JUDGMENT: K.J. Sengupta, J. 1. THE above application for condonation of delay in preferring appeal is taken out by the State/appellant against the judgement and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2nd May, 2008 passed in the above writ petition. It appears there has been delay for about 220 days. This application is strongly contested by the respondents above named, hence it was made to understand to both the parties hearing of this application and merit of the appeal is to take place simultaneously; in the event the Court finds sufficient cause having been made out, this delay would be condoned and considering the argument on merit appeal itself would be disposed of and in the event the Court finds none obviously there would be no need to consider the argument on merit, and appeal would be dismissed. 2. HENCE factual aspect of this matter needs to be stated for which present appeal is intended to be preferred. The respondents above named were claiming to be organizing teachers and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan, Police Station, Garbeta, District: Paschim Midnapore (hereinafter referred to as the said school). The said school though organized, was not being recognized by the State as well as Board of secondary Education despite repeated representations hence number of writ petitions came to be filed and several orders were passed thereon. First of which was CO. No. 955(5) of 1993 and the same was disposed of by the Hon'ble Justice Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee (as His Lordship then was) on 3rd February, 1994 directing the Board of Secondary Education to grant recognition of the said school as IV Class Junior High school. After the said writ petition was disposed of one Manik Chandra Ghosh made an application for addition of parties and modification of the said order dated 3rd February, 1994. On the application His Lordship Justice Mukherjee was pleased to recall the earlier order dated 3rd February, 1994 by order dated 25th August, 1994. After the said writ petition was disposed of one Manik Chandra Ghosh made an application for addition of parties and modification of the said order dated 3rd February, 1994. On the application His Lordship Justice Mukherjee was pleased to recall the earlier order dated 3rd February, 1994 by order dated 25th August, 1994. This order dated 25th August 1994 was appealed against by the present respondents and the same being F.M.A.T. No. 1474 of 1994 was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court and Their Lordships of Division Bench were pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the order of learned Single Judge dated 25th August, 1994 and fresh direction was given by the Appeal Court to the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter in short Board) to consider the application for grant of recognition of the said school. However, the Board refused to grant recognition while considering the application in terms of the Division Bench Judgment and order by a Memo being No. 6-S dated 3rd January, 1997. Thereafter the respondents herein filed an application before the Division Bench for clarification of the order of the Appeal Court on 27th July 1994 on various grounds and the Division Bench however dismissed the said application observing that in view of order of rejection of the said Board fresh cause of action had arisen. Thereafter the respondents challenged the order of rejection dated 3rd January, 1997 in a writ petition being WP No.17429 (W) of 1999 and the same was disposed of upon contested hearing on 29th March, 2000. By order dated 29th March, 2000 His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lala (as His Lordship then was) gave direction to the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education to grant recognition to school in question within a month from the date of communication of this order. Further direction was given in the said order to the respondents to forward the names of the respondent to the District Inspectors of Schools within 15 days from the date of grant of recognition of the said school for considering approval of the services of the petitioner after opportunity being given. The Board intended to prefer appeal against the order dated 29th March, 2000 with an application for condonation of delay. The appeal Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay consequently appeal was also dismissed. The Board intended to prefer appeal against the order dated 29th March, 2000 with an application for condonation of delay. The appeal Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay consequently appeal was also dismissed. Subsequently a review application was made unsuccessfully in an attempt to upset the order of the learned Trial Judge as well as the order passed by the Division Bench. In spite of the dismissal of the appeal order of the learned Trial Judge having not been carried out, a contempt application was filed thence the Board granted recognition by order dated 10 September, 2003 as un-aided IV Class Junior High school provisionally for three years with effect from 1st May, 2003 without any financial assistance. The contempt application was finally heard out and His Lordship held that contemnors were guilty for not carrying out the order passed in true sense. Hence Justice Lala by an order dated 23rd June, 2004 disposed of the contempt application by deleting the word "without any financial assistance" from the said order of recognition. Thereafter the Board reconsidered the matter and in terms of the said order dated 23rd June, 2004 deleted the said words "without any financial assistance." This order of reconsideration dated 9th November, 2005 was passed informing the respondents herein that the Board had no power to grant financial assistance as the matter of grant of financial assistance is left for consideration of the State Government in compliance with the order of me Hon'ble High Court. Thus the order of Justice Lala has been accepted conclusively by the Board and even State of West Bengal did not prefer any appeal against the above order of Justice Lala. In spite of the above orders and communication made, the State respondent did not take any step for release of financial assistance and also for granting approval of appointment of the present respondents, as such DI on representation being made, had given hearing to the teaching and non-teaching staff and respondent school authorities, and he came to the conclusion that services of four teaching and two non-teaching staff could be approved with effect from 1st May, 2005 but appointment of the respondents were not accorded approval. In view of the aforesaid rejection the respondents filed the above writ petition praying for following reliefs: "a) A writ of and/or in the nature of mandamus should not be issued commanding the respondent to act and proceed in accordance with law and further commanding the respondents to approve the service of your petitioners as organiser teaching and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan forthwith; b) A writ of and/or in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to withhold the approval of appointment of your petitioners as organiser teaching and non-teaching Staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshaniketan, Post Office Manalbendi, Garbeta, District-Paschim Midnapore and pay their salary on and from 1st May, 2003 till date and month by month; c) A writ of and/or in the nature of certiorari directing the respondents to transmit the entire records of the case forming the basis of withholding the approval of appointment of your petitioners as organiser teaching and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibashi Sikshaniketan Post Office- Manalbendi, Garbeta, District - Paschim Midnapore till date and also the papers and documents forming the basis of withholding the appointment of your petitioner as Organiser Teaching and non- teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibasi Sikshanikatan, Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District- Paschim Midnapore till date to this Hon'ble Court and to certify the same and on behalf so certified quash the same; d) Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a) to (c) as above; e) An order do issue directing the respondents to approve the appointment of your petitioners organising teaching and non-teaching staff of Vidyasagar Tapasili Adibashi Sikshaniketan Post Office - Manalbendi, Garbeta, District-Paschim Midnapore forthwith; f) Ad interim order in terms of the prayer (e) above till the disposal of the Rule; g) And pass further order/orders and/or direction or directions, as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper;" 3. THE learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order after hearing the parties and considering the decisions of this Court as well as Apex Court allowed the prayer of the respondents and had given direction in the manner as follows: "Thus the respondents particularly the 4th respondent are directed to approve the appointments of the petitioners within four weeks from the date of communication of the order and once the appointments were approved by the 4th respondent the petitioners will be entitled to the salaries with effect from the date of recognition of the said high school by West Bengal Board of Secondary Education on 4th January, 2003". 4. IN the application for condonation of delay the petitioner/appellant in order to explain the delay has stated substantially as follows: The impugned judgment and order was passed on 2nd May, 2008. It was communicated for the first time to the then District INspector of school concerned by a letter of the learned Advocate of the writ petitioners/respondents dated 14th August, 2008 which was received on 19th August, 2008. Thus it was for the first time the appellant is said to have knowledge through its officers on 19th August, 2008. Thereafter on 21st August, 2008 the then District INspector of Schools requested the learned Advocate for the State of West Bengal in Original Side to apply for a certified copy of the impugned judgment and order. Pursuant to such request application for; certified copy was filed in the Registry of the Hon'ble Court on 28th August, 2008. Folio charges/requisites of the said certified copy were notified on 17th which were put in on the same day the certified copy was made ready for delivery ultimately on 18th of March, 2009, meanwhile a proposal for preferring appeal was submitted by District INspector of school concerned. The proposal was approved by the school Education Directorate of the school Education Department Government of West Bengal and ultimately vide Memo dated 17th March, 2009, Mr. Saikat Banerjee learned Advocate was engaged in appeal. Thereafter all the papers including the certified copy were handed over to Mr. Banerjee by the Office of the appellant/petitioner No. 1 on 24th March, 2009. Upon receipt of the papers Mr. Banerjee thereafter took some time to get the documents prepared for filing the aforesaid appeal which was ultimately filed in 2nd Week of April 2009. Thereafter all the papers including the certified copy were handed over to Mr. Banerjee by the Office of the appellant/petitioner No. 1 on 24th March, 2009. Upon receipt of the papers Mr. Banerjee thereafter took some time to get the documents prepared for filing the aforesaid appeal which was ultimately filed in 2nd Week of April 2009. IN the application it is stated that there has been delay for about 109 days in preferring appeal. The aforesaid statements and averments made in the said application were dealt with and/or controverted by the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by one Mr. Tarun Kumar Ghosh in the manner as follows: Actually the delay was more than 109 days as computation of this period is patently wrong since impugned judgment and order was passed on 2nd May, 2008 and admittedly application for obtaining certified copy was made on 28th August, 2008 that is to say after expiry of 30 days of period of limitation. According to the respondent the delay would be at least 340 days. Immediately after the said impugned order was passed, by a letter dated 5th May, 2008 the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner/respondent duly communicated to the District Inspector of Schools by a letter dated 5th May 2008 and the same was received on 6th May, 2008, about passing of the order dated 2nd May, 2008. Thus the said letter was duly received by DI himself having signed. Thus it is incorrect to say that the appellant for the first time came to know about the order dated 2nd May, 2008, in the month of August, 2008. Thereafter on receipt of the certified copy of the order on 14th August, 2008 the same was communicated by registered post with acknowledgement due and the same was received on 19th August, 2008. 5. IT was found in spite of communication, order was not carried out. Then a contempt proceeding was initiated and the said impugned order was complied with by the then DI of Schools on 15th December, 2008 and such compliance report was submitted before the learned Single Judge without any reservation and hesitation. 6. 5. IT was found in spite of communication, order was not carried out. Then a contempt proceeding was initiated and the said impugned order was complied with by the then DI of Schools on 15th December, 2008 and such compliance report was submitted before the learned Single Judge without any reservation and hesitation. 6. IN the affidavit-in-reply the appellant tried to deal with the statement and averment made in the said affidavit in opposition in the manner as follows: The figure of 340 days of delay is fabricated as it will appear that the High Court department concerned has computed the delay of 109 days. IN this connection it has been stated that the said letter sent on 5th May, 2008 was found in the record book in the office of the DI of schools but the same was not brought to the attention of the then DI. It is also stated that the system is, if any letter is addressed to the DI of Schools the same should be received by the Receiving Section of the INspectorate and thereafter a docket number is allotted to the said document received and then appropriate action is taken. This document being letter dated 5th May, 2008 does not bear any such docket number. Therefore, it is sought to be explained, that the said letter is unusually sent and was received by the DI but it was not placed in the proper file. After completion of filing of the aforesaid pleadings namely application, affidavit in opposition and affidavit in reply, two supplementary affidavits were filed by the appellants to advance further explanation. The DI requested the Directorate of school Education by letter dated 4th September, 2008 to take step for preferring appeal and it was mentioned in the said letter that no copy of the writ petition was served and the matter was moved in the Original Side jurisdiction. On receipt of the said letter the Directorate of school Education on November, 2008 accepted the proposal for preferring appeal thereafter the file was sent to the Legal Remembrancer, West Bengal for necessary approval which was accorded on 20th November, 2008 and thereafter Mr. Amar Mitra the learned Advocate was engaged to file appeal. Mr. Mitra then took steps for drafting and preparing memorandum of appeal and the same were handed over to the Legal Remembrancer (hereinafter in short LR) on 11th December, 2008. Amar Mitra the learned Advocate was engaged to file appeal. Mr. Mitra then took steps for drafting and preparing memorandum of appeal and the same were handed over to the Legal Remembrancer (hereinafter in short LR) on 11th December, 2008. However, the LR's office returned the Memo and the said application to Mr. Mitra on 18th December, 2008 without assigning any reason. It is also stated that after considering entire situation Mr. Saikat Banerjee was engaged by the appellant to prefer appeal. Unfortunately prior to filing of the appeal the contempt Rule was issued by the Hon'ble Single Judge making returnable date on 12th December, 2008. On receipt of the said Rule it appears that the then DI of Schools (SE), Paschim Midnapore appeared in the contempt proceeding and was served with a copy of the contempt application pursuant to the direction of learned Single Judge. Under threat of contempt the said order had to be carried out and compliance report was submitted. All these had been done by the erstwhile DI before he handed over the charges to the present DI on his retirement in the month of January, 2009. While hearing contempt application direction was given to the then DI for compliance of the order, and to file report of compliance of the impugned order. Thereafter in the order dated 17th December, 2008 the learned Trial Judge recorded compliance of the earlier order by the then DI according approval to the appointments of the organizing teaching and non-teaching staff from the date of recognition. 7. IN reply to the said supplementary affidavit of the appellants another affidavit was filed on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent. IN this affidavit apart from reiterating the statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition it was stated additionally that allegations of non-service of copy of the writ petition was not correct as after filing of the writ petition a copy of the same was duly served upon the DI on 24th April, 2008. Thereafter at the time of hearing of the said application the learned Advocate Mr. Mitra appeared. 8. Thereafter at the time of hearing of the said application the learned Advocate Mr. Mitra appeared. 8. WITH the leave of the Court another supplementary affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner/respondent on or about 6th August, 2009, in this affidavit the writ petitioner/respondents have brought certain facts namely passing of order dated 17th December, 2008 by the learned Single Judge in contempt application wherein the factum of filing report of compliance of the order was recorded and copy of the order dated 17th December, 2008 was also annexed. Mr. Jayanta Mitra learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant contends that act of compliance does not prejudice the right of the appellant of preferring the instant appeal as this was done under the threat of contempt. It is settled law that whenever any act of compliance is done under the threat of contempt such action does not wash out the right of preferring appeal in accordance with law. According to him the appellant being the State Government is depending upon the act and action of its officials who do not have, any personal interest and stake. As such action of the State cannot be as prompt as that of individual litigants. It is clear from the fact aforesaid that the DI was not aware of the order and the moment he came to know he took prompt steps in getting approval of preferring appeal and ultimately approval was granted but the respective departments could not take prompt action as it was required. 9. HE submits with the support of Supreme Court decision in case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO, reported in 2005(3) SCC 752 , that while exercising power under section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of condonation of delay the test of promptitude and diligence should not be the same as in case of private individuals. Some degree of latitude should be allowed as the State Government is to act with the cumbersome procedure of note making, official decision, file pushing and then formal approval. From the facts stated in the application as well as the affidavit it is thus clear the State Government had to be subjected to the aforesaid process. 10. Some degree of latitude should be allowed as the State Government is to act with the cumbersome procedure of note making, official decision, file pushing and then formal approval. From the facts stated in the application as well as the affidavit it is thus clear the State Government had to be subjected to the aforesaid process. 10. HE also contends showing relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court that if the case is not hopelessly "meritless the delay should be condoned to advance substantial justice forsaking technicalities. While strengthening his case for condonation of delay he has hinted how the appeal is meritorious and substantive one. HE submits that the order for approval of the appointment of the organizing teacher is wholly illegal as there has been no provision for such unusual method of approval de hors the statutory provision. HE also submits that departmental approval of appointment of the teaching and non-teaching staffs are held to be illegal and invalid by the judicial pronouncement of this Court. In support of this contention he has brought the following Supreme Court decisions and decisions of this Court to our notice: 2006(4) SCC 1 , Secretary State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi; 2008(10) SCC 1 , Official Liquidator vs. Dayananda; 2005(6) SCC 106 , State of Haryana vs. Narender Singh; 1997(2) SCC 1 , Aswani Kumar vs. State of Bihar; 2008(1) WBLR 229 , State of West Bengal vs. Gopal Singh and Ors.; 2006(4) CHN, Manindranath Sinha vs. State of West Bengal; 2008(1) CLJ 453, HEadmistress, Garifa Arti Academy vs. Gita Banik and 2008(1) CHN 582 , State of West Bengal vs. Smritikana Maity. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that there has been misstatement on oath as to the knowledge of the passing of the impugned order as factum of communication of gist of the judgment and order of 6th May, 2008 has been suppressed, and there has also been incorrect statement as regards service of copy of the writ petition, because before the said writ petition was moved a copy of the same was received by the DI himself. The impugned judgment and order was passed on contest and on appearance and in presence of the learned Counsel for the State, as such there was no point to urge that State had no knowledge of passing of such order. The impugned judgment and order was passed on contest and on appearance and in presence of the learned Counsel for the State, as such there was no point to urge that State had no knowledge of passing of such order. Moreover when impugned order has been carried out unconditionally, unequivocally there is no reason nor the State has any right to prefer any appeal, as such the question of condoning delay in entertaining instant application does not arise. Besides, there has been no sufficient cause either having been stated or proved. Moreover there has been no explanation at all from 6th June, 2008 till August, 2008. 11. HE counters the submission of Mr. Mitra on the merit of the appeal contending that the earlier order of granting recognition of the said organizing school and directing consideration of approval to the appointment of organizing teaching and non-teaching has reached its finality. The legality and validity of the same cannot be reopened or questioned any more. 12. HE has sought reliance on the question of condonation of delay, on the Supreme Court decision reported in case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields, reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 . On the merit of the case he has drawn support of the following decisions of the Supreme Court MM. Pathak vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 803 ; AIR 1982 SC 1126 , A. V. Nachane vs. Union of India and AIR 1992 SC 522 , In Re. Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal. As we have already recorded in the event the application for condonation of delay is allowed then the matter is to be dealt with on merit also. Therefore it is incumbent on us to consider the application for condonation of delay first. The language of section 5 of the Limitation Act is very clear and it provides in exercise of discretion in the matter of condonation of delay, there must be some fact apparently acceptable that will lead the Court to believe the same to be probable and acceptable in given facts and situation for which the appellant was prevented from taking steps within the time fixed for preferring appeal and thereafter the proof thereof if controverted. Even after the proof of the said fact it is still for the Court either to exercise discretion or not. Even after the proof of the said fact it is still for the Court either to exercise discretion or not. To extend the time if the Court wants to exercise discretion by condoning delay then Court shall not only consider fact purporting to constitute sufficient ground, but also the fact and circumstances subsequently took place and that results in accrual of right in favour of the beneficiary of the order. While considering facts and situation if the Court finds condonation of delay would work as gross injustice to the party in whose favour order is passed, the Court will not certainly condone, but if it is found that the appellant would be seriously prejudiced and the degree of the same would be more than that of the respondent the Court will till to condone delay. 13. IN essence as rightly urged by Mr. Mitra the Court would lean to look for a cause of substantial justice rather to bank on the technicalities of the Rule. The approach of the Court to advance substantial justice in the matter of condonation of delay is not recent development. It was explained by the Supreme Court in case of Ramla vs. Rewa Coalfields, ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ) in paragraph 7 while approving the Madras High Court Judgment (ILR 13 Mad. 269, Krishna vs. Chathapan) as follows:- "(7) IN construing section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. IN other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice." 14. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice." 14. FROM 1962 till today the view of the Supreme Court and also the High Courts have not been changed basically but different approach have been noted under different circumstances. In the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO, 2005(3) SCC 752 , Justice Arijit Pasayat (as His Lordship then was) considering a large number of decisions, of course AIR 1962 SC 361 was not considered, has explained in paragraph 15 what should be sufficient cause: '(15)..........The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.' We have noted the ratio of both the aforesaid decisions. We think the approach of Court would be broadly to advance substantial justice in considering question of delay, and in fit case application of the Government for condonation of delay should be dealt with little degree of latitude in comparison to private litigant, but not in all cases. In case where the State is proved to be in absolutely helpless condition remaining at the hands of the official, and there was no scope to prefer appeal earlier discretion ought to be exercised in favour of State. In case where the State is proved to be in absolutely helpless condition remaining at the hands of the official, and there was no scope to prefer appeal earlier discretion ought to be exercised in favour of State. In cases where it was possible for the State to take action at any point of time earlier, than it has been actually presented before this Court delay ought not to be execused. In this context the statement and averment made out by the State has to be examined carefully, at the same time Court should not be oblivious of the fact whether any irreversible right has been accrued in favour of the respondents by passage of time. 15. IN this case it appears that State Government has made statement that there has been delay of 109 days as it is much more as rightly pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee. The factum of knowledge of the State through the DI should not be in the month of August, 2008 rather it should be in the month of May, 2008, viz. two days after passing of the impugned order. Admittedly in spite of having received letter dated 6th May, 2008 such fact has not been stated in the application for condonation of delay. According to us computation of period of limitation by the department of this Court is patently incorrect, and the same cannot be an excuse for stating wrong computation of period of limitation. Once period of limitation for preferring appeal runs out the time subsequent difficulty or incapacity does not arrest running out of time. The impugned order was passed on 4th May, 2008, hence the limitation of 30 days will start running from 5th of May, and will be expiring on 5th June, 2008. Subsequent step for making application for obtaining certified copy in the month of August 2008 and even up to the date of preferring appeal rather a month of delay ought not be considered at all. It is thus clear as rightly argued by Mr. Mukherjee from May, 2008 till August, 2008 there is simply no explanation. The State Government in its affidavit no where blamed any of the officials for not taking any step nor any action has been taken against the erstwhile DI for sitting over the matter despite admitted receipt of communication. It is thus clear as rightly argued by Mr. Mukherjee from May, 2008 till August, 2008 there is simply no explanation. The State Government in its affidavit no where blamed any of the officials for not taking any step nor any action has been taken against the erstwhile DI for sitting over the matter despite admitted receipt of communication. It appears that there has been misstatement on oath again as regard service of copy of the writ petition. It appears that a copy of the writ petition was served upon the DI himself and the learned Advocate was instructed to appear at the time of hearing. It could have been open for the State to ask for time to contest the matter but was not done obviously the learned Advocate was not instructed to do so. All through, the case was represented by learned Lawyers so knowledge of passing of the order is immaterial. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Mukherjee the respondent/ writ petitioner had no obligation under law to bring to the notice and knowledge of passing of the order when the learned Counsel appeared and represented the State. However, to facilitate to comply with order the gist of the same was communicated in advance followed by supply of certified copy. We, therefore, fail to understand why such plea of knowledge has been taken in this matter. It appears that DI concerned has wrongly communicated to the Director of school Education while seeking advice for preferring appeal that no copy of the writ petition was served. We also fail to understand in spite of all steps being taken why Mr. Amar Mitra was replaced by Mr. Saikat Banerjee Advocate, and thus resulted further delay. IN the affidavit or in the petition there is no grievance against Mr. Arun Mitra, nor against any of the officials of the State. Hence in absence of such complaint or allegation against any of its officials or learned Advocate we think that laches and negligence is on the part of the State itself and perhaps for this reason the order was accepted and carried out as it has been recorded in the order of the learned Single Judge while exercising contempt jurisdiction. 16. Hence in absence of such complaint or allegation against any of its officials or learned Advocate we think that laches and negligence is on the part of the State itself and perhaps for this reason the order was accepted and carried out as it has been recorded in the order of the learned Single Judge while exercising contempt jurisdiction. 16. THUS it is clear while looking into the position and status vis-a-vis the right of both the parties we think, that in the event delay is condoned then right of the petitioner/respondents would be irretrievably prejudiced as their livelihood would be at stake as order has been carried out fully with issuance of necessary order of approval to their appointment. The order granting recognition to the school has reached its finality in view of dismissal of appeal earlier against order of Justice Lala as rightly argued by Mr.Mukherjee. When order granting recognition with financial aid has now become unavailable, the State does not stand to lose financially as fund has to be released for school in any case naturally the State is not be affected. We are of the opinion when the Court thinks of caring of substantial justice in the matter of condonation of delay, it must weigh the extent of affectation of substantive right nay technical, of the parties. In this case in the event delay is condoned and appeal is admitted then the accepted judicial pronouncement will be put back to debatable area again consequently the fate of these teachers and the staff would be thrown to agonizing uncertainty. We- are not satisfied with the cause made out before us and particularly when we find inconsistent, incorrect and suppressive statement having been made out in the pleading. It would not be prudent for the Court to exercise this extraordinary jurisdiction in this situation. Hence we reject this application for condonation of delay. In view of the rejection we do not feel the need to consider and examine respective contention and submission made by the learned Counsel on merit. In the result the application dismissed so also the appeal. However, without any order as to cost.