Hon'ble VYAS, J.—In this revision petition, petitioner J.K. White Cement Works, Gotan is challenging order dated 20.7.2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Merta in Civil Original Suit No. 36/2009 whereby the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. by the petitioner-defendants for rejection of the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff was rejected. 2. According to brief facts of the case, non-petitioner plaintiff was employee of the petitioner company since July 1983 and was working on the post of driver. His services were terminated by the petitioner-defendant on 2.1.2008 after holding regular inquiry. On 1.2.2008, a notice was served upon the respondent-plaintiff calling upon him to vacate quarter No. E-105 which was allotted to him by the company in the colony constructed by the petitioners at Gotan for its employees. Against said notice and another notice dated 26.3.2009, the respondent-plaintiff filed suit for permanent injunction. Along with the said suit, application for temporary injunction was also moved by the plaintiff. 3. In the suit, though written-statement was filed, the petitioner-defendants also filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. before the trial Court. Learned trial Court, vide the impugned order dated 20.7.2009, rejected the said application which is under challenge in this revision petition. 4. While assailing the validity of the order impugned, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the trial Court has committed an error while rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. because at the time of allotment an undertaking was executed by the respondent-plaintiff that quarter No. E-105 was allotted to him by virtue of employment by the J.K. Cement Works, Gotan and this facility was only provided as privilege attached to his service. It is contended that the said facility was covered by item No. 4 of Second Schedule appended to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, after termination of his services, respondent-plaintiff was under obligation to vacate the premises. Further, it is submitted that the withdrawal of the facility of quarter is specifically covered within the definition of the term industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947; and, for the same, only the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 5. Further, it is submitted that the withdrawal of the facility of quarter is specifically covered within the definition of the term industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947; and, for the same, only the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 5. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent-plaintiff has already raised a dispute against termination of his services by way of filing complaint before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Nagaur and a notice dated 12.2.2009 has also been received by the petitioner-defendants, therefore, the matter regarding withdrawal of the privilege being covered by the Act of 1947, it could only be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and as such the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit regarding withdrawal of the privilege which was enjoyed by the respondent-plaintiff as an employee of the petitioners. 6. It is further argued that the trial Court has entertained the suit beyond jurisdiction, therefore, the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. was to be allowed but the learned trial Court has committed error while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioners contents that the prayer which is made by the petitioner in the suit can be granted by the Industrial Tribunal only and, for the same, the plaintiff is required to raise industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, the finding given by the trial Court while rejecting the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC deserves to be quashed. It is specifically stated by the petitioners that the learned trial Court has committed serious error on the basis of prima facie opinion whereas the application is to be decided on the basis of final opinion as to holding the suit maintainable. Therefore, if the trial Court was of the view that evidence is required to determine the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, then too, the application could not have been rejected without framing and deciding a preliminary issue. According to the documents placed before the Court, it was clear the accommodation occupied by the respondent-plaintiff was purely by way of concession and no cause of action arose in regard to the facility provided by the petitioners. 7. According to the documents placed before the Court, it was clear the accommodation occupied by the respondent-plaintiff was purely by way of concession and no cause of action arose in regard to the facility provided by the petitioners. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention towards judgment of this Court passed by the co-ordinate Bench in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 31/93 and S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 627/92 dated 2.9.1998, in which, while setting aside the impugned order passed upon the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, the trial Court was directed to deal with the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC in the manner adjudicated in the said revision petitions. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff vehe-mently argued that at the time of deciding application under O. 7 R. 11, CPC only the pleadings of the plaint are required to be considered and from the prayer made in the suit it is clear that it has nothing to do with the definition of industrial dispute. More so, the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to leave in the accommodation which is allotted to him by the company till adjudication of the dispute raised before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Nagaur. 9. It is further submitted that there is no power left with the Assistant Labour Commissioner to grant stay and the petitioner-defendants were taking action forcibly to dislodge the respondent-plaintiff from the premises in question, therefore, the only remedy available was to file civil suit because the petitioner-defendants were violating the principles of natural justice. While placing reliance upon the judgment reported in (2009) 4 SCC 299 , it is submitted that Hon'ble apex Court has held that a suit is maintainable in a civil Court if the employer-employee dispute(s) pertains to matters like non-observance of principles of natural justice or constitutional provisions and, in this case, it employees from the facts that on the one hand the services of the plaintiff were terminated against which he is seeking remedy and, on the other hand, the respondents are taking harsh action to dislodge the family from the accommodation which is provided to the respondent-plaintiff, that too, without following the principles of natural justice. 10. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by both the parties. 11. 10. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by both the parties. 11. Admittedly, the respondent-plaintiff was employee of the petitioner company since the year 1983 and his services were terminated in the year 2008 and that termination is pending adjudication before the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is obvious that there is no provision for granting any stay and, here, in this case, before the civil Court, the respondent-plaintiff is not seeking any remedy against the termination order; but, he has sought remedy that he and his family should not be dislodged from the accommodation forcibly and shall not be deprived from the other facility like electricity and water. In my opinion, the learned trial Court has not committed any error while rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC. The prayer of the respondent-plaintiff is altogether different which is based upon the ground that after termination of services of the respondent-plaintiff, the petitioner-defendants are forcibly dislodging the respondent-plaintiff from the accommodation allotted to him, so also other facilities as provided to him and his family, they are rescinding without following any procedure of law forcibly which is against the principles of natural justice. Therefore, obviously, the learned trial Court found that the prayer made in the suit is not against the termination order which is of course industrial dispute as defined in the Act of 1947 but the prayers are altogether different and, for claiming those reliefs, the main ground is that the petitioner-defendants are violating the principles of natural justice. In this view of the matter, the judgment of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Another vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2009) 4 SCC 299 ) (supra) is fully applicable upon the facts of the present case, in which, the Hon'ble apex Court has held that suit is maintainable in the civil Court if the employer-employee dispute (s) pertains to matters like non-observance of the principles of natural justice or constitutional provisions. 12. In this view of the matter, I see no reason to interfere in the order impugned. Hence, this revision petition is dismissed. 13. 12. In this view of the matter, I see no reason to interfere in the order impugned. Hence, this revision petition is dismissed. 13. However, with regard to framing preliminary issue, the petitioner company is at liberty to file application under Order 14 Rule 5, CPC for framing preliminary issue; and, upon filing such application by the petitioner company before the trial Court, it is expected of the trial Court that application shall be decided in accordance with law.