JUDGMENT : A widow landlady being a co-owner of a shop, situated at Building No. 7, 123, Sadar Bazar, Shivpuri had initially approached the Civil Court seeking eviction of the tenant from the non-residential premises, upon having a bona fide need of her major son Rakesh Garg, for establishing his business, but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the special provision contained in section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') alone should have been invoked, whereafter an appeal preferred before the District Judge also failed, compelling the widow to institute proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri wherein an application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code was filed by the tenant that all the co-owners have not been impleaded in the application and the Rent Controlling Authority, on being influenced with this aspect of the matter had dismissed the main application on the ground of non-joinder of all the co-owners before seeking eviction of the tenant, which present a very sorry state of affairs and exhibit helplessness of the widow that in-spite of clear legislative intendment of providing speedy justice, through specially created forums for securing eviction of the tenant nothing substantive could be done as yet and after a long lapse of six years, the matter could now reach before this Court. 2. This revision petition has been preferred under section 23-E of the Act, upon dismissal/ rejection of the landlady's application by the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri in Case No. 05/2005 by its Order dated 17-7-2006, whereby the application preferred by the widow Smt. Pista Devi Goyal under section 23-J of the Act has been dismissed on the ground that her three sons, namely Ritesh Kumar, Rajesh Kumar and Rakesh Kumar being her co-owners (co-heirs of her deceased husband Rambabu), had not been impleaded as a party in the eviction proceedings. 3. 3. The record demonstrate that Smt. Pista Devi Goyal had issued legal notice to the tenant Brijmohan Garg on date 12-11-2002 seeking eviction of the shop and a suit was instituted before the Civil Judge for seeking eviction in terms of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of the Act, but upon finding certain technical flaws, the suit for recovery of the rent was found not tenable, however the Civil Court found that the widow ought to have approached the Rent Controlling Authority for securing eviction of the tenanted premises, in view of special provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. 4. An appeal was also preferred against the judgment of Civil Court and the first Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 29-A/05 had affirmed the judgment of the Civil Court by its appellate judgment dated 19-10-2005 by observing that the widow can institute proceedings for eviction of the tenanted premises only before Rent Controlling Authority, being co-owner. 5. Thereafter the petitioner had approached the Rent Controlling Authority by filing an application under section 23- J of the Act and on being noticed, the Respondent had moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, wherein an objection was raised that since all the co-owners have not approached the Rent Controlling Authority, therefore the application filed on behalf of one co-owner would not be maintainable and the Rent Controlling Authority without caring to examine the relevant law and the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court, had straightaway dismissed the application of the petitioner by finding the same to be suffering from the defect of non-joinder of the necessary parties, by its impugned order dated 17-7-2006. The present petitioner has preferred this revision petition against the order of Rent Controlling Authority passed on date 17-7-2006. 6. The present petitioner has preferred this revision petition against the order of Rent Controlling Authority passed on date 17-7-2006. 6. Shri Kamal Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the tenant has admitted the ownership of the petitioner and the Appellate Court had recorded a finding based upon admission of the tenant that the petitioner is the owner of the tenanted premises, thereafter the tenant is estopped from raising any plea regarding the ownership of the landlord/landlady and the Rent Controlling Authority was not justified in entertaining such objection in contravention to the provisions of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provide that during the continuance of the tenancy the tenant is estopped from raising any objection about the ownership of the landlord. Shri Jain further submits that the legislature has incorporated Chapter III-A in Accommodation Control Act with an objective to provide speedy justice to the landlords, who fall into the specified categories, as contained in section 23-J of the Act and the Rent Controlling Authority cannot reject such an application on the ground that other co-owners are not impleaded as co-applicants. 7. Shri Kamal Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court, which is reported as AIR 1976 SC 2335 , Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and others to demonstrate that the non-joinder of the other owners of the property is not fatal to the plaintiff. Shri Jain further places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court, which is reported as 1989 MPLJ 202 = 1989 M.P.R.C.J. 88, Shivraj Jat vs. Smt. Asha Lata Yadav to demonstrate that anyone of the co-owner can maintain an action for eviction. Shri Jain also relies upon a Full Bench Decision of the M. P. High Court, reported as 7990 MPLJ (FB) 112 = 1990 J.L.J. 97 (F.B), Harbans Singh (Lt. Col.) vs. Smt. Margreet G. Bhingardive, where the Court has opined in Para 18 of its judgment that out of several landlords of an accommodation, an application for eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children (who are members of his family), would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority, under section 23-A read with section 23-J of the Act. 8. 8. Shri Kamal Jain has also made a reference to a Supreme Court judgment reported as (2006) 2 SCC 724 , Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain to demonstrate that when one of the co-owner institute a proceeding, he is not required to demonstrate that he had already taken consent of the other co-owners and therefore, he submits that even when the controversy in question is visualized from a different angle, there would be no necessity of obtaining a consent of the other co-owners before instituting a suit in relation to the tenanted premises. Lastly he relies upon a Single Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court reported as 2007(2) MPLJ 349 = AIR 2001 M. P. 235, Dhannalal vs. Smt. Kalavatibai and others to demonstrate that the co-owner can file a petition for the need of her major sons, who are also the joint landlord of the suit accommodation. (This judgment stood confirmed by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported as (2002) 6 SCC 16 ). 9. Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner certainly is a co-owner of the property along with her three sons, but since the tenanted premises is sought to be evicted by herself alone, for establishing the business need of the other co-owners, therefore the proceeding initiated by one co-owner for securing eviction for the need of other co-owners would not be covered in the scope of section 23-A of the Act and if at all the same would be maintainable, it would be a mischief in the eyes of law as the other co-owner (Ritesh Goyal) was having an independent and legal right to institute an independent suit, for his bona fide need, before the Civil Court and from this view of the matter the attempt of the widow in utilizing beneficial provisions, made exclusively for the benefit of the person, belonging to the specific category, would be a clear mischief in the eyes of law. 10. 10. Shri Dudawat, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the intent and object of the legislature in introducing Chapter III-A in M. P. Accommodation Control Act may be examined from yet another angle for appreciating legislative intendment that the definition of 'landlord' as prescribed in section 23-J takes into its sweep only five category of landlords whereafter the definition of the 'landlord' prescribed in section 2(b) could not be considered as the same would widen the scope of the application of the beneficial provisions and would defeat the legislative intendment as the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act are meant only for exclusive/independent need of the persons placed and prescribed under section 23-J of the Act. He further submits that there would have been no quarrel had the present petitioner Pista Devi Goyal would have instituted proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority as the sole owner of the property, but here is a case where her three sons are also the co-owners of the suit property, therefore the non-obstante clause, contained in section 23-A would operate which would debar the petitioner from instituting the proceedings for securing eviction for the cause of other co-owners. 11. Shri Arvind Dudawat further argued that since the right to defend is not available to a tenant as of right but the same is circumscribed, as the tenant is not entitled to contest without obtaining permission of the Rent Controlling Authority, in terms of section 23-C of the Act and from this point of view the legislative intendment should be analyzed for appreciating the meaning and scope of the word 'landlord' as described in section 23-J of the Act which would be relatable only to the five specified categories of tenant excluding the other categories of persons who would be joint-owners or co-owners of the property and when the petitioner has not set up her own need, for the establishment of her business, therefore a narrow meaning of the word 'landlord' would be available for interpretation, as also for granting the benefit of special provisions to the litigants. 12. I have heard Shri Kamal Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record of the case. 13. 12. I have heard Shri Kamal Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record of the case. 13. The legislature has introduced a special procedure in M. P. Accommodation Control Act by providing special provisions in Chapter III-A of the Act, for securing eviction of tenants on ground of bona fide requirement, wherein the landlords specified in section 23-J would be entitled to secure eviction of the tenant for their own need and would be entitled to secure eviction for the need of their major sons or unmarried daughters, which makes it crystal clear that the specified category of landlords would be entitled to secure eviction of tenants for their individual need as also for the need of their major sons and unmarried daughters. For ready reference sections 23-A and 23-J are quoted here-in-below; "23-A. Special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application, signed and verified in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation, namely (a) That the accommodation let for residential purposes is required 'bona fide' by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, 'accommodation let for residential purposes' includes - (i) Any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose; (ii) Any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purpose; (b) That the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required 'bona fide' by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. 23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is- (i) A retired servant of any Government including a retired member of defence services; or (ii) A retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) Physically handicapped person; or (v) A servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such place" 14. The objection regarding non-impleadment of other co-owners seems to be raised on behalf of the tenant, in violation to the scheme of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, where the tenant has been estopped from denying the ownership of the landlord in relation to existing tenanted premises and particularly when in the present case tenant has not disputed about the co-ownership of the petitioner/lady, the argument that the other co-owners have not been impleaded as co-applicants, becomes fallacious and looses its efficacy, in as much as the objection becomes redundant for all practical purposes, in absence of specific denial of the ownership of the tenanted premises. This issue was considered by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported as (1976) 4 SCC 184 , Shri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath wherein the Court has observed that a Suit could not be thrown out on account of non-impleadment of the other co-owners. The relevant paras 13, 14 and 25 to 27 of the judgment are quoted here-in-below; "13. It is strenuously submitted by Mr. Tarkunde that unless the landlord is also the absolute owner of the premises, he cannot evict the tenant under section 13(1)(f). landlord means landlords under the appropriate General Clauses Act and, therefore, since there are other co-sharers the plaintiff alone could not file the suit for eviction. 14. There are two reasons for our not being able to accept the above submission. Firstly, the plea pertains to the domain of the frame of the suit as if the suit is bad for non-joinder of other plaintiffs. Such a plea should have been raised, for what it is worth, at the earliest opportunity. It was not done. Secondly, the relation between the parties being that of landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such. 25. The principal question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff being a co-owner landlord can be said to reasonably require the premises for his own occupation within the expression "if he is the owner" in section 26. Mr. V. S. Desai reads to us from Salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edn.) and relies on the following passage in Chapter 8 (ownership), para 46 at p. 254 : "As a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time, but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. This may happen in several distinct ways, but the simplest and most obvious case is that of co-ownership, partners, for example, are co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in-trade, of the lease of the premises on which their business is conducted, and of the debts owing to them by their customers. It is not correct to say that property owned by co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a separate part. It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person.... The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned". 27. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants." 15. When a tenant raises objection about the non-impleadment of other co-owners, it pre-supposes that the tenant wants an adjudication about the inter se rights of ownership of the property and invite (or rather provoke) landlords to establish their respective ownership by adducing evidence in an un-called for manner, where the tenant is required to be evicted simplicitor and there appears to be no necessity of adducing evidence about the ownership. This aspect has also been considered by Supreme Court in its judgment reported as (1994) 4 SCC 250 , Anar Devi vs. Nathu Ram, where the Court has found that there exists no necessity for establishing the ownership by adducing the evidence. The relevant paragraphs 16 to 18 of this judgment are reproduced here-in-below ; "16. The legislature, in our view, by use of the words 'if he is the owner thereof in clause (b) of section 23-A could not have intended to require the landlord for whose benefit that provision was made, to plead in his application and to establish by evidence aliunde, that he was the owner of the accommodation, becomes obvious from the various provisions in Chapter III-A to which we have adverted to. When we look at section 23-A along with the form of notice in the Second Schedule to be issued on the application made under clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act by the landlord, an obligation is imposed on the tenant to obtain leave from the Rent Controller to contest that application. For seeking such leave, the tenant is required to make an application supported by an affidavit specifying the ground on which he wants to contest the application. Again, if he does not file such application supported by an affidavit or if the Court refuses to grant leave to contest it, the statement as regards the ground on which recovery of possession of the accommodation is sought by the landlord in his application shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the Rent Controller in that event, is bound to pass an order of eviction of the tenant from the accommodation. When it comes to sub­section (3) of section 23-D, it says that "in respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of section 23-A is bona fide". Such presumption requires the Rent Controller to regard the fact of bona fide requirement of the accommodation by the landlord to be taken as proved until the same is disproved by the tenant. Such presumption requires the Rent Controller to regard the fact of bona fide requirement of the accommodation by the landlord to be taken as proved until the same is disproved by the tenant. Thus, when the said provisions in the Chapter along with other provisions therein, reflect a legislative scheme or policy of enabling landlords of specified classes to recover possession of accommodation from their tenants with utmost expedition before the Rent Controller, a forum specially constituted for the purpose and when under section 116 of the Evidence Act a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title to accommodation, whether he was there either from the beginning of the tenancy or had become a tenant subsequently by acknowledging the landlord's title, it is difficult to think that the words "if he is the owner thereof" used in clause (b) of section 23-A are intended to require the landlord to plead in his application for recovery of possession made under the clause, his ownership of accommodation, and establish the same by evidence aliunde, to succeed in recovery of possession of such accommodation from the tenant. It would be so, particularly, when he was not so required to plead or establish on an application if had been made by him for recovery of possession of the accommodation on the self-same ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. It is also difficult to think that the said words "if he is the owner thereof in the clause, require that the landlord should plead and establish his title to the accommodation for recovery of its possession from the tenant, for that would be as good as asking him to go to Civil Court for establishing his title to the property and recover its possession from the tenant, which if is the correct position, would, instead of advancing the aforesaid object of the provisions in the Chapter, squarely result in its defeat. Therefore, what could be said of the words "if he is the owner thereof used in clause (b) of section 23-A, is that they are although meant to enable the landlord who is the owner of the accommodation, to submit an application under that clause for recovery of possession of the accommodation from his tenant, they are not intended to require such landlord to plead in his application that he is the owner of such accommodation and adduce evidence aliunde in that behalf for succeeding in that application. 17. Our answer to the question, therefore, is that the use of the words "if he is the owner thereof used in clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act does not require of the landlord who makes an application thereunder for recovery of possession of accommodation from the tenant to plead therein that he is the owner of such accommodation and establish by evidence aliunde that he is such owner, for succeeding in such application even though these words may enable a tenant to contest such application on the ground that the landlord is not the owner of the accommodation if he is not inhibited from doing so under section 116 of the Evidence Act. 18. Coming to the facts of the present appeal, as has been already pointed out by us, the learned Judge of the High Court reversed the order of the Rent Controller, on his view that the landlord-appellant, who had sought to recover possession of the accommodation from his tenant-respondent under clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act, had failed to establish or prove that she was the owner of the accommodation by adducing sufficient evidence in that behalf and, therefore, her application for eviction of the tenant-respondent from the accommodation was liable to be rejected. The question as to whether a landlord, who files an application under clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act should plead in such application that he was the owner of the accommodation and establish by evidence aliunde that he was such owner, has since been considered by us earlier and answered to the effect that the landlord making such application need not plead in his application that he was an owner of the accommodation and he need not establish or prove by adducing evidence aliunde, for succeeding in such application, the view taken by the High Court that the landlord's application under clause (b) of section 23-A of the Act should be rejected on the ground that the appellant has failed to prove that she was the owner of the accommodation which she sought to recover from the tenant, cannot be sustained. Besides, the respondent, who had acknowledged the ownership of the accommodation as that of the appellant and had regarded her as the landlord in his counter-notice, Ex. P-4, and plaint in the suit, Ex. P-5, was not even entitled to deny the title of the appellant to the accommodation. Hence, the judgment and order of the High Court calls to be interfered with and set aside." 16. The newly added provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, as contained in Chapter III-A have been thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported as (2002) 6 SCC 16 , Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai, wherein the Court has found that Chapter III-A provides for a summary procedure for hearing of the application, where the tenant has to obtain leave to defend by moving an appropriate application and the burden has been placed on the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord, unlike the ordinary procedure in a Civil Court, where the burden of proof lies on the landlord and while examining the other judgments on this point, it has been observed by the Court that one of the co-owner alone in his own lawful right can file an application for eviction of the tenant before the Rent Controlling Authority and either of the co-owner falling into the five specified categories of the landlord can maintain a suit/application. The relevant paragraphs 16, 17, 25 and 26 of this judgment are reproduced here-in-below : "16. The relevant paragraphs 16, 17, 25 and 26 of this judgment are reproduced here-in-below : "16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath, Kanta Goel vs. B. P. Pathak and Pal Singh vs. Sunder Singh that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and also satisfied the requirement of being "if he is the owner", the expression as employed by section 13(1)(f) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 17. 17. It follows that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the premises can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under section 23-A(b), as analysed hereinbefore, without joining other co-owners/ co-landlords as party to the proceedings if they do not object to the initiation of proceedings by such landlady, because she is the owner of the property and requires the tenanted accommodation for the purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major sons. The major sons though co-owners/co-landlords may not have been joined as party to the proceedings but it would not adversely affect the maintainability of the proceedings. It would also not make any difference if they are also joined as party to the proceedings. Their presence in the proceedings is suggestive of their concurrence with the widow landlady maintaining the proceedings in her own right. The presence of such co-landlords, as co-plaintiffs or co-applicants, as are not classified landlords as defined in section 23-J of the Act does not alter the nature of claim preferred by the widow landlady and therefore does not take the proceedings out of the scope of section 23-A(b). Conversely, the major sons or any of them suing alone without joining a widow co-landlord as party to the proceedings may institute a suit before a Civil Court under section 12 of the Act pleading that the non-residential premises were required bona fide by them or any of them for the purpose of continuing or starting their own or his own business as they would be owners thereof and the requirement will be theirs. It would not make any material difference if the widow co-landlord was joined as party to the proceedings either as plaintiff or as co-applicant because the case pleaded in the plaint would squarely fall within the ambit of clause (f) sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. 25. Reverting back to the issue before us, the cause of action is one requirement of a major son, who himself is a co-owner. It is capable of being construed in two ways, depending on from the point of view of which of the landlords we look at. 25. Reverting back to the issue before us, the cause of action is one requirement of a major son, who himself is a co-owner. It is capable of being construed in two ways, depending on from the point of view of which of the landlords we look at. From the point of view of the widow landlady and owner it is a case of the accommodation let for non-residential purpose required bona fide by the landlady for the purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major sons, within the meaning of section 23-A(b) of the Act. From the point of view of the major son himself, who is also himself an owner, it is a case of the accommodation let for non-residential purpose required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business as he is owner thereof, within the meaning of section 12(1)(f) of the Act. In the former case the cause of action is triable by way of an application before RCA. In the latter case the cause of action is triable in a suit instituted in the Civil Court. Any one of them may singly commence the proceedings without impleading the other or by impleading the other as a non-applicant or defendant in pro forma capacity in which case the choice of forum would present no difficulty. The former shall go to RCA. The latter shall go to the Civil Court. However, the law does not prevent the co-owner landlords from joining together to sue on the cause of action common to them all. And if they do so the conflict of jurisdiction arises. The choice of forum, in such a case, must of necessity be left open to the plaintiffs. Otherwise they will be left without remedy. However, the law does not prevent the co-owner landlords from joining together to sue on the cause of action common to them all. And if they do so the conflict of jurisdiction arises. The choice of forum, in such a case, must of necessity be left open to the plaintiffs. Otherwise they will be left without remedy. Keeping in view the three relevant principles (i) that every wrong must have a remedy and every right to relief must have a forum for enforcement, (ii) that the plaintiff is dominus litis, and (iii) that one co-owner/ landlord can file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and it is not necessary that all co-owners/ landlords must jointly sue for ejectment though they are not prevented from - rather entitled to -joining together and suing jointly if they wish to do so, we proceed to state our conclusions as under : (i) Where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord, or a co-landlord, belonging to any one of the five categories defined in section 23-J of the Act, as the sole applicant without objection by other co-landlords who have not joined as co-applicants and the nature of claim for eviction is covered by section 23-A(b) of the Act, the proceedings would lie only before the Rent Controlling Authority. (ii) Where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord or by such a co-landlord who does not belong to any of the categories defined by section 23-J and the other co-landlord/landlady falling in one of the categories defined in section 23-J is not joined as a co-plaintiff the claim shall have to be filed only by way of a suit instituted in a Civil Court. (iii) If the proceedings are initiated by such co-owner landlords, one or more of whom belong to section 23-J category while some others are those not falling within the definition of "landlord" under section 23-J and the requirement pleaded provides a cause of action collectively to all the landlords arrayed as plaintiffs or applicants, the choice of forum lies with the landlords. They may file an application before RCA under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a Civil Court under section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be competent and maintainable. 26. They may file an application before RCA under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a Civil Court under section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be competent and maintainable. 26. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the plea raised on behalf of the appellants that the three respondents, one widow and her two major sons, could not have initiated proceedings for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority. We have carefully perused the two applications for eviction filed by the respondents. The bona fide requirement pleaded is of the widow landlady, respondent 1, who requires the suit premises for Govinda, respondent 2 for starting his business and that of another son Hemant, respondent 3 for continuing the business which presently he is carrying on in rented premises. Respondents 2 and 3 being major sons of the widow, respondent 1, such requirement clearly falls also within the purview of section 23-A(b) of the Act. The proceedings initiated before RCA do not suffer from want of jurisdictional competence." 17. This judgment of the Supreme Court propounds that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the premises can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under section 23-A(b), without joining other co-owners/co-landlords as party to the proceedings, on being the owner of the property for commencing business of any of her major sons, even when her major sons, who are also the co-owners/co-landlords, have not been joined as party to the proceedings and it would not affect the locus of the landlady or the maintainability of the proceedings. The Supreme Court has also decided that the presence and/or absence of other co-owners would be of no use or rather it would be inconsequential for all the purposes, because it would not alter the nature of claim preferred by the widow landlady and would not take away the proceedings beyond of the scope of section 23-A(b) and simultaneously in an independent proceeding initiated by other co-owners before the Civil Court for securing eviction of a tenant, the presence and absence of the widow lady would be inconsequential and immaterial because the case pleaded in the plaint would be required to be seen in terms of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 18. 18. Another question based upon the undivided share of the co-owner of the property came for the scrutiny of the Supreme Court in a recent judgment reported as (2008) 5 SCC 449 , Ramanlal Bhailal Patel vs. State of Gujarat, wherein the Court has observed that even the co-owners of the undivided share can institute eviction proceedings. The relevant portion of paragraph 27 of this judgment is quoted here-in-below ; 27. When several persons acquire undivided shares (as contrasted from defined portions) in a property, either equal or unequal, they become co-owners of the property; or where an owner of a property transfers a share in the property to another, the transferee becomes a co-owner along with the original owner. To be termed as co-owners, the right of each owner should be co-ordinate with the other "owners". If the right of one is higher in degree than that of the other, there is no co-ownership. For example, a mortgagor and mortgagee are not co-owners. A lessor and lessee are not co-owners. Whether the shares are equal or not, each co-owner is entitled to be in possession of every part of the property, jointly with the other co-owners... 19. As regards the argument about the consent or option of the other co-owners for the institution of proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority by one co-owner, it would be useful to refer to the judgment cited by Shri Kamal Jain, learned counsel for the Petitioner, which is reported as (2006)2 SCC 724 , Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the consent of the other co-owners for instituting the proceedings for eviction of the tenant, would not be required and the bona fide requirement to evict the tenant could be established without even suggesting for the consent of co-owner about the institution of the eviction proceedings. The following paragraph of this judgment throws sufficient light about the consent of the co-owner in the following terms ; "11. A suit filed by a co-owner, thus, is maintainable in law. It is not necessary for the co-owner to show before initiating the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller that he had taken option or consent of the other co-owners. However, in the event a co-owner objects thereto, the same may be a relevant fact. A suit filed by a co-owner, thus, is maintainable in law. It is not necessary for the co-owner to show before initiating the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller that he had taken option or consent of the other co-owners. However, in the event a co-owner objects thereto, the same may be a relevant fact. In the instant case, nothing has been brought on record to show that the co-owners of the respondent had objected to eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent herein. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that before initiating the proceedings, the respondent was required to show that he had experience in running the business in Ayurvedic medicines, has to be stated to be rejected. There is no law which provides for such a precondition. It may be so where a licence is required for running a business, a statute may prescribe certain qualifications or pre-conditions without fulfilment whereof the landlord may not be able to start a business, but for running a wholesale business in Ayurvedic medicines, no qualification is prescribed. Experience in the business is not a pre-condition under any statute. Even no experience therefore may be necessary. If the respondent has proved his bona fide requirement to evict the appellant herein for his own purpose, this Court may not, unless an appropriate case is made out, disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority and affirmed by the High Court." 20. In a case where the proceedings were instituted as executors before a Court, without disclosing that the executors are co-owners also, the Supreme Court has found that if the status as co-owner transpires clearly from the admitted facts of the case, thereafter, the objection of tenant about non-pleadment of co-owners would loose its efficacy, therefore even when a party fails to describe himself as a co-owner, he/she would be entitled for maintaining a suit for eviction of the tenant. The relevant paragraphs 37 to 42 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, reported as (2009) 10 SCC 223 , FGP Ltd. vs. Seleh Hooseini Doctor is quoted here-in-below ; 37. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the suit which has been filed by the respondents they have not asserted that they are filing it as co-owners but they have claimed that they are filing it as executors/executrix. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the suit which has been filed by the respondents they have not asserted that they are filing it as co-owners but they have claimed that they are filing it as executors/executrix. So they cannot now meet the challenge of maintainability of the suit on the ground that it was filed by the respondents as co-owners. It is not possible to accept the aforesaid contention in the facts of this case. This Court is of the opinion that if the status of the respondents as co-owners of the property transpires clearly from the admitted facts of the case, they cannot be denuded of the said status at the instance of some objections by the tenants. Normally, a tenant's right to question the title of a landlord is very limited in view of the rule of law which is codified in section 116 of the Evidence Act. 38. Apart from that it has been held in some decisions of this Court that a co-owner of a property is an owner of the property, till the property is partitioned. 39. In Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath it has been held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner. In coming to the said finding, the learned Judges relied on the proposition laid down in Salmond on Jurisprudence (13th Edn.). The relevant principles in Salmond on Jurisprudence are set out here-in-below : "... It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person.... The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of the two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition, co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned" (emphasis supplied) 40. Relying on the aforesaid jurisprudential principles, this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha held as under: (SCC p. 190, para 27) "27. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place." 41. Since in the instant case, no partition has taken place, the plaintiffs' status as co-owners cannot be disputed by the tenant and it is nobody's case that there is a clash of interest between the respondent and the co-owners. 42. Therefore, the suit is maintainable. 21. Therefore from the perusal of the fact of the case and the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act as also in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court it is crystal clear that the widow-petitioner Smt. Pista Devi alone was competent to institute the proceedings for securing eviction of her tenant by maintaining her application under section 23-A of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority and non-impleadment of other co-owners in her application would not be a defect, on the basis of which her application could be dismissed due to non-joinder of the parties and as such the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri, has committed a serious error of law in dismissing the petitioner's application preferred under section 23-A of the Act, for securing eviction of the tenant, for the bona fide need of her major son, of establishing a business in the tenanted premises. 22. Consequently the Civil Revision is allowed and the order passed on date 17-7-2006 by the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri, in Case No. 05/2005 (Rent) Smt. Pista Devi vs. Brij Mohan Garg is set aside and the application preferred on behalf of the petitioner/applicant under section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is revived to its original number, for its decision on merits by the Rent Controlling Authority. Since the petitioner widow lady had been knocking the doors of several Courts, in the past six years, for securing eviction of her tenant from the tenanted premises, the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri, is directed to dispose of the entire proceedings expeditiously within a maximum period of six months, by passing a final order on the application, preferred under section 23-A of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Parties are directed to remain present before the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri on April 19, 2010 along with a copy of this judgment/order. 23. The Registry of the High Court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Rent Controlling Authority, Shivpuri for securing compliance of the aforesaid directions, within the prescribed time frame of six months. Revision allowed.