ORDER: 1. These two civil revision petitions are filed under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter in short referred to as “Act” for the purpose of convenience) by the tenants and the landlords respectively as against the common order made in R.A.No.202 of 2002 and R.A. No.219 of 2002 being aggrieved of the portions of the order and the relief made in R.C.No.474 of 1998 on the file of IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. 2. In view of the commonality involved in both these civil revision petitions and in the light of the fact that both the R.As. aforesaid also had been disposed of by a common order by the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, the Appellate Authority, these civil revision petitions are being disposed of by a common order by this Court. 3. Heard Smt. Manjiri S Ganu, learned counsel representing tenant and Sri Hanumanthu Rajagopal Rao, learned counsel representing landlords. 4. The tenants filed C.R.P.No.6422 of 2006 and the landlords filed C.R.P. No.2113 of 2008 being aggrieved of the common order made in R.A. No.219 2002 and R.A. No.202 of 2002 which were preferred as against the order made in R.C. No.474 of 1998 on the file of IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. 5. The landlords filed the said R.C. No.474 of 1998 on the ground of wilful default, on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and on the ground of securing alternative accommodation. The learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, R.W.1, marked Exs.A-1 to R-29 and Exs.B-1 to B-43 and came to the conclusion that there is no wilful default in payment of rents and the tenants had not secured alternative accommodation and the tenant did not claim permanent tenancy, but however, ordered eviction on bona fide personal requirement. Aggrieved by the same, the tenants preferred R.A. No.202 of 2002 and the landlords preferred R.A. No.219 of 2002 and the Appellate Authority after formulating the points for consideration at para 20 recorded reasons and came to the conclusion that the ground of wilful default had been established. The Appellate Authority also referred to the decision in Satyanarayana v. Moizuddin Khan ( 2005 (4) ALD 249 ) and recorded further findings at paras 33, 34 and 35 and confirmed the said finding of the learned Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority also referred to the decision in Satyanarayana v. Moizuddin Khan ( 2005 (4) ALD 249 ) and recorded further findings at paras 33, 34 and 35 and confirmed the said finding of the learned Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority also came to the conclusion that the tenants did not set up any permanent tenancy and, hence, declined to grant eviction on that ground confirming the finding of the learned Rent Controller. However, while answering point No.4 elaborate reasons had been recorded at paras 37 to 49 and came to the conclusion that ordering eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement cannot be sustained and accordingly reversed the said finding, but however, ultimately ordered eviction on the ground of wilful default. Aggrieved by the respective portions, the present civil revision petitions had been filed by the tenants and the landlords as already aforesaid. 6. Smt. Manjiri S Ganu, the learned counsel representing tenants had explained the respective stands taken by the parties and the findings recorded and would maintain that the Appellate Authority failed to notice that the landlords were receiving rents from the tenants up to October 1997 and on 17.10.1997 the original tenant i.e., the father of the present tenants died and the rents tendered thereafter from November 1997 onwards were refused in a mala fide way by the landlords compelling them to file R.C.No.73 of 1998 in which Ex.B-1 order was made. The learned counsel also would maintain that the Appellate Authority failed to note that during the pendency of the rent case, an interim permission was given under which the tenants deposited all rents which is evident from ledger extract Ex.B-42 and thus the tenants have been depositing the rents into bank account. The learned counsel also explained the sequence of events. The counsel also would maintain that in the light of the facts and circumstances to order eviction on the ground of wilful default stating that intimation of deposit as required under Rule 5 of the Rules had not been complied with definitely cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also pointed out to the respective pleadings and the evidence available on record and would maintain that in the light of the same it cannot be said that the ground of wilful default is established and, hence, the civil revision petition filed by the tenants to be allowed. The learned counsel also pointed out to the respective pleadings and the evidence available on record and would maintain that in the light of the same it cannot be said that the ground of wilful default is established and, hence, the civil revision petition filed by the tenants to be allowed. While further elaborating her submissions, the learned counsel also had taken this Court through the other findings recorded by the Appellate Authority and would maintain that since the said findings are to be confirmed, the other civil revision petition filed by the landlords to be dismissed. The learned counsel relied on several decisions to substantiate her submissions. 7. Per contra, Sri Hanumanthu Rajagopal Rao, the learned counsel representing landlords would maintain that it is the prerogative of the landlords to choose their own building and this aspect had been totally ignored and apart from the ground of wilful default even on other grounds eviction should have been ordered and, hence, the civil revision petition filed by the landlords to be allowed and the civil revision petition filed by the tenants to be dismissed. The learned counsel also had further taken this Court through the oral and documentary evidence available on record and further relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 8. Heard the counsel on record and perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also the Appellate Authority. 9. In the light of the submissions made by the counsel on record, the following points arise for consideration in these civil revision petitions. (1) Whether the findings recorded by the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in R.A.No.219 of 2002 and R.A. No.202 of 2002 by a common order to be disturbed or to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? Point No.1: 10. For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as “landlords” and “tenants” as shown in R.C.No.474 of 1998 on the file of IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. 11. Averments made in the R.C. No.474 of 1998 as hereunder: The petitioners-landlords are the owners and landlords of the property bearing mulgi No.5-2-1022 situated at Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Mozamjahi Market, Hyderabad and the respondents are tenants having obtained the same from the petitioners-landlords’ vendor. 11. Averments made in the R.C. No.474 of 1998 as hereunder: The petitioners-landlords are the owners and landlords of the property bearing mulgi No.5-2-1022 situated at Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Mozamjahi Market, Hyderabad and the respondents are tenants having obtained the same from the petitioners-landlords’ vendor. The petitioner-landlord purchased the property under a registered sale deed dated 18.6.1991 and after the death of the original tenant on 17.10.1997 the respondent-tenant failed to pay the rents to the petitioners-landlords for the period from November 1997 to June 1998 at Rs.100/- per month and in order to cover the default period, filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 on the file of III Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad and failed to follow the procedure under Section 8 of the Rent Control Act and are liable to be evicted. 12. It is also averred that the respondent-tenant secured alternative accommodation and was carrying business at Siddiamber Bazar, Hyderabad and also at Secunderabad and, hence, they are liable to be evicted. 13. Further it is averred that petitioner No.5 was not at all in possession and enjoyment of non-residential premises in Hyderabad and Secunderabad except the petition mulgi. In spite of petitioners-landlords’ demand, the respondents-tenants failed to vacate the premises. Hence, the petition. 14. Respondents-tenants filed counter as hereunder: Section 10(3) of the Act had no application, as the petitioners-landlords were already in occupation of more than one non-residential building in the city of Hyderabad and carrying on business. In the event of their being no termination of tenancy, the petitioners had no cause of action to claim eviction of the respondents-tenants. It is not denied that the petitioners being the landlords of the demised mulgi No.5-2-1022. It is denied that Lal Mohan T. Mehta died on 17.10.1997 so also the tenancy is month to month. The understanding with the original lessor had been to continue the tenancy as long as the tenants occupied and continued the business thereon. It is denied that the respondents-tenants failed to pay the rents from November 1997 to July 1998. The respondent-tenant filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 for depositing the rents into court and in that R.C. petitioner-landlord furnished his bank account number on the day when the order was passed and not when demanded by the respondent-tenant. After collection of rent in the month of October 1997 petitioners-landlords evaded to receive the rents. The respondent-tenant filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 for depositing the rents into court and in that R.C. petitioner-landlord furnished his bank account number on the day when the order was passed and not when demanded by the respondent-tenant. After collection of rent in the month of October 1997 petitioners-landlords evaded to receive the rents. The respondents-tenants are continuously depositing the rents to the credit of R.C. No.73 of 1998. 15. It is also stated that the respondents-tenants had not secured any alternative accommodation either at Siddiamber Bazar, Hyderabad, or at Secunderabad and they are carrying their business in the petition mulgi only. It is denied that petitioner No.5 is a unemployee and that he is having experience in hardware and general goods business and that he had sufficient funds to commence the business. It is denied that petitioners-landlords are not in possession of any non-residential premises in Hyderabad and Secunderabad except the petition mulgi. The petitioner on his own admissions is carrying on business. The present petition is filed as a counterblast to R.C. No.73 of 1998. 16. Further it is stated that the entire building was purchased by the petitioners-landlords and it is located in a busy commercial locality and the entire first floor admeasuring 800 square feet is lying vacant since the last several months except the room which is in occupation of another tenant. The tenancy in respect of the petition mulgi was created four decades ago and there was no room for complaint to any of the landlords. 17. The learned Rent Controller formulated the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the respondents have committed wilful default in payment of rents from November 1997 at Rs.100/- per month fill June 1998? (2) Whether the respondent has secured alternative accommodation at Siddiamber Bazar and Secunderabad? (3) Whether the 5th petitioner bona fidely requires the petition premises for establishing hardware and general store business? (4) Whether the respondent had mala fidely claimed permanent tenancy? 18. Before the learned Rent Controller, the under noted evidence had been recorded and the documents had been marked. Appendix of evidence Witnesses examined For petitioners-landlords P.W.1: Mohammed Abdul Rahman P.W.2: Mohd. (3) Whether the 5th petitioner bona fidely requires the petition premises for establishing hardware and general store business? (4) Whether the respondent had mala fidely claimed permanent tenancy? 18. Before the learned Rent Controller, the under noted evidence had been recorded and the documents had been marked. Appendix of evidence Witnesses examined For petitioners-landlords P.W.1: Mohammed Abdul Rahman P.W.2: Mohd. Abdul Sattar For respondents-tenants: R.W.1: Mukund Lal Mehta Documents marked For petitioners-landlords: Ex.A-1: Rough sketch plan Ex.A-2: Office copy of letter of attornment Ex.A-3: Postal acknowledgement Ex.A-4: Postal receipt Ex.A-5: Municipal tax receipt Ex.A-6 to: Photographs with negatives Ex.A-9: Ex.A-10: Bill dt.27.7.2001 Ex.A-11 & : Cash bills Ex.A-12 Ex.A-13: Invitation card Ex.A-14: Envelope cover Ex.A-15 to : M.O. space for communication slips Ex.A-29: For respondents-tenants: Ex.B-1: Certified copy of order in R.C.73/98 Ex.B-2 to: Certified copy of sale deeds Ex.B-7: Ex.B-8 to: Photograph with negatives Ex.B-17 Ex.B-18: M.O. acknowledgement Ex.B-19: Postal receipt Ex.B-20: Acknowledgement Ex.B-21 to : Ex.B-23: Postal receipts Ex.B-24 to : M.O. coupons Ex.B-26: Ex.B-27: Office copy of legal notice dt.24.1.98 Ex.B-28 to : Postal receipts Ex.B-33: Ex.B-34 to : Returned postal covers Ex.B-39 Ex.B-40: Postal receipt Ex.B-41: M.O. coupon Ex.B-42: Certified copy of ledger account Ex.B-43: Notice dt.17.11.91 19. The learned Rent Controller while answering point No.1 came to the conclusion that there is no wilful default in payment of rents. While answering point No.2 came to the conclusion that the tenants had not secured any alternative accommodation, while answering point No.3 recorded reasons on the ground ‘bona fide requirement’ and ultimately came to the conclusion that the requirement of the 5th petitioner is bona fide. While answering point No.4 the learned Rent Controller recorded certain further findings and came to the conclusion that there was no claim of permanent tenancy by the tenants and ultimately ordered eviction only on the grounds specified supra granting the tenants two months time to vacate the premises from the date of order. 20. As already aforesaid, aggrieved by the order of eviction made, the tenants preferred R.A. No.202 of 2002 and aggrieved by the negativing of the other grounds while ordering eviction the landlords filed R.A. No.219 of 2002 and the learned Appellate Authority having recorded reasons in detail reversed the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on the ground of wilful default and ordered eviction. But however, reversed the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller on the ground of bona fide personal requirement, but however confirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the ground of securing alternative accommodation and also permanent tenancy. 21. On the ground of wilful default, the burden is on the tenants to prove that they have not committed any default, much less, wilful default. The learned Appellate Authority recorded reasons at paras 22 to 31 and came to the conclusion that on the ground of non-compliance of Rule 5 (4) of the Rules, since the wilful default had been established, the findings had been reversed and the eviction had been ordered. 22. Reliance was placed on the decision in S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman AIR 1985 Supreme Court 582 wherein the Apex Court at paras 21 to 25 observed as hereunder. “Before, however, going into this question further, let us find out the real meaning and content of the word 'wilful' or the words 'wilful default'. In the book A Dictionary' of Law by L. B. Curzon, at page 361 the words 'wilful' and 'wilful default' have been defined thus: 'wilful' - deliberate conduct of a person who is a free agent, knows what he is doing and intends to do what he is doing. 'wilful default' - Either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty, or a recklessness in the performance of a duty. In other words, 'wilful default' would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In Words and Phrases, Volume 11-A (Permanent Edition) at page 268 the word 'default' has been defined as the nonperformance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In volume 45 of Words and Phrases, the word 'wilful' has been very clearly defined thus : 'wilful' - intentional: not incidental or involuntary; -done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly; thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently; - in common parlance word 'wilful' is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary. P. 296-'wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary. P. 296-'wilful' refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary. In Volume III of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at page 2617, the word 'wilful' has been defined thus: governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason obstinately or perversely self-willed The word 'default' has been defined in Vol. I of Webster's Third New International Dictionary at page 590 thus: to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility ; to fail to meet a financial obligation. In Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edn.), at page 1773 the word 'wilful' has been defined thus: 'wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice. The word 'reckless' as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of 'wilful' or 'wanton'. Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause. it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.” 23. In Mohammed Izhar Ali v. Smt. Olive founseca (died per L.Rs. and others 2008 (4) ALT 147 (F.B.) the Full Bench of this Court following the view expressed in N.D. Thadani (dead) by Lrs. V. Arnavaz Rustom Printer, Mumbai and another ( 2004 (3) ALT 1 (SC)) answered the reference in the following terms. “Therefore, the reference has to be and is answered accordingly in the following terms: (1) Though Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 is directory and optional, a tenant taking advantage and benefit of the said provision has to strictly and mandatorily comply with the procedure prescribed under Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961. (2) While deposit of rent in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules amounts to valid tender of rent to the landlord, the failure to comply with sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 requiring delivery of a copy of the challan for the deposit of rent in the office of the controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, so as to enable the Controller or the appellate authority to cause maintenance of proper accounts under sub-rule (5) and give notice of deposit to the person or persons concerned within seven days of such delivery of copy of the challan in one or the other of the modes specified in Rule 16 (paying within a reasonable time the prescribed fee as per Rule 17 for service of such notice, if the tenant himself did not serve such notice directly on the landlord or the advocate appearing for the landlord)under sub-rule (4), amounts to wilful default in making valid payment or lawful tender of the rent by the tenant to the landlord; (3) Sub-rule (1) and/or sub-rule (3) of rule 5 of Rules do not prescribe any time limit for depositing rent after obtaining permission for such deposit from Rent Controller under section 8 (5) of the Act. A perusal of sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 5 of rules, however, shows that after obtaining permission a tenant has to deposit rent every month and as required under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Rules shall deliver rent challan in the office of Rent Controller or appellate authority as the case may be. A perusal of Section 10 (2) (i) of the Act would show that in the absence of any agreement, rent has to be paid by the last day of month next following that for which rent is payable or if there is agreement of tenancy within 15 days after expiry of time fixed in the agreement. This indicates some guidance as to reasonable time for deposit of rent. This indicates some guidance as to reasonable time for deposit of rent. Thus, where a tenant obtains an order to deposit rent, same shall be deposited at least by the last day of the month following that for which rent is payable and rent challan shall be delivered in the office of Controller within a reasonable time so that Rent controller can take necessary action for service of notice of deposit under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the Rules within seven (7) days of such delivery. In the absence of compliance in so depositing rent and delivering challan in the office of controller, tenant shall be deemed to have committed wilful default, as per conclusions on question Nos. 1 and 2 above. (4) There is no conflict between section 10 (2) (i) and Section 10 (2) proviso on one hand and Rule 5 on the other.” 24. The Full Bench, in fact, had referred to the under noted decisions: (1) Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta and others ( AIR 1956 SC 140 ) (2) Administrator, Municipal Committee Charkhi Dadri and another v. Ramjilal Bagla and others ( (1995) 5 SCC 272 . (3) Kailash v. Nanhku and others ( 2005 (3) SCJ 303 = 2005 (4) ALT 30.2 (DN SC) (4) M.P. Purushothaman v. Govt. of A.P. and others ( (2004) 11 SCC 547 . (5) Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and another v.Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (( 1985 3 SCC 53 ). (6) Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others ( 2006 (1) ALT 1 (SC). (7) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. N.R. Vairamani and another ( (2004) 8 SCC 579 = 2005 (1) ALT 32.1 (DN SC). (8) Vemuri Somisetti v. M/s. Vagicherla Guravaiah and sons (1975 (2) An.W.R. 370) (9) Nagula Konda Marayya v. P.V.G. Raju (1985 (1) An.W.R. 433) (10) Nimmagadda Krishna Hari and another v. Manepalli Mangamma ( 2001 (6) ALT 765 (DB). (11) Hari Prasad Badruka v. T. Lakshmi and others ( 2000 (1) ALT 551 ). (12) Smt. Amavaz Rustom Printer, Mumbai and another v. N.D. Thadani and another ( 2001 (4) ALT 509 ). (13) J.M. Benedict v. Mithileswari Jaiswal (2002 (4) ALT 509). (14) Vinukonda Venkata Ramana v. Mootha Venkateswara Rao and another ( 2001 (5) ALT 479 (F.B.). (15) Fakruddin Ali Tarwala v. Ved Prakash Mishra and others ( 2002 (6) ALT 421 ). (13) J.M. Benedict v. Mithileswari Jaiswal (2002 (4) ALT 509). (14) Vinukonda Venkata Ramana v. Mootha Venkateswara Rao and another ( 2001 (5) ALT 479 (F.B.). (15) Fakruddin Ali Tarwala v. Ved Prakash Mishra and others ( 2002 (6) ALT 421 ). (16) Munnalal and others v. Englarg Pershad ( 2007 (4) ALT 49 ). (17) N.D. Thadani (dead) by Lrs. V. Amavaz Rustom Printer, Mumbai and another ( 2004 (3) ALT 1 (SC)). (18) Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan (2002 (1) ALT (Crl.) 250 (SC). (19) Ammena Bee v. Noorjahan Bedum and others ( 2001 (1) ALT 510 ). (20) Linga Pentamma and others v. T. Jagadishwar Rao and others ( 2006 (1) ALT 1 11 (D.B.). (21) E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy ( 2002(7) Supreme 574 ). (22) Balwanth Singh and others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and others (2003 (6) ALD 69 (SC) = 2003 (3) ALT 17.3 (DN SC). (23) Lakhan Rai v. Ram Kumar Aggarwal ( AIR 1979 SC 824 ). (24) Duli Chand v. Maman Chand ( (1980) 1 SCC 246 ). (25) Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao and another ( AIR 1989 SC 2185 ). (26) M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu ( (1996) 6 SCC 228 = 1996 (4) ALT 32 (DN). (27) Kanigalupula Subbamma v. Jangala Venkata Ramamma (1965 (2) An.W.R. 381 (D.B.). (28) Dekaya alias Dakaiah v. Anjani ( 1996 (1) ALT 1 (SC). (29) Maiku v. Vilayat Hussain through L.Rs. ( AIR 1986 SC 1645 ). (30) Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal and another ( (1996) 1 SCC 243 ). (31) Inter-State Transport Agency v. Bibi Habiba Khatoon ( (1998) 4 SCC 70 ). 25. Reliance also was placed on the decision in Linga Pentamma and others v. T. Jagadishwar Rao and others 2006 (1) ALT 1 11 (D.B). 26. The aspect of burden of proof and the acceptance of rent by landlord under protest had fallen for consideration in S. Pentaiah and others v. Khatija Bee and others 2008 (6) ALT 645. 27. In Munnalal (died) and others v. Engiarg Pershad 2007 (4) ALT 49 it was observed at paras 9, 10, 11 and 12 as hereunder. 26. The aspect of burden of proof and the acceptance of rent by landlord under protest had fallen for consideration in S. Pentaiah and others v. Khatija Bee and others 2008 (6) ALT 645. 27. In Munnalal (died) and others v. Engiarg Pershad 2007 (4) ALT 49 it was observed at paras 9, 10, 11 and 12 as hereunder. “Rule 5 (1) of the Rules lays down the procedure, when a tenant is desirous of depositing the rent under sub-section (5) of section 8 or Section 9 or Section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ' the Act' ). Rule 5 (4) of the Rules lays down the procedure for service of a notice of deposit and specifies that it shall be done in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules. Rule 16 of the Rules reads as under: 16. (1) All notices under the Act issued by the Controller or the appellate authority and all orders passed by the Controller or the appellate authority if not pronounced in open court shall be served on the person concerned; (a) personally by delivering or tendering to him the notice or order; or (b) if such person is not found, by leaving the notice or order at his last known place of abode or business or by giving or tendering the same to some adult member of his family; or (c) if such person does not reside in the area within the jurisdiction of the controller or the appellate authority, by sending the same to him by registered post, with acknowledgment due; or (d ). . . . . . . . (not relevant for the present controversy.) Admittedly, none of the three modes prescribed under Rule 16 of the Rules have been followed in this case. Such questions have been considered by a learned single Judge of this Court in a judgment reported in Hari Prasad Badurka v. Tellakunta Lakshmi and others and by a division Bench of this Court in a judgment reported in Linga Pentamma and others. v. T. Jagadiswar Rao and others and also by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in n. D. Tandani (dead) by LRs v. Arnavaz rustom Printer and another. v. T. Jagadiswar Rao and others and also by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in n. D. Tandani (dead) by LRs v. Arnavaz rustom Printer and another. Since the tendering of rents was not communicated by way of a notice in terms of rules 5 (4) and 16 of the Rules, the appellate court was right in coming to a conclusion that it was a case of wilful default.” 28. Further reliance was placed on the decision in N.D. Thandani (dead) by LRs., v. Arnavaz Rustom Printer and another AIR 2004 Supreme Court 495 wherein at paras 7 and 8 it was observed as hereunder. “The case at hand projects a picture where in spite of the leaning of the law in favour of the tenant, if anyone deserves sympathy it is the landlord and not the tenant. As already noticed, this is the third round of litigation complaining of default in payment of rent by the tenant. In the first round of litigation the rate of rent was alleged by the landlord to be Rs.160/- per month which was denied by the tenant who pleaded the rate of rent to be Rs.80/- per month only. In the litigation which ended in the apex court, the rate of rent was finally adjudged to have been Rs.160/- per month and not Rs.80/- as was pleaded by the tenant. Not only does the law itself require the tenant to pay or tender the rent month to month, the order of this Court mandated the tenant to clear all the arrears of rent within two months and thereafter to deposit the rent month by month and strictly observe compliance with the orders of the Supreme Court. The tenant did not even thereafter comply with the provisions of Rule 5. Huge amount of arrears accumulated, which were cleared in one go. Even other deposits were not regularly made. The tenant did not keep the landlords informed of the deposits either directly or by complying with the provision of the Rule. The obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent cannot be said to have been discharged unless and until the landlords were posted with the information along with particulars enabling them to withdraw the amount. The legal notices served by the landlords were not responded to in the desired manner so as to put an end to their grievance. The legal notices served by the landlords were not responded to in the desired manner so as to put an end to their grievance. A claim for eviction founded on the simple ground of default in payment remained pending for years, obviously because of the reluctance and the procrastinating tactics of the tenant. If this is not 'wilful default' then what else can it be? We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has rightly held the tenant to be a chronic wilful defaulter. The decree for eviction is fully justified. Before parting, and, in fairness to the learned counsel for the parties, we may place on record a submission made on behalf of the appellant that in spite of the tenant having defaulted in payment of rent for any period prior to the institution of the suit, if the arrears have been cleared (though belatedly) and the landlord has accepted the same, the default, if any, stands wiped out and the cause of action for seeking eviction of the tenant based on the preceding default does not survive. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vinukonda Venkata ramana vs. Mootha Venkateswara Rao and am.- AIR 2002 AP 52 . This decision takes notice of two decisions of this Court (both by two judges benches) reported as Dakaya Alias dakaiah vs. Anjani (1995) 6 SCC 500 and k. A. Ramesh and Ors. vs. Susheela Bai (Smt.)and Ors.- (1998) 3 SCC 58 . An earlier decision by a Five-Judges Bench of the Andhra pradesh High Court, namely, Pallapothu narasimha Rao and Anr. vs. Kidanbi Radhakrishnamacharyulu - AIR 1978 AP 319 was brought to the notice of the Full Bench deciding Vinukonda Venkata Ramana's case (supra) but the Full Bench commented that the five-Judges Bench decision in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and Anr. (supra) is not good law because it fails to take note of the Supreme court's decision in the case of Dakaya Alias Dakaiah (supra ). The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the Five-Judges bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and Anr. (supra) is not good law because it fails to take note of the Supreme court's decision in the case of Dakaya Alias Dakaiah (supra ). The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the Five-Judges bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and Anr. 's case (supra) is based on a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Mangilal vs. Suganchand Rathi - (1964) 5 SCR 239 , which was not noticed in the two Supreme Court decisions noted and followed by the Full Bench in Vinukonda Venkata Ramana's case (supra ). The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that this Court should hold the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vinukonda Venkata Ramana's case not to be good law in view of the larger Bench decision of that very court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and Anr. The issue is substantial and we would have certainly going into it but we find the present case is not an appropriate case for doing so. It is not the finding arrived at either by the trial court or by the High Court that the amount of arrears had stood paid by the tenant to the landlord prior to the initiation of proceedings for eviction by the latter. The question of examining the effect of such payment does not, therefore, arise in the present case. On the contrary, the finding is that the tenant was and has continued to remain in arrears up to the date of the initiated of the proceedings, and the only question arising for decision in the present case is whether the default can be said to be 'wilful' or not.” 29. The scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction had been explained in Challa Maheswara Rao and another v. Vadagam Venkata Subba Rao and another 2008 (6) ALT 446 . 30. Reliance also was placed on the decision in Hari Prasad Badruka v. Tellukunta Laxmi and others 2000 (1) ALT 551 wherein at paras 11 and 14 the learned Judge observed as hereunder. “Deposit of rent by a tenant into court, as per the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, is for the benefit of the landlord, so that the landlord can withdraw the amount immediately after it is deposited. “Deposit of rent by a tenant into court, as per the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, is for the benefit of the landlord, so that the landlord can withdraw the amount immediately after it is deposited. If the tenant who makes a deposit does not file the challans evidencing the deposit into the bank into Court, the landlord cannot have the benefit of amount deposited by the tenant, and therefore it is as good as the tenant not paying the money to the landlord. Though Rule 5 of the Rules does not stipulate any time within which the tenant should file the challans evidencing the deposit of money in the Bank into the court, by necessary implication it should be taken that he should file the challans into the Court within a reasonable time from the date of deposit. It is well known that where no time is stipulated for performing an obligation the person who has to perform the obligation has to perform it within a reasonable time. The tenant who deposits money into Bank, as per the order of the court under Sections 8,9 and 11 is under an obligation to file the challans evidencing deposit of money in Bank, into the Court as per Rule 5 (3) of the Rules. Rule 5 (4) of the rules contemplates notice of deposit being given to the person (s) concerned within seven days of delivery of the challan by the tenant. If the tenant himself gives a notice to the landlord, or if the landlord is appearing through a Counsel to the Counsel for the landlord, there is no further need for the rent Controller to serve notice of deposit on the landlord. If no such notice is given, the tenant has to deposit process fee for the court to serve the notice of deposit on the person (s) concerned. If process fee is not deposited, the Court cannot serve notice of deposit on the landlord. In this case, admittedly, notice of deposit was not given to the landlord or his Counsel and it is not even the case of the tenant that process fee was deposited, as per Rule 16 for sending notice of deposit to the landlord. If process fee is not deposited, the Court cannot serve notice of deposit on the landlord. In this case, admittedly, notice of deposit was not given to the landlord or his Counsel and it is not even the case of the tenant that process fee was deposited, as per Rule 16 for sending notice of deposit to the landlord. Thus it is clear that the tenant has not complied with the provisions of Rule 5 (4) read with Rule 16 of the Rules, for the Rent Controller taking steps for service of notice of deposit on the landlord, because without the tenant depositing the process fee for service of notice, Court cannot cause service of notice of deposit on the landlord. When a tenant takes recourse to section 8 of the Act for deposit of rents into the Court, he has to follow the procedure prescribed therein. If he fails to deposit challans into Court and give notice of deposit or fails to deposit process fee to enable the Court to cause service of notice of deposit on landlord for a considerably long time, it cannot but be held that he becomes a wilful defaulter, thereby creating a right in the landlord seeking his eviction from the demised premises on the ground of wilful default.” 31. Further reliance was placed on the decision in Mohammed Gulam Mustafa v. Mohammed Abdul Jabbar 2006 (1) ALT 423 and Mallampalli Mallikarjuna Rao and another v. Godavarthi Seshamma and another AIR 1971 Andhra Pradesh 298. 32. The stand taken by the landlords that the tenants committed wilful default in payment of rents for the months November 1997 till the end of June 1998 and it is the case of the landlords that in spite of repeated demands the said amounts had not been paid as contemplated in the Act and the Rules. The tenants denied the said stand taking specific stand that they had tendered rents up to the death of their father for the month of November and the landlords did not receive and thereafter the tenants remitted the rents by M.Os. and those M.Os. also were returned with endorsement of refusal. Having no other alternative, after issuing notice, R.C. No.73 of 1998 was filed praying for permission under Section 8 (5) of the Act and interim permission had been obtained to deposit rent and deposited the rents regularly. and those M.Os. also were returned with endorsement of refusal. Having no other alternative, after issuing notice, R.C. No.73 of 1998 was filed praying for permission under Section 8 (5) of the Act and interim permission had been obtained to deposit rent and deposited the rents regularly. Finally, the said R.C. was allowed. 33. The default is said to have commenced in the month of November 1997. R.W.1 deposed about tendering of rents by person and by M.Os. and refusal of same by landlord No.1 and issuance of notice under Section 8 (2) of the Act calling upon the landlords to furnish the bank account details and having failed in their attempts, filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 for deposit of rents and deposited arrears of rent covered by the default period in the eviction petition. It is also the specific case of the tenants as on the date of filing of the eviction petition, no arrears were due. R.W.1 relied on Exs.A-15 to A-29, Exs.B-24 to B-39, Ex.B-41. Ex.B-43 is the served copy of legal notice dated 17.11.1991 got issued by the first landlord to Lal Mohan Mehata, father of the tenants, wherein it was stated that Lal Mohan Mehata is the tenant in occupation of the premises having obtained premises from Pasupati Rao Antoo. The father of the present tenants alone obtained the premises from Pasupati Rao Antoo and payment of rent by R.L. Mehata may not be of much consequence when the landlords themselves accepted that R.L. Mehata was tenant and succeeded the right of tenancy by the present tenants after his death. Exs.B-22 to B-26 are the money order receipts and returned money order coupons. These money orders were refused by the landlords on the ground that the tenant Lal Mohan Mehata expired. After return of money orders, the tenants got issued the original of Ex.B-27 calling upon the landlords to furnish bank account details so as to enable the tenants to deposit rent, but no reply was sent. The tenants remitted under Ex.B-41 and the same was refused. The landlords refused to receive rents remitted by money orders on the ground of original tenant died. 34. The stand of the present tenants is that the tenancy being heritable, they succeeded to the tenancy rights of their father. The tenants remitted under Ex.B-41 and the same was refused. The landlords refused to receive rents remitted by money orders on the ground of original tenant died. 34. The stand of the present tenants is that the tenancy being heritable, they succeeded to the tenancy rights of their father. Hence, refusal of acceptance of rent from November 1997 to June 1998, in the facts and circumstances, to be held not to be bona fide. The tenants had filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 and obtained interim permission to deposit arrears of rent and deposited rents for the month of November 1997 to February 1998 on 02.3.1998, rent for the month of March 1998 to June 1998 on 27.4.1998, July 1998 to December 1998 on 10.8.1998 as well reflected by Ex.B-42 ledger extract. 35. The evidence of R.W.1 also is to the same effect. It is also not in serious controversy that as on the date of filing of the eviction petition no arrears were due. In the cross-examination of P.W.1, P.W.1 deposed that the tenants filed R.C. No.73 of 1998 under Section 8 (5) of the Act praying for permission to deposit the rents and on contest the said R.C. was allowed on 09.10.1998, but pleaded ignorance about the filing of I.A. No.105 of 1998 for deposit of rent into court during the pendency of the proceedings. This witness, no doubt, admitted furnishing of bank account number as mentioned in Ex.B-1, certified copy of the order in R.C. No.73 of 1998. This witness also admitted that the tenants had deposited the rents in the bank account till the end of June 2001. Thus, the tenants had deposited rents to the credit of their account after obtaining permission under Ex.B-1. However, P.W.1 did not admit as to the deposit of rents after obtaining interim permission in I.A. No.105 of 1998 during the pendency of R.C. No.73 of 1998. The evidence of R.W.1 would go to show that R.W.1 deposited rents to the credit of R.C. for the period from November 1997 till the end of December 1998. But however, this witness admitted about the non-compliance of Rule 5 (4) of the Rules. This witness admitted as hereunder. The evidence of R.W.1 would go to show that R.W.1 deposited rents to the credit of R.C. for the period from November 1997 till the end of December 1998. But however, this witness admitted about the non-compliance of Rule 5 (4) of the Rules. This witness admitted as hereunder. “I have not intimated the deposit of rent into court for the months of November 1997 to December 1998 to the petitioner.” This admission was not further explained any where either in the further cross-examination or no attempt was made to explain the same by at least re-examination. The non-compliance of the procedure as contemplated by Rules 5 and 16 of the Rules being mandatory as held by the decisions already specified supra and in the light of the same, since mere deposit of rent into court would not absolve the tenants from the responsibility of payment unless and until the mandatory provisions are followed. 36. The findings recorded in this regard in the light of Ex.B-1 and Ex.B-42 and several admissions made by P.W.1 and R.W.1 cannot be found fault and accordingly the said findings are hereby confirmed. 37. On the aspect of securing alternative accommodation, the Appellate Authority referred to the decision in Satyanarayana v.Moizuddin Khan ( 2005 (4) ALD 249 ) wherein it was held as hereunder. “When he tenant said to have alternative accommodation under Section 10(2)(v) and sought for eviction by the landlord who purchased the property subsequently it does not amount to securing alternative accommodation.” 38. The evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 had been appreciated, Exs.A-9 to A-14 had been discussed at length and ultimately the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the learned Rent Controller, on proper appreciation of the facts and evidence available on record, rightly concluded that the tenants did not secure alternative accommodation and, thus, in the light of the elaborate findings recorded at paras 33 to 35 this Court is of the considered opinion that these findings being concurrent findings recorded by both the learned Rent Controller and also the Appellate Authority this Court is not inclined to disturb the said findings while exercising revisional jurisdiction and accordingly the said findings are hereby confirmed. 39. 39. On the aspect of permanent tenancy the learned Appellate Authority recorded reasons at para 36 and came to the conclusion that the findings of the learned Rent Controller to be confirmed and this Court does not see any reason to interfere with the said findings and accordingly the said findings are hereby confirmed. 40. No doubt, on the aspect of bona fide personal requirement elaborate submissions had been made and the under noted decisions had been relied on. (1) Palichetty Latchanna v. Giduthuri Appa Rao AIR 1983 Andhra Pradesh 244; (2) Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan and others AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 74; (3) Shamshad Ahmad and others v. Tilak Raj Bajaj (D) by L.Rs. and others 2008 AIR SCW 6201; (4) Yadvendra Arya and another v. Mukesh Kumar Gupta AIR 2008 Supreme Court 773; (5) Uday Shankar Auadhyay and others v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 503. 41. There cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, to the choice of landlord to choose his own premises for the purpose of accommodating his own business. The stand taken by the tenants that the 5th landlord P.W.2 is already carrying on business as on the date of filing of the eviction petition and the allegation that he remained as a unemployee and intending to carry on business in Hardware and General Goods may be unsustainable. The Appellate Authority appreciated the evidence available on record referred to Exs.B-2 to B-7 and also the admissions made by P.W.1 and P.W.2 as well and came to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller cannot be sustained. The evidence of R.W.1 also had been appreciated. 42. Specific finding had been recorded that the mere desire or intention may not be sufficient to conclude or to arrive at a conclusion that the landlord’s requirement to be taken as bona fide and the entire evidence and also the pleading of the landlords would not reflect the need of the premises except stating that one of them intend to carry on business. The mere desire to carry on business is not sufficient since the landlords are expected to establish bona fide need. The mere desire to carry on business is not sufficient since the landlords are expected to establish bona fide need. As per the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and also the evidence of R.W.1 there cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that the landlords jointly are in possession of mulgi in the ground floor and the upstair building at Shah Gunj and all the mulgies are utilized for commercial purposes. The non-production of sanction plan to find out whether the building was constructed for residential purpose or for nonresidential purpose also had been referred to. 43. This Court had carefully analyzed several admissions made by P.W.1, P.W.2 and also R.W.1 and the reasons which had been recorded by the learned Appellate Authority commencing from paras 37 to 49. In the light of the principles which had been already specified above and since the learned Appellate Authority also referred to relevant decisions and recorded appropriate findings, though the said findings are reversing findings, this Court does not see any reason to interfere with the said findings and accordingly the same is hereby confirmed. The defined limitations of this Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act also cannot be forgotten. Point No.2: 44. In the result, these two civil revision petitions being devoid of merit, the same shall stand dismissed with costs. The tenants are granted two months time to vacate the premises.