officials, who were members of the IAC, buLdlinot attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of T ripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting of the attended the meeting not member of the IAC, but attended IAC meeting 16.03.06 Commissioner of Commissioner of Customs and Central Customs and Central Excise, Shillong, Addi tional Chief Secretary Government of Excise. Shillong. Additional Chief Secretary Government of Assam Assam, Director (Industries & Commerce), Government of Tripura. Commissioner, Central Excise. Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Cent- Director (Industries & Commerce) Government of Tripura. Commissioner, Central Excise.Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner. Central Excise. ral Excise. Shillong. Shillong. members of the IAC. but did not attend Ihe.meeting. Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Shillong. Principal Secretary. Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary. Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC. but attended IAC meeting 06.11.06 Chief Commissioner Additional Chief of Customs & Cent- Secretary. Governm- ral Excise. Shillong, ent of Assam, Com- Additional Chief Se- missioner & Secietarj cretary. Government (Industries & Comm- of Assam. Commiss- erce), Government of ioner & Secretary Tripura. the Comm- (Industries & Comm- issioner, Central Ex- erce). Government of cise, Dibrugarh and Tripura, the Commi- the Commissioner, ssioner, Central Exci- Central Excise, se, Dibrugarh and the Shillong. Commissioner. Cent- ral Excise, Shillong. OJIicjaLSj who vyere members of the IAC. but did not attend the meet ing. Principal Secretary. Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Tripura. Government of cise, Dibrugarh and Tripura, the Commi- the Commissioner, ssioner, Central Exci- Central Excise, se, Dibrugarh and the Shillong. Commissioner. Cent- ral Excise, Shillong. OJIicjaLSj who vyere members of the IAC. but did not attend the meet ing. Principal Secretary. Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended 1AC meeting 01.03.07 Chief Commissioner Chief Secretary, of Customs & Cent- Government of ral Excise, Shillong Assam. Zone, and the Chief Secretary, Governme- nt of Assam. OfficialSvWho were members of the IAC. but did not attend thcnieeting. Principal Secretary. Department of Indu- stries. Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary. Department of Ind- ustries. Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC. but attended IAC meeting 15.11.07 Chief Commissioner Commissioner of of Customs & Cent- Central Excise. ral Excise, Shillong, Dibrugarh, Commi- Principal Secretary, ssioner, Central Industries & Comm- Excise, Shillong, Ad- erce, Government of ditional Commission- Assam, Guwahati. er, Central Excise, Commissioner of Shillong. Central Excise, Dibr- ugarh, Commissioner, Central Excise, Shil- long, Additional Co- mmissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. QfficialSjjwho were members of the IAC, but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Ind- ustries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended IAC meeting 11.01.08 Chief Commissioner, Commissioner, Cent- Central Excise & ral Excise, Shillong, Customs, Principal Commissioner, Cen- Secretary, Industries tral Excise. Dibruga- & Commerce, Mem- rh. Additional Com- ber (T ripura), Princ- missioner, Central ipal Secretary, Indu- Excise, Shillong. In- stries & Commerce, chargc of Monitoring Government of Assan , Cell. Additional Member (Assam), Commissioner. Cen- Commissioner, Cen- tral Excise, Shillong, tral Excise, Shillong, Joint Commissioner. Commissioner, Cent- Customs (P). Shillo- ral Excise, Dibrugarh, ng, Additional Dire- Additional Commiss- ctor. Industries & ioner Central Excise, Commerce, Gov- Shillong, In-eharge of ernment of Tripura Monitoring Cell, and Superintendent. Additional Commiss- Central Excise & ioner, Central Excise. Customs. Shillong. Shillong, Joint Com- missioner, Customs (P). Shillong, Additi- onal Director. Indus- (HQ838 GAUHATl LAW TIMES VOL.1, 2010 tries & Commerce, Government of Tri- pura and Superinte- ndent, Central Excise & Customs. Shillong. Industries & ioner Central Excise, Commerce, Gov- Shillong, In-eharge of ernment of Tripura Monitoring Cell, and Superintendent. Additional Commiss- Central Excise & ioner, Central Excise. Customs. Shillong. Shillong, Joint Com- missioner, Customs (P). Shillong, Additi- onal Director. Indus- (HQ838 GAUHATl LAW TIMES VOL.1, 2010 tries & Commerce, Government of Tri- pura and Superinte- ndent, Central Excise & Customs. Shillong. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended 1AC meeting 06.02.08 Chief Commissioner, Commissioner. Cent- Central Excise & Cu- ral Excise. Shillong. stoms, Principal Sec- Additional Commis- retary, Industries & sioner, Central Excise Commerce, Member Shillong, In-charge of (T ripura), Principal Monitoring Cell, Secretary, Industries Joint Commissioner, & Commerce, Gover- Customs (P). Shillong nment of Assam, Me- Senior Manager, DIG mber (Assam), Com- Government of Trip- missioner, Central ura. Superintendent, Excise, Shillong, Add- Central Excise & itional Commissioner Customs, Shillong. Central Excise. Shill- Inspector. Central ong, In-charge of Excise, Shillong, and Monitoring Cell. the Inspector. Centra' Joint Commissioner. Excise. Dibrugarh. Customs(P), Shillong Senior Manager, DIG Government of Trip- ura. Superintendent, Central Excise & Customs, Shillong. Inspector, Central Excise. Shillong and the Inspector, Centr- al Excise. Dibrugarh. Date ol" Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC. but attended IAC meeting 25.03.08 Chief Commissioner, Commissioner. Cent- Central Excise & ral Excise, Shillong, Customs, Principal Commissioner, Cen- Secretary Industries tral Excise. Dibrugarh & Commerce. Gove- Additional Commiss- rnment of Assam. ioner. Central Excise, Member (Assam). Shillong. Superinten- Commissioner, Cent- dent, Central Excise, ral Excise, Shillong, Shillong, Inspector, Commissioner, Cent- Central Excise, Shill-, ral Excise.Dibrugarh, ong.'and the Inspect- Additional Commi- or, Central Excise. Date of meeting of the 1AC 12.06.08 ssioner, Central Excise. Shillong, Superintendent, Central Excise. Shillong. Inspector. Central Excise. Shillong, and the Inspector, Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Officials who attended the meeting Chief Commissioner. Central Excise & Customs, Shillong; Principal Secretary, Planning and Co-ordination Department, Government of Trip-ura: Commissioner, Central Excise. Shillong; Joint Commissioner. Customs. Shillong. General Manager, District Industries Centre, Government of Tripura; Superintendent, Central Excise. Shillong; Inspector. Central Excise. Shillong; and Inspector. Central Excise, Guwahati. Dibrugarh. Officials who were members of the IAC. but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary. Department of Industries. Government of Tripura. Officials, who were not member of the IAC, but attended meeting Principal Secretary. Planning and Coordination Department. Government of Tripura; Commissioner. Central Excise. Shillong; Inspector. Central Excise. Shillong; and Inspector. Central Excise, Guwahati. Dibrugarh. Officials who were members of the IAC. but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary. Department of Industries. Government of Tripura. Officials, who were not member of the IAC, but attended meeting Principal Secretary. Planning and Coordination Department. Government of Tripura; Commissioner. Central Excise. Shillong; Joint Commissioner. Customs. Shillong. General Manager, District Industries Centre. Government of Tripura; Superintendent, Central Excise. Shillong, Inspector, Central Excise, Shillong: and Inspector, Central Excise. Guwahati. Officials. who were members of the AC, but did. not, attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC, but attended I AC meeting 09.09.08 Chief Commissioner, Principal Secretary, Central Exeise & Government of Tri- Customs. Shillong: pura, Agratala; Com- Principal Secretary. missioner. Central Government of Tri- Excise, Shillong, Addi pura. Agartala; Com- tional Commissioner missioner. Central (CCO), Shillong: Sec- Kxeise. Shi Hong; Ad- retary; Joint Commi- ditional Commission- ssioner, Customs (P). er (CCO), Shillong, NER, Shillong: Gene- Secretary: Joint Com- ral Manager. District missioner, Customs Industries Centre. (P).NER. Shillong; Government of Tri- General Manager, pura: Superintendent, District Industries Technical (IAC), Centre, Government Central Excise. Shill- of Tripura; Superin- ong: Superintendent tendent. Technical (CCO). Shillong; and (lAC).Central Excise, Inspector Technical, Shillong; Superinten- Central Excise. dent (CCO), Shillong; Shillong. and Inspector, Tech- nical. Central Excise, Shillong. Official s,_wh_(j >.were mgmbers_of the. IAC, but. did.not _attend_the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu- stries. Government ol Assam, and the Princ ipal Secretary, Depar- tment of Industries, Government of Tripura. Date of Officials who Officials, who were meeting attended the meeting not member of the of the IAC. but attended 1AC meeting 07.01.09 Chief Commissioner, Additional Commis- Central Excise & sioner (CCO), Cent- Customs, Shillong; ral Excise & Customs Principal Secretary, Shillong: Superinten- Department of Ind- dent, Technical (IAC) ustries, Government Central Excise. Shillo- of Meghalaya; Addi- ng; and Superintenden tional Commissioner (CCO), Central Excisi (CCO), Central Exc- and Customs. Shillong ise & Customs, Shillong; Superintendent, Technical (IAC), Central Excise. Shillong; and Superintendent (CCO); Central Excise and Customs, Shillong. Officials, who were but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu stries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries. Government of Tripura. 221. Shillong ise & Customs, Shillong; Superintendent, Technical (IAC), Central Excise. Shillong; and Superintendent (CCO); Central Excise and Customs, Shillong. Officials, who were but did not attend the meeting. Principal Secretary, Department of Indu stries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries. Government of Tripura. 221. From a careful examination of the persons, who had attended the meeting of the IAC, it becomes clear that on 18.08.2004, while the Chief Commissioner of the Central Excise, as Chairman, was present in the meeting, neither the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries, Government of Assam, nor the Principal Secretary of the Department of Industries, Government of Tripura, attended the meeting. In fact, on behalf of the Government of Tripura, it was the General Manager, Department of Industries and Commerce, who had attended the meeting, though he was not a member of the IAC, and, similarly, on behalf of the Govt. of Assam, it was the Secretary of the Department of Industries, who had attended the meeting, though he too was not competent to be a member of the IAC until the Central Government issued the Notification, dated 12.01.2009, aforementioned. This apart, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, attended the meeting as convenor, though he was not a member of the I AC. 222. What transpires is that the meeting of the IAC, held on 29.11.2004, was attended by, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Additional Secretary, Home, Industry and Commerce, Government of Tripura, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh; whereas the meeting of the IAC could not have been held without the presence of the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, nor could the meeting have been held in the presence of Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Additional Secretary, Home, Industry and Commerce, Government of Tripura, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, when none of them was a member of the IAC. This meeting, dated 29.11.2004, too, was, thus, held and concluded by persons, who were not eligible to participate in such meetings. 223. This meeting, dated 29.11.2004, too, was, thus, held and concluded by persons, who were not eligible to participate in such meetings. 223. The situation of the meeting, held on 07.01.2005, was no better inasmuch as this meeting was attended, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, by the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong; whereas none, except the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, could have had validly constituted the IAC, or could have had validly participated in the proceedings of the IAC. 224. The meeting of the I AC, held on 08.04.2005, was attended by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Here also, none, except the Chief Commissioner, could have been a part of the LAC inasmuch as the Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, or the Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, were not, and could not have been members of the LAC and could not have, therefore, attended the proceedings of the meeting of the IAC held on 08.04.2005. 225.The meeting, held on 15.07.2005, was attended by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. Strictly speaking, neither the Additional Chief Secretary of the Government of Assam, was a part of the IAC, nor the meeting could have been held in the absence of the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura, inasmuch as no quorum having been prescribed by the Notifications (whereunder the IAC has been constituted), no meeting of the IAC could have been held except in the presence of all the persons, who legally constituted the IAC in terms of the relevant Notifications. 226.The meeting, held on 25.08.2005, was attended by, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Joint Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, General Manager, District Industries Centre (West), Government of Tripura, and the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. 226.The meeting, held on 25.08.2005, was attended by, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Joint Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, General Manager, District Industries Centre (West), Government of Tripura, and the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. Here too, as always, the meeting was not attended by any member of the I AC except, of course, the Chief Commissioner, and, hence, those, who had participated in the meeting, held on 25.08.2005, except the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, could not have been a part of the IAC and could not have attended in the deliberations of the IAC. 227. Looking to the proceedings of the meeting, held on 08.12.2005,1 notice that this meeting was attended, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, by the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. However, none, except the Chief Commissioner, was qualified to attend the meeting. Apart from the fact that the Members of the Committee did not attend the meeting, the meeting was attended by persons, who were not members of the IAC ought not to have been attended the Committee's meetings. 228. Coming to the meeting of the IAC, held on 16.03.2006,1 notice that this meeting was attended by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Director, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. This meeting, strangely enough, was attended by none, who was eligible to be a part of the IAC either as a Member or as its Chairman. 229. The situation of the meeting, held on 06.11.2006, is, as usual, no better inasmuch as this meeting was attended, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, by the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, and the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong. 230. When I come to the meeting held on 01.03.2007,1 notice that this meeting was attended by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, and the Chief Secretary, Government of Assam. The Chief Secretary aforementioned could not have been a part of the I AC. 230. When I come to the meeting held on 01.03.2007,1 notice that this meeting was attended by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, and the Chief Secretary, Government of Assam. The Chief Secretary aforementioned could not have been a part of the I AC. This apart, in the absence of the other two Members, namely, the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Tripura, the quorum being not complete, no meeting of the IAC could have had been held. 231. Similar is the situation in respect of the meeting, held on 15.11.2007, inasmuch as this meeting too was not attended by the eligible Member from the Government of Tripura and, those, who had attended the meeting, apart from the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, were the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Assam, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, and also the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, though, Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, and/or the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, were not eligible to attend such meetings. Thus, except the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, and the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, none, who had attended the said meeting, was a member of the IAC. 232. When I come to the meeting, held on 11.01.2008,1 find that this meeting was attended, perhaps, for the first time, not only by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, but also by the Principal Secretaries of the relevant Departments of the two concerned State Governments, namely, Assam and Tripura. What is, however, unavoidable to note is that the said meeting was attended, apart from those, who were constituents of the I AC, by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong (who is also in-charge, Monitoring Cell), Joint Commissioner, Custom (P), Shillong, Additional Director, Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, and the Superintendent, Central Excise and Customs, Shillong. Since the IAC is a statutory body, one, who was not a member of the IAC, could not have attended the meeting held on 11.01.2008, and, hence, the decisions, taken in this meeting too, cannot be said to be valid and operative. 233. Since the IAC is a statutory body, one, who was not a member of the IAC, could not have attended the meeting held on 11.01.2008, and, hence, the decisions, taken in this meeting too, cannot be said to be valid and operative. 233. Now, I turn to the meeting, held on 06.02.2008, (i.e., the day, when some of the investments', claimed to have been made by one of the petitioners of the present writ petitions, as 'investments' in 'social projects), were not approved by the IAC and have formed the subject-matter of discussion in WP(C) No. 1048/2008. The meeting, on 06.02.2008, was attended by not only the Chief Commissioners, Central Excise, Principal Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Tripura, Principal Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Assam, but also by Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, (i/c, Monitoring Cell), Joint Commissioner, Customs (P), Shillong, Senior Manager, District Industries Centre, Government of Tripura, Superintendent, Central Excise and Customs, Shillong, Inspector, Central Excise, Shillong, Inspector of Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Other than the Chief Commissioner and the two Principal Secretaries aforementioned, all those, who had attended the meeting, were not Members of the IAC and they could not have participated in the proceedings of the meeting. The decisions, therefore, flowing from such a meeting, cannot, strictly speaking, be treated as decisions, reached by a duly constituted statutory body called the IAC. 234. As far as the meeting, held on 25.03.2008, is concerned, it was attended by the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Principal Secretary, Industries and Commerce, Government of Assam, Commissioner, Central Excise, Shillong, Superintendent, Central Excise, Shillong, Inspector, Central Excise, Shillong, and the Inspector, Central Excise, Dibrugarh. Thus, apart from the fact that the quorum of this meeting was not complete in the absence of the members of the IAC from the Government of Tripura, those, who had attended the meeting from the Department of Central Excise and Customs, not being members of the IAC, could not have participated in the meeting. 235. As far as the meeting, dated 12.06.2008, is concerned, it is suffice to point out that the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, was not present in this meeting. Hence, no decision could have been validly taken by the LAC in respect of the' investments' made by the petitioners in the present case. 236. 235. As far as the meeting, dated 12.06.2008, is concerned, it is suffice to point out that the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Assam, was not present in this meeting. Hence, no decision could have been validly taken by the LAC in respect of the' investments' made by the petitioners in the present case. 236. So far as the meeting, held on 09.09.2008, is concerned, it is worth pointing out that it was in this meeting that the IAC is claimed to have rejected the petitioners' request for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account for their hotel project. Suffice it to point out, as regards this meeting, that though the 'investment' was to be made on the hotel project, at Guwahati, which falls within the territorial limits of the State of Assam, the Principal Secretary of the concerned Department was not present in the meeting. In fact, none from the Government of Assam was present in this meeting. Hence, the rejection by the LAC of the petitioners' proposal for withdrawal of money from their Escrow Accounts for making 'investment' on their hotel project was without jurisdiction. The decision, in question, was, therefore, ultra vires and deserves to be set aside. This finding is in addition to the finding that the IAC has no role to play at the stage of consideration of withdrawal applications, seeking withdrawal from Escrow Accounts, by the jurisdictional Commissioner. 237. At last, when I come to the meeting, held on 07.01.2009, what I notice is that neither the members of the IAC from the Government of Assam, nor that of Government of Tripura was present. Hence, no binding decision, in respect of 'investments' made by the petitioners, either in Tripura, or in Assam, could have been validly taken in the meeting, which was held on 07.01.2009. 238. Insisting before this Court that the meetings, in question, did not suffer from any infirmity, it has been, once again, submitted by Mr. A. Sarma, learned Senior counsel for the respondents, that various State Governments had represented before the IAC that the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, of the respective States were not always available to attend the meeting of the IAC and it was, therefore, requested that the notifications may be amended regarding constitution of the IAC. A. Sarma, learned Senior counsel for the respondents, that various State Governments had represented before the IAC that the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, of the respective States were not always available to attend the meeting of the IAC and it was, therefore, requested that the notifications may be amended regarding constitution of the IAC. It is further submitted that the respondents had already made communications, on 02.05.2008, in this regard, with Central Board of Excise and Customs. Moreover, submits the learned counsel for the respondents, it can be seen from the constitution of the IAC that either Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, or in his absence, some person(s), who was (were) conversant with the issues of the meetings of the IAC, had represented the Principal Secretary in the proceedings of the IAC and, hence, there is no reason to hold that the lAC's meetings were illegal. Suffice it to point out here that, for the reasons, which I have already assigned above, I do not find any force in the submissions so made on behalf of the respondents, particularly, when the Central Government's subsequently issued Notification, in this regard, on 12.01.2009, eloquently speaks that the mere fact that a person is conversant with the affairs of his Department did not authorize him to act, and he could not have legally acted, as a member of the I AC. For the reason so indicated, the meetings of the IAC, as discussed above, cannot have any binding force and cannot be acted upon. 239. As regards mechanism of project approval, which the LAC has introduced into the scheme of exemption and which has been under serious challenge in this writ petition and also in WP (C) No. 591/08,1 may point out that I have already observed and held, while discussing the scheme of exemption, that the requirement of prior project approval, which the IAC has introduced, is beyond scheme as envisaged by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, inasmuch as the IAC, under the Notification dated 09.07.2004, comes into picture only after an investment stands made and not when a jurisdictional Commissioner considers a request made by a manufacturer for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account for the purpose of making investment. When such a request is made, it is the jurisdictional Commissioner, who has to take decisions on the basis of the scheme, which the Central Govt. When such a request is made, it is the jurisdictional Commissioner, who has to take decisions on the basis of the scheme, which the Central Govt. has introduced, and he cannot act according to the directions or instructions of the I AC merely because the IAC consists of personnel, senior in grade, to a jurisdictional Commissioner, Every statutory authority, while exercising its statutory power, has to act in terms of provisions of the statue and not according to the wisdom of his superior authority. Suffice it to point out, therefore, at the cost of repetition, that the scheme of exemption, as introduced by the Notification dated 21.01.2004, and modified by the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, do not envisage any role for the IAC at the stage, when an application for withdrawal of money from the Escrow Account is considered by the jurisdictional Commissioner. Any instruction or order or direction, issued by the IAC, which is contrary to the conclusion so reached by the Court, must be held, and I do hold, as nothing but usurpation of power by IAC and cannot, therefore, be sustained. In the name of safeguarding interest of revenue, the IAC cannot usurp a power, which does not lawfully belong to it and the IAC cannot, in the process, denude a jurisdictional Commissioner of his statutory powers. 240. The investment guidelines, which the IAC has issued, are, under the scheme of the notifications aforementioned, wholly without jurisdiction and ultra vires. The IAC has no power to direct any authority including a jurisdictional Commissioner, such as, the respondent No.2, to act in a particular manner, while exercising his jurisdiction under the terms of the notification inasmuch as, while exercising power, which has been vested by the notification in the respondent No.2, respondent No.2 is not exercising the power of an authority subordinate to the IAC; rather, it is exercising the power vested in him as the representative of the Central Government. The investment guidelines, which the IAC has issued, being foreign to the scheme of the notifications, do not bind the jurisdictional Commissioner. 241. The guidelines, issued by the IAC as to what kind of investment shall be approved, are beyond the powers of the IAC and, thus, ultra vires. The LAC has no role to play, when application for withdrawal is considered by Jurisdictional Commissioner. The IAC cannot, therefore, assume the jurisdiction, in such a matter. 241. The guidelines, issued by the IAC as to what kind of investment shall be approved, are beyond the powers of the IAC and, thus, ultra vires. The LAC has no role to play, when application for withdrawal is considered by Jurisdictional Commissioner. The IAC cannot, therefore, assume the jurisdiction, in such a matter. The law is well settled that no rule, regulation or guideline, issued under the terms of a Notification, can militate against the terms of the Notification itself. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vs. M/s G. S. Dal I and Flour Mills, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while examining the validity of the executive instructions under the Notification, pointed out as under: "19. The second ground on which the Full Bench has sought to invoke the instructions is also not correct. Executive instructions can supplement a statute or cover areas to which the statute does not extend. But they cannot run contrary to statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. The Full Bench seems to think that, unless the instructions are brought in, the notifications would have been in danger of abuse for want of proper guidelines as to the grant of exemption certificates. It is suggested that the notification contemplates rules to be issued for the purpose and that, since no rules had been issued, Directors of Industries were left with no parameters for the issue of exemption certificates and might act capriciously or arbitrarily in granting or refusing certificates. The instructions, it is said, have been issued to fill in this lacuna and are hence valid. There are two misconceptions in this line of reasoning. The first is that, though the last few words in column (3) of the notification are capable of a wider meaning, it would appear that these words govern only the immediately preceding words; rules envisaged are not in relation to the grant of exemption certificates and conditions therefor but in respect of the circumstances in which the assessees can exercise the option between exemption and deferment of sales tax. This view derives support from the instructions of 1983. This view derives support from the instructions of 1983. As pointed out earlier, the instructions first set out the scope of the various notifications as granting exemption from sales-tax; the instructions thereafter proceed to say: "The grant of exemption from the payment of sales tax is contingent upon the issue of a certificate of eligibility to the new industrial units. This certificate of eligibility is required to be issued by the Director of Industries or an officer authorised by him for this purpose. Insofar as the grant of concessions relating to the exemption from payment of sales tax is concerned, no further notifications are required to be issued. For enabling the new industrial units to avail of the second concession viz., that of deferment of payment of sales tax, a scheme is being issued separately. For availing of the benefit of the deferment of concession too, a certificate of eligibility is required to be obtained by the industrial unit. However, pending the issue of the scheme, the grant of certificate of eligibility should not be held up." Incidentally, we may point out, the first part of the para does not clarify that the eligibility certificate is not to be granted to "traditional industries". But, so far as the present point is concerned, it is categorically stated that no further notifications are required to be issued and that they are needed only to define the scheme for deferment of tax. Indeed, rules were framed in order to implement the deferment scheme which came into force with effect from April 1, 1983. We shall refer a little later to these rules. Secondly, there is no warrant for assuming that the notification envisages conditions for the issue of the eligibility certificate other than those specified by itself. There is nothing in the language of the notification to suggest that anything further is needed to enable the Director of Industries to grant the exemption. Without the guidelines, the requirement for an exemption certificate would not become an "empty formality" as suggested by the Full Bench. There is nothing in the language of the notification to suggest that anything further is needed to enable the Director of Industries to grant the exemption. Without the guidelines, the requirement for an exemption certificate would not become an "empty formality" as suggested by the Full Bench. The Director of Industries has to issue the same after satisfying himself that the applicant industry falls within the terms of the notification in the following respects: (a) that the assessee is one of the class of dealers set out in column (1); (b) that he has set up an industry in the State ; (c) that it has been set up in one of the districts set out in the annexure and the category to which it belongs; (d) that the industry has commenced production after April 1,1981; (e) that the assessee has not opted for the deferment scheme. These conditions are many and detailed and do not leave anything to the discretion of the Director of Industries. We fail to understand what need there was to lay down any elaborate procedure therefor. Even if there was, and the earlier procedure by way of application form, declaration form and form of certificate were to be adapted, that procedure, by itself, did not, as pointed out earlier, contain any reference to the assessee being a traditional industry or otherwise. To assume first that the conditions specified in the notification are not exhaustive or sufficient and may lead to abuse of power by executive authorities unless canalised by procedural guidelines and then to say that such a conclusion is borne out by the mere reference to a certificate being granted by the Director of Industries because, under some earlier schemes, such certificate was being granted on a restricted basis, does not appear to be sound logic. We are, therefore, of opinion that the notification is quite clear and leaves no area of vacuum which needs to be supplemented by guidelines. Thirdly, if we read the last part of the entry in column (3) of the notification as envisaging rules to be framed for the grant of the eligibility certificate, no such rules were framed. Only instructions were issued. These instructions say that even an assessee, who fulfils all the requirements of the notification, will not be eligible for exemption unless he fulfils one more condition outside the notification. Only instructions were issued. These instructions say that even an assessee, who fulfils all the requirements of the notification, will not be eligible for exemption unless he fulfils one more condition outside the notification. They travel beyond and counter to the notification. They restrict the scope of exemption under the notification. They deny exemption to a person who qualifies for it under the statutory notification. Indeed, there is force in the contention that if the statutory notification is construed as permittivity the State by rules or executive instructions to prescribe other conditions for exemption, whether new or based on past practice, it is liable to be struck down on the ground of impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive. This, certainly, they cannot do." 242. From the observations, made in M/s G. S. Dall and Flour Mills (supra), what becomes distinct is that executive instructions can supplement a statue or cover the areas to which the statute does not extend, but executive instructions cannot run contrary to the statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. In the present case, apart from the fact that the IAC could not have issued the instructions adding in the notification subjects, such as, durable and tangible, which are not found under the scheme of the notifications, it is equally important to bear in mind that the IAC had no power to issue any such guidelines, in the form of executive instructions, as it has done in the present case. The executive instructions, if any, were for the Central Government to issue and not for the IAC, which on amendment of the notification, dated 21.01.2004, by the notification, dated 09.07.2004, has no role to play at the time, when an application seeking withdrawal of funds from Escrow Account is considered by a jurisdictional Commissioner. 243. The guidelines, issued by the IAC, run counter to the notifications and restrict the scope of exemption assured under the notifications. The LAC could not have issued such executive instructions or guidelines as it has done in the present case. The mere fact that the IAC is consisted of persons, superior in grade to the respondent No. 2, is immaterial in this regard. 244. The LAC could not have issued such executive instructions or guidelines as it has done in the present case. The mere fact that the IAC is consisted of persons, superior in grade to the respondent No. 2, is immaterial in this regard. 244. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, as a whole, all these writ petitions are allowed to the extent as mentioned hereinbelow: WP(C) 591/2008 (i) The impugned actions taken by respondent No.2, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong. in 'forfeiting' the sums of Rs.57,61,37,536/- (Rupees Fifty Seven Crore Sixty One Lac Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Six only), Rs.28,55,14,172/- (Rupees Twenty Eight Crores Fifty Five Lakhs Fourteen Thousand One hundred and Seventy Two) and Rs.30.35.24,690/- (Rupees Thirty Crores Thirty Five Lakhs Twenty Four Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety only) from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners maintained by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, namely, State Bank of India, New Guwahati Branch, Guwahati, and Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Main Bazaar Branch, Agartala, respectively, and the directions given, or requests made, by the respondent No.2 to transfer the said amounts of money from the Escrow Accounts of the petitioners maintained by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 towards payment of duty and the consequential actions, taken by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, in carrying out the directions so given, and/or the request so made, by the respondent No.2 are hereby set aside and quashed. (ii) The impugned actions of the respondent No.2, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, in freezing the Escrow Account Nos. 10566984064 and 10566984086 of the petitioner No. 1, Escrow Account No. 10815025848 of the petitioner No.2 and Escrow Account No. 10815028838 of the petitioner No. 3 maintained by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and/or prohibiting the petitioners from operating their respective accounts aforementioned and/or directing the respondent Nos.3 and 4 not to let the petitioners operate their respective accounts aforementioned are hereby set aside and quashed and, in consequence thereof, it is further directed that while computing the period of investment of two years from the date of deposit under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, the period, during which the said accounts remained frozen and inoperative, shall be excluded. (iii) The respondent No.2 is hereby directed to consider, and decide, in the light of the discussions held above within a period of one month from today all the applications made by the petitioners, seeking withdrawal of money from their respective Escrow Accounts for the purpose of making investments on their various projects, including the project of five star hotel. WP(C) 1048/2008 (i) The two impugned letters/orders, both dated 11.03.2008, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati, and the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar, raising demands for payment of the amounts mentioned therein, as a result of turning down by the respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, the petitioner's request for issuance of 'investment certificates' on the 'social projects' in respect of the quarters ending on 31.12.2004 and 31.03.2005 as well as the minutes of meeting, dated 06.02.2008, of the Investment Appraisal Committee on the basis of which the impugned letters/orders had been issued, are hereby set aside and quashed. (ii) Respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, is hereby directed to re-examine and decide, in the light of the discussions held above, the claims of investments made by the petitioner on various 'social projects' and, upon examination by the IAC of the claims of investment as directed herein-above, further appropriate action shall, in accordance with law, be taken by the respondents. (iii) The respondents are hereby also directed not to recover any amount(s) from the petitioner in terms of the two impugned letters/orders, both dated 11.03.2008, issued by Deputy Commissioner. Central Excise, Guwahati, and the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Silchar. WP(Q 2814/2008 (i) The decisions, taken by the respondent No.2, namely, the Investment Appraisal Committee, in its meetings, held on 18.08.2004, 29.11.2004, 07.01.2005, 08.04.2005, 15.07.2005, 25.08.2005, 08.12.2005, 16.03.2006, 6.11.2006, 01.03.2007, 15.11.2007, 11.01.2008, 06.02.2008, 25.03.2008, 12.06.2008, 09.09.2008 and 07.01.2009, and all actions, taken on the basis of such decisions, having adverse impact on the interest of the petitioners, are hereby set aside and quashed and, in consequence thereof, the decisions of the I AC, taken in all the said meetings, which have had any adverse bearing on the petitioners, shall be treated as non est in law and shall not be operative. (ii) The respondentNo.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, is hereby directed to consider and decide the claims of investment made by the petitioners within the period as prescribed by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. (ii) The respondentNo.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, is hereby directed to consider and decide the claims of investment made by the petitioners within the period as prescribed by the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. (iii) The trade Notice Nos. 14/2004 and 05/2006-CE, dated 05.03.2004, and 27.03.2006, respectively, are hereby held to be ultra vires and set aside and quashed. (iv) The respondent No.2, namely, the Investment Appraisal Committee, is hereby directed not to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction and powers of the respondent No.3, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, and/or of any other jurisdictional Commissioners in respect of withdrawal applications, which have been made to the respondent No.3 by the petitioners, and the respondent No.3 shall, in the light of the discussions held above, consider anew all the withdrawal applications, including the one meant for the said hotel project, made by the petitioners, where permission has either been kept withheld or has not been granted so far or has been rejected. The consideration and disposal of all such applications shall be completed within a period of one month from today. (v) The decisions, taken by the respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, and/or the directions, given by the respondent No.2, on the basis of such decisions and/or the actions taken by the respondent Nos.2, 3 and/or any other respondents on the basis of such decisions shall stand set aside and quashed including the action of refusal to grant 'investment certificates' to the extent that such refusal are contrary to the position of law as discussed above and the respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, is hereby directed to reconsider all such claims of investments made by the petitioners in the light of what has already been discussed, pointed out and directed above. (vi) The petitioners' prayer that the' investment certificates' shall be deemed to have been granted in favour of the petitioners in respect of all such investments, which the petitioners claim to have made, if such claims have not been disposed of within the prescribed period, is hereby declined. (vii) The decisions taken and/or the directions given and/or the orders passed by the respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, to obtain project approval from the respondent No.2 before a withdrawal application is considered and allowed by the respondent No.3, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, shall stand set aside and quashed. (vii) The decisions taken and/or the directions given and/or the orders passed by the respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, to obtain project approval from the respondent No.2 before a withdrawal application is considered and allowed by the respondent No.3, namely, Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, shall stand set aside and quashed. (viii) Similarly, the requirements, set forth by the respondent No.2, namely. Investment Appraisal Committee, in respect of cost analysis and/or other directions issued by the respondent No.2 as to how and when respondent No.3 shall exercise his powers under the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, shall stand set aside and quashed. (ix) Whenever respondent No.3, namely. Commissioner of Central Excise, Shillong, finds that an application for withdrawal of money from Escrow Account cannot be allowed and/or respondent No.2, namely, Investment Appraisal Committee, finds that an 'investment certificate', sought for, cannot be granted, no action, based on such findings, shall be taken by the respondents/authorities concerned without giving requisite notice to show cause, if any, to the person, who makes such withdrawal application and/or who seeks to obtain 'investment certificates' in respect of investments claimed to have been made under the scheme of exemption embodied in the Notification, dated 21.01.2004, read with the Notification, dated 09.07.2004. (x) No action for recovery of any amount, in respect whereof, 'investment certificate' has been declined by the IAC, shall be made without giving a notice to show cause, if any, against such proposed action of recovery, under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with the Rules framed thereunder, to the manufacturer concerned nor shall any action of 'forfeiture' be taken, in exercise of powers given under the Notification, dated 09.07.2004, aforementioned, without giving notice to show cause, if any, against such proposed action to person(s) against whose interest such action is proposed to be taken. 245. With the above observations and directions, these writ petitions shall stand disposed of. 246. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.