Judgment :- 1. Writ jurisdiction is not meant to enable parties to demonstrate their contractual rights and get declarations of contractual rights and then to enforce them. 2. As to whether a contrast has been open, concluded or in itself closed is in doubt and at any rate when it is disputed, it is not for the writ court to embark to examine such matters. 3. In the present appeal by a person claiming to be the highest bidder of a property said to be sold by inviting tenders by the Karnataka State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, while exercising its statutory power under Section 29 of the Act, it appears the valuation though was highest has not fructified into the property being conveyed in favour of the appellant and therefore, the Writ Petition had been filed seeking for necessary directions to be issued to the Financial Corporation. Hence Writ Petition No. 3429/2008 was filed praying to quash the notice dated 04.02.2008 and direct the respondent-Financial Corporation to execute the sale deed in respect of the property bearing No. 32/6/3/C and D, 1st Cross, Bhagya Nagar, Belguam in favour of the petitioner etc. 4. Learned Single Judge found that the contract had not been finalised and that the Corporation getting as better valuation at Rs.57.81 lakhs in respect of the very property as against valuation of Rs.35 lakhs given by the appellant-petitioner and hence no need for interference. But nevertheless reserved liberty to the writ petitioner to proceed against the Corporation if the action on the part of the Corporation in going back from their valuation has resulted in any loss to the writ petitioner and to recover such damages in civil action. 5. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge, the present appeal. 6. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Sri Balakrishna Shastry submits that the learned Single Judge has misunderstood the nature of the transaction and as to up to what stage the transaction had reached with authority of decided cases, it may be demonstrated that there was a concluded contract between the Corporation and the appellant and if so, the consequences should necessarily follow in favour of the appellant. 7. 7. However much the laws might have been to indicate as to under what circumstances a contract can be said to be concluded, in the sense it has become a contract, the word which is coined by the courts when in fact there was no writing evidencing a contract, only for the purpose of ensuring that justice does not fail a gullible third party who had acted on the assurance held out by another party is not taken for a ride and to relieve the suffering from tyranny of an advantageously placed party to inflict loss and damages on the gullible party. 8. Be that as it may, if one has to make a good the case that there was a contract from out of which he got certain rights, it is a matter for enforcement, even contractual rights being a matter for enforcement before a civil court. The earlier requirement of making good or demonstrating a concluding contract is seldom examined in writ jurisdiction. 9. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to exercise discretion to issue a writ in a matter of this nature. Assuming that the precise reasoning mentioned by the learned Single Judge for dismissing the Writ Petition is not very apt, we find there were more reasons to dismiss the Writ Petition than to issue a writ. A writ jurisdiction is not one meant for enforcing specific performance of a contract and a fortiori is so dismissed. It is open for the appellant to take all such legal contentions as are open to him in law.